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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the role of internal structure of religious organizations 
in influencing these organizations’ interactions with incumbent governments and 
ultimately determining the political activities of religious groups.  This dissertation fits 
within a body of literature known as the political economy of religion.  I expand upon 
this literature by examining religious groups in terms of internal organization, focusing 
on Christian churches in Africa, with Kenya as my primary case country. 
The central argument of this dissertation is that churches  (national-level 
denominations) with certain organizational features – centralized leadership, authoritarian 
decision-making procedures, and lack of internal accountability mechanisms – are more 
likely to have friendlier interactions with governments and therefore tend to adopt more 
pro-government political stances compared to churches that lack these features.  This 
relationship operates through two mechanisms.  First, centralized churches possess 
negotiation advantages over decentralized churches. Second, centralized, authoritarian 
churches can more easily be co-opted by incumbent governments.  The dissertation also 
expand upon existing literature by offering a fuller and more nuanced understanding of 
the preferences of governments and churches vis-à-vis one another, proposing that 
churches seek to maximize number of church members, member faithfulness, and 
resources, while governments seek ideological support, citizen mobilization, and social 
service provision from churches.   
 iv 
These arguments are examined by historical comparative case studies of five of 
the largest Christian denominations in Kenya over the course of the country’s first three 
post-independence presidents.  Through qualitative historical analysis, combined with 
information gathered through fieldwork in Kenya, the dissertation demonstrates how the 
preferences of these churches and governments, mediated through the internal 
organizations of the churches, influenced church-state relations and ultimately 
determined the churches’ political stances.  The impact of internal organization is greater 
than factors such as ethnicity or theological conservatism/liberalism. 
The dissertation tests these arguments through a quantitative analysis of church 
political orientation using national-level data on Christian churches and countries across 
Africa from independence through 2010.  The results of the statistical analyses show 
significant effects of organizational features such as centralization, consistent with the 
arguments made concerning Kenya.  The dissertation then gives brief qualitative analysis 
of church-state relations for several of the African churches included in the quantitative 
dataset. 
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Chapter 1: Explaining Church Political Activity 
1 Introduction 
Understanding the various groups and organizations that mediate the relationships 
between individuals and states has been one of the major goals of political science.  In 
most modern states that offer at least a semblance of public choice, political parties play a 
key role in this process, yet parties are but one category of organizations that serve as 
intermediaries between the people and the state.1  Civil society, broadly defined, includes 
these various organizations that impact citizens’ political involvement and interactions 
with the government.2  Various special interest groups lobby the state on behalf of a 
subset of citizens in order to gain special considerations and privileges for themselves or 
others. Such organizations take a myriad of forms: trade associations, professionalized 
advocacy organizations, ethnic associations, mass social movements, even soccer clubs.3  
While the goals of these groups may vary – some seek economic or political concessions 
for their own members, others work to gain civil and political protection for 
disadvantaged or marginalized groups, while yet others seek to transform the political 
system or to change who occupies the top seats of political power—all of these groups 
and organizations play important roles in interacting with governments and states.  
                                                
1 Huntington refers to the political party as “the distinctive institution of modern politics.  
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press, 
2006:90 
 
2 Fowley and Edwards raise questions concerning the ability of civil society to serve as 
counterweights to authoritarian and democratic governments alike  Foley, Michael W., 
and Bob Edwards. "The Paradox of Civil Society." Journal of Democracy 7.3 (1996): 38-
52. 
 
3 For one example of the political roles that soccer clubs can play, see Shobe, Hunter. 
"Football and the Politics of Place: Football Club Barcelona and Catalonia, 1975–2005." 
Journal of Cultural Geography 25.1 (2008): 87-105. 
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Because of the power that such groups wield, governments often seek to influence, coopt 
or control these groups.4  The members and leaders of these groups, meanwhile, face 
dilemmas between maintaining independence while being able to achieve the groups’ 
goals in interactions (harmonious or conflictual) with governments, or accepting some 
level of cooptation in exchange for the benefits of access to the state.5 
Religious organizations, such as Christian churches, have long been among the 
most important forms of civil society throughout the world, playing a variety of functions 
attributed to the secular organizations described above.  Churches lobby for special 
privileges for their own members and leaders and also advocate for various social 
policies that affect all citizens (or even non-citizen residents) of a particular country alike.  
Churches engage in civic education and mass mobilization around political issues, 
including elections and other forms of government or regime change. As Huntington 
notes, churches were instrumental in opposing authoritarian governments in countries as 
varied as South Korea, the Philippines, and El Salvador; churches in African nations such 
as Malawi and Zimbabwe have also stood up to their governments when other forms of 
dissent were repressed.6 On the other hand, many churches have developed close, 
                                                
4 Harbeson briefly reviews the concept of civil society cooptation in the works of seminal 
political theorists such as Montesquieu, Gramsci, Marx and Tocqueville. Harbeson, John. 
"Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa." Civil Society and the State in Africa. 
Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers (1994): 19. 
 
5 This dilemma is exacerbated in political circumstances in which independent civil 
society organizations face repression. See Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel. "Civil Society in 
Africa." Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996): 126. 
 
6 Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.  
University of Oklahoma Press. 1993. p73-81; Newell, Jonathan. "‘A Moment of Truth’? 
The Church and Political Change in Malawi, 1992." The Journal of Modern African 
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mutually supportive relationships with a number of governments; the Russian Orthodox 
Church under Vladimir Putin and Ethiopian Orthodox Church under Meles Zenawi 
provide recent examples of churches allying closely with secular rulers.7 Various 
churches supported the MRND government of Rwanda even during the 1994 genocide. 
In still other examples, churches served as peacemakers between opposing factions in a 
number of countries, including Angola, the Dominican Republic and Mozambique.8 
What determines the political orientation of churches? That is, why do some 
national-level Christian denominations support incumbent governments, while other 
churches oppose sitting governments, and yet others take neutral positions, for example 
by mediating between governments and opposition forces or by choosing to abstain from 
political involvement altogether?  My dissertation addresses this question by examining 
the political stances of several Christian denominations over time in Kenya, a country in 
which the major churches have engaged in politics throughout the country’s history, 
varying in their political stances across denomination and over time.  Through original 
interviews and observations, as well as examination of numerous primary and secondary 
                                                                                                                                            
Studies 33.02 (1995): 243-262; Dorman, Sara Rich. "‘Rocking the Boat?’: Church-NGOs 
and Democratization in Zimbabwe." African Affairs 101.402 (2002): 75-92. 
 
7 Lomagin, Nikita. "Interest Groups in Russian Foreign Policy: The Invisible Hand of the 
Russian Orthodox Church." International Politics 49.4 (2012): 506-508; Haustein, Jörg, 
and Terje Østebø. "EPRDF's Revolutionary Democracy and Religious Plurality: Islam 
and Christianity in post-Derg Ethiopia." Journal of Eastern African Studies 5.4 (2011): 
760-761. 
 
8 Betances, Emelio. "Catholic Church and Political Mediation in the Dominican 
Republic: A Comparative Perspective, The." J. Church & St. 46 (2004): 341; Haynes, 
Jeffrey. "Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-building: The Role of Religion in 
Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia." Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47.1 
(2009): 52-75; Toft, Monica Duffy, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah. God's 
Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics. WW Norton & Company, 2011: 189-
191. 
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documents covering the periods of the first three Presidents since independence, this 
dissertation uses the cases of the Kenyan churches to refine existing understandings of 
the circumstances under which churches will support or oppose existing governments.9  
My dissertation explains the variation in church support for government by examining 
not only the preferences of the relevant actors – churches as organizations, church leaders 
as individuals, and governments, particularly heads of state – but also by examining 
differences in the internal organizations of churches that influence how preferences are 
translated into actions. The arguments presented here have implications for understanding 
not only the political orientations of African churches, but for understanding how civil 
society organizations more generally engage in politics.  Churches are generally viewed, 
accurately, as organizations that are incomparably driven by beliefs and ideological 
considerations.  Nevertheless, churches and other religious groups are still social 
organizations, and if “secular” structural features significantly influence their political 
stances, gaining a greater understanding of how structure impacts political activities will 
have implications for studying nonreligious organizations as well. 
My central contention is that internal decision-making and leadership structures of 
churches play a much larger role in determining church political stances than has been 
previously identified in the literature on church political activities. Specifically, churches 
with more concentrated and authoritarian leadership are more likely to support incumbent 
governments, all else being equal.  This relationship between internal structure and 
                                                
 
9 The heads of state of Kenya since independence have been: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-
1978), Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002), and Mwai Kibaki (2002-2013), and Uhuru Kenyatta 
(2013-present). 
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political orientation operates through two mechanisms.  First, centralized leadership 
allows churches to more easily negotiate with governments.  A single individual can 
channel preferences into a coherent set of political stances and demands and present these 
to governments.  Governments can more easily negotiate with a single leader, directly or 
through that leaders’ designated representatives, than they can with multiple church 
leaders who all claim to speak for their organizations. Second, the existence of a single 
national leader allows governments to better target that leader with carrots and sticks in 
order to gain compliance.  These effects of leadership centralization – negotiating 
advantage and cooptability – are enhanced if churches also feature authoritarian decision-
making structures and lack significant checks and balances or accountability measures for 
their leaders.  A single leader who has ultimate decision-making authority within his 
church can make credible commitments during negotiations with government officials, 
without either side having to worry that the agreements made will be vetoed by others 
within the church.  Furthermore, a church leader who faces little threat of censure from 
within his organization can accept government benefits or yield to government pressure 
with less fear of negative consequences when compared to a church leader who can be 
reprimanded or removed if he strikes a personally beneficial deal that does not meet with 
his church’s approval.  
Political science has lagged behind other disciplines such as sociology in 
recognizing religious actors as rational actors.  Churches, and specifically church leaders, 
choose actions to maximize their own utilities based on a set of clear preferences.  As is 
the case for other rational actors, it is important to understand the preferences of churches 
as organizations, and church leaders as individuals, yet political science literature has not 
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yet fully fleshed out these preferences. In addition, governments have specific 
preferences vis-à-vis religious organizations, and these preferences form the basis for 
interactions between the two sets of actors, even if the links between actors’ preferences 
and political outcomes are mediated by the internal structures of religious organizations 
in the ways summarized above.  The second main goal of this dissertation is to properly 
identify the preferences of churches and governments in order to better understand 
relations between these two actors.  Consistent with other works, I argue that churches 
are mainly concerned with maximizing members and resources, but unlike previous 
works, I argue that membership maximization has separate and sometimes conflicting 
components of member quantity and member faithfulness. These organizational goals 
factor into the preferences of church leaders, but leaders also have private incentives 
related to their own material wellbeing, social standing and private morality.  
Governments, meanwhile, seek churches to provide ideological justifications for 
citizens to comply with political rulers, which decreases the cost to government of ruling.  
In addition to just desiring compliance from citizens, governments often need to actively 
mobilize citizens for purposes including political campaigns and voting. Finally, churches 
often operate as service providers in fields such as healthcare and education, and both 
developed and developing country governments find it useful to cooperate with churches 
in providing such services. Government preferences for these three church “products” – 
ideology, mobilization, and service provision – will vary based on the capabilities of the 
government and the availability of substitute goods from other sources.  Even when 
church structure inclines churches to offer support to government, such support may not 
materialize if the government does not express demand for the church’s “products” and is 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
therefore unwilling to offer acceptable compensation to the church or its leader(s). 
Other political and social factors remain relevant for influencing the political 
positions taken by churches, such as government performance on political and economic 
issues, and – as is often the case in African politics – ethnic and regional considerations. 
My dissertation maintains that these secular concerns influence churches as well, just as 
they affect nonreligious organizations.  However, contrary to analyses that give primacy 
to ethnic considerations, I argue that the presence of permissive leadership structures and 
decision-making rules within churches has the power to facilitate church-state 
cooperation even in instances when the ethnic compositions of churches and governments 
would predict conflict.  
 The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review, 
highlighting social science analyses of religious organizations, particularly Christian 
churches, as part of a small but vibrant body of literature that studies the “political 
economy of religion.”  Section 3 draws upon the literature and research in Kenya to 
identify the relevant actors involved in influencing church-state interactions and church 
political orientations and details the variables that factor into these actors’ preferences.  
Section 4 lays out the main arguments of the dissertation, identifying the roles of internal 
church organization in influencing how actors’ preferences translate into interactions 
between churches and governments and subsequently into church political orientations.  
Section 5 concludes by identifying the churches that will be used as case studies in this 
work and summarizing the subsequent chapters of the dissertation. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Political Economy of Religion and Church Political Activity 
Despite the importance of Christian churches and other religious organizations in 
politics, social science has often viewed religion as operating outside of conventional 
ideas of rational behavior, leaving religious organizations understudied by political 
scientists in particular.  Nevertheless, some scholars have responded to the assumption of 
religious irrationality by using rational choice logic to produce careful and important 
analyses of the political and economic activities of religious actors.  
The political economy of religion literature can trace its origins at least as far back 
as Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, in which Smith discusses the politics of religious 
regulation, noting the greater efforts and competitive edge of clergy representing new 
sects over those employed by established religions.10  Though not nearly as well cited as 
Smith’s secular economic analyses, the treatment of religion in Wealth of Nations 
contains several lines of thought that would be revived in late 20th Century works.  Smith 
described, among other aspects of religion: a narrative of how certain sects become 
“established churches”, officially endorsed and sanctioned by the state; the strategies of 
established churches to seek from the state both regulations that restrict competing 
religious organizations and subsidies for the established church; and conditions under 
                                                
10 Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited 
by S. M. Soares. MetaLibri Digital Library, May 29, 2007.  
http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf.  Accessed September 23, 
2014.   For a discussion of Adam Smith’s treatment of religion in Book V, see Ekelund, 
Robert B., Robert F. Hébert, and Robert D. Tollison. "Adam Smith on Religion and 
Market Structure." History of Political Economy 37.4 (2005): 647-660. 
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which established churches would switch their allegiance from supporting incumbent 
governments to supporting political rivals of the sitting rulers.11 
In more recent literature, economists Robert B. Ekelund, Jr, Robert F. Hébert, and 
Robert D. Tollison found analytical traction in their study of the medieval Catholic 
Church by viewing it as a monopoly firm that “in return for a variety of payments, not all 
monetary,….dispensed such goods as ritual, solace, appeasement, status, and ultimately, 
salvation.”12  Ekelund et al. use economic analysis to reinterpret a number of practices of 
the medieval Church, including prohibitions on usury, in terms of profit maximization.  
Stathis Kalyvas focuses on the political side of the political economy of religion, 
examining the preferences and actions of the Catholic Church in eighteenth century 
Europe that led to the creation of Christian Democrat parties.13  At this point in history, 
the Catholic Church in several countries viewed itself as under attack by the anticlerical 
policies of new Liberal governments.  Unable to negotiate with the Liberals and faced 
with a loss of privileges, including control over education, the Church chose to launch a 
social and political strategy whereby Catholics were mobilized through mass lay 
organizations in order to oppose Liberal policies and support politicians from 
Conservative parties who pledged to restore Church privileges. It was these mass 
organizations that, facing unexpected levels of electoral success for the candidates these 
                                                
11 Smith 2007: 608-615. 
 
12 Ekelund, Robert B., Robert F. Hébert, and Robert D. Tollison. "An Economic Model of 
the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking." Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 5.2 (1989): 307-331. 
 
13 Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Cornell University 
Press, 1996. 
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organizations supported, quickly evolved into political parties despite the wishes of the 
Church to demobilize them instead. 
 Carolyn Warner picks up the analysis of the Catholic Church’s relationships with 
Christian Democracy by examining the Church’s choice of political partners in mid-
twentieth century Europe.14  She emphasizes an analogy found in Kalyvas that views the 
Church as akin to a special interest group seeking rents and preferential legislation from 
governments. The Church, Warner argues, chooses to support a political party from 
among several options based on the Church’s evaluation of which party is most likely to 
deliver desired policy concessions to the Church. 
 Both Kalyvas and Warner focus on the Catholic Church choosing a particular 
political ally from among competing politicians in multi-party European democracies.  
Gill takes up the question of Catholic Church political support in the context of the 
authoritarian political systems of Latin America in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.15 As the national Catholic Churches tended to support authoritarian governments 
in Latin America, Gill seeks to explain why some but not all national Catholic hierarchies 
ended such support in the 1970s and 1980s.  Gill finds his answer in the rise of 
Pentecostal Christian churches in some countries in Latin American countries. In the 
countries where Pentecostal churches took roots and expanded in membership, primarily 
by drawing away poorer Catholics, the Catholic Church responded to this challenge to its 
                                                
 
14 Warner, Carolyn M. Confessions of an Interest Group: the Catholic Church and 
Political Parties in Europe. Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
15 Gill, Anthony. Rendering unto Caesar: the Catholic Church and the State in Latin 
America. University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
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social and religious hegemony by adopting pro-poor political stances, which included 
speaking out against the conservative dictatorships and their anti-poor policies. National 
Catholic churches existing in countries without significant Pentecostal movements did 
not face competitive pressures and remained supportive of authoritarian governments. 
Kalyvas, Gill and Warner all view the Church as a unitary actor, and equate the 
actions of the Church’s leadership, namely its archbishops and bishops, as equivalent to 
the actions of the church itself. Kalyvas views the entire transnational Catholic Church as 
a single actor, with the leadership in the Vatican as decisive.16  Gill and Warner both 
modify this stipulation by viewing the national-level Catholic Church of each country as 
an independent, unitary actor “with its own history, structure, leadership, and political 
interests” which often differ from the interests of the Vatican.17 
 Kalyvas, Gill and Warner also attempt to identify the preferences of the Church. 
Kalyvas is somewhat vague concerning the Church’s preferences, stating that it sought to  
“maximiz[e] power, generally conceived as its ability to shape or influence society”, 
though the author notes that the most pressing policy issue for the church was 
maintaining its privileged position in providing education.18  Warner offers a refined list 
of preferences of religious organizations, arguing that they “seek to maximize their 
market share, measured by influence, number of believers, and amount of revenue.”19   
Gill offers the clearest and most precise statement of church preferences, stating that 
                                                
16 Kalyvas 1996: 31-33. 
 
17 Warner 2000: 8; see also Gill 1998: 9. 
 
18 Kalyvas, 1996: 26 
 
19 Warner 2000: 28. 
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religious leaders seek to maximize parishioners (or at least minimize parishioner loss) 
and maximize resources, with resource maximization largely serving the instrumental 
purpose of enabling the church to operate and convert more members.20  Given the 
Church’s preferences for maximizing members and resources, Gill and Warner both 
agree with Adam Smith that the two most pressing demands that churches make of 
governments are to restrict competing religious or ideological groups from entering or 
efficiently operating in the religious marketplace, and to provide subsidies to the favored 
church. 
2.2 Church Political Activity in Africa 
Despite advances made in the literature, the theoretical understanding of religious 
actors remains incomplete, partially because the theory has largely been built on a limited 
set of empirical cases.  Much of the literature in the political economy of religion school 
focuses on the Catholic Church, which has unique organizational and historical features 
that set it apart from other religious organizations.21  In addition, most of the theory-
driven analysis has focused on high and middle-income countries, particularly the US, 
Europe and Latin America.  In contrast, much of the work on church-state relations in the 
developing world, and Africa in particular, tends to be historical accounts and case 
studies, which are often rich in detail but theoretically light.  
                                                
20 Gill 1998: 55-56. Given that churches need monetary resources and effort from church 
clergy and/or members to recruit new members, church growth can be modeled as a 
function of monetary and human capital.  See for example Iannaccone, Laurence R., 
Daniel VA Olson, and Rodney Stark. "Religions Resources and Church Growth." Social 
Forces 74.2 (1995): 705-731. 
 
21 Bellin, Eva. "Faith in Politics. New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics." 
World Politics 60.02 (2008): 326. 
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The lack of theory-driven research on the political economy of religion in Africa 
is especially jarring given the historical and current prominence of religious 
organizations, which are among the largest and most impactful civil society organizations 
in many African nations.22 Catholic and mainline Protestant Christian denominations 
persist as prominent mass organizations and social actors in Africa, as do Islamic groups.  
Newer Christian churches of the Pentecostal and evangelical traditions have exploded in 
membership and notoriety across Africa, often drawing membership from older religious 
organizations. Collectively, religious organizations still provide a significant amount of 
education and health services across the continent.23  Religion is thus a very powerful 
social force in Africa, begging for greater theoretical analysis.  For non-Africanist 
scholars, Africa provides an unexplored set of cases for testing and revising existing 
theories of church-state relations and political economy of religion.  The unique ethnic, 
political, social and economic conditions of many African nations may yield new theories 
regarding how churches (and other organizations) operate.  This dissertation helps to fill 
in the gap in the literature through a theory-based historical analysis of Christian 
churches’ political activities in Kenya. 
Existing analyses of church political activity in Africa focus on a different set of 
explanatory variables than those that have been prominent in European-focused work. 
                                                
22 Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill, and Donald Rothchild. 1992. 
Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Cited in: 
Riedl, Rachel Beatty. "Transforming Politics, Dynamic Religion: Religion's Political 
Impact in Contemporary Africa." African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review 2.2 (2012): 
29-50. 
 
23 Bunting, Madeleine. "Where faith is a healer." The Guardian (2005); Obadare, 
Ebenezer Babatunde. 2007. “Religious NGOs, Civil Society and the Struggle for a Public 
Sphere in Nigeria” African Identities 5.1: 135–53. 
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Whereas the political economy of religion literature largely ignores the content of 
religious beliefs (except insofar as they influence broad church preferences such as 
membership maximization), scholars have viewed church political activity in Africa as 
determined, in part, by theological beliefs. Such attention to theological motivations 
echoes analyses such as that by Huntington, who explained the Catholic Church’s ”third 
wave” anti-authoritarian/pro-democracy shift as a response to the new theological 
guidelines issued by the Second Vatican Council, as well as the influence of liberation 
theology. The political economy of religion literature, while largely agnostic about the 
sincerity with which religious leaders hold and practice the tenets of their faith, tends to 
downplay the importance of ideational motivations, viewing Christian theology as 
containing justification for a wide variety of political behaviors and arguing that 
ideological shocks such as Vatican II do not adequately explain variation in churches’ 
subsequent political behavior.24    
Scholars of African church political activity often take a less skeptical view of the 
role of theology.  The critical roles played by Christian (often Catholic or mainline 
Protestant) denominations in the face of authoritarian regimes have been explained by a 
scripture-based commitment to democracy, justice and human rights.  Theology has also 
been used to explain the quiescence and support offered by other denominations, 
including certain evangelical churches and African Initiated Churches (AICs) for 
governments.  Among studies that venture to contrast the pro-government and anti-
government approaches of different denominations in the same political setting, those 
churches that remained uncritically supportive of governments are often labeled as 
                                                
24 See for example Gill 1998: 45-46. 
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conservative in their theology, with more “liberal” churches daring to serve a more 
critical, “prophetic” role.  
In addition to being theologically driven, African church leaders are also 
susceptible to the social and economic pressures that influence secular actors. Much of 
the critical analysis of church political activity and church-state relations in Africa is 
therefore based on taking existing frames for analyzing African politics and applying 
them to churches as social and political actors.  Two key, related concepts relevant to 
analyzing church politics are clientelism and ethnic-based politics. Bratton and Van de 
Walle describe the system of clientelism at play in many African nations as 
“neopatrimonialism”, which the authors contend “is the core feature of politics in 
Africa.”25  
The other much-discussed concept in African politics is ethnic favoritism and the 
role of ethnic ties.  Many of the patronage networks of the type discussed above are 
organized along ethnic, regional or family lines.  More generally, ethnic solidarity and 
intra-ethnic cooperation becomes a useful organizing principle for elites and non-elites 
competing with one another for scare economic resources and political power.26  Elites 
                                                
25 Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: 
Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 1997: 62; 
emphasis in original.  The authors describe neopatrimonialism as a system in which “the 
chief executive and his inner circle undermine the effectiveness of the nominally modern 
state administration by using it for systematic patronage and clientelist practices in order 
to maintain political order.  Moreover, parallel and unofficial structures may hold more 
power and authority than the formal administration”. 
 
26 Bates, Robert H. "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in 
Contemporary Africa." in Rothchild, Donald S., and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds. State 
versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. Westview Press, 1983: 171; Eifert, 
Benn, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner. "Political Competition and Ethnic 
Identification in Africa." American Journal of Political Science 54.2 (2010): 494-510. 
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have incentives to engage in ethnic-based political and economic competition; leaders 
derive benefits from the support of their ethnic groups, and these ethnic communities 
threaten various sanctions, including loss of prestige and social status, for elites who do 
not deliver goods to their co-ethnics.27  Longman sees church leaders as active 
participants in networks of ethnic ties and political entanglements.28  Despite Ross 
viewing churches as challenging existing systems of patronage at work in African 
politics, Longman notes that church leaders often sit atop such patronage networks 
themselves.29 Bergman argues that there have been active efforts by governments to 
incorporate Christian churches into ethnically-based, state-centric patronage networks. 30 
In applying these concepts to religious organizations, scholars of African politics 
have also challenge some of the assumptions that have been made in the western-based 
literature on church political activity, such as the conception of the church as a unitary 
actor.  Haynes, for example, does not deny the institutional motivations that church 
leaders have for promoting their organizations’ success, but also views the leaders of 
denominations as self-interested individuals whose preferences may diverge from those 
                                                                                                                                            
 
27 Bates 1983: 162. 
 
28 Longman, Timothy. "Church politics and the genocide in Rwanda." Journal of Religion 
in Africa (2001): 163-186. 
 
29 Ross, Kenneth R. "‘Worrisome Trends’: The voice of the churches in Malawi's third 
term debate." African Affairs 103.410 (2004): 91-107; Longman 2001: 174. 
 
30 Berman, Bruce J. "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil 
Nationalism." African Affairs 97.388 (1998): 334. 
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of church members.31 For Haynes (2004), these church leaders form part of a 
“hegemonic” network of ruling elites connected by ethnicity, education, and 
socioeconomic status.32   For Haynes, religious and secular elites alike have vested 
interests in maintaining the status quo.   In addition to sharing the general interests of the 
secular ruling class, religious leaders often enjoy specific economic and political ties to 
incumbent governments. Church leaders will therefore only offer protest against sitting 
governments in rare circumstances, such as government actions interfering with “the 
ability of [religious leaders] to practise and propound their religion,” or when popular 
opinion has turned strongly against the government.33 
2.3 Churches and Politics in Kenya 
Kenya is an especially useful country for studying the politics of churches.  The 
country has long been characterized by Christian pluralism, with various denominations 
existing within the country without any maintaining a majority share of the population.  
The largest denominations include the Catholic and Anglican churches; mainline 
Protestants such as Methodists and Baptists; strict sects such as Seventh-Day Adventists; 
Pentecostal churches such as Assemblies of God; and various African Initiated Churches.  
Many of these denominations have existed in Kenya since the colonial era, and have 
played a variety of roles in colonial and independence-era politics.    
                                                
31 Haynes, Jeff. "Religion and democratization in Africa." Democratization 11.4 (2004): 
66-89. 
 
32 Haynes 2004: 73.  Haynes draws upon Antonio Gramsci for his concept of hegemony, 
which Haynes conceptualizes in the African context as including ideological 
justifications for perpetuation of the status quo, appealing to concepts such as “national 
unity” (Haynes 2004: 77)  
 
33 Haynes 2004: 73-74. 
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Much has been written about the role of the church in Kenyan politics.  Several 
scholars have noted the close relationships that existed between the colonial Kenyan 
government and the two largest British mission churches, the Anglican and Presbyterian 
churches, as well as the activities of oppositional churches such as the Africa Independent 
Pentecostal Church of Africa, which offered support to the Mau Mau rebels who opposed 
colonial rule.34  The churches have continued to be involved in politics in independent 
Kenya, with scholars taking note of their political activities.  Several authors, such as 
Chepkwony, have noted the relatively peaceful relations between the churches and the 
government of Jomo Kenyatta.  More recently, the church has had a mixed role in politics 
during the Kibaki presidency, playing only a minor role in addressing the violence that 
followed the 2007 election, but carrying out a major political campaign opposing 
constitutional reform in 2010 (as detailed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation).  
Most of the scholarship on church-state relations in Kenya focuses on the 
presidency of Kenya’s second head of state, Daniel arap Moi.  Some works simply cite 
the Christian churches as playing a large role in opposing Moi’s autocratic rule and 
forcing democratization, comparing the role played by the Kenyan churches to similar 
pro-democracy church movements that operated in the 1980s and 1990s in countries such 
as Benin and Malawi.35   Other works take a more nuanced approach, acknowledging that 
there was disagreement between churches and between individual church leaders, with 
                                                
34 See, for example: Ngunyi, Mutahi G. "Religious Institutions and Political 
Liberalisation in Kenya." In Gibbon, Peter, ed. Markets, Civil Society and Democracy in 
Kenya. Nordic Africa Institute, 1995: 130-131, 150. 
 
35 Widner, Jennifer A. "Political reform in Anglophone and Francophone African 
countries." Economic and political liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa (1994): 66. 
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some denominations and clergy criticizing the government while others strongly 
supported Moi.   
Examining variation in the roles of the churches in Kenyan politics, Ngunyi 
provides one of the best comparative analyses of African church political activities.  
Comparing various Christian denominations in Kenya during the Kenyatta presidency 
and particularly the first portion of the Moi era, Ngunyi divides religious organizations 
into three categories based on their political stances: a) “activist” churches that offered 
criticism of the Moi government; b) “loyalist” churches that supported the government 
and criticized other denominations for mixing religion and politics; and c) “Africanist” 
churches that largely remained neutral and apolitical.36  In keeping with other analyses of 
church political activities in Africa, Ngunyi attributes much of the variation in church 
political stances to ethnic and patronage ties; the “activist” churches are identified as 
those with leaders and members of ethnic groups, namely the Kikuyu and Luo, who were 
incorporated into elite political circles and patronage networks by President Kenyatta, a 
Kikuyu, but who were subsequently excluded from political power and patronage by 
Moi, a member of the less prominent Kalenjin ethnic group. Ngunyi also identifies a list 
of other variables he argues made certain churches more likely to adopt oppositional 
roles:  
The more an institution’s internal decision-making process followed democratic 
procedures, the greater its involvement in local level development, the greater its 
autonomy from its parent organization, and the more middle-class its leadership 
                                                
36 Ngunyi (1995) labels as “activist” the Catholic, Anglican, and Presbyterian Churches; 
the “loyalist” churches he looks at are the Africa Inland Church (AIC),  the Reformed 
Church of East Africa (RCEA), the Kenya Assemblies of God and the African Gospel 
Church; the Legio Maria church is cited as an example of an “Africanist” church the 
Legio Maria church. 
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and its flock, the higher was its likelihood to take up issues that were unpopular 
with the state.37  
 
Ngunyi finds mixed results for these four additional factors. The first factor, 
organizational structure, based on Ngunyi’s assessment of organizational democracy, 
correlates fairly well with the activist/loyalist divide, Similarly, Ngunyi finds that the 
leaders and the members of the “activist” churches tend to have higher social status, as 
measured by educational attainment, than the loyalist churches, confirming his hypothesis 
of middle-class based activism.  Ngunyi finds mixed results for the other two variables. 
The relationship between political activism and involvement in development work is less 
clear; while the “activist” churches tend to engage in significant levels of development 
work, which Ngunyi argues reflects a greater sense of concern for the well-being of the 
citizenry and deeper connection to the populace and its preferences, some of the 
“loyalist” churches also had significant development projects. The author explains 
development work among churches in the loyalist group as a result of patronage from the 
state, though this explanation muddles the argument of whether development work 
should be correlated with less or greater dependence on the state.  Ngunyi likewise finds 
mixed results for the final variable, autonomy from parent organizations. While he argues 
that the “activist” churches were all autonomous organizations,38 he concedes that a “lack 
of autonomy was only a really constraining factor in some of the loyalist institutions.”39 
                                                
37 Ngunyi 1995: 152. 
 
38 Ngunyi (1995) argues, as do Gill and others, that the national Catholic Churches are 
functionally autonomous from the Vatican.  My treatment of the Kenyan Catholic Church 
similarly adopts this position. 
 
39 Ngunyi 1995: 173. 
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While thoughtful in its hypotheses and rich in empirical research, Ngunyi’s analysis 
still falls short of adequately explaining the different stances taken by the Kenyan 
churches.  It does not explain differences in the timing and intensity of the “activist” 
churches’ responses during the Moi era.  Nor do ethnic considerations alone explain the 
actions taken by the churches, despite the prominence given in other works to ethnic 
factors as explaining Kenyan church political stances in particular and politics in Kenya 
and Africa more generally. Rather, Ngunyi’s identification of the “internal decision-
making process” of a church as a determinant of the church’s political stance actually 
presents an important finding that calls for greater analysis. 
2.4 Internal Structure of Organizations and Political Activities 
A variety of literatures have recognized the link between the internal structures of 
civil society organizations and these organizations’ relationships with governments.  This 
has most notably been acknowledged in the literature on corporatism, which cites one of 
the defining features of corporatism as the consolidation of groups such as labor unions 
into centralized organizations marked by hierarchical control.40 Though later examples 
have demonstrated that corporatism may be able to exist with a variety of organizational 
structures for unions, the general consensus in the literature has been that corporatism 
required that labor be organized into “monopolistic, centralized, and internally 
nondemocratic groups.”41 
                                                
40 Schmitter, Philippe C. "Still the century of corporatism?." The Review of Politics 36.01 
(1974): 85-131. 
 
41 Baccaro, Lucio. "The Construction of “Democratic” Corporatism in Italy." Politics & 
Society 30.2 (2002): 328. See also: Baccaro, Lucio. "What is Alive and What is Dead in 
the Theory of Corporatism." British Journal of Industrial Relations 41.4 (2003): 683-706. 
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Schmitter differentiates between two varieties of corporatist arrangements: an 
interest group driven “societal corporatism” and a state driven “state corporatism.” In 
both forms for corporatism, leaders of corporatist groups are intended to work with state 
leaders in the formulation or implementation of policies.   Societal corporatism is meant 
to give economic sectors, such as labor, greater bargaining power by allowing them to 
speak with a unified voice. In state corporatism, the structures promoted by states over 
interest groups are meant, inter alia, to exert “explicit state control over the leadership, 
demand-making and internal governance of these associations.”42  State corporatism is 
thus a form of social control through hierarchical ordering and government control of 
organizations such as labor unions.43 These hierarchical unions often endure the fall of 
the authoritarian states that created them and remain as a tool used by states for social 
control in mixed or “hybrid” regimes.44 The two forms of corporatism correlate to the 
two mechanisms identified in this dissertation as relating church leadership structure to 
church political orientations. Just as unified economic groups can better negotiate with 
governments in societal corporatist arrangements, churches with unified – that is to say, 
singular – leadership can better negotiate with governments in order to reach mutually 
advantageous arrangements.  Just as governments practicing state corporatism seek to 
                                                
42Collier, David, and Ruth Collier. "Who Does What, to Whom, and How: Toward a 
Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism." in Malloy, James, ed. 
Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America. University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1976: 493; emphasis in original. 
 
43 Chapman, Debra D. The Struggle for Mexico: State Corporatism and Popular 
Opposition. McFarland, 2012. p27,172. 
 
44 Robertson, Graeme B. "Strikes and labor organization in hybrid regimes." American 
Political Science Review 101.4 (2007): 781. 
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control economic actors by hierarchically structuring organizations and coopting leaders, 
governments seek to influence or control churches through coopting leaders, a process 
that is easier when it can be accomplished through the capture of a single individual. 
 Internal organization is important in state interactions with groups in society 
outside of organized labor and business. David Downes demonstrates an extension of the 
corporatist model to environmental organizations in Australia, which has “necessitated 
the development of more hierarchical structures within the environmental organizations” 
to facilitate these groups’ representatives “negotiat[ing] on behalf of their 
organizations.”45  Examining social protest movements operating under autocratic states, 
Guillermo Trejo “suggest[s] that targeted forms of repression or co-optation are more 
likely to work when social movements are structured as centralized networks dominated 
by a few powerful leaders rather than as decentralized and horizontal structures.”46 Siegel 
demonstrates how such organizations are vulnerable to targeted repression of the groups’ 
leaders by authorities.47 
 Religious organizations have been no strangers to corporatist arrangements with 
governments.  While the corporatist literature has primarily focused on the incorporation 
of secular organizations, corporatism has its historical roots in Catholic thought.48  As a 
                                                
45 Downes, David. "Neo-Corporatism and Environmental Policy." Australian Journal of 
Political Science 31.2 (1996): 187. 
 
46 Trejo, Guillermo. Popular Movements in Autocracies: Religion, Repression, and 
Indigenous Collective Action in Mexico. Cambridge University Press, 2012: 112. 
 
47 Siegel, David A. "When Does Repression Work? Collective Action in Social 
Networks." Journal of Politics 73.1 (2011): 232-47. 
 
48 Modern corporatist thinking was articulated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries by Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI, respectively, as a response to socialism, as well 
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centralized, hierarchically ordered institution, the Catholic Church had been one of the 
main historical “corporations” in Europe, and similarly served a major role in corporatist 
arrangements in twentieth century Latin America.49 The hierarchical structure of the 
Catholic Church has generally been compatible with corporatist arrangements, though 
cross-country variations in the internal organization of national-level Catholic hierarchies 
have influenced church-state relations.50 Protestant and other non-Catholic Christian 
churches have a greater range of organizational variation, which Bellin suggests may be 
related to different preferences and thus different courses of action than those of the 
hierarchical, rigidly organized Catholic Church.51 Non-Christian religious organizations 
have further organizational variation still. In a discussion of the church taxes collected by 
the German government on behalf of the country’s largest religious groups, Monsma and 
Soper note that Muslims, despite being the third-largest religious group in Germany, are 
not included in the system.52  Explaining this exclusion, the authors attribute the 
                                                                                                                                            
as liberalism and the laissez-faire capitalism associated with the latter. Kickert, Walter 
JM. "Beneath Consensual Corporatism: Traditions of Governance in the Netherlands." 
Public Administration 81.1 (2003): 119-140.  See also Williamson, Peter J. Varieties of 
corporatism: a conceptual discussion. Cambridge University Press, 1985:4. 
 
49 Wiarda, Howard J. Democracy and its discontents: development, interdependence, and 
US policy in Latin America. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1995: 211. 
 
50 For example, Warner (2000) argues that the relatively decentralized nature of the 
Catholic Church in France, which lacked a single leader or spokesperson comparable to 
the Pope for the Italian Church, kept the French Catholic Church from engaging in 
politics in a unified or coherent manner.  Warner argues that this difference in internal 
organization helps explain the political ambivalence of the French Church when 
compared to the Catholic hierarchies of other countries such as Italy. 
 
51 Bellin 2008: 326-327. 
 
52 Monsma, Stephen V., and J. Christopher Soper. The Challenge of Pluralism: Church 
and State in Five Democracies. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008. 
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exclusion of German Muslims to the lack of bargaining power brought about by the 
decentralized organization of German Muslims. 
The first and no doubt most important factor that has raised challenges to integrating 
Muslims into the existing church-state cooperative system is the Muslims’ lack of a 
centralized organizational structure. Both the Catholic and Evangelical churches are 
hierarchical in nature and thus they have centralized councils and leaders who can 
deal with centralized governmental bureaucratic bodies and leaders….But – with the 
Muslims broken up into thousands of individual mosques (which do not have a 
formal membership) and a host of decentralized ethnic, political, and theological 
subgroups – in most instances there are no unified Muslim groups with whom the 
authorities can work.53 
 
On the occasions that governments have had the opportunities to exert major 
influences on church structures, historical examples show that states seek to impose 
centralized, hierarchical structures similar to the corporatist model.  For example, during 
the rule of President Mobutu Seso Seke, the major Protestant denominations of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly connected through a loose, nonbinding 
association, were merged into one body with a hierarchical (and eventually unelected) 
leadership and binding authority over the constituent churches.54  
Such state-induced changes in church structure are, however, rare. With organizations 
such as labor unions or environmentalist groups, internal organization is endogenous to 
political support. Unions wanting mutually cooperative relationships with the government 
can alter their leadership selection and governance structures to better interact with the 
government, and governments seeking to better control portions of their populations can 
pressure or force organizations to alter their structures in ways that facilitate state 
                                                                                                                                            
 
53 Monsma and Soper 2008: 20. 
 
54 Garrard, David J. "The Protestant Church in Congo: The Mobutu Years and their 
Impact." Journal of religion in Africa 43.2 (2013): 131-166. 
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cooptation. Governments are generally constrained in the degree to which they can 
influence church structure.  Fox shows that despite the fact that even liberal democracies 
rarely observe strict separations, democracy has been shown to be specifically associated 
with limitations on government involvement in religion.55  Fox’s analysis also shows that 
Christian states generally have lower amounts of government involvement in religion 
than non-Christian states, showing that the norm of separation of religion and state has 
most strongly manifested as separation of church and state.  This result implies that 
governments typically refrain from interfering heavily in the internal workings of 
churches.  
From the perspective of churches, denominations often have leadership and 
governance structures that are determined by church theology and history.  Hinings and 
Foster, for example, argue for a model of church organizational structure in which the 
beliefs and goals of a particular church are the primary determinants of its internal 
organization, explicitly distinguishing churches from other, economic organizations.56 
Allen goes further, presenting a two-dimensional classification of church doctrines and 
church organizational structure, with a one-to-one mapping of the former to the latter.57 
Additionally, churches that are transnational in nature have structures that are dictated 
                                                
55 Fox, Jonathan, et al. "Do Democracies have Separation of Religion and State?." 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 40.01 (2007): 1-25. 
 
56 Hinings, C. Robin, and Bruce D. Foster. "The Organization Structure of Churches: A 
Preliminary Model." Sociology 7.1 (1973): 93-106. 
 
57 Allen, Douglas W. "Order in the Church: A Property Rights Approach." Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 27.1 (1995): 97-117. 
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from abroad, as is the case with the Catholic Church. Thus church structure tends to be 
difficult to change and exogenous to secular politics.   
Churches nonetheless vary in the malleability of their internal structures.  The 
structures of Catholic, Anglican and certain Protestant Churches (such as Presbyterian 
Church) are the results of decades or centuries of religious and historical development, 
and in the short and medium terms are subject to minor changes at best.  Other, generally 
younger, denominations have more mutable structures.  These include African Initiated 
Churches, as well as Pentecostal, Evangelical and “Mega” churches that have developed 
in more recent decades and often eschew denominational labels. Even in these churches, 
however, there are generally limits on how much the state can interfere with the internal 
affairs of the churches.  Mao and Zech use a spatial model of church membership to 
argue that churches strategically adopt particular organizational structures to compete 
with other churches for members, but that theology constrains the range of structures that 
a given church can adopt.58  
Since churches operate based on moral authority, legitimacy is important to these 
organizations, and thus leaders have incentives to not implement changes that would be 
viewed as illegitimate by the membership.  Even in the case of the merger and changes in 
leadership structure that took place among the Protestant churches in the DRC, the idea to 
merge the churches came as much from the leadership within the Protestant umbrella 
organization as from the government, with the former proposing merger as a way to rid 
the Protestant Christian community of unhelpful denominational divisions that had been 
                                                
58 Mao, Wen, and Charles Zech. "Choices of organizational structures in religious 
organizations: a game theoretic approach." Journal of economic behavior & organization 
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imposed by European missionaries.59 Thus, even the more malleable denominations are 
often constrained in the degree to which their internal structures can be altered. 
 
3 Understanding Church Political Activity: Actors, Preferences and Utility 
The main research question for this dissertation is as follows: what explains the 
political orientations of churches vis-à-vis incumbent national governments?  Churches 
are defined as national-level Christian denominations.  For example, the Anglican Church 
of Kenya is considered a “church” for this project, whereas a local Anglican congregation 
in Nairobi is not.  National governments are equated with the head of state; i.e. Kenyan 
Presidents Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, or Mwai Kibaki.  Thus, the unit of analysis 
is the church-government dyad, e.g. the political orientation of the Anglican Church of 
Kenya toward the government of Mwai Kibaki. Political orientation is a one-dimensional 
measure of the stance taken by the church vis-à-vis the incumbent government.  This 
measure can fall into one of three categories, with varying levels of intensity within each 
category: a) supportive of the government, b) neutral/apolitical, or c) critical of the 
government and/or supportive of opposition parties or groups.60  The political orientation 
of a church as a whole is equated with official statements of the churches as corporate 
bodies, such as “pastoral letters” issued by a church hierarchy giving the church’s official 
position on a set of issues, or official actions taken by the churches such as participation 
                                                
59 Garrard 2013: 133-134. 
 
60 It is more straightforward to understand intensity of church support or church 
opposition than it is to conceive of gradations of neutrality; nevertheless, churches can be 
officially neutral but also betray by their words and actions a slight bias toward or against 
the existing government. 
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in political rallies.   In instances where a church does not explicitly produce an official 
statement or course of action, the church’s stance is equated with the words and actions 
of the church’s top national leadership, such as the Archbishop(s) of the Catholic and 
Anglican Churches, respectively, or the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church.  Equating 
“the church” with its national leadership is a convention common to the works of 
Kalyvas, Gill and Warner, among others, and it conforms to analyses of African churches 
as being leader driven and subject to the type of “Big Man” politics prevalent in secular 
institutions in Africa.61    
3.1 Actors and Preferences 
3.1.1 Church Leaders as Individuals: Private Preferences and Utility 
Contrary to the works of authors such as Kalyvas, Gill and Warner, this 
dissertation acknowledges that the church is not a unitary actor. To the extent that church 
leaders can be viewed as agents of their church and its governing bodies62, churches are 
subject to standard principal-agent problems, in which the interests of church officials are 
not completely congruent with those of the church as an organization.  Church leaders 
have personal preferences separate from the preferences of the church. These include 
material concerns as well as immaterial ones. For simplicity, I combine the various 
                                                
61 Gifford, Paul. “Some recent developments in African Christianity.” African Affairs. 93 
(1994). 520-521. 
 
62 Despite the high degree of latitude given to national church leaders, mainstream 
national-level denominations, including the primary case studies in this dissertation, tend 
to either be subordinate to a transnational organization (such as the Vatican for the 
Catholic Church or the Seventh-Day Adventist World Headquarters), or have governing 
bodies made up of clergy and sometimes lay representatives.  These governing bodies 
include the Provincial Synod of the Anglican Church of Kenya, the General Assembly of 
the Presbyterian Church of East Africa, and the  Central Church Council of the Africa 
Inland Church. 
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motivations of church leaders into three categories. First, church leaders are motivated by 
personal income and other material benefits, which may be derived from their salaries 
and perks from their churches as well as gratuities provided by governments.63  In 
addition, leaders belong to particular communities, such as ethnic or regional groups, and 
government policies may disproportionately favor or disfavor these groups, leading to 
material benefits or costs to the church leaders as members of these social groups.64  
Second, church leaders care about their reputation in the eyes of their colleagues (national 
and international), members of their respective churches, and the public more generally. 
Maintaining a reputation of morality and faithfulness helps a church leader gain 
compliance from current members and recruit new members, and a good reputation 
provides its own nonmaterial benefits in terms of prestige. Third, church leaders are 
motivated by their own moral and religious beliefs.65  Though individual morality is 
variable and not directly observable, it stands to reason that churches tend to select those 
                                                
63 Zech, for example, details how churches can use salary structure and promotion as 
incentives to overcome principal-agent problems between churches and their clergy.  
Zech, Charles. "An Agency Analysis of Church–Pastor Relations." Managerial and 
Decision Economics 22.6 (2001): 327-332. 
 
64 The benefits a church leader derives by virtue of being a member of a privileged ethnic 
group are likely to exceed the benefits that an average member of such a group receives, 
due to the leader’s status as an elite within the group and possibly as a well-connected 
individual within the network of patronage through which such benefits are channeled. 
(Longman 2001). 
 
65 Zech (2001) draws from economics literature to refer to these nonmaterial benefits as 
“psychic income.” I separate this concept into the portion that is dependent upon the 
perceptions of others – reputation – and the portion that is purely internal to the 
individual, or the individual and God – moral beliefs or conscience. See also: Thurow, 
Lester C. "Psychic Income: Useful or Useless?." The American Economic Review (1978): 
142-145; Zech, Charles. "The Agency Relationship in Churches: An Empirical Analysis." 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 66.4 (2007): 727-746. 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
with genuine religious beliefs as leaders, and that those who truly believe will, all else 
being equal, make more effective leaders than those who have to espouse false beliefs. 
3.1.2 Churches as Organizations: Organizational Preferences and Utility 
In addition to these personal determinants of utility, church leaders have strong 
incentives to promote the success of the church. Leaders who truly subscribe to their 
churches’ doctrines will generally prefer to remain faithful to church doctrine and to 
promote the interests of their churches, even if they may be willing to sacrifice some 
measure of church interests for personal benefits.  Furthermore, church leaders also gain 
social prominence and moral authority from the success of the organizations they lead, 
and leaders can likewise experience a loss of social and moral standing if their church is 
seen as failing. In addition, church leaders have specific skills and human capital that are 
not easily transferable to secular jobs, and often are denomination-specific.  Although 
some national religious leaders are able to transition to secular careers, or find 
promotions in denominations such as the Catholic Church that have transnational 
hierarchies, most national-level church leaders have reached the apex of their careers. 
Particularly for church leaders with long or indefinite tenures, there is an incentive to 
work toward the best interests of the church, meaning that church leaders’ preferences 
incorporate the interests of the organizations they head.   
As identified in previous works such as Gill, churches’ preferences are generally 
to maximize membership and resources.  In keeping with the political economy of 
religion literature, this dissertation accepts the organizational preferences of churches as 
seeking to maximize members and resources.  Christians are collectively commanded to 
“go and make disciples of all nations,” and most Christian denominations are therefore to 
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some extent “evangelical” in the literal sense of the term.66  Large membership can also 
give a particular church social, economic and political clout within a given society, and 
leading a large church gives a leader personal social and political influence as well. 
Monetary and human resources are necessary for recruiting and maintaining members, 
supporting clergy and other church professionals, and carrying out various activities in 
which churches engage. Especially in the developing world, churches often provide 
services such as education and healthcare, both for church members and for nonmembers 
as well.  Nowhere is such work more important than in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
churches have been claimed to provide half of all health and education services.67 Church 
resources can also be diverted by church leaders to private uses, within the constraints of 
church and external regulations and moral considerations (including the leaders’ own 
moral code and the expectations others have of church leaders as honest and holy 
individuals).  
The assumptions that churches seek to maximize members and resources is 
therefore reasonable for this study but requires an important refinement. The assumption 
that churches seek to maximize, or at least retain, membership is too simplistic. Several 
works in the sociology of religion focus on variations in the “strictness” of religious 
organizations, as some denominations have more stringent requirements for membership 
                                                
66 This call to evangelization comes from Matthew 28:19. 
 
67 See Bunting 2005. Furthermore, church leaders can divert resources to personal and 
semi-personal uses.  Personal uses include using church resources to fund and maintain a 
personal lifestyle beyond that which leaders could afford based on their salaries.  Semi-
personal uses include using resources for patronage purposes, which often directly benefit 
those with personal ties to the leader – family members, local community members, 
coethnics – and consequently results in prestige and social approbation for the  leader 
who is delivering these goods. 
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that deter casual members from remaining with these strict churches. Churches or “sects” 
may adopt higher levels of strictness in order to fulfill preferences such as maximize 
member welfare.68 While the literature has not reached consensus on whether or not 
“strictness” ultimately contributes to church growth in the medium or long runs, it is 
clearer that in the short run stricter churches are willing to accept lower levels of 
membership.69  As will be discussed in Chapter 4, some Kenyan church officials have 
stated in interviews with the author that they were willing to take unpopular stances on 
principle and found it acceptable to have fewer but more committed members, who will 
be better educated in church doctrine, practice church tenets more faithfully and 
contribute more resources.  I will refer to this bundle of characteristics as member 
“faithfulness”. Given the (short-run) tradeoff between church strictness and size, 
churches can be thought of as maximizing member quantity and member faithfulness, 
giving weights to each of these considerations that allow churches to make decisions 
when the goals of quantity and faithfulness conflict.70  Depending on how much value 
each church assigns to the “faithfulness” weights, scenarios may arise in which churches 
                                                
68 Barros, Pedro Pita, and Nuno Garoupa. "An Economic Theory of Church Strictness” 
The Economic Journal 112.481 (2002): 559-576. 
 
69 Iannoccone, Olson and Stark presents an argument in which strictness indirectly leads 
to church growth by maximize the average amount of resources donated by members, 
which provides a church with the means to attract more members. Iannaccone et. al. 
2004. 
 
70 In another work, Gill briefly recognizes the two aspects of membership maximization 
when he states that “[the Catholic Church] primarily wants to maximize the number of 
people adhering to Catholicism, and then assure that their faith is deeply ingrained.”  He 
does not, however, go on to discuss the potential tradeoff between these two goals. Gill, 
Anthony. "Politics of Regulating Religion in Mexico: The 1992 Constitutional Reforms 
in Historical Context, The." J. Church & St. 41 (1999): 764-765. 
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can maximize their utility by accepting a smaller total membership with higher average 
levels of faithfulness, or churches may instead seek to gain more members while 
accepting lower member faithfulness.   
Governments can affect churches in their quest to maximize member quantity 
through a number of different policies.  At an extreme, governments can promote one or 
more denomination to the position of official state church and make membership in such 
a church mandatory.  Governments can also ban certain denominations, making 
membership in these churches illegal.  In between these two extremes, governments have 
the power to incentivize membership in some churches through public rhetoric and 
endorsements, as well as by providing preferential treatment to members of a specific 
denomination, such as tax exemptions for church-related work. Governments can 
facilitate high levels of church member faithfulness by adopting policies that make it 
easier for church members to learn and practice church doctrines.  Governments can pass 
laws consistent with church doctrines, such as banning practices such as polygamy or 
alcohol consumption.  Governments can also negatively impact member faithfulness by 
espousing beliefs and practices that are at odds with church beliefs-a government may 
require work or civic participation to occur during the holy days of a particular 
denomination, or mandate a public education curriculum that contradicts church beliefs.  
Churches have a variety of sources from which they gain cash, labor and other 
income.  The primary source of income for many churches is donation from church 
members.  Most churches emphasize the duty of members to give tithes (literally one-
tenth of their income) or other offerings to the church, and many denominations also 
encourage lay members to volunteer labor for basic church operations or church-related 
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activities. Many churches, especially the larger and older denominations, also own 
various assets – land, facilities such as schools and hospitals, relics and other religious 
items – that the churches finds valuable and protect.  Conflict between church and state 
has often arisen when the state attempts to expropriate these assets – land in Latin 
America, schools in Africa – from churches that are resistant to letting them go.  On the 
other hand, the state is often another source of funding for the church.  In both developed 
and especially in developing countries, governments often find it valuable to abdicate 
some of the state’s duty of social services provision to churches and other religious 
organizations, and partially subsidize religious groups that provide services such as 
healthcare and education.  This may be due to a lack of state capacity, particularly in 
poorer countries, or simply because religious organizations possess certain 
characteristics, such as close community ties and ideologically driven motivation among 
their staffs and volunteers, that make them especially effective at service provision.  The 
state thus becomes another source of church resources when the former finds it valuable 
to partner with the church in service provision.71  In addition to subsidizing social service 
                                                
71 Churches also receive support from international sources.  National churches that are 
part of larger international organizations may receive transfers from their parent bodies, 
and churches that are not formally international often develop “partnerships” with sister 
churches of similar denomination or beliefs.  These transfers are generally flows of 
resources, including money and personnel, from churches in wealthier countries to those 
in poorer nations. Similarly, secular international actors interested in promoting social 
service provision in developing countries often channel resources to religious and other 
non-governmental organizations because of these same characteristics, and also because 
these international donors are wary of inefficient and corrupt governments mismanaging 
funds and find religious organizations to operate with greater integrity.  This project does 
not make any assumptions concerning the impact of national level politics or church-state 
relations on international donations, so these funds are considered constants and not 
incorporated into the analyses here presented. 
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provision, governments may also subsidize strictly religious aspects of church operation, 
such as by donating land for church buildings or subsidizing the incomes of clergy. 
 Churches offer support to governments when doing so helps to maximize church 
utility as defined above.  Governments can reward supportive churches by transferring 
resources to the church and/or to its leaders, and by enacting preferential policies that 
reduce competition from other churches and therefore increase membership.  Associating 
with a popular government can also boost a church leader’s reputation, and Church 
support can come at a cost, however. If the government is unpopular among church 
members, these members can react to their church supporting the government in several 
ways that decrease church utility, such as holding their church’s leader in lower esteem, 
decreasing contributions to the church, demanding a change in church leadership, or 
exiting the church altogether.72  Church leaders must weigh the benefits offered by 
governments against the costs of supporting those governments.  
3.2 Government Preferences and Utility 
Whether or not it is in the best interest of the church to support a given 
government depends in large part on what the government is willing to offer in return, 
and this in turn depends on the government’s preferences. In this dissertation, the 
preferences of governments will be equated with those of the head of state.  This is a 
reasonable simplification to make given the tradition of strong presidentialism that has 
                                                
72 Put in different terms, church members can exercise “exit” or “voice” to display their 
displeasure with church leaders’ actions. Hirschman, Albert O. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: 
Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Vol. 25. Harvard University 
Press, 1970. While Hirschmann argues that the exit option is “very nearly” unavailable in 
organizations such as churches (33), but in fact works like Gill (1998) show that 
denomination switching is a significant reality in many social contexts. 
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marked African governments in general (as noted by Van de Walle), and the strength of 
the executive relative to other branches of government in Kenya in particular; therefore 
the preferences of the president and the government are assumed to be equivalent.  
 Governments seek to maximize the probability that they will stay in power and 
the net amount of government income, that is, government revenue minus government 
expenditures. Governments earn revenue from taxes and other sources, such as 
investments and aid from other governments or international sources.  The main domestic 
expenditures include enforcing law and order, mobilizing citizens for political support, 
and provide social services.  Governments therefore have three main demands vis-à-vis 
churches: pro-state or pro-government ideology, citizen mobilization, and service 
provision.   
Governments can lower the cost of ruling by employing an ideology that fosters 
voluntary compliance with the state.  There are three main sources of such ideology.  The 
government may draw from its own popularity, legitimacy or prestige in order to inspire 
citizens to comply. There are various examples of governments leaning on secular 
ideologies that inspire allegiance and compliance from the population, as several Latin 
American states did by promoting communism or fascism-inspired nationalism.73 
Political liberalism served a similar function in nineteenth-century Europe.74 Secondly, 
government can instill pro-government ideology within the population through state 
                                                
73 Gill 1998: 63-64. 
 
74 Kalyvas (1996), for example, details the clashes between the Catholic Church and 
Liberal politicians and political parties in Western Europe. 
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propaganda, which is often disseminated through public education.75 Third, a church 
leader can, through his own efforts and those of his denomination, provide ideological 
support for the government. Governments can attempt to influence churches to support 
the government by providing material incentives to a church leader, or by providing 
subsidies to the church.  When governments can lower the cost of enforcing law and 
order by either drawing from existing alternate sources of ideology, or by producing 
ideology effectively and efficiently through public education, the additional benefits of 
purchasing supportive ideology from a church are less likely to be worth the costs of 
paying churches or their leaders, making church-state cooperation and thus church 
support for government less likely.76 
 Governments do not just require the passive obedience of citizens but also need 
active engagement of citizens in civic and political activities, including elections.77  Even 
in political systems that enforce strict separation between government funds and political 
expenditures – and many systems do not strictly enforce such distinctions – in practice, 
                                                
75 Lott discusses the importance to states of utilizing public education as a tool for 
indoctrination in order to explain inefficiencies in public schooling across countries.  
Lott, John R. "An explanation for public provision of schooling: The importance of 
indoctrination." Journal of Law and Economics (1990): 199-231. 
 
76 Support in such circumstances is “less likely” but still possible. The church utility 
function presented above shows that, even absent church-state cooperation, churches may 
still offer support for governments.  For example, if the government is of the same ethnic 
group as church members, or if the church leader has personal political preferences for 
the government, maximizing church utility may entail offering support for the 
government even if support does not increase the amount of funds government provides 
for the church or for the church’s leader. 
 
77 Gandhi and Lust-Okar review the literature that seeks to explain why elections are 
important even for many autocratic states. Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. 
"Elections Under Authoritarianism." Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 403-
422. 
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mobilizing citizens for elections and other polls is an expensive endeavor for 
governments.78  Churches can mobilize citizens by providing civic education, 
encouraging or compelling church members to participate, and even using church 
infrastructure to ensure that voters show up to their polling stations.  Governments (and 
political parties, which are not always easy to distinguish from governments) can 
therefore employ churches to help mobilize citizens to vote and specifically to vote in 
favor of the sitting government and its preferred policies. 
 The final major cost to governments is provision of government services. 
Governments generally provide or help provide a host of services to citizens, including 
national security, infrastructure, healthcare, and education.  Churches often provide 
services in the areas of health and education, and governments can employ churches as 
partners in these endeavors, subsidizing church efforts in healthcare and education as a 
less-expensive alternative to the government directly providing these services.  
Sometimes, however, working with churches may entail some cost to the government 
beyond the financial costs of subsidizing church work.  Ceding control of education to 
churches, for example, also means giving up a measure of control over the content of 
education and reduces the ability of the government to use schools to instill pro-
government ideology.79  
                                                
78 Research has suggested that elections are especially expensive in political systems 
characterized by patronage, as is the case in Kenya and many other countries. Pinto-
Duschinsky, Michael. "Financing Politics: A Global View." Journal of Democracy 13.4 
(2002): 83. 
 
79 Lott (1990) argues that the ideological usefulness of public education can lead 
governments to directly administer education even when doing so has higher direct costs 
than subsidizing private education. 
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4 The Effects of Internal Church Organization on Church Political Orientations 
Given the preferences of churches as organizations, church leaders as individuals, 
and governments, I propose that the internal organization of churches will affect the ways 
in which these preferences are translated into interactions between church and state, 
which in turn significantly influences the political stances taken by churches vis-à-vis 
incumbent governments.  In some cases, church-state relations are relatively 
uncontroversial.  If a government is generally popular among a country’s population and 
enjoys popularity, legitimacy and approval among a church’s leaders and its members, it 
is likely that the church will seek good relations with the government.  Cordial church-
state relations in the context of a popular government will generally benefit a church 
leader, who will see an improvement in his own reputation by being associated with the 
government and may also see increases in membership and members’ financial offerings.  
Friendly relations with the state will also generally be acceptable to church members, 
given the government’s general levels of popularity and legitimacy.  When governments 
are unpopular or regarded as illegitimate, or when previously well-regarded governments 
suffer declines in their reputations, the decision of church leaders on how to approach 
church-state relations become more complicated, and internal church organization can 
play a large role in determining how interactions with the state play out.  Based on the 
preferences of churches as organizations, church leaders as individuals, and governments, 
I make the following arguments, which will be explored through the case studies of 
Kenyan churches over time. 
Argument 1. Church centralization, with leadership authority concentrated in a single 
individual, facilitates more cooperative church-state relations; centralized churches are 
therefore more likely to support governments than decentralized churches. 
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1a) Centralized leadership within a church facilitates negotiation by presenting a single 
individual who can represent the church’s interests in negotiations and discussions with 
presidents and other top government officials (whether the church leader meets with 
government officials in person or through designated representatives), increasing the 
likelihood that the church and state will come to a mutually-beneficial arrangement. 
Centralized church leadership also aids church-state negotiations between church leaders 
and government officials by facilitating personal relationships, face-to-face negotiations, 
and the development of mutual trust between these individuals. 
1b) Centralized leadership within churches facilitates government influence over 
churches by presenting a single individual that the government can target with 
inducements or constraints in order to gain church cooperation, increasing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of church efforts to influence churches and making 
cooperative arrangements between church and state more likely. 
Centralization refers to the degree to which national-level leadership and 
decision-making authority – executive power – is concentrated into one entity or spread 
out over multiple entities, and whether or not those entities are each composed of single 
individuals or bodies of individuals.  For example, prior to 1990, most of the Kenyan 
churches being closely examined in this dissertation had one official who serves as the 
executive of his denomination.80 In 1990, the Catholic Church became decentralized 
                                                
80 The Catholic Church differed slightly in that there were two administrative structures, 
each headed by an individual who could be considered to have executive functions.  First, 
the Catholic Archbishop of Nairobi was the highest-ranking official in the church, served 
as the  de facto spokesperson and head of the Catholic Church in Kenya, and had a degree 
of oversight over the other bishops in the country.  Second, however, the archbishop and 
other Catholic bishops of the country collectively meet periodically as the Kenya 
Episcopal Conference, a deliberative body established in 1969 for the purpose of 
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when three of its dioceses were elevated by the Vatican to archdioceses, raising the 
number of archbishops in the country from one to four.  This change corresponds with 
increased activism of the Kenyan Catholic Church, which transitioned during this time 
frame from an organization that enjoyed generally cordial if unenthusiastic relations with 
the Moi government to a body that took a leading role in publicly criticizing the 
government.  As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the externally imposed decentralization 
of the Catholic Church incorporated into the Church’s decision-making process the 
preferences of several church leaders and the members of their communities.  This 
multiplication of preferences and veto players made it more difficult for the Government 
to negotiate with the church for church support, and the exclusionary nature of Moi’s 
ethnic coalition meant that most church members and leaders belonged to politically 
excluded groups, incentivizing church leaders to take an oppositional stance. 
Centralization also looks at the degree to which subordinate individuals or bodies 
are controlled by the national leadership or exercise autonomy in their actions and 
decision-making.  For example, while both the Catholic and Anglican churches have 
similar Episcopal structures with one or more Archbishops and a number of other, 
regionally based bishops, the relationship between these officials differs across 
denomination.  While Catholic suffragan bishops are formally appointed by the Pope and 
accountable to the Vatican, archbishops in the Catholic Church have some oversight 
                                                                                                                                            
deciding the Church’s stance on social issues, and this body elected a President (for three 
year terms) from among the bishops.  The president of the KEC could also be thought of 
as the leader of the church insofar as it addressed political and other social issues, 
potentially creating a situation of dual national authority figures.  In practice, the same 
individual occupied both positions until 1976; since then, one of the country’s 
archbishops has also served as KEC President roughly half of the time. 
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authority over the suffragan bishops in their geographical region.  By contrast, Anglican 
bishops other than the Archbishop enjoy a great deal of autonomy within their dioceses, 
and each bishop is elected by clergy and lay representatives within his diocese.81   
Argument 2. Alongside centralization, authoritarian church structures, featuring lack of 
accountability and few checks and balances for church leaders, increases the credibility 
with which church leaders, or their designated representatives, can promise support to 
governments.   
Lack of accountability makes it easier for the church leader to carry out 
agreement by lessening the veto power that exists within the organization.82  The leader 
himself can credibly commit to carry out the support promised to the government in 
exchange for benefits from government resources.  A church leader can also compel 
subordinates to acquiesce to the terms of the deal made between the church leader and the 
government.  From the point of view of the government, making a deal with the leader of 
an internally-democratic church not only raises the price that the government may have to 
pay for a successful deal (since the church leader has to worry about the consequences 
should his decision to support the government be an unpopular one among church 
members). Internal democracy within the church also presents the government with the 
                                                
81 The Anglican Archbishop is considered a peer, a “first among equals”, presenting a 
mesocosm of the associative nature of the worldwide Anglican Communion.  In such a 
structure, the Archbishop has little power to enforce any agreement made between 
himself and the government, as bishops in other dioceses can express their own political 
views with little fear of sanction from the church hierarchy. 
 
82 Putnam notes that a negotiator may have low credibility if he cannot guarantee that an 
agreement he makes will not be vetoed within the organization he represents. Putnam, 
Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games." 
International organization 42.03 (1988): 439. 
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possibility that the church may renege on a deal with the state should church members 
decide to veto the arrangement or replace the church leader who negotiated the deal.  
Internal democracy or accountability within the church thus creates a degree of 
uncertainty for the state, which makes successful negotiations less likely. 
Kalyvas, in an examination of democratic transition in the presence of religious 
political parties, makes the argument that religions characterized by “centralized, 
autocratic, and hierarchical organization” are better able to make credible commitments 
than their decentralized and democratic counterparts, due to the ability of the former 
religions to control and sanction individuals within the religion who attempt to violate or 
contradict policies enacted by the religions’ leaders.83 
Argument 3. Along with centralization, authoritarian church structures, in which internal 
democracy is low and leaders face little or no checks and balances or challenges to their 
positions and decision-making authority, lowers the cost to governments of obtaining 
church support by making it easier for governments to make private deals with leaders, 
lowering the cost of cooptation, in exchange for support. 
Lack of accountability can be thought of as increased job security. As a leader 
becomes more secure in his tenure, the salary and benefits the leader derives from his 
church approaches a constant, and is thus not influenced by the decision to support or not 
support the government.  In contrast, when accountability is high, a church leader’s 
decision to support an unpopular government can place in jeopardy the leader’s position 
and the benefits that come with it.  This presents a tradeoff between the benefits derived 
                                                
83 Kalyvas, Stathis N. "Commitment problems in emerging democracies: The case of 
religious parties." Comparative Politics (2000): 388-390. 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
from the church and those coming from the Government, thus raising the minimum level 
of benefits that governments would have to pay and therefore making the church a more 
expensive ally for the government to maintain. 
Additionally, even if leaders enjoy job security once in office, internal democracy 
in the initial selection of leaders will affect the types of leaders being chosen in ways that 
influence subsequent church political activities.  Knowing that their leader cannot easily 
be removed from office once he is selected, church members (or their representatives) 
will have greater incentive to select leaders who have strongly-held personal preferences 
that closely match the preferences of the membership. 
Argument 4. Church political orientation is influenced by factors such as ethnic 
considerations, government popularity, church size and government demand for church 
provision of social services, but these are unlikely to be decisive in determining church 
political stances unless decentralized leadership and democratic accountability structures 
exist with the church. 
When internal church organization presents unfavorable conditions for close 
church-state relations, the church may nonetheless support a government if the church 
and government share ethnic identities or if the government is simply popular among 
church members.  In such cases, supporting the government is not a liability for the 
church’s leaders, and may actually benefit them through enhanced reputation and 
favorable reactions from church members.  When the church and government primarily 
represent different ethnic or regional groups, particularly if antagonism exists between 
these groups, ethnic considerations will likely lead to greater church opposition to 
government.  Government unpopularity, even if not based on ethnicity, can have similar 
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effects, fostering church opposition.84   
For situations in which governments are less interested in gaining ideological 
support from churches and more interested in churches’ capacity to mobilize voters or 
carry out development work, centralization will generally be less important. When 
governments seek church support for voter mobilization, church size will factor into 
government decisions regarding which churches to target for negotiation or cooptation, 
since larger churches have influence over larger portions of a country’s citizenry.85  
Governments that primarily seek to partner with churches for the purpose of development 
work or service provision will also be more concerned with church capacity, which will 
be a function of factors such as church size, geographical coverage, human capital, 
connections to international financial and human resources (such as missionaries, 
particularly those with relevant technical skills), and other such factors.  Governments 
will seek the largest and most capable churches. The Catholic Church, for example, has 
estimated that it operates one quarter of all health care facilities worldwide,86 and is thus 
an attractive partner for governments seeking to improve social service provision.   
                                                
84 A further implication of Argument 4 is that even when churches are centralized and 
have unaccountable leadership, ethnic animosities or government unpopularity can 
negatively affect church-state relations, but the structure of the church will generally 
dampen or neutralize oppositional factors by allowing the churches to negotiate 
agreements with the government.  Only when negotiation fails, generally due to 
government disinterest or inflexibility, do these other factors become decisive. 
 
85 Governments will also be concerned with churches’ ethnic and geographical coverage 
within the country based on which populations the government seeks to target. 
 
86 “Catholic hospitals comprise one quarter of world's healthcare, council reports.” 
Catholic News Agency. 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/catholic_hospitals_represent_26_percent_of_
worlds_health_facilities_reports_pontifical_council/. Accessed October 2,2014. 
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Because churches generally have incentives to enter these mutually beneficial 
relationships with governments in the areas of service provision and development work, 
they will generally be willing to do so regardless of the churches’ internal structures.  In 
these scenarios, centralization can still have an impact in two ways. First, if multiple 
religious organizations are competing for government cooperation, centralization can 
provide a particular church with a negotiation advantage over less centralized 
denominations and allow it to win these government “contracts” in the same manner in 
which the church would negotiate government support in exchange for ideological 
support.  Second, even though government has a financial incentive to cooperate with 
churches in development and service work, if a church is oppositional and that opposition 
is having a large negative impact on the government politically, the government may 
withhold cooperation as a way of punishing that church or coercing it into changing its 
stance.  And given that opposition is argued here to be a function of church 
decentralization and internal accountability, church structure may thereby be correlated 
with cooperation on social services, but to a lesser degree than the link between structure 
and political support. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Without doing injustice to the ideological and moral factors that influence churches’ 
engagements in politics, church-state interactions can be understood in terms of 
interactions between rational actors seeking to maximize their respective utilities. It is 
therefore necessary to identify the preferences of these actors, and this dissertation 
improves upon previous works by examining some of the neglected nuances in the goals 
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of both churches (particularly church leaders) and governments.  Understanding 
preferences is, however, not sufficient for understanding what positions churches will 
take vis-à-vis governments; internal organizational features of churches influence the 
preference structures of churches as organizations and thus can have major impacts on 
the political stances that church leaders are willing and able to take on behalf of their 
denominations.  Given the exogenous nature of internal church structure, Christian 
denominations offer useful cases for examining the role of structure on the political 
activities of civil society organizations and their relations with states. This dissertation 
expands upon the insights offered by various literatures concerning the impact of 
organizational structure on relations with the state, including Ngunyi’s analysis of 
internal organization and the activist/loyalist divide, by exploring the logic and 
mechanisms by which internal church structure influences church political stances.  The 
dissertation does this by closely examining the characteristics, structures and political 
activities of the national leaderships of several major Christian churches in Kenya from 
independence in 1963 through 2012. These churches are among the largest 
denominations in the country, and each has a long history in Kenya.  They are: 
- The Catholic Church, including the assembly of Kenya’s Catholic bishops and 
archbishops, collectively known as the Kenya Episcopal Conference (KEC) 
- The Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK), formerly known as the Church of the 
Province of Kenya and hereafter referred to simply as “the Anglican Church” 
- The Africa Inland Church, or AIC  
- The Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), referred to here as the 
“Presbyterian Church” 
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- The Seventh-Day Adventist Church-East Africa Union, referred to as “The 
Seventh Day Adventist Church” or SDA87 
The following chapters examine the political orientation of churches in Kenya, 
primarily focusing on these five denominations, as demonstrated by the statements and 
actions of top church leaders.  Each chapter is devoted to examining the political 
orientation of the churches during one of the first three presidencies of post-independence 
Kenya.  Chapter 2 focuses on the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta, 1963-1978, a period 
marked by general church-state cooperation, punctuated by two major instances of church 
opposition to government policies.  This chapter argues that the generally cordial nature 
of church-state relations under Kenyatta is attributable to both the compatibility of 
preferences of the major churches and the Kenyatta government and the centralized 
leadership structure of the churches, which facilitated negotiation between church leaders 
and the President.  As the internal organizational features of some of these denominations 
gradually shifted away from centralization, the political stances of the decentralizing 
churches similarly shifted moderately in the direction of mild criticism toward the 
government.  The two instances of overt public clashes between churches and the 
government, meanwhile, came over issues in which negotiations broke down because 
church and government preferences were not immediately reconcilable.   
Chapter 3 details church orientation toward President Daniel arap Moi, in office 
1978-2002. During Moi’s presidency, Kenya became increasingly oppressive and 
authoritarian, until external and internal pressures, including opposition from several 
churches, forced the government to democratize in the early 1990s.  During the Moi 
                                                
87 Profiles of these denominations are included in Appendix 1. 
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years, church political orientation differed significantly across denominations.  These 
differences align with increasing divergence in the internal structures of the major 
denominations; those that remained centralized and authoritarian were coopted by the 
government, while the churches that became less centralized escaped cooptation and 
became increasingly critical of the abuses of the government.  Church structure serves as 
a better indicator of church political activities than other factors, such as ethnic identities 
or church conservatism/liberalism, which have been argued in other works as being 
decisive in church-state relations during this period.   
Chapter 4 examines the presidency of Mwai Kibaki through 2010, examining the 
orientations of the churches vis-à-vis the government, including differences within as 
well as across denominations, as highlighted by three major political events: the 2005 
constitutional referendum, the 2007 presidential election and subsequent post-election 
violence, and the 2010 constitutional referendum.  Church-state relations during the 
Kibaki presidency tended to shift based on the government’s changing “demand” for 
various church products, such as voter mobilization.  The government’s ability to find 
substitutes for church support, as well as political reforms that decreased the governments 
ability to negotiate with churches or coopt church leaders, weakened the link between 
church structure and church political activities.  Nevertheless, when President Kibaki 
most needed church support, such as during the 2007 election campaign, the churches’ 
responses to government courtship were again determined by church structure.   
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by offering discussions of the Kenyan cases 
and extending the examination of church political activity by conducting a quantitative 
analysis of church political stances and internal structures across African nations since 
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independence.  This quantitative analysis, as well as brief qualitative examination of 
some of the cases included in the larger dataset, gives “out of sample” validation to the 
arguments presented in the dissertation.  The chapter concludes by discussing the 
significance of the dissertation’s findings for understanding religious organizations and 
civil society more generally. 
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Chapter 2: Church Political Activity Under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) 
1 Introduction 
 In July 1976, Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta made an appearance at a meeting 
of the Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa, a gathering of 
Catholic bishops from across East Africa including Kenya’s own senior clergy.  Through 
his Minister for Agriculture, Jeremiah Nyagah, the elderly President Kenyatta referred to 
the church as “the conscience of the nation” and called upon religious leaders to speak 
out to the government when it became necessary to do so.88 Kenyatta’s words, however, 
hardly reflected the President’s desires or the churches’ actions during this period; the 
churches mostly remained quiet throughout Kenyatta’s time in office, which suited the 
President just fine.  During his time in power, Kenyatta enacted policies that 
disproportionately channeled land and other resources to his own Kikuyu ethnic group, 
consolidated political power around a small ruling clique, and either marginalized or 
eliminated political rivals.  The churches articulated few official criticisms of the 
government’s excesses.  On the contrary, the major denominations were mostly silent on 
issues of politics or governance, especially during the first few years of Kenyatta’s time 
in power, and the few comments made by the churches were usually supportive of the 
government and especially of Kenyatta himself.  To the extent that church leaders 
interacted with President Kenyatta and his government, often at harambees (fundraisers), 
relations were friendly and marked by expressions of mutual support and admiration.  For 
the most part, however, the churches stayed out of public life, which seemed to align with 
Kenyatta’s interests.  Beyond public expressions of friendship, the churches and the 
                                                
88 Target July 18, 1976. 
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government cooperated on a number of development projects and social services, as “the 
state co-opt[ed] the Church as a partner in nation-building,”89 
Prior to 1970, only two incidents drew significant public opposition from 
churches.  In 1968, the government enacted major educational reforms, assuming control 
of the country’s large network of mission-founded schools.  This action drew public 
rebuke from Kenya’s Catholic hierarchy, though the Catholic Church and the state soon 
came to a mutual understanding acceptable to both parties.  The following year, tensions 
between the ruling Kikuyu ethnic group and the politically marginalized Luo group led to 
a widespread phenomenon in which Kikuyu and members of some other ethnic groups 
were required to participate in traditional ceremonies in which they swore loyalty oaths 
that pledged to keep the state in Kikuyu hands.  These ceremonies were forcibly imposed 
on large segments of the Kikuyu population with at least tacit approval of the 
government.  The oathing phenomenon eventually led to condemnation and protests from 
several of the country’s largest Christian denominations, whose members suffered 
reprisals for refusing to participate in what they considered to be un-Christian rituals.  
After several public displays of dissatisfaction on the part of the churches, the 
government pledged to put an end to the oathing ceremonies, which died out soon after. 
In both these instances, church leaders only intervened when policies specifically 
impacted church interests, and still the churches did not take their criticisms public until 
after they had exhausted private efforts to influence the government’s actions.  
Furthermore, the churches were very careful to craft their criticisms in narrow terms, 
targeting the specific policies with which the churches took issue while pledging their 
                                                
89 Chepkwony, Agnes. "The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in Development: 
A Study of the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK), 1963-1978." (1987): 145. 
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general loyalty and support to President Kenyatta and his government.  From 1970 on, 
the churches again maintained mostly positive relationships with the government. The 
public statements of the Catholic and Anglican churches were more measured and not as 
uncritically supportive than they had been in previous years, but even these two 
denominations maintained mostly cordial and mutually supportive relationships with the 
government. 
What explains the generally supportive stances taken by the churches, and 
particularly by the churches’ top leaders? The experiences of the churches under 
President Kenyatta informed the arguments presented in the opening chapter of this 
dissertation, and the current chapter illustrates and elaborates upon these arguments. As 
noted in Chapter 1, the church’s public ideological support for government can be 
thought of as a commodity – one of three commodities that religious organizations 
specialize in producing, along with citizen mobilization and provision of social services – 
that governments may attempt to purchase from the churches.  Like any commodity, the 
quantity and price at which this ideological good is sold depends on supply and demand.  
On the supply side, church leaders were generally eager to be associated with the 
government, especially during the early years of independence, as this was a source of 
prestige and resources for the clergy.  From the demand side, however, Kenyatta had only 
limited use of church ideological support, as his history and reputation provided him with 
a great deal of personal popularity and legitimacy, and so the President only had to 
expend minimal amounts of effort to maintain church support. Kenyatta similarly did not 
need the churches to mobilize citizens, as the government’s authoritarian policies toward 
political opposition neutralized any significant threats to Kenyatta’s continued rule. In the 
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later years of Kenyatta’s presidency, the government’s failings, ethnic favoritism and use 
of repression and political assassinations severely damaged the public’s support for 
Kenyatta’s government.  This loss of confidence did not directly threaten Kenyatta’s 
tenure as President, but placed some of his political allies in danger of being voted out of 
office.  While the government thus had greater need for ideological support and pro-
government citizen mobilization from the churches, church leaders had gained their own 
legitimacy and were aware of the declines in Kenyatta’s prestige among the population 
and among church members.  Some of the churches were therefore slightly more willing 
to temper their support with mild criticisms.   
Chapter 1 argues that understanding the preferences of churches and state is 
insufficient for understanding the outcome of church-state relations, as the structure of 
churches impacts how preferences are transformed into political activities. During 
Kenyatta’s time in power, features of the internal organization of the churches served to 
mitigate the impact of lower level discontent on top-level church policies. During this 
time, the churches of Kenya shared centralized and relatively unaccountable leadership 
structures; the churches each possessed a single leader who could speak for his 
denomination. This structure facilitated direct contacts between church leaders and 
President Kenyatta or his close subordinates, and also privileged personal relationships 
between church leaders and high government officials.  Church leaders were generally 
able to directly discuss and negotiate issues with President Kenyatta and his government, 
keeping any disagreements private and coming to mutually beneficial understandings. 
The lack of strong checks and balances or accountability measures within the churches 
meant that church leaders could credibly pledge to enforce whatever agreements they 
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made with the government without either government officials or church leaders having 
to worry that the rank and file of the churches could veto the deal or significantly 
sanction their leaders.   
Changes in the internal structures of the Catholic and Anglican churches resulted 
in a slightly more critical stance toward the government. The full impact of these changes 
would not manifest until the Presidency of Daniel arap Moi (discussed in Chapter 3), and 
thus the Catholic and Anglican stances toward President Kenyatta did not deviate far 
from those of the other denominations, even as discontent developed within the churches. 
In addition to the influences of church structure on church-state relations, the demand and 
supply for the churches’ third “product”, social services, remained consistent, as church 
and state found it mutually beneficial for the latter to subsidize the efforts of the former in 
providing education, healthcare and other services. These factors guaranteed that the 
churches were on the whole supportive of the government even in the later years of 
Kenyatta’s rule.  
The two instances of church-state conflict, over education reform in 1968 and 
oathing in 1969, demonstrate the limits of structure and shared interests in maintaining 
church-state cooperation. These public clashes arose because the government had 
particularly strong preferences regarding education and oathing, leading to government 
policies that unintentionally imposed especially high costs on the churches.  Even with 
these two issues, public disagreements came only after failed efforts by the church to 
negotiate privately, and church leaders were careful to state their objections in very 
narrow terms that absolved President Kenyatta of personal responsibility and pledged 
continued church support for the President and his government.  
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The rest of this chapter elaborates upon the arguments presented above.  Section 2 
gives an overview of the major events and issues of the first years of Jomo Kenyatta’s 
presidency, 1963-1968, and the churches’ relationship to the government during this 
period.  The churches were silent on almost all political issues, while keeping friendly 
ties with the government through harambees and development work. Examining the 
general orientation of churches, this section demonstrates how the churches’ similar 
structures influenced them to hold back any criticisms and keep critiques private.  This 
section also addresses alternative explanations of church political activity that have been 
identified in the literature and finds them inadequate, such as ethnicity. Sections 3 and 4 
examine the two main instances of church-state conflict of the Kenyatta era, concerning 
education reform in 1968 and forced Kikuyu loyalty oaths in 1969, respectively. These 
sections details how divergent preferences of church and government hampered church 
efforts at negotiation and caused conflict despite church structures that were otherwise 
conducive to cooperation.  Section 5 examines the relationships between the churches 
and the government as they relate to the events of the latter years of the Kenyatta 
presidency, 1970-1978.  During this time, there was a slight divergence in the political 
orientations of the churches, as the Catholic and Anglican churches became slightly more 
critical of the government.  Though mild, this new criticism can be traced to the 
indigenization of leadership within these churches and the decentralization of leadership 
within the two denominations.  Section 6 concludes by summarizing the main insights of 
the chapter. 
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2 Church and State in Kenya, 1963-1968 
2.1 Churches In Kenya at Independence 
 Christianity has long been the largest religion in Kenya.  According to the 
database produced by Operation World, Christians made up approximately 42% of the 
Kenyan population around independence, numbering over four million of the over 9.5 
million citizens of the country.90 Table 2.1 details the sizes of the various denominations  
Table 2.1: Church Size, 1965-1975 
Church 
Name 
1965 1975 
Adherents 
% of Total 
Population Adherents 
% of Total 
Population 
Catholic 1332000 13.7% 2486000 18.1% 
Anglican 350000 3.6% 728000 5.3% 
Africa 
Inland 180000 1.8% 650000 4.7% 
Presbyterian 56975 0.6% 140000 1.0% 
Seventh-
Day 
Adventist 
81264 0.8% 138994 1.0% 
 
in 1965 and 1975.  Of the various Christian churches, the Catholic Church has 
consistently been the largest denomination in Kenya; its adherents numbered over 13% of 
the population in 1965.  Founded by various Catholic missionary societies operating 
throughout the territory of what would become Kenya, the Catholic Church was one of 
the few churches that had a national scope at independence.  Though smaller and initially 
                                                
90 Johnstone, Patrick, Robyn Johnstone, and Jason Mandryk. Operation World. 21st 
Century Edition. Carlisle. Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster, 2001. 1965 figures.  Unless 
otherwise noted, I use Operation World’s measures for “adherents”, rather than members.  
The former is a broader category of church followers that includes those who attend and 
participate in church activities but may not fulfill the official membership requirements of 
their denominations.  The number of adherents is thus larger than the number of 
members, but is used because it gives a fuller understanding of the scope of the churches’ 
size and influence. 
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containing a Kikuyu majority, the Anglican Church shares the national presence of the 
Catholic Church in Kenya.91  The other three denominations covered in this dissertation 
are smaller in size and narrower in their ethnic and regional character.92 The Presbyterian 
Church, Kenyatta’s childhood denomination, is concentrated among the Kikuyu and 
related Embu and Meru ethnic groups (collectively known as the GEMA community) in 
Nairobi and Central Province.  The Africa Inland Church, though initially having a 
sizable Kikuyu minority, is mostly populated by the Kalenjin and Kamba communities of 
Rift Valley and Eastern Province, respectively, and has generally associated with these 
two ethnic groups.93  The Seventh-Day Adventists are concentrated in Nyanza Province 
in the west of the country, and its membership is evenly split between the Luo and Gusii 
ethnic groups.  Table 2.2 shows the distribution of the major ethnic groups among the 
memberships of these churches.  Together, adherents of these five denominations 
accounted for almost half of the Christians in Kenya and over 20% of the overall Kenyan 
population. These churches therefore represented important religious constituencies, in 
addition to the influence they held within their respective ethnic and regional 
communities.  
                                                
91 Barrett, David B. World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches 
and Religions in the Modern World, AD 1900-2000. Oxford University Press, USA, 
1982. The Anglican presence was in fact multinational, as the Anglican churches of 
Kenya and Tanzania were administered together as a single church, the Church of the 
Province of East Africa, until the two national churches were separated out in 1970. The 
Archbishop over East Africa (1960-1970), Leonard Beecher (1960-1970), was a 
missionary from London who had long served in the Kenyan branch of the church before 
becoming Archbishop, and retired in Nairobi as a Kenyan citizen.  See interview with 
Beecher in Target, August 1970. 
 
92 Ethnic composition of churches drawn from Barrett (1982). 
 
93 Barrett 1982. 
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Table 2.2: Ethnic Composition of Churches 
  
Church Name 
Ethnic Group 
GEMA1 Luo Luhya Kamba Kalenjin2 Gusii 
Catholic 38.5% 18.9% 14.9% 7.6% 5.1% 6.8% 
Anglican2 68.6% 8.0% 7.9% 0.0% 1.1% 0.1% 
Africa Inland 20.0% 2.0% 0.0% 33.0% 27.0% 0.0% 
Presbyterian 90.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 
Seventh-Day 
Adventist 5.0% 45.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 45.0% 
1GEMA includes Gikuyu (Kikuyu), Embu and Meru Groups 
2 Kalenjin is the sum of figures for the Kalenjin group as well as figures for Kalenjin subgroups, 
including the Elgeyo, Marakwet, Pokot, Nandi and Kipsigis. 
3 Ethnic data not available for Nairobi diocese of Anglican Church, which represents about 6% of all 
Anglicans in 1970. Therefore, all percentages for the Anglican Church are lower-bound estimates. 
 
2.2 Major Events and Church-State Relations, 1963-1968  
Kenya became independent on December 12, 1963, with Jomo Kenyatta as its 
founding leader94. Kenyatta, a member of the Kikuyu ethnic group, had emerged as the 
leading figure in Kenya’s struggle for independence from Great Britain as the head of the 
Kenya African National Union (KANU), the main Kenyan political group leading up to 
independence.  Kenyatta was detained by the colonial authorities for eight years based on 
disputed charges that he was a leader within Mau Mau, a Kikuyu-led uprising that carried 
                                                
94 Independent Kenya initially operated under a parliamentary government, with Jomo 
Kenyatta as the country’s founding Prime Minister. One year after independence, Kenya 
became a republic, and Kenyatta was converted from Prime Minister to President. 
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out a violent rebellion against the colonial system that lasted from 1952-1960. The Mau 
Mau had, among other characteristics, been viewed as anti-Christian, as fighters were 
compelled to take traditional, “pagan” Kikuyu loyalty oaths and generally rejected the 
mission churches as agents of colonialism.  Those denominations closest to the colonial 
government, the Anglican and Presbyterian churches, actively participated in the 
government repression of Mau Mau.95  The mission churches’ European leaders were 
wary of Kenyatta due to his alleged ties to Mau Mau, but the churches’ growing African 
leadership was more open to Kenyatta, sending a delegation to visit him during his 
detention.96  Released due to massive pressure on the colonial authorities from Kenyans, 
including a favorable report from the African church leaders who had visited him, 
Kenyatta negotiated Kenya’s independence, emerging as prime minister in a KANU-led 
government. At Uhuru (“Independence”) Day celebration on December 12, 1963, clergy 
from the Catholic and Anglican churches appeared on stage with Kenyatta to represent 
Kenyan Christians in the celebration of the new nation.97 
Kenyatta quickly consolidated power within the young state. Within a year of 
independence, the constitution was amended to transform Kenya from a British-styled 
                                                
95 Meanwhile, the Catholic Church remained neutral to the conflict, while some 
indigenous Christian churches such as the predominantly-Kikuyu Africa Independent 
Pentecostal Church of Africa (AIPCA) collaborated with the insurgency. Ngunyi, Mutahi 
G. "Religious Institutions and Political Liberalisation in Kenya." Gibbon P.(ed) (1995): 
130-132, 150. 
 
96 Chepkwony 1987: 86.  The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) account 
of this meeting records the six leaders as Obadiah Kariuki (Anglican), Rev. Andrew 
Wambari (AIM), Rev. John Mpaayei (AIM), Brigadier Jonathan Munyi (Salvation 
Army), Rev. Charles Kareri (PCEA) and John Gatu (PCEA). 
 
97 Baur, John, and Hans Burgman. The Catholic Church in Kenya: A Centenary History. 
St. Paul Publications-Africa, 1990. 
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parliamentary democracy to a presidential system, with Kenyatta the country’s first 
president.98  A number of other amendments concentrated power in the central 
government, the ruling party and/or the office of President.99  KANU’s main political 
rival in the final years of colonialism, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), 
was soon absorbed into the ruling party.100 Kenyatta’s first vice-president, Oginga 
Odinga, led a defection from KANU to form the opposition Kenya People’s Union 
(KPU), but the new party only lasted three years before it was banned and Odinga 
arrested in 1969, ahead of the first post-independence general elections, which were held 
in December of that year.101  The churches were mostly quiet on these events.  An 
exception to this silence came in April 1968 when, in the midst of the government’s fight 
with the KPU, the head of the Anglican Church in Kenya, Archbishop Leonard Beecher, 
publicly extolled the government. The Archbishop published an open letter to Kenyatta 
praising his government and noting: ‘Although we are in practice a one party state, there 
is no dictatorship or fascism in this country…Kenyatta’s rule and government has built-in 
mechanisms for self control and criticism.”102   
In addition to political opposition, Kenyatta faced several security threats during 
his presidency, and the government’s use of force against these threats proceeded without 
                                                
98 Hornsby, Charles. Kenya: A History Since Independence. IB Tauris, 2013: 106. 
99 For a summary of the thirteen constitutional amendments passed during the Kenyatta 
presidency, see Ochieng’, William. “Structural & Political Changes” in B.A. Ogot and 
W.R. Ochieng’, eds, Development & Independence in Kenya: 107-8. 
 
100 Hornsby 2013: 95-96. 
 
101 Ibid, 214-217. 
 
102 Sabar, Galia. Church, State, and Society in Kenya: From Mediation to Opposition, 
1963-1993. Psychology Press, 2002: 78-79. 
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comment from the church community.  Disgruntled former Mau Mau fighters grew 
increasingly dissatisfied as the government refused to reward their roles in the fight for 
independence with landholdings.  These former fighters threatened to return to the forest; 
several were subsequently killed by security forces.103  In the economically marginalized 
and underdeveloped North East Province, members of the ethnic Somali population took 
up arms in a low-scale war of secession, supported by the Somali government across the 
border, from 1964-1967.104 Kenyatta also put down threats from Kenya’s military, 
including a coup attempt in 1964.105 The churches were silent concerning the 
government’s conduct in suppressing these various threats.   
After transforming Kenya into a de facto one party state, Kenyatta and his inner 
circle further concentrated power. Administrative power was wielded by officials such as 
district commissioners and provincial commissioners who were directly answerable to the 
office of the president.  Politically, Kenyatta surrounded himself with Kikuyu from his 
home district of Kiambu in Central Kenya.106  Kenyatta and his Kiambu clique sought to 
prevent rivals from emerging within the KANU government. Asian lawyer and politician 
Pio Gama Pinto, a communist and close ally of Odinga, was assassinated in 1965, the 
                                                
103 Hornsby 2013: 115. 
 
104 The government waged a war against these Shifta (“bandits:”) until 1967, when the 
Kenyan and Somali governments came to an agreement that dried up Somalia’s support 
for the shifta and effectively ended the insurgency. Branch, Daniel. Kenya: Between 
Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. Yale University Press, 2011: 34. 
 
105 Branch 2011: 37. 
106 Prominent members of the so-called “Kiambu Mafia” surrounding Kenyatta were 
Mbiu Koinange, James Gichuru, Njoroge Mungai and Charles Njonjo. See Ochieng’, 
William. “Structural & Political Changes” in B.A. Ogot and W.R. Ochieng’, eds, 
Development & Independence in Kenya (102). 
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first of several prominent political figures who would suffer suspicious deaths during 
Kenyatta’s time in power.107 
During the first half of Kenyatta’s presidency, the country experienced significant 
economic growth. Kenyatta paid lip service to “African Socialism”, as KANU’s 
economic policies were ironically named when the government published its economic 
vision as “Sessional Paper No. 10” in 1965.  In practice, Kenyatta adopted capitalist, pro-
western policies and was virulently opposed to policies that approached anything close to 
what was commonly understood as socialism.108 The clear distinction between African 
Socialism and Marxism noted in Sessional Paper No. 10 partially explain why the 
Kenyan Catholic hierarchy embraced the document, with Archbishop McCarthy 
declaring on behalf of the Catholic Church that “we recommend that our people embrace 
and propagate it in every area of our country, for it will indeed be the cornerstone of 
developing a free and united Kenya nation."109  
While Kenyatta’s economic policy was socialist in name only, those favoring 
actual redistribution, including Odinga, were labeled communists and harassed.  Instead 
of expropriating large landholdings to satisfy poor landless Kenyans, Kenyatta carried out 
an orderly transition of ownership in the so-called White Highlands, buying out European 
settlers and overseeing the resettlement of land left by those settlers who exited the 
country.  The Kenyatta government granted many of these lands to fellow Kikuyu, 
                                                
107 Hornsby 2013: 144-148. 
 
108 The KPU would criticize Kenyatta’s African Socialism as “neither African nor 
socialism.” Hornsby 2013: 162. 
 
109 African Ecclesiastical Review Vol 7, No 3. July 1965: 271.  
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creating enduring tensions with groups such as the Kalenjin who have ancestral claims to 
the land. Virtually all of the settler lands were indigenized during Kenyatta’s presidency, 
and government policies facilitated the transfer of most of the country’s economic 
activity, rural and urban, into Kenyan hands.110 At the same time, Kenyatta was sure not 
to alienate foreign involvement in the economy. “Between 1964 and 1970, large-scale 
foreign investment in commerce and industry almost doubled in Kenya.”111 Kenyatta’s 
policies, though fostering overall growth, concentrated much of the economic gains in a 
small, largely Kikuyu, elite, excluding other ethnic groups as well as many ordinary 
Kikuyus who were not well-off or politically connected enough to take advantage of 
Kenyatta’s land policies.112  In addition, widespread corruption further concentrated 
economic gains into the hands of those closest to the President.  The churches did little to 
publicly challenge these policies. Indeed, many of the large denominations benefited 
from the land policies, becoming major landholders in their own rights113 
 The Kenyatta government abolished many primary school fees and greatly 
expanding primary school enrollment, though its pledge of free primary education was 
never fully achieved for all Kenyan children. The government also devoted significant 
resources to greatly expand secondary education in Kenya, and this effort was 
supplemented by a wave of harambee secondary schools funded by parents, churches and 
                                                
110 Hornsby 2013: 194-195. 
 
111 Ochieng’, William. “Structural & Political Changes” in B.A. Ogot and W.R. 
Ochieng’, eds, Decolonization & Independence in Kenya: 85. 
 
112 See “Country Study: Kenya”. Library of Congress- Federal Research Division. 2007. 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Kenya.pdf. Accessed September 10, 2014.   
 
113 See, for example, the role of the Anglican church as landlord, Sabar 2002: 128-9. 
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other forms of civil society.114 The government also expanded the number of health 
facilities and medical personnel in the country. Despite overall improvements in 
education and health services, significant regional disparities in these services remained 
unchanged through Kenyatta’s presidency, as resources were channeled into Kikuyu 
areas at disproportionately high amounts while other areas such as North East Province 
remained underserved and underdeveloped.115  Here the churches generally provided 
active support for the government, less by their rhetoric and more by their role as service 
providers, picking up some of the slack left by the government and therefore lessening 
the pressure on the government to actually provide these services.  Only when the 
government made moves to nationalize the education system, assuming control over the 
vast networks of church-founded schools throughout the country, was there significant 
public criticism from church leadership, and then only from the Catholic Church, which 
eventually came to terms with the government. 
 
2.3 Explaining Church Political Orientation Under President Kenyatta, 1963-1968 
 The general attitude of the churches, and particularly of the national church 
leaderships, during these initial years was cordiality with the Kenyatta government and 
general disengagement from politics otherwise.  Despite the prominent role that ethnicity 
played in Kenyan politics during this era and would continue to play after, ethnic 
                                                
114 Some school fees still existed, particularly for higher levels of primary education. 
Furthermore, local school bodies implemented their own fees to replace the lost revenue 
from the discontinued government fees.  See Sivasubramaniam, Malini and Mundy, 
Karen, “Kenya: Civil Society Participation and the Governance of Educational Systems 
in the Context of Sector-Wide Approaches to Basic Education” Draft.  February 2006. 
 
115 Hornsby 2013: 140. 
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considerations were not as much of a driving point in church-state relations, contrary to 
what other studies have argued.  Structure trumped ethnicity in determining church 
attitudes toward the government.  The Presbyterian Church, Kenyatta’s boyhood church 
and overwhelmingly populated by the President’s co-ethnics, was not significantly more 
supportive of the government than other denominations with less favorable ethnic 
compositions (see Table 2.2 above). Church structure, particularly leadership 
centralization and top-level autonomy from checks and balances, nullified the ethnic 
differences of the churches, as held by Argument 1 of the opening chapter of this 
dissertation.  Ethnic considerations only came into play when combined with internal 
democracy, internal checks and balances, or inclusive decision-making rules, as 
characterized the Anglican and Catholic churches (Argument 4).  These variations in 
internal structure were slight, as were the deviations in political positions that these 
structures facilitated; as will be discussed in Chapter 3, both would become more 
pronounced in the years after Kenyatta’s death.  The following subsections examine in 
detail the  
2.3.1 Preferences and Outcomes: Government Perspective 
 Despite the churches’ numerical prominence, they initially had little to offer to 
Kenyatta in terms of political support.  Though a Presbyterian by upbringing, the 
president did not strongly identify as Christian, rarely attended church services outside of 
special appearances as a guest of honor, and practiced polygamy, which was anathema to 
the mainstream denominations.116  More importantly for church-state relations, Kenyatta 
had alternative sources of ideology and popularity upon which he could draw, especially 
                                                
116 Hornsby 2013: 202, 309. 
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in the early years of independence. To the young nation as a whole, he was Mzee (a 
Swahili honorific for an respected elder), the country’s founding father and a living 
symbol of its successful struggle against foreign rule. Furthermore, he was presiding over 
a period of relative political harmony and strong, if uneven, economic growth. Among his 
(Kiambu) Kikuyu base, he was a benefactor, personally sitting atop various patronage 
networks which channeled resources to the Kikuyu in Central Province and facilitated 
their purchases of valuable lands in the Rift Valley and elsewhere.  And to the western 
international community, his image had been rehabilitated by the smooth transfer of 
power from the British and the moderation of the new government’s policies, which 
presented Kenya as a stable country that would resist communist influence.  Drawing 
upon his reputation and early accomplishments, Kenyatta enjoyed the legitimacy and 
popularity that inspired voluntary compliance among the population. The government’s 
slogan of Harambee! – Swahili for “let’s pull together” – characterized the popular mood 
in these early years.  With this reputation and level of social clout, Kenyatta had little 
demand for legitimation or citizen mobilization from the churches, and only expended 
minimal resources and effort to maintain friendly relations with them. 
The widespread practice of harambees exemplified the dynamics of relations 
between Kenyatta and the churches.  Like other private actors within Kenyan society, 
churches would hold harambees in order to raise funds for particular projects, such as a 
new hospital or church building at a particular location.  Important church officials would 
preside over these events, and influential government officials would sometimes attend as 
guests of honor.  Kenyatta and top government officials appeared at harambee fundraisers 
and other significant events for a number of denominations, including the Catholic, 
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Anglican, Presbyterian and AIC churches.117  At these events, the featured guests would 
speak at the event and donate a token sum on behalf of the government, but their 
financial contribution was usually minor; the real value of an appearance by a cabinet 
minister or presidential advisor was that their presence drew in other important and 
wealthy individuals who would attend the harambees and publicly contribute in hopes of 
fostering connections with the government.  This scenario typified the relationship 
between a popular government and a church; the government official would lend his 
presence and provide only a small sum of money in exchange for church support, and the 
church leaders present would gain both the prestige from the government association and 
income, most of the latter coming not from the government but from private citizens 
motivated by the government official’s appearance to donate.   
2.3.2 Preferences and Outcomes: Church (Leader) Perspective 
While the government had little need for ideological support from the churches, 
these churches, and particularly their leaders, had strong incentives to associate with 
Kenyatta.  Table 2.3 lists the national leaders of the five denominations throughout 
Kenyatta’s presidency and their ethnic identities. At independence, most of these 
denominations were led by expatriates. The Catholic Archbishop of Nairobi, J.J. 
McCarthy, came from Ireland. Anglican Archbishop of Nairobi Leonard Beecher was 
                                                
117 To give a few examples that were reported in the Daily Nation and Target 
newspapers: James Gichuru, Minister for Finance, addressed the opening session of the 
Presbyterian General Assembly (Daily Nation, February 17, 1964); Vice President Moi 
made an appearance and donation at the opening of an Anglican Boys Center (Target, 
June 1968) and was guest of honor at a construction ceremony for an Africa Inland 
Church building (Daily Nation, October 6, 1969; Kenyan First Lady “Mama” Ngina 
Kenyatta was guest of honor at the consecration of a Catholic bishop (Target, December 
1970). 
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British, and the President of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church was a Norwegian.  With 
independence and the concomitant push for Africanization of Kenyan institutions, having 
the churches led by white clergy was incongruous with the spirit of the times.  
The Anglican Church under Archbishop Beecher was particularly vulnerable to 
criticism, having played a mixed role during colonialism. On one hand, Beecher had 
emerged during the colonial era as an “unofficial spokesm[a]n for African interests in the 
predominantly white Legislative Council” of the Kenya colony after unsuccessfully 
advocating for African representation on the Council.118  On the other hand, his 
participation in the Council made him an active part of the colonial structure, and his 
church was particularly close to the colonial government.119  Beecher had also chaired a  
                                                
118 Sabar 2002: 39. 
 
119 Hastings, Adrian. A History of African Christianity 1950-1975. Vol. 26. CUP Archive, 
1979. This closeness was symbolized by the location of the residence of the Bishop of 
Mombasa (who at the time governed the Anglican church throughout Kenya) just outside 
the colonial governor’s residence. (20) 
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Table 2.3: Church Leaders During Kenyatta Presidency 
Church Name 
Highest 
National 
Church Office 
Officeholder Term Ethnic Group/ Nationality 
Catholic Archbishop of Nairobi 
John Joseph 
McCarthy 
1946-
1971 Irish 
Maurice Michael 
Otunga 
1971-
1997 Luhya 
Anglican 
 
 
Archbishop of 
Nairobi 
 
 
Leonard James 
Beecher 
1960-
1970 British 
Festo Olang 1970-1980 Luhya 
Presbyterian 
 
 
Moderator 
 
 
Charles Muhoro 
Kareri 
1961-
1967 GEMA 
Crispus Gitu 
Kiongo 
1967-
1973 GEMA 
Jeremiah Kiongo 
Gitau 
1973-
1979 GEMA 
Africa Inland 
 
 
President/Bis
hop 
 
 
Andrew Wambari 
Gichuha 
1961-
1971 GEMA 
Wellington Mulwa 1971-1979 Kamba 
Seventh-Day 
Adventist 
President/ 
Bishop 
M.E. Lind 1960-1965 Norwegian 
F.G. Reid 1966-1970 American 
C.D. (Coleridge 
Dunbar) Henri 
1970-
1973 American 
D.K. Bazarra 1973-1985 Ugandan 
*Catholic (Episcopal 
Conference) 
President of 
Episcopal 
Conference 
John Joseph 
McCarthy 
 
1969-
1970 Irish 
Maurice Michael 
Otunga 
 
1970-
1976 Luhya 
John Njenga 
 
1976-
1982 GEMA 
 
commission tasked with reforming education in colonial Kenya.  The resulting “Beecher 
Report” was controversial, advocating for increased schooling for Africans while still 
limiting their opportunities to advance beyond primary education.  Beecher’s mixed 
record thus left him in a vulnerable position come independence.   
 
 
 
 
72 
 
The Presbyterian Church had also been very close to the colonial government, 
though it Africanized its top leadership prior to independence by electing Charles Kareri 
as its first black moderator, a position he would hold for two terms (1961-1967).  The 
Africa Inland Church similarly entered independence with a black leader, President 
Andrew Wambari Gichuha (1961-1971), but the church itself was not fully independent 
from its parent organization, the American-run Africa Inland Mission, until 1971. The 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church, though mainly apolitical during both colonialism and 
Kenyatta’s presidency, was at independence heavily expatriate-led in its administration. 
Thus, all the denominations under study had leaders or histories that conflicted with the 
nationalist sentiments prevalent in the new nation, and thus had reasons to benefit from 
close ties to the President. 
Chapter 1 detailed various benefits that the government can offer to the church in 
exchange for church support, namely using government resources to provide material 
benefits to the church leader and/or provide subsidies to church activities. However, a 
popular government – and Kenyatta was very popular, at least initially – need not provide 
much in the way of material benefits in order to secure church allegiance. The 
government could instead supply the churches, and especially the church leaders, with 
legitimacy and enhanced reputation.  Merely being associated with a popular political 
figure benefits church leaders and churches as organizations: publicly supporting 
Kenyatta was a means by which a church leader could improve his own reputation among 
the population, inspire more citizens to join the church, and inspire church members to 
donate more.  
The government also has the power to negatively impact the churches and their 
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leaders.  Had Kenyatta chosen to vilify the churches as colonial institutions or church 
leaders as illegitimate, such negative rhetoric would have likely hurt church leaders’ 
reputations, which could have inspired citizens to opt out of church membership or 
withhold donations. The government could also have withheld its own subsidies, and 
even actively cut into the incomes of churches and their leaders through taxes, 
regulations, or direct expropriation of property. The government also had the power to 
restrict church activities through regulations, such as denying denominations registration 
and thus rendering their operations illegal.  Such a move would make it more costly for a 
church to operate, as it must do so in secret in order to avoid the authorities, and the extra 
hassles and threat of police action is enough to discourage members from remaining with 
a church.120  
By instead promoting a friendly and reconciliatory tone with the various churches, 
Kenyatta therefore benefited the personal welfare of church leaders and the 
organizational goals of the denominations they led.  This gave the churches incentive to 
support the President.  The Catholic Church acknowledged the benefits of Kenyatta’s 
actions in the Church’s official published history, noting that President Kenyatta chose 
reconciliation over holding grudges against the Church, despite the latter still being a 
missionary-led institution at independence.121 Kenyatta chose a conciliatory approach 
                                                
120 Banning an uncooperative church was not a theoretical or idle threat. For example, the 
Legio Maria Church, a predominantly-Luo breakaway sect of the Catholic Church in 
western Kenya, was initially banned before satisfying government officials that the group 
was not political in nature (Daily Nation, June 20, 1964 and June 25, 1964). Years later, 
Kenyatta would remind a delegation from the Legio Maria sect that churches that sought 
to interrupt “the smooth running of the Government machinery will be banned 
forthwith.” (Target, November 23, 1973). 
 
121 Baur 1990: 221-2. 
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with the Anglican Church and Archbishop Beecher as well.  Shortly before leading 
Kenya into independence, the future President sent the Archbishop a letter 
acknowledging the latter’s role in bringing about independence and asking the Church to 
work toward nation-building.122 Beecher, in turn, called on Anglicans in Kenya to serve 
the new country.123   
The government also affirmed Kenyatta’s childhood denomination, the 
Presbyterian Church. As recounted in the Daily Nation newspaper, Kenyatta in 1964 sent 
his close aide James Gichuru (then Minister for Finance) to address the first Presbyterian 
Church’s first General Assembly since independence, promising religious freedom.124  
Moderator Charles Kareri, an old associate of Kenyatta, pledged the Church’s loyalty and 
service to Kenyatta and the new state.  Reverend Kareri also warned that “that there will 
be times when the Church will be called to speak out against social injustices, if there are 
any, but always in a constructive manner.”125 In practice, this latter promise would rarely 
be carried out publicly, if at all.  Though the Africa Inland Church, initially still a part of 
the Africa Inland Mission, was not particularly close to President Kenyatta, it did count 
as one of its members Daniel arap Moi, who served as Vice-President from 1967 until 
Kenyatta’s death in 1978.  At least as early as 1967, Moi was attending public events for 
                                                                                                                                            
 
122 Sabar 1995: 66-67 
 
123 Daily Nation. February 5, 1964. 
 
124 Daily Nation. February 20, 1964. 
 
125 Ibid. 
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the church and its associated mission.126 While the AIC was not as vocal as some of the 
other denominations under study, the statements it did make tended to be innocuous or 
supportive of the government. 
As will be evident throughout this dissertation, the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church is a special case. The SDA Church, similar to the Catholic Church, has a uniform 
set of SDA-specific rules and doctrines that members worldwide are meant to follow. 
Many of these regulations are derived from the teachings of Adventist founder and 
prophet Ellen G. White.127 SDA doctrine calls on church members to separate themselves 
from political matters, while remaining “loyal citizens” as long as doing so does not 
violate other church tenets.128 This separation limits Adventists engagement in political 
activities.129 Given the reputational benefits that a church leader would enjoy by 
associating with a popular government, which could have indirect benefits for the church 
in terms of increased membership and member donations, there are only have two main 
                                                
126 Daily Nation. December 4, 1967. 
 
127 For example, Seventh-Day Adventists strictly adhere honoring the Sabbath each 
Saturday, which sometimes excludes them from jobs and other forms of civic 
engagement. 
 
128 Even though we must stand apart from all political and social strife, we should always, 
quietly and firmly, maintain an uncompromising stand for justice and right in civic 
affairs, along with strict adherence to our religious convictions. It is our sacred 
responsibility to be loyal citizens of the governments to which we belong, rendering 
“unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s” 
(Matt. 22:21). Seventh-day Adventist Church Manual. Revised 2005. 17th Edition. 
Secretariat General Conference of Seventh-day Adventist: 173. 
 
129 The practical implication of these limitations on Adventists’ political activities varies 
based on the demands of governments.  Governments seeking passive acquiescence from 
religious bodies generally find the Adventists very agreeable, while governments looking 
for more active civic or political engagement can interpret the Adventist disengagement 
as defiance. 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
reasons why a church leader would not offer support to a popular government: either 
because doing so violated his personal sense of holiness or ethnics or he believed that 
doing so would somehow lower the overall faithfulness of members.  The SDA doctrine 
against political involvement satisfies the former condition by creating a moral 
impediment to close relations between the SDA leadership and the government.130   
Even if offering support for government is a violation of a leaders personal sense 
of holiness, this will only result in the leader withholding support if the weight he 
attaches to personal holiness is sufficiently large relative to the magnitudes of the positive 
benefits derived from offering support. A long-held distinction has been drawn within the 
sociology of religion literature between two types of religious organizations, generally 
referred to as “sects” and “churches.” Sects are generally thought of as younger or less 
mainstream religious groups that differentiate themselves from more established churches 
in a number of ways, including greater emphasis on proper personal behavior among 
members and separation from secular social and political life.131  The level of demands 
                                                
130 Close ties between SDA leaders and government officials may have also set a bad 
example and encouraged SDA members to become more involved with political matters, 
which would represent a decreased level of faithfulness for church members and thus 
satisfy the other condition by which church leaders refused to associate with a popular 
government. 
 
131 Johnson (1963) summarizes the distinction as follows: “The sect, interpreting the 
teachings of Jesus in a literal and radical manner, is a small, voluntary fellowship of 
converts who seek to realize the divine law in their own behavior. It is a community apart 
from and in opposition to the world around it. It emphasizes the eschatological features of 
Christian doctrine, espouses ideals of frugality and poverty, prohibits participation in 
legal or political affairs, and shuns any exercise of dominion over others. Religious 
equality of believers is stressed and a sharp distinction between clergy and laity is not 
drawn. It appeals principally to the lower classes. The church, on the other hand, stresses 
the redemptive and forgiving aspects of Christian tradition. It compromises the more 
radical teachings of Jesus and accepts many features of the secular world as at least 
relatively good. It seeks to dominate all elements within society, to teach and guide them, 
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that churches place upon their members has come to be known in the literature as 
“strictness” and has been tied to church growth and various measures of church 
“strength” such as commitment of members to their church.132 While the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church is generally understood to have started as a sect that has moderated 
over time and lessened its conflictual relationship with governments and society, the 
SDA is still viewed as a strict religious group.133 
As a particularly strict church, The Seventh-Day Adventist Church Manual 
includes an entire chapter on “Standards of Christian Living,” which gives instructions on 
a number of lifestyle issues.134 This level of attention to the everyday details of life 
implies a strong value placed on personal holiness within the Seventh-Day Adventist 
denomination.  Assuming that SDA church leaders are indoctrinated with these beliefs or 
chosen in part because of their conformity to these principles, it is reasonable to assume 
                                                                                                                                            
and to dispense saving grace to them by means of sacraments administered by 
ecclesiastical office holders. Although it contains organized expressions of the radical 
spirit of Christianity in its monastic system, it does not require its members to realize the 
divine law in their own behavior. It is conservative and allied with the upper classes” 
Johnson, Benton. "On Church and Sect." American Sociological Review (1963): 539-549. 
 
132 Iannaccone, Laurence R. "Why Strict Churches are Strong." American Journal of 
Sociology (1994): 1180-1211. 
 
133 Lawson, Ronald. "Broadening the Boundaries of Church-Sect Theory: Insights from 
the Evolution of the Nonschismatic Mission Churches of Seventh-day Adventism." 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (1998): 652-672; Cragun, Ryan T., and 
Ronald Lawson. "The Secular Transition: The Worldwide Growth of Mormons, 
Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh-day Adventists." Sociology of Religion 71.3 (2010): 
349-373. 
 
134 Seventh-day Adventist Church Manual. Chapter 13.  This chapter includes instructions 
on lifestyle choices in areas such as health (which includes abstinence from alcohol, 
tobacco and other “intoxicants and narcotics”), dress, use of various forms of media, 
recreation, and entertainment. 
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that leaders place a high level of value on maintaining personal holiness, including 
adherence to the SDA doctrine on political involvement.  
In line with this doctrine, Seventh-Day Adventist leaders were almost completely 
silent on political issues during Kenyatta’s presidency. Nyaundi attributes this to 
Adventist doctrine. “Due to the official Adventist view of church and state, its 
relationship to the state in Kenya is a distant one, being neither openly friendly nor 
openly hostile.”135 There were a couple of incidents in which there were tensions with the 
government.136  In neither instance does it appear that the Seventh-Day Adventist Church 
intended to provoke political controversy, nor did either lead to public disagreement from 
the SDA hierarchy. While the SDA would occasionally join its church counterparts in 
commenting on political issues during the later Moi and Kibaki presidencies, it remains 
starkly apolitical when compared to other Kenyan denominations during Kenyatta’s 
presidency. 
With the exception of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, however, the other 
denominations generally offered unequivocal support and loyalty to President Kenyatta 
during the early years of his presidency.  The government did not place a high value of 
this support, given the alternative sources of legitimacy that Kenyatta enjoyed.  Thus 
while Kenyatta and other government officials did offer some benefits to the churches, in 
terms of friendly relations and appearances at fundraising events, the “price” paid for 
                                                
135 Nyaundi 1995: 208. 
 
136 The government took issue with the Kenyan Seventh-Day Adventist Church’s links to 
the SDA in white dominated Rhodesia around 1968, and later the government pressured 
SDA farmers who were refusing to grow tea and coffee – substances which the SDA 
prohibits members from consuming but which are major cash crops for Kenya – to relax 
their stances. 
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church support was relatively low, as consistent with the low level of demand.  Because 
associating with the popular government brought useful side benefits to the churches and 
their leaders, in terms of legitimizing church leaders and bringing positive reactions from 
current and potential church members, the churches generally offered their support 
despite the governments only mild interest in soliciting ideological support from the 
religious bodies. 
2.3.3 Preferences and Outcomes: Shared Church-Government Interests 
While, in these early years of Kenyatta’s presidency, church leaders’ needed to be 
legitimated by the government more than the government needed to be legitimated by the 
church, there was another aspect of church-state relations that provided significant 
benefits for both parties. The government and churches found it mutually advantageous 
to work together in social service provision.  Through a combination of limited resources 
and ethno-regional favoritism, the government concentrated resources to provide social 
services in some areas, especially the Kikuyu homeland of Central Province, while 
leaving other regions, such as North East Province, underdeveloped.  Even within the 
relatively well-funded areas such as Central Province and Nairobi, large classes of poor 
citizens found themselves underserved. Churches worked to reach both the urban and 
rural poor with a variety of social services such as health and education.137  For the 
churches, helping the poor and needy was both an end unto itself and a useful recruitment 
strategy for winning converts among those being served.  By serving these populations, 
the churches relieved some of the pressure on the government to provide services.  The 
government found it cheaper in many instances to use the church to provide social 
                                                
137 Hornsby 2013: 202, 309. 
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service. Due to the churches’ motivations and resources, they would take on much of the 
cost and effort of providing services if partially subsidized or even simply allowed to do 
so without government interference.  Furthermore, the government could support projects 
by soliciting donations through harambees, limiting the actual financial contribution 
made by the government. The government therefore supported church efforts through 
joint programs, partial subsidies and by making appearances at harambees, which 
encouraged private donations for church projects such as hospitals or schools.   
Not all churches were equally equipped or equally motivated to provide social 
services.  The Catholic and Anglican churches had the largest presence in service 
provision due to their size and scope throughout the country, and the government 
therefore found these two denominations to be the most useful partners, though the state 
also supported individual projects of smaller denominations.   Though the other 
denominations in this study were not as large or widespread as the Catholic and Anglican 
churches, they were still significant presences in their respective communities and thus 
useful local partners for the government to work with in service provision.   
One useful measure of the relative amounts of services provided by the 
denominations comes from examining the churches’ role in education.  Even after 
mission schools were formally nationalized by the government in 1968, churches were 
still allowed to “sponsor” schools, contributing to the financing and administration of 
these schools and maintaining access to them for the purposes of providing religious 
education to students.  According to Barrett, by 1971, three-fourths (4706 of 6123) of the 
primary schools in Kenya were church sponsored, mostly by the churches covered in this 
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chapter.138  Of the Christian-sponsored schools, almost 40% (1876) were Catholic-
sponsored, followed by 16% (775) for the Anglican Church.  The other three churches in 
this study combined for another 23% (1073), the majority of which were sponsored by 
the Africa Inland Church and its parent organization, the Africa Inland Mission.139 All 
these churches, and especially the Catholic and Anglican Churches, were thus involved in 
most of the primary schools in the country even after the nationalization of their 
education systems.  Church run hospitals, clinics and other health facilities also supplied 
half of the hospital beds in the country.140 The mutual interests of the government and 
churches in cooperating for service provision thus provided further incentive for the 
churches, especially the larger and more equipped denominations, to maintain friendly 
relations with Kenyatta and his government. 
2.3.4 Internal Church Organization and Political Outcomes 
 In addition to church leaders’ personal incentives to identify with Kenyatta and 
the churches’ organizational interests in cooperating with the government for 
development work, the leaders of Kenya’s churches also found themselves atop church 
structures that facilitated close relationships with the President and his top aides.  Despite 
denominational differences in the various polities of the churches, in practice the 
churches operated along similar leadership lines.  Executive authority was centralized in 
                                                
138 Barrett, David B., ed. Kenya Churches Handbook: The Development of Kenyan 
Christianity, 1498-1973. Evangel Pub. House, 1973. 
 
139 Of the 4706 church-sponsored primary schools, 13% (642) were sponsored by the 
Africa Inland Church/Mission, 6% (275) by the Presbyterian Church and 3% (156) by the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church. 
 
140 Hornsby 2013: 307. 
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a single leader. These highest-ranking officials possessed different titles within their 
churches: Archbishop (Catholic and Anglican), Moderator (Presbyterian), 
President/Bishop (Africa Inland Church), and President/Executive Director (Seventh-Day 
Adventist).141 In theory, these executives were subject to oversight by governing bodies 
that were endowed with legislating and policy-making powers within their respective 
denominations.142 In practice, however, oversight was limited.  Except in times of crisis, 
these bodies only assembled periodically, their meetings ranging in frequency from twice 
per year to once every five years. This left the leader of each church in charge of most of 
the decision-making for his denomination.  As stated in Argument 2, centralized church 
leadership and decision-making authority meant that a church leader could credibly claim 
to speak for his entire denomination when dealing with government officials. 
 Close examination of the Kenyan churches’ internal structures highlights the 
importance of examining the actual structures and operations of institutions and not just 
their formal rules. The governance structures of Christian churches are generally derived 
from three distinct forms of administration (known as church polities) – episcopal, 
presbyterian and congregational. In theory, episcopal polity is the most hierarchical form 
of church polity and congregational the least hierarchical form, with hierarchy generally 
                                                
141 The leaders of the African Inland Church and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church were 
both initially referred to as president, but in 1973 the Government of Kenya banned 
organizations from using the label “President” for reserving that title for Kenyatta alone.  
Hornsby 2013: 258. 
 
142 These governing bodies, with frequency of regular meetings in parentheses, are: the 
Catholic Kenya Episcopal Conference (twice per year), the Anglican Provincial Synod 
(Anglican), the Presbyterian General Assembly (Presbyterian), Central Church Council 
(Africa Inland Church), and the Quadrennial Session of the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church (once every 4 years). Beginning  in 1970, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church 
Sessions became quinquennial (once every 5 years). 
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thought of as varying inversely to democracy.  In practice, however, the ability of actors 
other than the top national leader to influence policy are dependent on internal factors 
that go beyond the form of church polity.  
 The Catholic and Anglican churches both operate on the episcopal model. The 
Catholic hierarchy during Kenyatta’s time in power consisted of the Archbishop of 
Nairobi and a number of other suffragan bishops – seven such bishops at independence in 
1963, thirteen by 1978 – administering dioceses throughout the country.143  None of the 
other bishops rivaled Archbishop McCarthy; his position as the country’s only 
archbishop, his proximity to political power due to his placement in Nairobi, and the fact 
that Kiambu district was included within his Archdiocese, all factored to place McCarthy 
as the highest representative of the Catholic Church in Kenya in the eyes of the 
government.   
 The Anglican Church has a similar episcopal leadership structure, with an 
archbishop and bishops who preside over administer priests within their respective 
dioceses.144 Archbishop Beecher resided over the Anglican Church, which at the time 
included both Kenya and Tanzania in a single church hierarchy, officially known as the 
                                                
143 Data drawn from Cheney, David M. Catholic Hierarchy website. www.catholic-
hierarchy.org. Accessed September 9, 2014. 
 
144 The Catholic and Anglican churches both operated according to an “Episcopal” 
structure, in which authority at each level is wielded by a single individual- priests at the 
local level, bishops at the provincial/state level, and archbishops at the regional or 
national level.  The second form of church polity is the presbyterian model. In this model, 
authority at each level is invested by representative bodies (some of which are known as 
presbyteries), culminating in a national assembly.  In the final form of church polity, the 
congregational model, local congregations are largely autonomous, and regional and 
national bodies largely serve coordination roles, as the local congregations are generally 
not bound to follow directives made at a higher level. 
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Church of the Province of East Africa.145  In theory, Anglican Archbishop Beecher 
occupied a very similar role as Catholic Archbishop McCarthy due to the centralization 
of national-level authority within both denominations.  However, compared to the 
Catholic Church at the time, the Anglican Church structure provides checks and balance 
in its administrative structure by providing the individual dioceses with significantly 
more autonomy; bishops are elected within their dioceses and are autonomous in 
administering their territory; the Archbishop is regarded as more of a “first among 
equals” among the bishops.146  Archbishop Olang himself acknowledged that the 
Anglican Church in Kenya was “a federation of largely self-governing dioceses linked 
together for convenience, mutual support, guidance and fellowship.”147 This degree of 
bishops’ autonomy would eventually contribute to the Anglican Church’s increasingly 
oppositional stances (particularly in the Moi era).  
 Initially, however, the effects of the Anglican structure were mitigated by a few 
factors. At independence, there were only three other Anglican bishops in the country 
besides Archbishop Beecher, and the bishop who administered the Mount Kenya Diocese 
(which encompassed the Kikuyu districts such as Kiambu, Nyeri and Muranga) was 
Kenyatta’s brother-in-law, Obadiah Kariuki, who was supportive of Kenyatta from 
                                                
145 Archbishop Beecher’s retirement coincided with the division of the church into 
independent provinces in Kenya and Tanzania.  
 
146 This is similar to the relationship of the various national Anglican Churches to the 
Church of England, in which the Archbishop of Canterbury is considered primus inter 
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colonial times through the bishop’s retirement in 1976.148  Thus, the “checks and 
balances” that came with bishops’ autonomy actually worked in favor of President 
Kenyatta as long as the Archbishop was politically vulnerable and one of the most 
prominent bishops was a relative and friend of the President, but once this special set of 
circumstances ended, the oppositional tendencies that the Anglican structure promoted 
would begin to manifest. 
Though in theory the presbyterian form of church polity (which is the governance 
structure of the eponymous Presbyterian Church as well as other denominations) 
distributes power more broadly than the episcopal model, as representative bodies hold 
positions of authority comparable to those held by individual priests or bishops in the 
Episcopal churches).149 In practice, however, the Presbyterian Church in Kenya 
concentrates executive authority in the Moderator and his subordinate, the Secretary 
General.150 The Seventh-Day Adventist Church combines the presbyterian structure with 
elements of episcopal governance, and also places its national leader in a position of 
centralized authority. Likewise, the Africa Inland Church’s administrative structure, 
while combining elements of the Presbyterian structure and the more decentralized 
                                                
148 Festo Olang, a Luhya bishop who was elected Archbishop in 1970, administered 
Maseno diocese, encompassing the western portion of the country; Australian Bishop 
Neville Langford-Smith resided over Nakuru Diocese, covering the Rift Valley area; and 
Obadiah Kariuki, a Kikuyu and President Kenyatta’s brother-in-law, was the bishop of 
Mount Kenya Diocese, which covered all of Central Province.  In 1964, Peter 
Mwang'ombe was elected to administer a new Mombasa Diocese covering the coastal 
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congregational model, nonetheless concentrates national power in a single leader.  
Ironically, the relatively decentralized nature of these three denominations’ middle and 
lower level bureaucracies make it difficult for individuals at the local or regional level to 
amass their own prominence or influence within their denominations, thus leaving the 
national leadership’s authority to speak for their entire denominations unchallenged.  This 
combination of lower level decentralization and top-level centralization came into play in 
the later Kenyatta years and especially during the Moi era.  Developments in the 
episcopal polity denominations (the Anglican and Catholic Churches) introduced 
elements of checks and balances or decentralization of leadership within these two 
denominations. The structural changes within these two churches coincided with 
increased criticisms of the government, while the other denominations maintained 
centralization at the top and were more hesitant to criticize the government. 
 From the point of view of the government, having a single leader not only raises 
the level of confidence that the government has in the church leader’s ability to speak for 
the church as a whole, but it also means that the church can be persuaded to cooperate 
more cheaply (Argument 3).  As noted above, church leaders had multiple incentives to 
associate themselves with popular governments such as Kenyatta’s; the government 
could therefore “buy” church support at little or no cost.  When associating with a 
popular leader, the only possible costs to a church leader are incurred if he has personal 
qualms or beliefs against offering support to the government or if support would 
somehow lower the quality of church members.  While it is generally unlikely that 
supporting the government would have a clear effect on church member quality, there are 
reasonable scenarios under which a church leader may think it inappropriate to politicize 
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himself or his church by offering support to politicians or governments.  And even if a 
leader has no qualms about supporting a government per se, he may find moral issues 
with supporting a particular president, even if that president is popular. In such a 
scenario, the government will either have to pay some amount (in subsidies to the leader 
or to the church as an organization) in exchange for support, or the government will 
decide that the church leader’s “price” is too high and forego church support.  Adding a 
second national leader to a church’s hierarchy would increase the probability that one of 
these leaders would have a moral or personal objection to supporting the government, 
which would in turn make church support less likely, and/or more costly for the 
government.151   
 Church leaders’ personal preferences toward supporting government are not 
determined randomly, but are based on a number of factors beyond personal 
idiosyncrasies, including denomination (as seen by comparing the SDA Church to the 
other denominations). In Kenya, as in many countries in Africa and elsewhere, ethnic and 
regional identities influence church leaders as well.  This is both because of leaders’ 
individual preferences as members of certain communities, and because of the 
preferences of the members they directly lead.  Since decentralization of church 
leadership generally has a regional component, such as creating archdioceses in major 
cities throughout a country, it often serves to increase the influence of marginalized or 
excluded groups within churches, giving these communities’ religious leaders veto power 
or other influence over church policies.  The regional character of decentralization further 
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increases the probability that decentralized leadership will lead to less support for 
government. 
 Besides lowering the price that the government has to pay for support and 
lowering the probability of church support being vetoed by a church leader because of his 
personal qualms or ethno-regional interests, centralized leadership also facilitates 
negotiation between church leaders and government officials (Argument 1a).  President 
Kenyatta wielded power in a very personalistic fashion, doling out favors and money in 
face-to-face meetings.152 Church leaders took advantage of this.  Catholic Archbishop 
McCarthy spoke of his fondness for President Kenyatta in a 1965 interview, noting that 
he “often” talked to Kenyatta and that the President helped fund Catholic education in the 
country.153 Kenyatta’s main link to the Anglican Church appears to have not been 
Archbishop Beecher, but rather Kenyatta’s brother-in-law, Bishop Obadiah Kariuki.154 
Charles Muhoro Kareri, PCEA Moderator from 1961-1967, was an associate of Kenyatta 
from colonial times, has been described as a “counselor” and “beloved consultant” of 
President Kenyatta.155  Though not religious, Kenyatta had been educated in the 
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154 Beecher had been wary of Kenyatta during colonial times due to his alleged Mau Mau 
links. After independence, Beecher was supportive of the President, as demonstrated 
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Presbyterian Church and remained supportive of the denomination.  Though Kenyatta 
was usually sent one or more of his cabinet ministers to represent the President at the 
major churches’ events, Kenyatta personally attended several Presbyterian events 
throughout his presidency.156 AIC President Andrew Wambari was not close to President 
Kenyatta, nor were the Seventh-Day Adventist leaders.157   These two denominations 
were generally silent on political issues throughout Kenyatta’s presidency.  
While not openly supportive of President Kenyatta, these two denominations were 
not hostile or critical toward the President, in keeping with the cordial relationships that 
all the major churches enjoyed with the government during the first few years of Kenya’s 
independence.  Prior to 1970, there were only two instances of significant church 
opposition to the government. The next section details the dispute between the 
government and the Catholic Church over school reform in 1968, while the following 
section discusses the clash between the government and the major churches concerning 
Kikuyu oathing ceremonies the following year. 
 
3 Church Opposition to Kenyatta: The Catholic Church and School Reform, 1968 
                                                                                                                                            
Kareri preached the sermon at President Kenyatta’s funeral in 1978; see Daily Nation, 
September 1, 1978. 
 
156 Kenyatta personally attended the Presbyterian Church’s 70th anniversary celebration in 
1968, opening Chogoria Hospital in 1971, laying the cornerstone of the new Presbyterian 
offices in Nairobi in 1972, and even as late as 1977 hosting a ceremony to donate to a 
local Presbyterian church in honor of a deceased reverend with whom he was friends 
(Daily Nation, March 25, 1968; Target, April 1971; Target October 23, 1972). 
 
157 The Africa Inland Mission leadership had opposed the churches’ meeting with 
Kenyatta after the latter’s release in 1961, though it is unclear if Wambari was involved 
in the decision-making process regarding this meeting. See Ngunyi 1995: 133; 
Chepkwony 1987: 87. 
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3.1 The Church and Education in Kenya 
Education in pre-independence Kenya was mainly within the purview of the 
churches.  The vast majority of the schools in the country were mission schools. The 
main Protestant churches largely ran their schools through the Christian Churches’ 
Educational Association (CCEA), while the Catholic Church had its own internal system 
for managing Catholic schools. The government had long recognized the role of the 
churches in education. In 1949, the colonial government tasked Anglican L.J. Beecher 
(who would later become Archbishop) to chair a committee to make recommendation on 
improving the school system.  The so-called “Beecher Report” was controversial among 
the African population. Although it promoted expanded educational opportunities for 
Africans, it did not push for universal primary education and emphasized practical 
training for Africans. 158 Not surprisingly, the report also advocated for retaining a large 
role for the church in providing and monitoring education. Although these 
recommendations offered some improvements in the way the government was to 
approach African education, the African population was disappointed and rejected the 
Beecher proposals. 
The colonial government was aware of the political role of education. Mission 
schools were used as alternative to Mau Mau159. On the other side of the Mau Mau 
conflict was the AIPCA church, which operated mainly among the Kikuyu, had grown 
out of the Kikuyu Independent School Association (KISA) and was involved in hundreds 
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of schools.  The colonial government viewed the AIPCA as a Mau Mau sympathizer, and 
when the government declared a state of emergency in 1952, the church was banned, and 
its schools were seized and given to other, more loyal, denominations such as the 
Catholic, Anglican and Presbyterian churches.160 KANU also recognize the political 
aspect of education. The KANU manifesto of 1963 set as among the party’s main goals 
universal primary education in Kenya, along with expanded secondary and university 
education.161 
On the eve of independence, the churches sought to reaffirm their primacy in 
providing education for Kenyans.  A joint statement was issued by Anglican Bishop 
Obadiah Kariuki, who chaired the CCEA, and Catholic Archbishop J.J. McCarthy.  The 
purpose of the statement is best summed up in the following: “As the State takes over 
more and more responsibility for the administration of schools, the position of the Church 
in educational matters must be safeguarded to ensure that she can carry out her divine 
commission and give service of the highest quality”162 The statement, while affirming the 
rights of the state in providing education and enforcing standards, placed emphasis on the 
divine rights of parents and the church in education youth. 
 For its part, the government signaled early on its desire to assume greater control 
of education from the churches.  In 1964, the Minister for Education at the time, Joseph 
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Otiende, stated the aim of greater government control of education for the purpose of 
nation-building, arguing that the system of education based on church and mission 
schools ‘placed the Christian Churches in a position of privilege which has become 
inconsistent with the kind of national society, the building of which we are dedicated to 
today.”163 The government’s 1964 Kenya Education Commission Report, generally 
known as the Ominde Report, proceeded along similar lines.  The Ominde Report argued 
that “‘the time had come to relieve the churches of their remaining responsibilities for the 
management of maintained schools’”, while also continuing to “‘secure the continuing 
participation of the church in the religious life of the school.’”164 The report 
recommended the mission schools be handed over to the government, and required this 
transfer specifically for high schools and teacher-training colleges.165 The Catholic 
Church totally rejected these recommendations, while the Anglican Church engaged in 
minimal compliance, transferring most of its upper level schools to the government.166 
The Anglican Church took advantage of loopholes in the Ominde Report 
recommendations, most notably those related to church sponsorship of schools and 
harambee schools, to maintain much of the Church’s de facto control over its primary 
schools.167    
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3.2 Catholic Church Opposition to the Education Act of 1968 
The Education Act of 1968 formalized the recommendations of the Ominde 
Report.  The Act officially transferred all primary education in the country from the 
control of the missions to the government. The governments administered schools, hired 
faculty, paid salaries, provided equipment and opened new schools. The rights of church 
“sponsors” were delineated and limited, allowing the churches to administer religious 
education in the school and use school facilities after-hours.168 With the Education Act 
closing the loopholes created by the Ominde Report reforms, the Anglican Church 
complied with the new system. Archbishop Beecher said “the Anglican Church has 
reached a stage where [it is] proud to hand over control and management of schools to the 
government…We feel this step is only right and that the churches can now embark on 
other ways of helping build a strong and progressive nation.”169 The Protestant churches 
also complied with the government takeover of mission schools.  
The Catholic Church, in contrast, put up a sustained and public fight.  During the 
parliamentary debates over the Education Bill in January of 1968, the new Minister for 
Education, Dr. J.G. Kiano, had successfully opposed amendments that would have 
increased the churches’ authority over sponsored schools. The Catholic Church 
responded by releasing a series of statements to the Kenyan press expressing the 
Church’s objections to the content of the Education Act and displeasure over what the 
clergy saw as a failure of the government to properly consult with the churches ahead of 
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time.  The Catholic Church’s statements escalated in the prominence of their authors and 
the content of their criticisms. First was a statement from John Njenga, at the time the 
Education Secretary for the Nairobi Archdiocese, released on January 21. He flatly 
contradicted statements made by Dr. Kiano in parliament indicating that the churches had 
been consulted prior to the publishing of the Education Bill, and chided the Minister for 
Education for striking down the amendments that would have addressed church 
concerns.170  This statement was followed by a letter to the editor published in the Daily 
Nation newspaper on January 25, written by Caesar Gatimu, Bishop of Nyeri. The bishop 
reiterated the Church’s stand on the defeated amendments and laid out in great detail 
instances where the church was ignored, either by an inability to secure meetings with 
government officials, or by being reassured during meetings only to find their concerns 
unaddressed in the subsequent legislation.171 Finally, on February 1, a statement was 
released signed by the bishops of all nine Catholic dioceses and Archbishop McCarthy of 
Nairobi Archdiocese.172  This statement kept the defiant tone of the others, lambasting the 
government for both failing to consult with the Catholic Church and ignoring the 
Church’s written advice.  The bishops’ letter went on to detail several specific objections 
the Church has to the bill as it was written.  
First, the bishops complained that the bill took away from the Church the power 
to determine the content of religious education through “syllabus, books and curricula” 
and gave this power over to the government.  Second, the bishops complained that “we 
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are not allowed to enter the schools during the period of religious instruction to assist our 
teachers,” even for schools founded by the Church.  Third, the Education Act reduced the 
amount of time provided for religious instruction and left open the possibility of further 
reductions.  Finally, the new law did not guarantee that the headmasters or staff of former 
church schools share the faith of the founding church.  
Dr. Kiano attempted the following week to reassure the churches that they would 
continue to play a vital role in religious education in Kenyan schools.173 A follow-up 
statement from Catholic Church spokesmen rejected this pledge, acknowledging a cordial 
relationship with the Education Department but also stating that the Church could not 
rely on “reassuring speeches.”174 Instead, the Catholic Church reiterated some of the 
previous objections in the form of specific requests for changes to the law.  The Church 
demanded that the Bill be amended to include three specific rights for church sponsors of 
schools: 1) the “right of entry, ” referring the Church’s ability to enter schools in order to 
inspect religious education, 2) a “right of selection and recommendation”, giving the 
Church a voice in the selection of staff for schools run or sponsored by the Church, and 
3) “the right to control the movement or placing of [the Church’s] own staff, such as 
nuns, sisters, priests and in certain cases foreign teachers.” 
Dr. Kiano’s initial response to these demands was to take a hard-line approach.  
He bluntly stated that the government “cannot make any special provisions for any 
special groups, religious or otherwise”, while claiming that both Catholic Archbishop 
McCarthy and Anglican Archbishop Beecher had assured him of continued church 
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cooperation with government. Kiano declared that “from now on the campaign against 
the Education Act must come to an end,” giving assurances that the fears of religious 
organizations were unfounded and expressing a desire to meet with religious leaders 
soon.175  While Archbishop Beecher did not issue a response to this claim, Archbishop 
McCarthy immediately doubled down on the Catholic Church’s opposition.  McCarthy 
claimed that he had not given the assurance claimed by Dr. Kiano and expressed shock at 
having read the report, essentially accusing the Education Minister of lying in the press. 
While affirming the strong support given by the Catholic Church to the government 
generally, the Archbishop nevertheless argued that when it came to the Education Bill 
“we cannot reasonably be expected to cooperate in anything which would deprive us of 
our God-given right to teach the children entrusted to our care.”176   
With the public exchanges between the Catholic bishops and Dr. Kiano growing 
increasingly confrontational, the Minister for Education blinked.  He clarified in the press 
that his previous statement had been misquoted and that he was merely referring to 
various statements by Archbishop McCarthy concerning the Church’s cooperation with 
the government on issues of education generally, not specific cooperation concerning the 
disputed sections of the 1968 Education Bill.177  Dr. Kiano announced that talks were 
occurring between the Ministry for Education and the churches. This move on the part of 
the Minister for Education ended the public feud between the government and the 
Catholic Church.  Kiano would update parliament on the talks between his Ministry and 
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church officials from various denominations, including the Catholic Church.178 Finally, a 
joint statement released in April by the Ministry of Education and representatives for 
both the Catholic Church and the CCEA announced agreement on new regulations that 
addressed church concerns, as well as a pledge to regular consultation between the 
Ministry and the churches to review the implementation of the education reforms.  This 
statement also pledged the churches’ “continued loyalty and co-operation” in the field of 
education.179 As a postscript to the debate, Catholic Bishop Caesar Gatimu remarked on 
the resolution of the controversy during his Easter sermon that April, thanking President 
Kenyatta for assisting the churches during the disagreement with the Ministry of 
Education (though without specifying what help the President had provided).   
Subsequent reports detail the fruits of the new cooperative framework set up 
between the government and the churches for education.  The government created a new 
position for a religious education inspector for the nation’s schools; notably, this position 
initially went to an Irish Catholic priest who had spent many years working in education 
in Kenya.180  The Catholic and Protestant churches were initially allowed to operate using 
different syllabi for primary education while working to draw up a joint syllabus 
acceptable to all the relevant denominations.181  Work on various iterations of this joint 
syllabus continued into the later years of Kenyatta’s time in power, and the government 
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facilitated cooperation between itself, the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches 
through various.182 
3.3 Explaining Catholic Church Response to School Reform 
Why did the Catholic Church, and only the Catholic Church, put up such a fight 
against the requirements of the 1986 Education Bill? Understanding this incident requires 
an understanding of the relevant preferences of the Catholic Church (compared to those 
of other denominations) and the government.  The first, and most obvious answer is that 
the Catholics had more to lose. The education reforms entailed a loss of both physical 
resources, in terms of church facilities, and human capital, as the government became the 
new employer of the teachers at the formerly church-operated schools.  The Catholic 
Church was the largest provider of education in Kenya, and thus lost the most in terms of 
schools. Though education statistics from this period are fairly unreliable, some basic 
comparisons can be discerned. Father John Njenga’s 1968 statement claimed the Catholic 
Church ran one-fifth of all primary schools in the country. Sabar (2002) gives a 
significantly higher number, estimating that the Catholic Church funded 55% of all 
church schools in 1963 and 60% in 1967, compared to 29% and 33% for the Anglican 
Church in these years. 183  In absolute terms, this amounted to over 2000 Catholic 
schools. 
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In addition to the lost physical resources, the education reforms represented a loss 
of human capital as well. The Catholic Church employed a number of its members as 
teachers and school staff. In particular, the Catholics had the largest number of 
missionaries in Kenya of any denomination.184 Missionaries in Kenya were heavily 
involved in education.185 The Education Bill gave the government power to transfer 
Catholic personnel to other schools, potentially non-Catholic schools, and to place non-
Catholic personnel in Catholic schools.  While the Catholic Church thus had more human 
and physical resources to lose, the other churches also possessed significant amounts of 
school property and employed large numbers of domestic and missionary teachers.  This 
suggests that if the physical and human resources were the only factors, the Catholic 
Church might be expected to be the loudest voice protesting the education reform, but not 
the only one.  In addition to being a loss of human and physical capital, the education 
reforms also represented a loss of government subsidies, though some churches instead 
viewed it as a financial benefit, relieving them of many of the expenses of providing 
education services while still allowing the churches access for religious education.186 
To fully understand why the Catholic Church alone objected to the government 
takeover, it is necessary to understand both the importance and the content of Catholic 
education.  For the churches, education was an extremely useful tool.  It allowed them to 
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evangelize large segments of the population, exposing them to the churches’ doctrines 
during their impressionable years.  In addition to winning new converts, education was a 
very useful tool for training church members in the content of church doctrines and 
instilling in them the desire to follow these church teachings.  Controlling education thus 
had large impact for church membership, in terms of both quantity and faithfulness. So 
important was education that in 1928, the Pope’s representative to Anglophone Africa 
advised the assembled bishops of these countries that “where it is impossible for you to 
carry on both the immediate task of evangelisation and your educational work, neglect 
your churches in order to perfect your schools.”187  
Even though other churches similarly valued education for its evangelistic and 
catechistic uses, the non-Catholic denominations were satisfied that their access to the 
schools for religious instruction would be sufficient to fulfill those roles. While the 
Education Act made arrangements for the churches to carry out religious education, it did 
not seek to address denomination-specific religious doctrines. Indeed, the Minister for 
Education’s comments during debate on the bill suggested a desire to downplay 
denominational differences.188 After the bill had become law, Dr, Kiano’s initial rhetoric 
was no less accommodating of specific Catholic concerns. On the contrary, he expressed 
hope that the Catholic Church would not try to seek ‘special privileges” over other 
religious groups.189   
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The Catholic Church is especially sensitive to dangers presented by homogenized 
religious instruction. Catholicism has a much more extensive set of doctrines developed 
and collected into holy tradition and canon law over two millennia, whereas the younger 
denominations tended to have fewer specific doctrines outside of those contained in the 
Bible, as keeping with the sola scriptura emphasis of the Protestant Reformation.  During 
colonial times, the Catholic Church sought “independence to develop a system with 
Catholic religious character for Catholic schools”, and eschewed government aid in order 
to keep its independence.190  In fact, of the major churches, it was the Seventh-Day 
Adventists who come closest to the Catholics in terms of denomination-specific 
doctrines, and this church also hesitant of government control of education, though the 
SDA eventually opted to cede control rather than fight.191  With the requirement of 
creating a joint syllabus for religious education, the Catholic Church faced the prospect of 
religious instruction that focused on common denominator Christian principles, an 
approach that inherently favors Protestant denominations (who therefore accepted the 
new framework) while excluding much of Catholic doctrine.  For the Protestant churches, 
then, the reforms could be seen as a more efficient subsidy, allowing them to continue 
religious education while relieving the burden of funding the secular aspects of education 
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as well.  For the Catholic Church, however, the reforms represented a loss, as it would no 
longer be able to provide the type of education it saw as necessary to convert new 
Catholics and properly train existing ones.  The Catholic Church therefore sought to have 
a greater voice in determining the content and implementation of religious education in 
order to avoid having its teachings, and therefore its members, lost in the new system. 
Given the public rebuke that the government suffered from its spat with the 
Catholic Church, coming at the politically sensitive time when there was a formal 
opposition party in parliament, it is also necessary to explain why the government chose 
its course of action.192  From the perspective of the government, it may initially appear 
that the government was taking on an additional expense by taking on the cost of 
administering services previously provided by the churches.  In order for the government 
to rationally choose to take on this expense, at least one of two conditions must apply.  
First, the government could believe that the overall cost of directly providing education 
was less costly that providing subsidies.  Given that the government was assuming a large 
financial obligation in financing schools, this was clearly not the case.  Government 
expenditure on education rose from 14.6% of the total budget in 1963 to 30% in 
1970/1971 and 36.3% in 1976/1977, with the large majority of these expenditures used to 
pay teacher salaries.193  
The other rational explanation is that the government believed that taking on this 
extra expense would create greater returns to education.  Government control of 
                                                
192 In fact, some members of the opposition KPU party criticized the Education Bill, with 
one KPU official calling it “ ‘a slap in the face’ and ‘a violation of the role of the 
Christian church.’” East African Standard 1968. 
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education served two purposes.  First, it allowed the government to exercise quality 
control.  Rather than leaving education in the hands of the churches, which were 
primarily concerned with the religious aspects of education, the government-controlled 
education system could focus on instilling the skills and knowledge necessary to produce 
economically productive citizens.  This would in turn promote economic growth and 
ultimately raise tax revenues for the government. Second, government control of schools 
would shift the ideological focus of education away from religion and toward citizenship.  
Thus, government control of education also represented an enhancement of pro-
government ideology through schooling, which would lower the cost of ruling.  By 
allowing churches continued access to schools to conduct religious education, the 
government believed that it could accomplish these changes without lowering church 
support.   
This scheme in fact worked for the Protestant churches, but the government 
initially miscalculated by assuming the Catholic reaction would be similar.  Bureaucratic 
changeover during the markup of the bill may have contributed to this error; Dr. Kiano 
only assumed the position of Minister for Education in January 1968, just as the bill was 
being debated in parliament.194 There was also a desire on the part of the government to 
downplay denominational differences, which both Otiende as Education Minister in 1964 
and Kiano as Education Minister in 1968 both cited as detrimental to national unity.  
Thus, a combination of conflicting goals and bureaucratic shortcomings led to the 
government adopting an education policy that was initially unacceptable to the Catholic 
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Church, but even with these problems, the Catholic Church was soon brought on board 
with the changing policy.  
The central argument of this dissertation is that preferences alone are insufficient 
for understanding church-state relations and ultimately church political stances; an 
understanding of internal church structure is necessary as well.  The public feud between 
the Government and the Catholic Church demonstrates the usefulness and limitations of 
this perspective.  As detailed in the Church’s accounts of failed meetings and broken 
guarantees, this dispute arose from a breakdown in negotiation between the government 
and the Church.  Nevertheless, the incident also shows that such private negotiations 
were the preferred method by which the Catholic Church sought to address its concerns. 
Only when the government seemed unresponsive and uninterested of working out these 
issues privately, and subsequently defeated amendments to the Education Bill that would 
have addressed Church concerns, did the Catholic Church take its complaints public.  
As noted above, Archbishop McCarthy had in 1965 referred to having 
conversations with President Kenyatta “often” and specifically cited the President’s 
efforts to fund Catholic education in Kenya as evidence of the good relationship between 
the Kenyatta government and the Church. In contrast to these top-level meetings between 
the Catholic Church and the government, the initial fight in 1968 was between various 
subordinates within the Catholic Church and the government who were delegated control 
over the education policies of their respective organizations. It was only when 
Archbishop McCarthy publicly challenged Dr. Kiano’s account of previous negotiations 
that the latter dropped his hardline stance and sought accommodation with the Church.  
The fact that Kiano justified his position by claiming to have had a prior, heretofore 
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unpublicized, agreement specifically with the Catholic and Anglican Archbishops 
acknowledges that direct high-level private negotiations were the norm.195 It appears that 
President Kenyatta also directly intervened to help bring a resolution to the public spat.  
This resolution does also demonstrate, however, that these informal high-level 
negotiations were not the only way in which the churches and governments dealt with 
one another. After Archbishop McCarthy’s comments and Dr. Kiano’s response got 
negotiations going, the Church let its designated officials in charge of education policy 
handle the details, and the final agreement created institutionalized mechanisms for 
contact between church and government bureaucrats to manage the implementation of the 
agreements reached.   
 
4 Church Opposition Under Kenyatta: The Oathing Controversy 
4.1 The Churches’ Respond to Oathing 
The year 1969 saw two distinct yet related events that negatively colored the 
Kenyatta presidency. On July 5, Tom Mboya, Kenya’s Minister of Economic Planning 
and Development, was gunned down while running errands in downtown Nairobi. The 
popular politician had been a presumed major contender to follow Kenyatta as president. 
Mboya was a Luo, one of the largest ethnic groups in Kenya, with its home in the western 
                                                
195 Archbishop McCarthy’s response to the Education Minister demonstrates a notable 
qualification to the main argument of this dissertation: while top-level centralization of 
church leadership facilitates church support for government by easing cooperation 
between the church and political rulers, this centralized structure can also be effective for 
directing church opposition in cases where cooperation breaks down, though the next 
chapter will demonstrate that decentralized churches are equally effective at opposing 
governments when negotiations break down or church and government preferences are 
incompatible. 
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portion of the country. His murder sparked shock and anger across the country, especially 
from the Luo community.196 Speculation around his murder pointed fingers at the Kikuyu 
clique surrounding Kenyatta.197   
In response to the anti-Kikuyu feelings permeating the country and particularly to 
political opposition from the Luo community, the latter part of 1969, an election year, 
saw a series of “oathing” ceremonies among members of the Kikuyu ethnic group. 
During the Mau Mau uprising, Kikuyu participants swore oaths of loyalty in ceremonies 
involving consumption of goat’s blood and flesh. In 1969, Kikuyu were encouraged or 
compelled to engaged in similar ceremonies, pledging to keep the presidency in Kikuyu 
hands.  Unwilling participants were harassed and threatened. A Presbyterian elder was 
beaten to death for resisting the practice.198 Several ceremonies occurred near the 
President’s residence, implying Kenyatta’s support.199  During the summer of 1969, 
oathing had become very widespread among the Kikuyu community.  There were reports 
that the Meru and Embu, related ethnic groups, were also being oathed, as were members 
of the Kamba.200 
                                                
196 In the days after the murder, both President Kenyatta and Vice-President Moi had 
their cars stoned by angry protestors (Hornsby 2013: 208). 
 
197 The sole person arrested and convicted of the murder was Nahashon Isaac Njenga, a 
Kikuyu man. Upon his arrest, he alluded to a “big man” who was not being held 
accountable. The above account of Tom Mboya’s death and its aftermath draws from 
Gimode, Edwin. Tom Mboya. Vol. 5. East African Publishers, 1996: 49-51. 
 
198 Hornsby 2013: 211-212. 
 
199 Branch 2011: 85. 
 
200 Hornsby 2013: 211-212. 
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Although the opposition KPU party first brought the phenomenon to public 
attention by complaining about the process in Parliament in mid-August, these reports 
were vigorously denied by the government.  The Christian churches became involved in 
opposing the oaths in September.  The churches responded to the crisis due to the havoc 
and confusion these ceremonies were causing among church members, who were being 
forced to take the oaths against their Christian morals or brutalized for refusing.  The 
initial church opposition consisted of  “unofficial” actions from local clergy and regional 
church leaders in those areas at the center of the oathing crisis, such as Catholic Bishop 
Raphael Ndingi of Machakos (the homeland of the Kamba, one of the ethnic groups 
being forced to take the oath).201  
The national leadership of the churches learned of the oathing crisis from their 
lower clergy. As usual, the initial tactic of church leaders was to meet with Kenyatta and 
express their opposition to oathing, particularly on the grounds that Christians were being 
forced to take the oath or brutalized for refusing. The Catholic Archbishop for Kenya, J.J. 
McCarthy, was informed by his bishops of the practice, but declined to personally 
confront his “friend” Kenyatta over the issue.202 The Archbishop instead decided to send 
a delegation of Kikuyu clergy led by Bishop Caesar Gatimu of Nyeri. According to 
insider accounts, the meeting proceeded contentiously until the clergymen informed the 
President that religious sisters were being forcibly oathed, at which point the President 
promised that such incidents would stop.  Other church leaders visited Kenyatta as well.  
                                                
201 Bishop Ndingi was perhaps the most prominent church figure in this early opposition.  
The bishop publicly decried the oath, sarcastically exclaiming that he would also like to 
visit the President (Hornsby 2013: 208). 
 
202 Waihenya 2009: 62. 
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On multiple occasions, a delegation of church leaders visited the President, consisting of 
Bishop Obadiah Kariuki (Anglican Bishop of Mount Kenya), Crispus Kiongo 
(Presbyterian Moderator), John Gatu (Presbyterian General Secretary) and Andrew 
Wambari Gichuha (President of the African Inland Church).203  It is unclear if Bishop 
Kariuki was acting on behalf of his superior, Archbishop Beecher;204 the others 
represented the highest leaders of their respective churches.  During these meetings, 
President Kenyatta was dismissive of the oathing claims. Kenyatta would spend the latter 
part of August and most of September on the Coast, effectively limiting the opportunity 
for further private negotiations with the national church leaders who operated in or near 
Nairobi. 205 
It was only after these private visits failed to have an impact that the issue became 
a public debate. On August 12, an opposition MP raised the issue in Parliament, 
including mention of the church leaders’ visits to Kenyatta; the government denied the 
allegations.206 The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) publication Target, 
on September 1 published an issue with several articles from Anglican Church officials 
directly opposing oathing.207 The article writers were careful to only criticize Kenyatta 
                                                
203 East African Standard. October 20, 2004. 
 
204 When Beecher later made a public statement on the issue, he indicated that he would 
leave further dealings with the government to the church’s African bishops. Kariuki was 
a Kikuyu, bishop of the area where much of the Kikuyu population lived, and brother-in-
law to Kenyatta. 
 
205 Daily Nation. September 20, 1969. 
 
206 East African Standard. August 13, 1969. 
 
207 East African Standard, September  9, 1969; Target, September 1, 1969. The National 
Council of Churches of Kenya is an umbrella organization composed of a number of 
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and the government indirectly and by allusion, so as not to incur legal wrath.208 Even so, 
the Target newspaper was accused by one KANU official of being “engaged in a 
campaign aimed at inflaming tribal feelings to such an extent as to pose a threat to peace 
and tranquility” and warned that such actions would not be tolerated by the ruling 
party.209 
It was only after these instances that the churches’ top national leaders took 
official, public stands against oathing. Among the first churches to take official positions 
on oathing are two that are not among those highlighted in this dissertation, the Friends 
(Quakers) and the Nairobi Baptist Church. The Quakers were conducting their annual 
Yearly Meeting when reports of the oathing crisis were beginning to gain prominence in 
the news, and thus the church’s top officials penned a statement, unanimously agreed 
upon at the annual conference, urgently requesting the President to act against oathing 
and other threats to peace and unity in Kenya.210 The press reported on this letter on 
September 5, 1969. During Sunday church service two days later, the Reverend of the 
                                                                                                                                            
protestant and independent churches in Kenya, including the Anglican, Presbyterian and 
(during the Kenyatta Presidency) Africa Inland Churches.  In the September 1 issue of 
the organization’s Target newspaper, Henry Okullu, the magazine’s editor wrote a front-
page article titled “Killing our Unity” (possibly an allusion to Mboya’s murder) with a 
photo of Christian communion, alluding to the conflict between the Christian sacrament 
and the Kikuyu oath-taking ceremony. Okullu was critical of the churches, including his 
own Anglican church, of not speaking up more forcefully. In the same issue, the Bishop 
of Nakuru, Australian missionary Neville Langford-Smith, published a bullet-point list 
laying out why oathing was unchristian. See also Sabar 2002: 84-85; Okullu, Henry. 
Quest for Justice: An Autobiography of Bishop John Henry Okullu. Shalom, 1997: 55. 
 
208 Sabar 2002: 84-85. 
 
209 East African Standard. September 3, 1969. 
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Nairobi Baptist Church (NBC), Tom Houston, preached a sermon opposing the oathing 
practice and then led over 200 members of his congregation in signing a covenant drafted 
by NBC opposing the practice. Nairobi Baptist Church, unlike the larger denominations, 
consisted of a single congregation, thus allowing quick action. In this case, Rev 
Houston’s stand was the result of a visit from one of his church’s members, who 
recounted how she had been forced to take the oath after experiencing beatings and 
threats made against her family.211 
Among the five major Kenyan churches that are the focus of this dissertation, the 
first to respond were the Africa Inland Church and the Anglican Church. On September 
8, just one day after the Nairobi Baptist Church took its stand, the Anglican Archbishop 
Beecher commented on oathing, calling the practice “repugnant and unacceptable” and 
beyond the citizenship duties that Christians should be expected to perform.212  While 
giving his general opinion on the situation, he also explicitly deferred to the African 
bishops of the Church for further action, which took several forms. At Beecher’s request, 
Bishop Obadiah Kariuki, in whose diocese the oathing was occurring, called together the 
Diocesan Synod, which later issued a statement condemning the oathing on grounds of 
being anti-Christian and because of coercion. On the same day as Archbishop Beecher’s 
initial statement, the AIC released its own statement, offering full support for the NBC 
statement and threatening to hold demonstrations in Nairobi and elsewhere “to declare 
                                                
211 Daystar University Research Center. Celebrating the Unchanging God: The Story of 
Nairobi Baptist Church. Thomas Press (India), Limited. 2008. 
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our supreme loyalty to the Lord Jesus Christ and to protest against enforced taking of 
secret oaths.” The statement also denied that AIC President had taken the oath.213  
On September 9, the Presbyterian Church’s administrative secretary, Bernard 
Muindi, strongly condemned the practice, especially due to Christians being forced to 
partake against their conscience and contrary to the law, and called upon the government 
to put a stop to it.214  Reverend Muindi qualified his statement as representing his own 
views and not necessarily those of the Church, though his stance would be echoed in later 
church statements. The official PCEA statement would come one week later on 
September 15, after the church’s general administration committee met and listened to 
accounts from those who had been harassed over taking the oath. The PCEA statement 
strongly condemned oathing and called upon Kenya’s Parliament to reconvene to discuss 
the issue. The church also pledged action, including sending details of victims’ reports to 
the President and convening a day of prayer later in the month, during which the church 
would agree to a “covenant of unity.”215   
The Catholic Church publicly entered the fray on September 11 with a pastoral 
letter, condemning oathing as “against human dignity and freedom.”216  The bishops had 
previously stated that statement was “overdue” but that they were waiting for bishops 
who had not been able to attend the bishops meeting in person to read and approve of 
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statement.217 The letter was generally seen as weak compared to some of the other church 
statements. The Adventist Church provides an exception to the general church response, 
as it practiced its usual abstention from political affairs, speaking only to reaffirm its 
loyalty to God and to the government.218 
The churches were joined in their efforts by the continued statements against 
oathing by KPU officials and condemnation of the practice by secular civil society actors, 
including ethnic associations and trade unions.  The pressure was too much for the 
government. On Sept 19, Vice President Moi read a statement condemning the oathings 
and instructing the police to investigate the incidents and arrest those administering oaths 
by force.219 The churches did not let up. On Sunday, September 21, Anglican Bishop 
Kariuki held a service attended by thousands in which his Mount Kenya Diocese, which 
covered the Kikuyu homeland of Central Province, presented a statement condemning the 
oathing and calling upon ”the Government and its forces to uphold law and order and to 
restore the stability of [the] country.”220 The Presbyterian Church held a similar event of 
comparable scale the following Sunday at its historic Church of the Torch in Kikuyu 
town, with other events being held in various Presbyterian congregations.221 The 
Presbyterian service collected money for a PCEA elder who had recently died from 
injuries inflicted upon him when he refused to take the oath.  By early October, the 
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government was ready to declare that oathing was no longer occurring in the country, 
ending the controversy over the practice.222 
4.2 Explaining the Oathing Controversy: Preferences and Structure 
Though implemented for secular reasons, the oathing phenomenon represented 
the greatest single threat to the major churches in the Kenyatta era.  It is clear that oathing 
offered no benefits to the major denominations and was a significant threat to the 
churches for a number of reasons.  Most significantly, the phenomenon threatened to both 
detract from church membership and lower the faithfulness of remaining church 
members. Much of the on-the-ground resistance to oathing came from devout Christians 
who refused to take the oath because they viewed it as an affront to their beliefs.  
Christians had given similar resistance to the Mau Mau oath in the 1950s.  The churches 
thus saw their members and lower-level officials being intimidated, brutally assaulted and 
in at least one case killed by the oath-enforcers.223  
For the church leaders, letting the oaths go on would have continued the 
widespread victimization of their members. Furthermore, some Christians relented under 
the pressure and took the oath, causing crises of faith that affected their participation in 
their churches.224  If allowed to continue, the Kikuyu loyalty oaths could have 
                                                
222 Daily Nation. October 3, 1969. 
 
223 An elder of a Presbyterian church and his wife were beaten after refusing to 
participate in the oath, with the husband dying of his injuries. was beaten to death after 
refusing to participate in the oath. This death was front-page news in the country’s two 
most prominent newspapers, and his funeral brought out thousands of mourners including 
the top leadership of the Presbyterian Church.  East African Standard, September 22, 
1969.  Daily Nation, September 22, 1969. 
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discouraged many more church members from continuing to participate in their churches, 
which would also have downstream effects on the amount of offerings the churches could 
raise from their members.  The oaths were intended to secure Kikuyu loyalty to the 
KANU government in the face of political opposition. They were thus very divisive, and 
this priming of ethnic animosity threatened to affect church members’ ability to interact 
and worship together, as did the divisions between those who choose to participate in 
oathing and those who objected on moral grounds.  This would represent a significant 
decrease in faithfulness of members, who were being primed and encouraged to adopt 
ethnic animosities that were at odds with the doctrines of love, unity and cooperation that 
were central to church doctrines.225  
These divisive effects thus threatened a sharp decline in church attendance and 
membership. Oathing also potentially affected church leaders, specifically those who 
belonged to the Kikuyu and other groups.  Public perception that church leaders had 
taken the oaths would have damaged the reputation of these leaders, as noted by AIC 
President Gichuha’s firm denial that he had participated in an oathing ceremony.226  As 
                                                                                                                                            
participated, and Houston had to arrange a “private cleansing Communion Service” for 
her in order to absolve her of the guilt she felt and reaffirm her religious commitment. 
Daystar University Research Center 2008: 56-57. 
 
225 These church concerns were identified in an editorial in the East African Standard 
newspaper: “Apart from its anti-Christian ethos, or possibly because of it, oath taking 
divides the takers from the non-takers, while other tribes who are uninvolved in the ritual 
react suspiciously.  The administrators and the takers are removed socially, politically, 
tribally and, innately, spiritually from the repudiators. Ultimately they arrive at a 
confrontation which can split the people down the middle, to their lasting disadvantage. 
East African Standard. September 9, 1969. 
 
226 Not taking the oath could also damage church leaders’ credibility among members 
who were in favor of oathing and ethnic solidarity; thus the existence of this practice 
created a dilemma for church leaders, who would likely lose credibility with some 
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stated in a later Presbyterian publication recounting the controversy “Some people did not 
see the evils of oathing, and the period was so critical that there could have been a schism 
had the church not acted so quickly and boldly.”227  
Beyond these direct effects on church members willingness to remain with their 
churches and participate in church activities, oathing also called into question the 
supremacy of Christianity over other allegiances.  The oath givers were implicitly 
enforcing a rival allegiance to Christianity with the tacit, if not active, support of the 
government. Church leaders therefore felt compelled to challenge what they saw as 
government endorsement of an unchristian practice that threatened to undermine 
Christian morals and Christian beliefs among those who agreed to participate, as well as 
threatening the safety and wellbeing of those who did not participate.  The belief that the 
Kikuyu oathing was antithetical to Christianity was reflected in Reverend Okullu’s 
September 1 Target article, “Killing Our Unity,” which explicitly argues against oath-
taking on scriptural grounds and implicitly portrays oathing as sacrilegious by including a 
picture and captioned description of a Christian communion service. 
From the point of view of the government, oathing was initially a way of 
enforcing solidarity within the Kikuyu community.  Specifically, it can be viewed as a 
way of forcibly instilling pro-government ideology within the ethnic bloc that the 
government considered its de facto minimum winning coalition.  Looking toward a 
general election at the end of 1969 and facing political threats from a Luo community 
                                                                                                                                            
segment of their membership for either option (participating or objecting) available to 
them. 
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angry over Tom Mboya’s murder and an opposition party within parliament, Kenyatta or 
his inner circle felt the need to secure their support base among the Kikuyu and their 
ethnic allies such as the Meru and Embu. There has been speculation that the government 
consulted with church leaders and obtained the latter’s tacit approval before 
implementing the oathing plan, though this seems unlikely given the intensity of the 
church response.228  In practice, the government either did not anticipate the 
unprecedented level of opposition that the churches would raise, or simply calculated that 
the loss of church support would be worth the benefits.229 Despite the churches’ efforts, 
which ultimately brought government action against oathing, the practice had already run 
its course among the Kikuyu population and the goal ethnic solidarity among the Kikuyu 
had already been reached.230  Furthermore, the government likely anticipated that church 
leaders would seek to maintain friendly relations with the government apart from the 
churches’ opposition to oathing, as in fact happened.   
4.3 Ethnicity and the Churches’ Response to Oathing 
Given the shared threat that oathing posed to the major Christian churches, the 
responses of all the denominations (except the Seventh-Day Adventist Church) were in 
many ways similar, though with some variation.  The Anglican Church, Africa Inland 
                                                
228 Murray-Brown, Jeremy. Kenyatta. New York: EP Dutton, 1973. Cited in Hornsby 
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229 Specifically, the gains in pro-government ideology that would result from oathing 
would outweigh the loss in church ideological support that would come along with 
promoting this practice. 
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Church and Presbyterian Church all responded within two days of the Nairobi Baptist 
Church sermon. The Catholic response, though “overdue”, came four days after the NBC 
sermon. The content of all the churches’ statements conformed to a common model. 
While generally pledging supreme allegiance to Jesus Christ, the statements all go out of 
their way to affirm church loyalty to President Kenyatta and/or the Government, or to 
make it clear that the church opposed extra-legal opposition to the Government.  On the 
critical side, the churches statements were unified in opposing oathing on the grounds of 
coercion, and described the practice as unchristian and contrary to the country’s 
constitution.231 None of the statements directly implicated President Kenyatta or the 
government for conducting the oathing.  
Despite these similarities, there were differences in the churches responses that 
reflected the level of exposure they had to the oathing phenomenon. Because oathing 
primarily affected the Kikuyu community and related groups such as the Meru, Embu and 
Kamba, the churches that were mainly populated by members of these groups responded 
most forcefully.  The Anglican, Presbyterian and AIC denominations all had significant 
numbers of GEMA members among their adherents (as well as Kamba in the case of the 
AIC, and these three churches had stronger reactions against oathing than the more 
diverse Catholic Church (see Table 2.2 above).  Of these three, the two with Kikuyu 
majorities, the Anglican and Presbyterian churches, were the most exposed to oathing due 
to their Kikuyu majorities, and these two churches had the strongest responses against 
oathing.    
                                                
231 Section 78(4) of the 1969 version of the Kenyan constitution stated “No person shall 
be compelled to take an oath which is contrary to his religion or belief or to take an oath 
in a manner which is contrary to his religion or belief.” 
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The relative strength of the churches’ opposition to oathing can be examined 
through comparison of the content of the churches’ statements and the actions they took 
subsequently.  The Anglican, Presbyterian and AIC statements all made demands of the 
government. The Anglican and Africa Inland Churches both called on the government to 
act to protect citizens from forced oathing, while the Presbyterian Church requested 
Parliament reconvene to discuss the matter.  The Anglican statements go slightly further 
in implying government involvement or complicity in the oathing, stating that such oaths 
could not “be required of us by the State” and stating that “that the Government should be 
pressed to accept a Christian’s word or written assurance of his loyalty as sufficient”, 
thus implying that the government was behind the oaths. The Catholic Church’s 
statement, generally regarded as weak, made no demands on the government, simply 
including a vague call for Christians to pray for the country and its leaders.  
 In addition to looking at the words of the various churches, the intensity of their 
responses to the oathing crisis can be measured by the actions taken by the different 
denominations.  Again, the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches, the two denominations 
which drew a majority of their members from the GEMA ethnic groups, had the strongest 
response, reflecting the level of threat that oathing posed to these two churches.  Both the 
Anglicans and Presbyterians held massive anti-oathing events that drew thousands of 
people to attend.232 Following the model set by the NBC service a few weeks earlier, 
each of these services included what amounted to a counter-oathing ceremony, in which 
the crowd approved of a statement authored by the respective church pledging loyalty to 
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God and the government while condemning the practice of forced oathing.  The Africa 
Inland Church in its initial statement threatened to engage in mass action instead, but did 
not carry out such activities.  The Catholic Church left its response at the statement issued 
on September 11, neither threatening nor carrying out any type of mass action.   
As noted, the only comment from the Seventh-Day Adventist Church was a 
statement reaffirming its loyalty to the government.  This is consistent with the church’s 
apolitical stance during this era, largely a result of SDA doctrine.  In addition to the 
Seventh-Day Adventist prohibition against becoming embroiled in political controversy, 
the churches’ ethnic and regional makeup also discouraged taking action on the oathing 
crisis.  The SDA Church had its base in the western area of the country among the Luo 
and Gusii, far away from the Kikuyu areas that were at the epicenter of the oathing 
phenomenon.  The President of the SDA Church in Kenya was an American. This limited 
exposure to the oath-taking happening in the center of the country presented little reason 
for the SDA to supercede its principle of abstention from political action. 
4.4 Church Structure and the Churches’ Response to Oathing 
As stated earlier, the centralized structures of the churches facilitated cordial 
relationships with the government. Examining the churches campaign against oathing 
highlights the roles of both church structure and church preferences in influencing 
political action. While this organizational feature of the churches did not prevent them 
from speaking out against the oathing rituals, it did influence the timing of the churches 
response.  As noted, the churches only spoke publicly about the oaths after the political 
opposition had done so, despite the fact that church members were the main victims of 
this practice and had informed their leaders of what was happening.  Consistent with this 
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dissertation’s arguments concerning church structure, the church leaders’ first response to 
the oathing crisis was to privately take the issue to President Kenyatta, as they had done 
with other issues during the Kenyatta administration. Thus, we see the churches having 
multiple private meetings with Kenyatta over the issue.  The two Kikuyu clergy who 
were national-level church leaders, Presbyterian Moderator Crispus Kiongo 
(accompanied by the number two official in the Presbyterian Church, General Secretary 
John Gatu, who was also a Kikuyu and politically active in this era) and Africa Inland 
Church President Andrew Wambari Gichuha, went in person to visit President Kenyatta.  
The Anglican and Catholic churches, both headed by expatriates at the time, delegated 
negotiations to high-ranking Kikuyu clergy within their ranks.233 The various 
denominations’ Kikuyu clergy could speak to President Kenyatta from a position of 
shared community.  When the church’s fight with the government over oathing became 
public, Anglican Archbishop Beecher was explicit in his public comments on oathing that 
he was leaving the further details of the Anglican Church’s response to its African clergy.  
Future Catholic Archbishop Raphael Ndingi, who at the time was a Bishop of one of the 
areas being affected by the forced oathing, recalls that Archbishop McCarthy declined to 
directly confront President Kenyatta based on his friendship with the President.234  
                                                
233 Githiga argues that “the expatriates were hesitant to be involved in post-independent 
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It was only after the efforts at private mediation were tried several times and 
failed that the churches went public with their challenges to the government to stop the 
oaths.  Even then, the church statements were careful to distance the President from the 
practice, despite the evidence that he was at least complicit in the oaths, and affirmed the 
churches’ overall loyalty to the government, thus preserving as best they could the 
churches friendly relationships with the Kenyatta government. The President also 
attempted to take advantage of the direct top-level contacts facilitated by church 
centralization.  By the time of the Anglican and Presbyterian mass rallies against oathing, 
Kenyatta had returned from his extended stay on the Coast. He initially responded angrily 
to the church demonstrations, even challenging his brother-in-law, Anglican Bishop 
Kariuki, telling the bishop that “you should be the last person to undermine me.”235 
Kenyatta also summoned the Moderator and General Secretary of the Presbyterian 
Church to meet with him, but after haranguing the church leaders, Kenyatta finally 
listened to their criticisms and pledged to stop the oathing.236 Though placing a dent in 
church-state cooperation, the confrontation between the churches and the government 
over oathing did not prevent the churches from continuing generally cooperative 
relationships. 
 
5 Church Political Orientations, 1970-1978: Divergence and Continuity 
5.1 Major Events and Church-State Relations, 1970-1978 
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 As time went on, circumstances in Kenya and in the churches changed 
significantly, leading to more measured responses from the churches toward the 
government. President Kenyatta lost some of the prestige and popularity that he held 
when Kenya first gained independence.  Prior to independence, KANU had largely been 
an endeavor of the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups.  Odinga’s defection and the 
government’s suppression of his KPU opposition party, as well as the murder of Tom 
Mboya, were catalysts in a major split between these two communities, leading to Luo 
opposition to the government.  Though this was the most notable example of a 
disaffected community, it was not the only one.  Ethnic tensions, political rivalries and 
economic disparities eroded the national unity that had characterized the early years of 
the Kenyatta presidency. The government foiled a mutiny plan in 1971, and this event 
was used as an excuse to replace military officers from other ethnic groups, such as the 
Kamba, with Kikuyu.237 Mboya’s murder was followed by other mysterious deaths of 
political figures: C.M.G. Argwings-Kodhek (another Luo) in 1969 and Ronald Ngala 
(from the Giriama subgroup of the Mijikenda people, and the most prominent politician 
from the Coast Province) in 1972. Most of the political assassinations and mysterious 
deaths went by without church comment. Despite operating under de facto one party rule 
after the KPU’s banning in 1969, Kenyatta still faced dissatisfaction amongst the 
population and dissent from within the ruling KANU party. These oppositional forces 
featured prominently in the 1974 election, the final general election of Kenyatta’s 
presidency.   
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During the 1974 campaign, even some of the church leaders voiced a level of 
discontent at the state of affairs in Kenyan politics. The national leadership of the 
churches had maintained their support for the government during the political clashes 
with the KPU (1966-1969) and during the uproar over Mboya’s murder in 1969, only 
objecting to the Kikuyu oathing that followed Mboya’s killing because these oaths 
negatively impacted Christians who refused to participate in these ceremonies. In the 
1970s, relations between the church and government were more mixed, particularly for 
the Catholic and Anglican denominations. Ahead of the 1974 national elections, the 
Catholic bishops released a public letter condemning abuses in the voter registration 
process and criticizing MPs who were in office for selfish reasons and had not been 
attentive to their constituents’ needs.238  Anglican Archbishop Festo Olang, who had 
succeeded retiring Archbishop Beecher in 1970, addressed the upcoming 1974 election 
by warning African leaders to avoid greed, lest they suffer a similar fate to Ethiopian 
Emperor Haile Selassie, who had recently been deposed.239 These criticisms did not 
directly name President Kenyatta, who would continue to be personally lauded in church 
leaders’ remarks, but they represented a level of criticism not seen in the early days of the 
Kenyatta presidency.240 The Catholic and Anglican comments reflected the attitude of the 
people as seen through the results of the vote; half of the incumbent MPs were voted out 
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of office, including four cabinet ministers, while several critics within the party won re-
election.241 
Kenyatta’s government increasingly became known for its ethnic favoritism 
toward the Kikuyu over the other ethnic groups.  Even within the Kikuyu community, 
tensions rose between those from Kenyatta’s own Kiambu District, who were given most 
influential posts in Kenyatta’s government and favored by his policies, and the Kikuyu 
from Nyeri and Muranga Districts.242  In addition to geographical differences, the Kikuyu 
were also divided by class, with a few privileged members of the ethnic group becoming 
wealthy in land and money during Kenyatta’s rule while a large underclass of landless or 
indebted Kikuyu grew dissatisfied with the government’s policies.   
Josiah Mwangi “J.M.” Kariuki, a populist MP who led the unofficial opposition 
within KANU during the first half of the 1970s, actively appealed to the excluded Kikuyu 
along both regional and class lines, as he was from Nyeri and championed major land 
reform, and he also appealed to disaffected Kenyans of other ethnic groups.243  Kariuki’s 
popularity – he was seen for a time as the clear frontrunner to succeed Kenyatta – 
represented the widespread dissatisfaction that had developed to Kenyatta’s policies, and 
the MP’s murder brought protests and civil unrest.   
By the time of J.M Kariuki’s murder in 1975, the top leaders of some of the 
churches were willing to put limited distance between themselves and the government by 
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supporting investigation into Kariuki’s murder and explicitly endorsing the rights of 
citizens to protest over the death.244 Thus, some churches, particularly the Catholic and 
Anglican churches, were more willing to offer criticisms in the 1970s than they had been 
in the 1960s.  This change was notable but also moderate, as the church leaders still 
offered support to Kenyatta himself and offered no direct criticisms of the government. 
Nevertheless, what accounts for this divergence in church attitudes? 
5.2 Explaining Church Political Orientation Under President Kenyatta, 1970-1978 
 In part, the adjustment of some of the churches’ political attitudes, from 
uncritical support to more measured but still loyal stances, reflects the changing mood 
within the country.  While the political controversies of the late 1960s were largely a 
dispute between the government and a specific community, the Luo from Nyanza 
Province in the far west of the country, by 1975 discontent had become widespread.   By 
the time of Kariuki’s murder, association with the government, especially in the midst of 
such political controversy, did not bring church leaders the same benefits from the 
population – reputation, increased church membership or increased donations – that being 
a friend of Kenyatta brought in earlier years.  
In addition to the changing political climate of the country, which diminished the 
government’s ability to supply legitimacy to the church leaders, another change had 
occurred within the leadership of the churches that decreased the church leaders’ demand 
for external legitimation.   By 1975, the national leadership of each of the major churches 
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had changed hands.245  This turnover was exogenous to the political situation in Kenya. 
Catholic Archbishop McCarthy and Anglican Archbishop Beecher left office upon 
turning 75 and 65, respectively, the mandatory retirement ages within their 
denominations.  The Presbyterian Church limits Moderators to a maximum of two terms 
of three years each, and all Moderators since independence have held their positions for 
six years.  While the SDA does not have term limits, its leaders left Kenya for reasons 
unrelated to the situation within Kenya.246 The story is less clear for the AIC, but 
missionary Erik Barnett recalls that Andrew Wambari Gichuha (who left office in 1971, 
four years before his death) retired from leadership in the AIC due to his age and failing 
health.247 
While the retirements of the churches initial post-independence leaders were 
exogenous to Kenyan politics, the processes by which their replacements were chosen 
were mixed on this regard. In the international denominations, the Catholic and Seventh-
Day Adventist Churches, leaders were chosen from above without much focus on local 
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in 1965, two Americans led the Church: F.G. Reid (1966-1970) and C.D. Henri (1970-
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politics. Maurice Otunga’s seniority within the Catholic hierarchy made him a clear 
choice for Archbishop.248 In the case of the SDA, its top Kenyan leaders remained 
expatriates who were mainly brought in to lead the Kenyan church from assignments 
elsewhere. Even the first African leader of the Kenyan SDA Church, D.K. Bazarra (who 
took office in 1973) came from neighboring Uganda, which was at the time 
administratively tied to Kenya.  
Internal Kenyan politics appeared to play a greater role in the leadership selection 
process of the Anglican Church.  The 1970 election of Festo Olang, a Luhya bishop who 
led the Maseno Diocese that encompassed western Kenya, over Obadiah Kariuki to the 
position of Archbishop of the Anglican Church has been viewed as a move by the 
Anglican Church to distance itself from Kenyatta.  This election places view on the role 
of internal democracy in church politics.  Unlike Leonard Beecher, who was appointed 
Archbishop of East Africa, in 1970 the selection for the Archbishop for Kenya was done 
through election, with the bishops and other representatives of the Anglican dioceses 
serving as electors.  Though Kariuki was close to Kenyatta and Kikuyu made up a 
majority of Anglicans at the time, most of the Kikuyu were concentrated in one of the 
Church’s dioceses, Mount Kenya.249  Because the other dioceses had equal votes, the 
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electorate was thus disproportionately outside of Kenyatta and Kariuki’s power base, and 
by this time discontent within Kenya had risen against Kenyatta and his Kikuyu clique 
from the Luo, who along with the Luhya comprised most of the population of Olang’s 
own Maseno diocese, and various other groups.  The Presbyterian and AIC elections 
proceeded along ethnic lines.  The former, with its base among the Kikuyu and related 
Embu and Meru ethnic groups (collectively known as GEMA) has since independence 
always chosen leaders from among this ethnic bloc. Likewise, the AIC is largely 
composed of the Kalenjin and Kamba ethnic groups, and after the retirement of AIC 
President Andrew Wambari (a Kikuyu) in 1971 and his succession by Wellington Mulwa 
(a Kamba), the leadership of the denomination has alternated between the Kamba and 
Kalenjin. 
Unlike the situation in 1969, by 1975 all the major churches were under African 
leadership.  All the national church leaders were Kenyan except for Seventh-Day 
Adventist President D.K. Bazarra (in office 1973-1985), who was from neighboring 
Uganda.  Catholic Archbishop Maurice Otunga and Anglican Archbishop Festo Olang 
were both members of the Luhya, one of the main ethnic groups of Kenya hailing from 
Western Province.  As such, they did not suffer from the stigma of colonialism that could 
have been employed against their predecessors.  While Otunga was chosen by Rome, 
Olang was elected by the bishops and representatives of the clergy and laity within the 
Anglican Church.  The new leaders who were in charge of the churches by 1975 had less 
incentives to associate with the government due to the increasing unpopularity of 
                                                                                                                                            
ethnic data is not given for the Diocese of Nairobi, this diocese was directly administered 
by the outgoing Archbishop Beecher, who apparently favored Olang over Kariuki. See 
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Kenyatta’s ruling clique and its policies, and the church leaders had less need to be 
legitimated as they were all African and did not have a stigma of participation in 
colonialism.  Thus these leaders could afford to occasionally part ways with the 
government.   
Nevertheless, it was only the Anglican and Catholic Churches that occasionally 
exercised this leeway for criticism.  In these two churches, but not in the other 
denominations understudy, changes had occurred within their internal structures that 
encouraged greater independence from the government.  As noted above, the pro-
government effects of top-level leadership centralization in the Anglican Church were 
mitigated by the autonomy of the Church’s bishops within their individual dioceses.  
Initially, this worked in Kenyatta’s favor as long as the number of bishops was small and 
Kenyatta’s brother-in-law occupied a key bishopric.  By the time of J.M. Kariuki’s 
murder in 1975, the number of Anglican dioceses had expanded due to the 1970 division 
of the Maseno Diocese in western Kenya into two dioceses that more or less covered the 
Luhya-dominated Western Province (Maseno North Diocese) and the Luo homeland of 
Nyanza Province (Maseno South Diocese).  The Anglican leadership selection 
procedures were democratic, with bishops elected within their individual dioceses.  In 
1975, the Luo Anglicans of Maseno South elected as their new bishop Reverend Henry 
Okullu, who had been a relatively outspoken voice of criticism from within the church’s 
lower ranks.  Just a few months after J.M. Kariuki’s death, the prominent Mount Kenya 
Diocese would also be split into two. While Kenyatta’s relative, bishop Obadiah Kariuki, 
retained his leadership position in Mount Kenya South Diocese (headquartered in 
Kiambu), the new Mount Kenya East Diocese elected Reverent David Gitari, another 
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outspoken Anglican who had preached a series of critical radio sermons about J.M.’s 
murder and had been chastised by the government for doing so.250 The election of these 
particular bishops was endogenous to Kenyan politics, as their elections can be seen as 
rewards for their earlier critical stances, the structures that allowed them to advance in the 
Anglican hierarchy were exogenous to Kenyan politics, having been in place prior to the 
contentious political atmosphere in which they operated. The Anglican Church, with its 
autonomous administrative divisions and internal democracy, filtered up popular 
discontent against the government and contributed to church independence from the 
government. 
The Catholic Church underwent an exogenously determined alteration in 
leadership structure that also lessened the pro-government tendencies of the Church.   
Kenyan independence coincided with the worldwide Catholic Church’s Second Vatican 
Council, popularly known as “Vatican II,” which lasted from 1962 until 1965. One of 
these reforms was the creation of national “Episcopal Conferences” that gathered all of a 
country’s bishops together into a body that deliberated on and decided the national 
churches’ stances on relevant social and political issues. These conferences did not 
replace the formal hierarchical structure of Catholic leadership, but created a parallel 
structure with greater internal democracy. The Episcopal Conferences were headed by a 
President elected for a set term from among the countries’ bishops by those bishops 
themselves, and the decisions of a conference were to be made by two-thirds majority.251 
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The Kenyan Episcopal Conference (KEC) was inaugurated in 1969 with Archbishop 
McCarthy serving as its first President; Archbishop’s McCarthy and then Otunga would 
head the KEC from 1969-1976.  Though the top leadership of this new structure initially 
coincided with the leadership of the traditional church structure, the democratic nature of 
the KEC brought about greater autonomy from government cooptation, as evidenced by 
the bishops’ letter ahead of the 1974 election.  As contended in Argument 4, the changes 
in the internal leadership and decision-making structures of the Anglican and Catholic 
churches interacted with political factors within Kenya, such as declining government 
popularity, to bring about relatively critical stances from these two denominations. The 
other denominations largely maintained their centralized leadership structures.  The 
Presbyterian Moderator, AIC Bishop and SDA Executive Director remained the top 
national leaders of their respective denominations.  These leaders did not venture to 
criticize the Kenyatta government, even at the height of the government’s unpopularity.   
5.3 Structure, Preferences and Limited Divergence of Church Political Orientations 
The distinction between these denominations and the Catholic and Anglican 
churches, in terms of both structure and political orientation, should not be overstated.  
Even the churches that did criticize only did so mildly. Despite the various structural 
features of the Catholic and Anglican churches highlighted above, each of these 
denomination still had a single national head who could negotiate with the government 
on behalf of their church and who be held accountable for falling too far out of line with 
the government. The two Archbishops of the later Kenyatta years, Otunga and Olang, 
employed private negotiation as the preferred method of the church heads.  Archbishop 
Otunga had an early experience dealing with Kenyatta when his Archdiocese became 
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involved in a land dispute with a group of local politicians. Kenyatta personally stepped 
in to settle the dispute, holding a meeting with Otunga and the others involved and ending 
the dispute in favor of the Church.252 After the murder of J.M. Kariuki, Cardinal Otunga’s 
response was to meet privately with Jomo Kenyatta and urge the President to work 
toward reconciliation.253 Anglican Archbishop Olang employed a similar strategy in his 
relationship with government. As he says in his autobiography:  
During my years as Archbishop I did not find relationships with government or 
international figures difficult. My approach, if there is a matter in dispute, has 
always been to try to meet the person concerned privately, look for common 
ground and, if necessary, seek mutual forgiveness. By doing this one can avoid 
open conflict and show that if there is any hostility it is not on the side of the 
church. Of course there are issues on which one cannot compromise, but these 
principles should be self-evident.254 
 
Other factors also ensured that none of the churches strayed too far from their 
friendly relationships with the state.  Government officials still benefited the churches 
financially through their appearances at harambees.  Several important officials within 
Kenyatta’s inner circles had important ties to the churches.  Kenyatta himself belonged to 
the Presbyterian Church.  The First Lady, “Mama” Ngina Kenyatta, was a Catholic 
whose brother was a priest and the Catholic chaplain the University of Nairobi.255 Vice-
President Moi was a committed member of the Africa Inland Church, and Charles 
Njonjo, the Attorney General throughout Kenyatta’s presidency, was a dedicated member 
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of the Anglican Church.  These and other officials within the government made numerous 
appearances at fundraising events for their own denominations and other churches as 
well.256 Consistent with Argument 4, the continued benefits of government-endorsed 
fundraising for the Catholic and Anglican churches mitigated the effects of the 
government’s declining popularity and church structural changes, such that these 
denominations only became mildly more critical of the government in these later years. 
Fundraising became even more important for the Presbyterian Church, which in the 
1970s followed suggestions coming out of the World Council of Churches to implement 
a moratorium on foreign missionaries and funding.  The resulting Presbyterian policy, 
called Jitegemea in Swahili, led to an increased reliance on harambees to fund church 
operations and projects.257  The Africa Inland Church also took on greater local 
responsibilities; in 1971 the church formally became independent from the Africa Inland 
Mission that had founded the denomination in Kenya. The government immediately 
helped with fundraising; Vice-President Moi, the guest of honor at the church’s 
independence celebration, helped to raise 65,900 Kenya shillings for the church at the 
event.258 The government and the churches still benefited from cooperation in social 
service provision and development work, such as the church relief efforts in the state-
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neglected northern regions of Kenya following severe droughts in 1970-1971.259 In this 
and various other efforts around the country, the government sponsored church efforts 
and the churches provided its own workers and resources from both local and 
international sources.   
As noted, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church differed from the others. Due to its 
principles against political involvement, the SDA stayed silent on political issues, even 
during the later years of the Kenyatta government. In addition to the church’s belief 
system, which avoided political comment and limited cooperation with the government, 
the church’s leadership remained expatriate, even if though it passed from European to 
American and ultimately to African hands with the choice of D. K. Bazarra of Uganda as 
Executive Director in 1973. Like the Catholic Church, the SDA is transnational in 
character, with each national church a branch of the worldwide organization 
headquartered in Silver Spring, Maryland. Although leadership was centralized, leaders 
were chosen by the SDA administration abroad and answerable to the church hierarchy 
outside of Kenya. SDA leaders could, and did, gain promotion within this transnational 
structure.260 These options for advancement lessened the incentive to forge close ties with 
the Kenyatta government, as leaders’ future prospects lay outside of the social and 
political structure of Kenya.   
At the same time, SDA leaders had incentives not to antagonize the government. 
The government during Kenyatta’s time banned certain religious groups including the 
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Jehovah’s Witnesses, another denomination that eschews participation in political life.261 
The SDA may not have escaped government censure. SDA documents imply that an 
official selected to head the SDA in Kenya was prevented by the Kenyan government 
from entering the country, possibly due to his association with Rhodesia, forcing the 
international SDA leadership to find a replacement.262 While the SDA’s centralized 
leadership likely played a role in its quiet acquiescence to government policies – if for no 
other reason than the fact that centralization provided a clear target for government 
reprisals if the church had become critical – ideational factors and international 
administrative structure likely had large effects on the SDA as well.  Thus, SDA political 
silence is over-determined, but is consistent with the arguments made in this dissertation. 
The above discussion focuses on the general political orientation of the various 
Kenyan churches over time, using the churches’ reactions to specific events as means by 
which this orientation can be measured. In so doing, it shows that the general orientation 
of the churches remained supportive of the government, with mild variation accounted 
for by divergence in the internal organization of the different denominations.  This 
divergence was limited, however, by the limited nature of structural change within the 
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more “critical” denominations and by sustained compatibility of the churches’ 
preferences and the government’s preferences surrounding fundraising and service 
provision. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the political orientation of several large denominations 
and the nature of church-state relations in Kenya during the rule of founding Kenyan 
President Jomo Kenyatta, 1963-1978.  The primary feature of church political stances 
during this period was general uniformity in the nature of the churches’ stances, which 
were cooperative and supportive of the government, with slight divergence over time 
between the slightly critical Catholic and Anglican churches and the other, more 
supportive and acquiescent Protestant denominations.  Consistent with the arguments 
presented in the opening chapter, this chapter demonstrated how the interests of the 
church and state generally aligned in terms of providing mutual support for one another. 
Initially, the government had alternative sources of legitimacy and was therefore only 
willing to “purchase” church support cheaply, while the churches and particularly the 
church leaders had strong demand for government legitimation. The relative need for 
ideological support shifted over time as the government became less popular and the 
churches gained legitimacy through indigenization of their leadership. Parallel to 
considerations of ideological support, however, the churches and the state had 
consistently aligning incentives to cooperate in providing social services and conducting 
development work within Kenya, encouraging a level of cooperation throughout the 
Kenyatta era even as political considerations shifted. 
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This chapter also demonstrates the necessity of examining church structure in 
addition to church preferences.  The similarly centralized nature of church leadership 
across denominations contributed significantly to the supportive stances of the churches 
by allowing them to negotiate directly and credibly with President Kenyatta and his top 
officials.  This method of top-level negotiation, facilitated by centralized leadership, 
generally neutralized other factors such as ethnicity that may have otherwise caused a 
divergence in church positions. Even though political considerations and turnover in 
church leadership influenced the incentives for continued church-state cooperation, only 
the Catholic and Anglican churches noticeably altered their stances. These alterations are 
inadequately explained by the changing political climate or by factors such as ethnicity 
that are generally thought by others to have been decisive.  Rather, it is only by 
examining these other factors in relation to changing organizational structures that these 
shifts in some church stances but not others make sense.  Those churches that ventured 
into mild criticism of the government were the ones in which internal structures increased 
the number of individuals who were involved in setting church policy or who could 
publicly make their voices and opinions heard without being constrained by the rules or 
bureaucracy of their denomination. 
This chapter also examined the two major instances of church-state conflict that 
arose under President Kenyatta, involving the Catholic Church objecting to educational 
reforms in 1968 and the major denominations (except for the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church, which represents a special case for theological and historical reasons) launching 
a strong opposition to government-condoned compulsory Kikuyu oathing ceremonies in 
1969.  These examples show both the applicability and the limits of explaining church 
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political activities through church structure.  While centralized leadership did not 
ultimately prevent the churches from adopting oppositional stances, it did delay these 
decisions until after the churches had exhausted attempts by church leaders and their 
representatives to address their concerns through private, direct negotiations with 
President Kenyatta and his aides.  Examining the churches’ political activities in this 
chapter may give the impression that church-state cooperation is the norm and that 
deviations from this relationship are rare.  However, the next chapter will demonstrate the 
extent to which, after Kenyatta’s death, the altered priorities of the new government of 
President Daniel arap Moi and the continued divergence in internal church organization 
would result in much greater diversity in church political orientation vis-à-vis the national 
government, highlighting in particular the degree to which internal church structure can 
influence church political activity. 
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Chapter 3: Church Political Activity During the Moi Years: 1978-2002 
1 Introduction 
Looking at Christian churches as politically active civil society organizations, 
Kenya presents an empirical puzzle that defies both the conventional wisdom presented 
by scholars of Kenyan politics and the broader theoretical literature on how churches 
operate as political and economic actors. Kenya’s founding President, Jomo Kenyatta (in 
office 1963-1978), had nominally remained a Christian in his adult years, but he showed 
little interest in practicing Christianity, rarely attended church, and engaged in polygamy, 
a practice that the Catholic and Mainstream Protestant churches consistently 
condemned.263  Nevertheless, Kenyatta maintained good relations with all the major 
Christian denominations, which generally remained silent or supportive of Kenyatta as 
the President consolidated political power around a small ruling clique who marginalized 
or eliminated political rivals.  
Upon Kenyatta’s death, his Vice-President, Daniel arap Moi, became Kenya’s 
second President (1978-2002).  Moi was a devout Christian who attended church weekly 
and was a prominent member of a conservative mission-founded denomination, the 
Africa Inland Church (AIC).  As Vice-President, he had often attended harambees 
(fundraisers) and other important functions for his own AIC and various other 
denominations.  It was therefore expected that his presidency would feature even closer 
collaborations between the churches and the President.  But as Moi consolidated power 
through repression, cronyism and ethnic manipulations, the relationships between the 
government and the various churches were much more varied than it had been under 
                                                
263 Hornsby, Charles. Kenya: A History Since Independence. IB Tauris, 2013:202, 259. 
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Kenyatta.  Some churches, such as the Seventh-Day Adventist Church and Moi’s own 
Africa Inland Church, were very supportive and loyal to the President, even in the midst 
of severe political strife and economic hardship.  However, several of the larger Christian 
denominations, most notably the Anglican and Catholic churches, presented sustained 
opposition to Moi that went far beyond any objections that the churches had expressed 
toward Kenyatta. 
Many scholars have attributed the varied stances of the churches to ethnic 
considerations.264  Moi assumed the presidency over the objections of members of 
Kenyatta’s “Kiambu mafia” who sought to keep power in Kikuyu hands, and the new 
President eventually consolidated power around the office of the President and increased 
the influence of his own Kalenjin group.  Scholars have therefore equated the opposition 
of some of the churches with an ethnic backlash, but a close examination of the ethnic 
composition of the churches’ membership and leadership does not support the ethnic 
conflict thesis advanced in these works.   
Others have pointed to religious and theological issues, arguing that the more 
“conservative” denominations, including Moi’s Africa Inland Church, supported the 
President as a matter of moral imperative, while more “liberal” or “activist” churches 
                                                
264 Mutahi Ngunyi, for example, cites ethnic considerations and political patronage as the 
main determinants of Kenyan churches’ political stance during the Kenyatta and Moi 
presidencies, although the author acknowledges other factors as well.   Ngunyi, Mutahi 
G. "Religious Institutions and Political Liberalisation in Kenya." in Gibbon, Peter, ed. 
Markets, Civil Society and Democracy in Kenya. Nordic Africa Institute, 1995: 174.  
Similarly, Gifford argues that “a large number [of churches] supported Moi either from 
ethnic or patrimonial-clientelist considerations or out of a theological conviction that 
political involvement was not the role of churches.” Gifford, Paul. Christianity, Politics 
and Public life in Kenya. Hurst & Co., 2009: 41. 
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took up the roles of critics.265 Ngunyi, for instance, argues that Catholic and Anglican 
Churches, the two denominations that were most critical of the Moi government, were 
more socially permissive than other denominations in Kenya.266 However, the distinction 
between conservative and liberal churches is often made based on the churches’ political 
positions, creating a circular argument for the relationship between conservatism and 
political support for the incumbent regime.267 Furthermore, despite the assertions by 
authors like Ngunyi concerning the relative liberalness of the activist churches, these 
denominations have consistently exhibited conservative political positions as well, 
sometimes agreeing with President Moi and at times even placing themselves to the right 
of the government.268 The main evidence linking theological conservatism with support 
                                                
265 John Lonsdale uses the “liberal” and “conservative” designations to describe the 
churches that opposed and supported President Moi, respectively, while also arguing that 
theological justifications served to reinforce ethnic political divides. Lonsdale, John. 
"Kikuyu Christianities: A history of intimate diversity." Studies on Religion in Africa. 23 
(2002): 157-198. 
 
266 Specifically, Ngunyi argues that the Anglican Church, due to the autonomy it gives to 
individual dioceses, accommodates a spectrum of conservative and liberal social stances, 
while the Catholic Church in his estimation is more accepting of members engaging in 
activities such as “smoking cigarettes, drinking cheap alcohol, wife-beating and moderate 
use of prostitution – all of which constitute important dimensions of the lifestyle of the 
poor in Kenya” (138). 
 
267 For instance, Sabar casually uses the terminology of “conservative” and “liberal” to 
describe those churches that supported or opposed the Moi government, respectively 
Sabar, Galia. Church, state, and society in Kenya: from mediation to opposition, 1963-
1993. Psychology Press, 2002: 189. 
 
268 Even during the initial period of cordial relations between President Moi and the 
Catholic Church, the latter took the government to task over the government’s liberal 
family planning policies. Crary, David. “Catholic Church, Kenya At Odds Over Soaring 
Population” Associated Press. August 12, 1985. Sabar (2002) describes the Anglican 
Church in Kenya, which eventually became a mild critic of the Kenyatta government and 
a strong opponent of President Moi, as initially hesitant to criticize Kenyatta due to the 
Church’s “conservative theological tradition” (72). Anglican Archbishop Manasses Kuria 
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for President Moi has been the rhetoric of the supportive churches themselves, as they 
cite scriptures, such as Romans 13, as justification for their political stands.269 The 
“liberal” churches, however, similarly ground their stances in biblical references and 
theological concerns.270 
I argue instead that the main differences between those churches that supported 
the government and those that opposed it were structural rather than theological. The 
churches that supported President Moi were, by and large, those with certain 
organizational features, including centralized and unaccountable leadership, which made 
it easier for the government to coopt them (see Argument 1b and Argument 3 of Chapter 
1). While it could be argued that conservative theology is an omitted variable, 
determining both church structure and church political support, the evidence more 
strongly supports a story of cooptation.  Rather than offering support to Moi independent 
of any particular inducements or pressure from the government, as would be the case if 
                                                                                                                                            
took issue with Anglican churches of other countries at the international Lambeth 
Conference for addressing safe sex outside of marriage as a method of preventing HIV 
transmission. Longley, Clifford and Gledill, Ruth.  “Clash on homosexuals' rights; 
Lambeth Conference” The Times (London). August 5, 1988. Archbishop Kuria also took 
issue with bishops at the Lambeth Conference for accepting polygamy within the Church, 
a stance that placed Kuria in agreement with President Moi. Mkubwa, Margaret Lunyolo. 
“Kenya: Reheated Debate Over Polygamy.” IPS-Inter Press Service. August 19, 1988.  
 
269 Romans 13:1-2 states: “Everyone must submit to governing authorities. For all 
authority comes from God, and those in positions of authority have been placed there by 
God. So anyone who rebels against authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, 
and they will be punished.” (New International Version). 
 
270 To give just one example, the Catholic Bishops, in a 1993 open letter to President Moi 
published in the Daily Nation newspaper, justify their criticisms of the government by 
citing the example of the Old Testament prophet Ezekiel and the admonition given to him 
by God to “warn the wicked from his wicked ways in order to save his life” (Ezekiel 
3:18). “An Open Letter to H.E. the President Daniel Arap Moi and to All the People of 
Goodwill in Kenya: Message of the Kenya Catholic Bishops” October 30, 1993.  
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the supportive churches were driven primarily by theological dictates, the backing of the 
supportive churches was clearly connected to patronage for the churches and their 
leaders. Through qualitative analysis, this chapter identifies the specific effects of church 
structure as distinct from the effects of ideology, arguing that the former are 
independently important for understanding the churches’ positions toward President Moi. 
While churches with certain structural features, such as leadership centralization 
and lack of accountability mechanisms, are more likely to end up supporting their 
national governments, these structural factors are permissive rather than determinative. 
Ultimately, church political stances are based on the preferences of church leaders and 
are influenced by the actions of governments insofar as policies directly or indirectly 
affect the churches.  Centralization and authoritarianism within certain churches allow for 
more streamlined negotiations with the government (Argument 1a) and also makes these 
churches more attractive targets of government cooptation (Argument 1b), but these 
mechanisms do not guarantee church support.  Negotiations between church and state 
may fail due to incompatible preferences or unwillingness of the government to engage in 
discussions.  Similarly, if a government does not find the support of a particular church 
worth the effort it would have to expend or the cost it would have to pay to achieve this 
support, the government will not devote time and resources to maintaining that church’s 
support.   
In the following three sections, I discuss in depth the major statements and actions 
of the five major Kenyan Christian denominations under study during the years 1978-
2002.  Following Anglican Bishop Gideon Githiga’s analysis of the roles played by the 
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churches under President Moi, I divide these years into three periods.271  Section 2 covers 
the First Nyayo Era, to use Bishop Githiga’s terminology, which refers to the beginning 
of Moi’s presidency, 1978-1985.272  This period is marked by general cooperation 
between the churches and the state, as the former adopted largely pro-government 
political orientations.  The primary exception to this cordial relationship is the Anglican 
Church, which began this period with a friendly attitude toward the new government, but 
went on to have several conflicts with the government during these years. Section 3 
analyzes the Second Nyayo Era, 1985-1991, which contained a split in the churches’ 
relationships with the government.  As economic and political conditions deteriorated 
within Kenya, the Anglican Church stepped up its criticisms and opposition to the 
government, followed by a later but similar stance by the Catholic Church and eventually 
the Presbyterian Church, though the latter was more ambivalent in its stance toward the 
government.  The churches did not present a united front, however, as the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church and especially Moi’s own denomination, the Africa Inland Church, 
remained supportive of the government.  Section 4 looks at the Multi-Party Democracy 
Era, 1992-2002, during which opposition parties were legally allowed to compete for 
power in Kenya. During this era, several churches adopted partisan stances to various 
degrees. Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
                                                
271 Githiga, Gideon Gichuhi. The Church as the Bulwark Against Authoritarianism: 
Development of Church and State Relations in Kenya with Particular Reference to the 
Years After Political Independence 1963-1992. Regnum, 2001. 
 
272 Nyayo, a Swahili word meaning “footsteps,” was the primary slogan of the Moi 
government, just as Harambee (“let’s pull together”) had been for President Jomo 
Kenyatta’s government. 
 
 
 
 
 
145 
 
Finally, a note about the content of the following chapter is in order. As stated 
previously, the dependent variable for this dissertation is the political orientation of the 
national level denominations of the churches, as reflected by the words and actions of 
national church leadership.  This does not include the political orientations of regional or 
subordinate church actors, except insofar as the words and actions of these lower-level 
actors reflect the orientations of the national leadership. Nonetheless, the following 
discussion will spend significant time detailing the political comments and actions of a 
handful of regional and local church leaders, particularly Anglican Bishops David Gitari, 
Henry Okullu and Alexander Muge, and Presbyterian Reverend Timothy Njoya.  These 
four clerics were the most prominent church voices criticizing the government, with their 
statements often making headlines in Kenyan press and drawing reactions from the 
government.  Discussing church-state interactions during this period without looking at 
these four church leaders would therefore be difficult. In addition, the national 
leaderships of the Anglican and Presbyterian churches often had to react to the statements 
of these individuals, and some indication of the national church leaders’ political stances 
can be inferred from the actions or inactions taken in response to lower level clergy’s 
statements.  Thus, while reading the following accounts, view the details concerning 
these four clerics in the context of how their statements and actions affect and reflect the 
political orientations of their respective churches’ national leaders. 
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2 The First Nyayo Era, 1978-1985: General Church-State Cooperation, Anglican 
Criticism 
2.1 Cordial Church-State Relations Before the 1982 Coup Attempt 
When founding President Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978, power transferred to his 
Vice-President, Daniel arap Moi. Though Moi's ascendance followed legal procedures, 
his assumption of the country's top position was controversial.  President Kenyatta had 
surrounded himself with officials from his Kikuyu ethnic group, often dubbed the 
"Kiambu Mafia" after the district from which they hailed.  This clique held key positions 
in both the government and in GEMA, the Gikuyu (Kikuyu) Embu and Meru 
Association.  Members of this group wanted to keep power in their hands, and tried to 
amend the constitution to prevent Moi, a member of the smaller Kalenjin group, from 
automatically assuming the presidency upon Kenyatta’s death. GEMA’s efforts were 
blocked by Moi’s allies, most notably Attorney General Charles Njonjo, a Kiambu 
Kikuyu who chose to side with Moi against the Kiambu clique.273 With the GEMA 
efforts blocked and the backing of allies in Kenyatta’s cabinet such as Njonjo and Mwai 
Kibaki (also a Kikuyu, hailing from Nyeri), Moi took power in 1978 without legal 
complication.   
As Kenyatta's motto had been Harambee ("Let's Pull Together"), Moi branded his 
presidency with Nyayo, the Swahili word for "footsteps." Initially, he portrayed this as a 
pledge to follow in the footsteps of Jomo Kenyatta, while also implementing popular 
                                                
273 Njonjo declared that speculation about Kenyatta’s death was illegal under Kenyan 
law, effectively silencing the group seeking to change the succession law.  Branch, 
Daniel. Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. Yale University Press, 2011: 
135. 
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changes such as releasing political prisoners and declaring a fight against corruption.274 
After holding parliamentary elections in 1979, Moi’s new government seemed to promote 
inclusiveness when it expanded the number of assistant ministers in the cabinet in order 
to include politicians from every district in Kenya.275  Later, however, it became apparent 
that Moi really expected Kenya to follow his own footsteps, and Moi was quick to 
sanction those who did not.  Even in the early years of his presidency, Moi used 
authoritarian tactics to silence critics, including shuttering the University of Nairobi (a 
hotbed of student activism), detaining critics, and banning former Vice-President Oginga 
Odinga from running in both the 1979 parliamentary election and a later parliamentary 
by-election.276  Moi forced the country’s ethnic associations, including GEMA, to cease 
operations.277  When Odinga threatened in 1982 to form a new opposition party, Moi had 
Attorney General Njonjo (whom he had retained from Kenyatta’s cabinet) rush through 
legislation that banned parties other than KANU, legally solidifying Kenya’s status as a 
one-party state.278   
The change in leadership of the country coincided with changes in the leadership 
of several of the major churches in Kenya, as detailed in Table 3.1.  Anglican Archbishop 
Festo Olang reached the mandatory retirement age of for his church and was rather 
                                                
274 Hornsby 2013: 333; Branch 2011:138. 
 
275 Hornsby 2013: 344. 
276 Branch 2011: 149-152; Hornsby 2013: 340. 
 
277 Hornsby 2013: 353. 
 
278 Ibid.: 375. 
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unceremoniously pushed out of his position.279  He was replaced as Archbishop by 
Manasses Kuria, a Kikuyu cleric who was at the time of his 1980 election Bishop of 
Nakuru.280 Kuria’s election was controversial within the church.  The election took an 
ethnic tone, with tensions between supporters of the Kikuyu cleric Kuria and his rival for 
the position, Bishop Henry Okullu of the Luo ethnic group (the same ethnic group to 
which Odinga belonged).281 In addition, Attorney General Charles Njonjo, a devoted 
Anglican, is thought to have manipulated the results in favor of Kuria.282 Regardless of 
the actual degree of manipulation involved in his selection, Kuria was thus seen as the 
government’s choice. The Presbyterian Moderator, Jeremiah Gitau, retired in 1979, 
having reached his two-term limit within the church, and was succeeded by the Reverend 
John Gatu.  Reverend Gatu had long served as the Church’s first African Secretary 
General (the number two spot within the church), during which time he spearheaded the 
church’s initiative of Jitegemea or “self-reliance.”283 Gatu would serve as Moderator for 
two terms, 1979-1985.  In Moi’s Africa Inland Church, Bishop Wellington Mulwa died 
                                                
279 Okullu, Henry. Quest for Justice: An Autobiography of Bishop John Henry Okullu. 
Shalom, 1997: 100. 
 
280 Archbishops within the Anglican Church are elected, with three electors from each 
diocese, including the diocesan bishop. 
 
281 Musalia, Martha Wangari. Archbishop Manasses Kuria: A Biography: Strong in the 
Storms. WordAlive Publishers, 2001: 67-68. 
 
282 There are conflicting reports of how much involvement Njonjo had in defeating or 
dissuading other candidates. 
 
283 Practically speaking, this initiative was a move away from relying on foreign funding 
for Church activities.  See Muita, Isaiah Wahome. Hewn from the Quarry: Presbyterian 
Church of East Africa 100 Years and Beyond. Presbyterian Church of East Africa, 2003: 
161. 
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suddenly in 1979.  The man elected to replace him, Ezekiel Birech, was not only a 
Kalenjin like Moi, but was also the President’s in-law.284  
The two international denominations, coincidentally, both enjoyed more 
continuity in leadership from the late Kenyatta era to the early Moi years.  The Seventh-
Day Adventist Executive Director, D.K. Bazarra from neighboring Uganda, had been in 
office for several years when Moi came to power and remained so for most of the first 
Nyayo era.  Bazarra would be succeeded in 1985 by Frederick Wangai, the first Kenyan 
to head the SDA in Kenya.285   The Catholic Church leadership remained stable under 
Cardinal Maurice Otunga, the Archbishop of Nairobi, who would not retire until 1997.   
Parallel to Otunga’s leadership, the chairmanship of the Kenya Episcopal Conference (the 
collection of all the country’s Catholic bishops who met periodically and voted on 
Catholic Church policy on political and social issues) was held by bishops John Njenga 
(Bishop of Eldoret) and Raphael Ndingi (bishop of Nakuru) from 1976-1982 and 1982-
1988, respectively.286  Table 3.2 shows the chairs of the KEC during Moi’s presidency. 
 
                                                
284 Githiga 2001: 92 
 
285 “General Conference Committee.” November 7, 1985, 10:00 a.m. Seventh-Day 
Adventist Office of Archives, Statistics and Records. Online Archives. 
http://documents.adventistarchives.org/Minutes/GCC/GCC1985-11.pdf. Accessed 
September 17, 2014. 
 
286 Njenga and Ndingi had been leading figures in the Catholic Churches opposition to 
education reform and oathing, respectively. See Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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Table 3.1: Anglican and Protestant Church Leaders During Moi Presidency 
Church Name 
Highest 
National 
Church Office 
Officeholder 
Term 
Ethnic Group/ 
Nationality 
Anglican 
 
 
Archbishop of 
Nairobi 
 
 
Festo Olang 1970-1980 Luhya 
Manasses Kuria 1980-1996 GEMA 
David Gitari 1998-2003 GEMA 
Presbyterian 
 
 
 
Moderator 
 
 
 
Jeremiah Kiongo 
Gitau 
1973-
1979 GEMA 
John Gachongo 
Gatu 
1979-
1985 GEMA 
George Ernest 
Wanjau 
1985-
1991 GEMA 
Bernard 
M'Mukindia Muindi 
1991-
1997 GEMA 
Jesse Macharia 
Kamau 
1997-
2003 GEMA 
Africa Inland 
Church 
Bishop/Presidi
ng Bishop 
Wellington Mulwa 1971-1979 Kamba 
Ezekiel Kiprop 
Birech 
1980-
1996 Kalenjin 
Titus Musili Kivunzi 1996-2001 Kamba>
1 
Silas Yego 2001- Kalenjin 
Seventh-Day 
Adventist 
Executive 
Director 
D.K. Bazarra 1973-1985 Ugandan 
Frederick Wangai 
 
1986-
1988 GEMA 
Joseph N Kyale287 
 
1988-
1995 Kamba?
 1 
Johnson Othoo 1995-2000 Luo?
 1 
Musyoka Paul 
Muasya 2000- Kamba 
1 Dr Kivunzi comes from the Ukambani area. Nzengu, Musembi. “New constitution too costly for Kenya, 
Moi” The Star. February 28, 2011. Furthermore, Kivunzi’s surname matches Kamba naming patterns, as 
does Joseph Kyale’s, while Johnson Othoo’s surname is consistent with the Luo ethnic group. 
 
                                                
287 After Frederick Wangai’s departure, a retired former head of the SDA Church in 
Kenya, C. Dunbar Henri, briefly served as interim Executive director.  Reverend Joseph 
Kyale was chosen on October 17, 1988 to become the new head of the SDA Church in 
Kenya. Adventist Review. 16, 1988; November 10, 1988. 
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Table 3.2: Kenya Episcopal Conference Chairman During Moi 
Presidency 
Name Term Diocese Ethnic Group/ Nationality 
John Njenga 
 1976-1982 Eldoret GEMA 
Raphael S. Ndingi 
Mwana'a Nzeki 1982-1988 Nakuru Kamba 
Nicodemus Kirima 1988-1991 Nyeri GEMA 
Zacchaeus Okoth 1991-1997 Kisumu Luo 
John Njue 1997-2003 Embu/Nyeri GEMA 
Cornelius Kipng’eno 
Arap Korir  2003-2006 Eldoret Kalenjin 
John Njue 2006 Nyeri/Nairobi GEMA 
 
Despite the early signs of authoritarianism demonstrated by President Moi’s 
government, the church leaders initially enjoyed a “honeymoon period” of friendly 
relations with the new president, and Moi actively worked to maintain this cordiality. 
Catholic Bishop Njenga, who was at the time also chairman of the Catholic Church’s 
Kenya Episcopal Conference (KEC), included in his 1978 Jamhuri (Independence) Day 
sermon a call for Kenyans to pray for President Moi, telling the congregation present that 
the country should be grateful to have “ a God-fearing President.”288 After the 1979 
meeting of the Presbyterian Church’s triennial General Assembly, the Church’s resulting 
statement to its members included commendation for President Moi’s recent extension of 
free education in Kenya.289 When Moi held an inter-denominational service later that 
year to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Kenyatta’s death, Bishop Wellington 
Mulwa of Moi’s Africa Inland Church delivered the sermon, in which the AIC head 
                                                
288 Target, December 10-December 23, 1978. 
 
289 Muita 2003: 191. 
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praised both Kenyatta and Moi, the latter for tackling corruption, and pledged loyalty to 
Moi and the government.290  A pastoral letter released by the Catholic Church ahead of 
the 1979 elections praised Moi for promoting “love, peace and understanding” and for 
respecting human rights.291 The Presbyterian letter about the upcoming elections was 
somewhat more circumspect, urging non-partisanship among clergy, but it also gave 
members permission to join a political party of their choosing (while not mentioning that 
KANU was still the only party in operation).292 In 1981, Anglican Archbishop Manasses 
Kuria led a delegation of the Church’s bishops to meet Moi in State House. At this 
function, the President guaranteed the government’s continued prioritization of religious 
education in school, and the Archbishop pledged the Anglican Church’s support in 
preaching the government’s Nyayo philosophy.293 
2.1.1 Church Support, 1978-1982: Church Structure, Negotiation and Cooptation  
Ngunyi has argued that Moi came into office with the view that “the Kenyatta 
clients from the mainstream churches were part of the coalition he had to disband in order 
to settle on the presidency.”294 According to this argument, Moi purposely shifted away 
from patronizing the larger churches and moved toward newer churches, evangelical 
churches and churches rooted in his own ethnic group.  Though this strategy eventually 
                                                
290 Target, August 26-September 8, 1979. 
 
291 The Church’s comment served as an allusion to Moi’s own interpretation of Nyayo as 
consisting of “love, peace and unity.” Target, July 15-July 28, 1979. 
 
292 Target, November 4-November 17, 1979. 
 
293 Daily Nation. January 22, 1981. 
 
294 Ngunyi 1995: 121-177.p150-151. 
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came into being, it was not Moi’s initial approach. Unlike Kenyatta, who remained 
friendly with the churches but did not particularly seek their participation in public life, 
Moi actively courted church support, and he initially looked to the main churches in 
Kenya for this support. These denominations held an increasing share of the Kenyan 
population during the Moi years (see Table 3.3), and there was thus much value in 
gaining their support.   
As noted in Chapter 1, churches can provide three services to governments: 
ideological support, citizen mobilization, and social service provision.  Moi initially 
sought all three of these church “products.” Whereas Kenyatta had assumed the 
presidency with a great deal of prestige and political stature, Moi lacked such popularity 
and standing.  Moi had essentially served as an unassuming Kenyatta loyalist who was 
not a potential rival to the Mzee, and the new president had come to power without the 
legitimizing effects of a popular election.  Furthermore, Moi’s Kalenjin ethnic group 
lacked unity and political influence, whereas the churches represented large, organized 
and motivated segments of the population that could be mobilized for political purposes, 
including the 1979 election.295  The churches also remained major forces in development 
and social service provision.  For all of these reasons, President Moi sought to employ the 
churches as important components of his political base. 
Despite President Moi’s Christian credentials, his desire to maintain church 
support was threatened by the fact that, other than his own Africa Inland Church, the 
major denominations were largely comprised of ethnic groups he was actively attempting 
                                                
295 The seven sub-groups that make up the Kalenjin were not classified as a single ethnic 
group (“tribe”) until 1979 (Hornsby 2013: 23). 
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to demobilize or diminish politically.  With shared Christian identity insufficient to 
overcome the ethnic-based political tensions between the government and the 
communities from which the churches drew their membership, Moi courted the major 
denominations through financial benefits to their organizations and leaders. During 
Kenyatta’s time in office, the President had only casually sought the churches’ public 
support through informal and ad hoc appearances by himself and his cabinet ministers at  
Table 3.3: Church Size, 1980-20001 
Church 
Name 
1980 1990 2000 
Adherents 
% 
Total 
Pop. Adherents 
% Total 
Pop. Adherents 
% Total 
Pop. 
Catholic  3,194,000  19.2% 
 
5,050,000  21.4% 
 
6,800,000  22.6% 
Anglican  909,900  5.5% 
 
1,450,000  6.2% 
 
2,700,000  9.0% 
Africa Inland 
 
1,000,0002  6.0% 
 
2,000,000  8.5% 
 
2,100,000  7.0% 
Presbyterian  200,0003  1.2% 
 
1,000,000  4.2% 
 
1,600,000  5.3% 
Seventh-Day 
Adventist  242,3854  1.4%  439,5625  1.9%  700,000  2.3% 
11 Data drawn from: Johnstone, Patrick, Robyn Johnstone, and Jason Mandryk. Operation World. 21st 
century edition. Carlisle. Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster (2001).  
21982 data. 
31978 data. 
41979 data. 
51988 data. 
  
harambees and other church events. As Vice-President, Moi had often attended these 
events on behalf of Kenyatta.296 As President, Moi intensified the government’s efforts to 
raise money for the churches.  In early 1979, Moi appeared at a large harambee for the 
Anglican Church’s Mount Kenya South Diocese.  The fundraiser was the most successful 
                                                
296 In addition to appearing at special events, Moi was a regular church-goer, making 
weekly Sunday appearances at congregations of his own Africa Inland Church and other 
denominations. 
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ever in Kenya, raising nearly 1.5 million shillings for the diocese’s development 
programs.  This record was broken several months later when Vice-President Kibaki 
appeared at a fundraiser for the same diocese and raised 1.8 million shillings; Njonjo 
would raise over 1.3 million at a similar event for the Anglican Mount Kenya East 
diocese.  In 1981, President Moi, along with Kibaki and Njonjo, helped the Presbyterian 
Church raise nearly 6 million shillings at a single event.  Even accounting for the 
inflation that plagued the Kenyan economy in the 1970s and 1980s, these were very 
significant sums of money; the Presbyterian haul brought in more than half of the entire 
amount that the Church sought to raise during its entire fundraising campaign.297  
Moi even courted the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, which was famously 
reticent to engage in politics and remained all but silent during the Kenyatta years.  In 
early 1979, Moi hosted a Seventh-Day Adventist delegation that included one of the 
international Vice-Presidents of the Church, as well as the Executive Director of the 
Kenyan SDA, D.K. Bazarra. The visit between Moi and the Adventists was prominently 
featured in Kenya media.298  During this meeting, Moi offered the church several hundred 
acres of land upon which to build the University of East Africa, Baraton.  Like Kenyatta, 
Moi would use his power over land allocation to enrich himself and his loyal supporters 
and to gain new allies as well.  
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As noted in the previous chapter, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church is distinct 
among the major churches in its extensive set of doctrines governing all aspects of life, 
including emphases on personal holiness and abstention from contentious politics.  
Because of these beliefs, the Adventist Church had not factored into politics during 
Kenyatta’s era. Moi was able to gain this church’s support, not solely by providing for its 
material needs, but also by appealing to the church’s doctrine and beliefs.  In the initial 
meeting with SDA leaders in 1979, Moi made a point of emphasizing his respect for 
religious freedom. This reassurance was especially important for a church such as the 
SDA, which has come into conflict with various national governments over practices 
such as strict adherence to the Saturday Sabbath, which can limit SDA members’ ability 
to participate in political and civic life.  Perceiving a high potential for conflict and 
persecution in its relations with governments, the Church holds religious freedom to be 
both practically useful and biblically mandated.299 Adventist doctrine promotes healthy 
living, including abstention from alcohol and tobacco, and Moi was a well-known 
teetotaler and non-smoker.300 The President supported the International Commission for 
the Prevention of Alcoholism and Drug Dependency (ICPA), an officially non-sectarian 
NGO founded by Adventists to promote abstinence from drugs and alcohol. Kenya 
hosted this group in 1982, with President Moi addressing the delegates and commending 
their work.301 
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Moi put significant effort and resources behind cultivating church support for 
himself and his government. Raising money for church development projects and 
facilitating the creating of an Adventist university in Kenya represented continued 
cooperation between church and state in social service provision and development work, 
as had occurred during the previous administration.302 Additionally, however, these 
material benefits provided by the government made church leaders more inclined to offer 
support.303  Beyond simply making appearances with church officials and receiving 
favorable public statements from the different denominations, Moi sought more formal 
ties with the churches. He sought to define a philosophy around his Nyayo slogan, basing 
his ideas on the Christian principles of love, peace and unity.304 In 1982 the President 
commissioning the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK, an umbrella 
organization of Protestant denominations including the Anglican, Presbyterian and AIC 
denominations) to expound upon these principles, which they did in a book published the 
following year entitled A Christian View of Politics in Kenya: Love, Peace and Unity.305  
By the time that the book was published, however, the political situation had changed due 
to a day of violence that rocked Moi and put Kenya on a path of greater repression. 
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2.2 The August 1982 Coup and Its Aftermath 
Two months after amending the constitution to effectively ban organized political 
opposition, Moi faced the greatest challenge of his early years as president in the form of 
an attempted coup. Disgruntled airmen from the Kenya Air Force seized key positions 
within Nairobi in the early morning of August 1, 1982, announcing on Kenyan radio that 
President Moi was no longer in power.  The majority of the military remained loyal to the 
government and defeated the rebel airmen in a matter of hours, but the coup attempt cost 
more than two hundred lives, as well as millions of shillings of property damage resulting 
from both the fighting and opportunistic looting.306  
In the aftermath of the coup, the government punished those directly or indirectly 
implicated, including convicting half of the air force of being involved in the attempted 
overthrow, shutting down two major universities in the country where students had 
supported the coup and looted during the events of August 1, and jailing individuals 
accused of involvement. This last group included Raila Odinga, son of the former Vice-
President (and future Prime Minister).307  
The failed coup also factored into the downfall of Charles Njonjo, who had been 
one of the President’s most important allies. Resigning from his post as Attorney General 
in 1980 and successfully launching a political career of his own, Njonjo was developing 
into a potential rival to Moi and thus became dispensable.308  Through innuendo and 
rumor, Njonjo was increasingly portrayed as a source of subversion, and the former 
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Attorney General was eventually publicly accused of a litany of offenses, including 
involvement in the 1982 coup.  By the time Moi pardoned Njonjo (possibly to avoid a 
trial that would expose information embarrassing to the government), Njonjo had been 
pushed out of government and his political career ruined.309 
Reprisals did not stop with these individuals.  The attempt to violently overthrow 
Moi made a deep impression and inspired even greater levels of repression in Kenya, as 
detentions and torture became widespread practices for dealing with dissent.  A separate 
set of human rights abuses occurred during this time period in peripheral areas of Kenya, 
particularly in the North East Province, which remained dangerous due to the flow of 
people and weapons across the border with Somalia and inter-clan rivalries between the 
ethnic-Somali population.  The government’s efforts to police the region led to various 
abuses by security forces, the most notorious of which occurred in Wagalla in February 
1984, when an effort to disarm rival clans devolved into a massacre by Kenyan security 
forces that left several hundreds dead.310 
2.2.1 Church Response to Government Post-Coup, 1982-1985 
During these post-coup years of the First Nyayo Era, the national leaders of the 
churches mostly stayed quiet when it came to political affairs, with some variation. As 
was the pattern during the later Kenyatta years, the Anglican and Catholic Churches 
voiced moderate criticisms of specific issues during the early part of Moi’s presidency, 
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but these denominations also remained silent or supportive on other issues.  The Anglican 
Church was the first church to develop a contentious relationship with the government. 
As early as 1980, it had developed a “reputation of the most controversial religious 
organization in Kenya” due to its political statements.311  
While this chapter focuses on the national leadership of the churches, the 
strongest opposition from the Anglican Church initiated with several of the subordinate 
diocesan bishops.  Although the Archbishop is the official head of the Anglican Church, 
the Church’s structure makes him more of a first among equals by granting the other 
bishops considerable autonomy within their dioceses.  During the Moi years, three of 
these bishops were especially vocal. David Gitari, a Kikuyu bishop of the GEMA-heavy 
Mt. Kenya East Diocese, had been one of the relatively few vocal critics of President 
Kenyatta, as the church used the little known cleric to publicly voice its opinions over the 
murder of J.M. Kariuki in 1975.312  Gitari became a bishop that same year. Henry Okullu 
hailed from the Luo group in the western part of Kenya and headed the Maseno South 
Diocese in that area of the country.  Okullu was regarded as one of the main 
representatives of Luo interests in the country, particularly as former Vice-President 
Oginga Odinga became excluded from the political process. Another early critic of 
government, Okullu published works on the relationship between church and state.313  He 
had been a strong candidate for Anglican Archbishop in 1979, but the government seems 
                                                
311 Sabar 2002: 181. 
 
312 Sabar 2002: 163-4. 
 
313 Among his most notable publications is the book Church and politics in East Africa. 
Uzima Publishing House, 1974. 
 
 
 
 
 
161 
 
to have considered him too radical, and Attorney General Charles Njonjo worked to have 
the more moderate Kuria elected instead. Alexander Muge was elected Bishop of Eldoret 
in 1983. Though the Bishop was a fellow Kalenjin to President Moi, he and the President 
belonged to rival sub-clans, the Nandi and the Tugen respectively, and Muge came into 
conflict with members of Moi’s Africa Inland Church.  These three bishops began to 
criticize the KANU government on a number of issues in the early years of the Moi 
presidency.314  All three bishops would challenge the government over its widespread 
detention of political opponents after the 1982 coup attempt.315  These criticisms echoed 
human rights complaints that were being made about Kenya from outside the country but 
were effectively forbidden from discourse within the country. 
Archbishop Manasses Kuria was not as radical as his fellow bishops, and mostly 
stayed out of the political spotlight for the first few years of Moi’s time in office. The 
Archbishop’s response to the 1982 coup attempt and aftermath was mixed; Kuria 
encouraged the country’s churches to help restore peace and order, but also objected to 
the government’s wide-scale detentions and arrests.316 The Archbishop’s relationship 
with the government took a more significant turn in 1983, which many political observers 
attributed to Kuria’s relationship with Charles Njonjo.  Kuria earned the government’s ire 
when he took the politically charged move of holding prayers for his ousted ally Njonjo, 
though this activity was not presented as an official Anglican Church statement about 
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Njonjo’s situation.317 Kuria’s contentious relationship with the government continued in 
December 1983 when he used the twentieth anniversary of Kenyan independence to 
question whether the country was really free given the human rights situation in the 
country. Though Kuria later claimed that his words were misquoted, he coupled this 
clarification with an assertion of his right as a Kenyan citizen to speak on political 
matters.318  
In these early years, the bishops’ criticisms were of specific government policies, 
rather than the more general condemnations they would later offer.  Even during this time 
of criticism, there was cooperation between the Anglican Church and KANU. For 
instance, when Moi approached the churches to help him flesh out his Nyayo slogan, 
which he was claiming to be based on the principles of Peace, Love and Unity, the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) responded with its book A Christian 
View of Politics in Kenya.  The NCCK, at the time led by Anglican Bishop Gitari as its 
chairman and Presbyterian cleric John C. Kamau as its Secretary General, expounded 
upon the Nyayo principles identified by President Moi while also reserving the role of the 
churches in holding the state accountable. Though critical of various aspects of the 
political situation in the country, the book’s explicit purpose is “to assist, to guide, and to 
encourage the President, so that he can fulfill his duty of being a good imitator of 
Christ.”319 
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The Catholic Church was mostly quiet during this initial period.  The Church 
issued a response to the 1982 attempted coup, in which the bishops went out of their way 
to display loyalty and a positive attitude toward President Moi. The letter thanks God for 
saving Moi and the country from the coup.320 It then proceeds to thank President Moi 
himself for a number of things he had done, beginning with “the good he has done in 
support of religion and religious teaching in attending church services, fundraising 
meetings, etc.” before mentioning “the accomplishments of Kenya in the fields of 
education, health and economic development.” It further cites Romans 13:1-2, one of the 
Bible’s strongest assertions of the duty to obey secular authorities.321 While the letter 
goes on to offer criticisms of corruption, inequality and other ills, these criticisms are 
targeted toward society and not directed toward the ruling party or the President; the 
latter is praised throughout as working against these social problems.   
At the same time, the Catholic Church did offer some criticisms of the 
government, but these were tangential to the main political issues of the day. For 
instance, in 1984 Cardinal Maurice Otunga got into a dispute with the government, and 
particularly with Vice-President Mwai Kibaki, over coercive family planning policies 
implemented by the government, but this did not spiral into any larger confrontation 
between the Church and the state.322 Nonetheless, the Catholic Church was generally held 
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up by the government as a model of how the churches should approach political matters 
circumspectly.  This perception would not change until about 1990. 
 Much of the literature on Kenya during the Moi period presents the Presbyterian 
Church as a major critic of the Moi regime, but this characterization is somewhat 
misplaced. Though the Presbyterian Church would eventually join in some of the 
critiques being offered by their Anglican and Catholic counterparts, for the most part the 
Presbyterian hierarchy kept a low profile when it came to political affairs.  For most of 
the 1980s, the Presbyterian Church’s reputation for opposing the government largely 
came from a single cleric, the Reverend Timothy Njoya.  Though Njoya was the pastor of 
St Andrew’s in Nairobi, the most prominent Presbyterian congregation in the country, he 
was only a local pastor and not part of the national Presbyterian hierarchy.  Njoya 
emerged as an early, consistent and fierce critic of the KANU government headed by 
President Moi, but the reverend did not speak for the denomination when he delivered his 
several biting sermons.  On the contrary, the Presbyterian Church sought to maintain 
good relations with the government during this early period. In 1984, when the 
government objected to a sermon by Njoya that urged listeners to pray for Charles 
Njonjo, the Presbyterian Church leadership issued an apology to the government and 
initiated procedures within the Church to discipline Njoya.323  In 1985, the President was 
a guest of honor at the Presbyterian Church’s triennial General Assembly meeting.324 
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The relationship between the President and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church 
remained good during these years.  In 1984, the President and various aides attended a 
large Adventist service of over ten thousand people that was being personally conducted 
by the Kenyan SDA Executive Director, D.K. Bazarra.325  By 1985, the Kenyan SDA 
Church had grown into the largest church union (the title for the SDA Church’s 
administrative divisions) in the world.326  While the government of Kenya may not have 
been directly responsible for this impressive church growth, the SDA’s growth in Kenya 
gave this Church reason to be pleased with the religious atmosphere Moi maintained in 
the country.  President Moi’s own Africa Inland Church also continued to support the 
President, as it would do throughout his presidency.   
2.2.2. Divergences of Internal Church Structures and Church Political Orientations 
As identified in the previous chapter, the Catholic and Anglican Churches 
underwent changes in their internal organizational structure that increased internal 
democracy or accountability, while the Presbyterian Church, Africa Inland Church and 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church maintained their centralized and authoritarian leadership 
structures.  This divergence of structure, which I argue explained the divergence in 
political opinions between the churches during the latter part of the Kenyatta era, also 
played a role in determining church stances during the first Nyayo era.  The government 
attempted to manipulate the structure of the Anglican Church by influencing the 
Archbishop election in 1980. Initially, the new Archbishop Kuria was friendly toward the 
government, as shown by the Archbishop’s pledge of support during his visit to Moi in 
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1981.327  However, these efforts to install pro-government leadership within the Anglican 
Church were thrown off course by President Moi’s fallout with Charles Njonjo (who had 
been Kuria’s supporter and the most prominent Anglican in the government).  Moi’s 
strategy of coopting the Anglican Church was further undermined by the autonomous 
nature of Anglican dioceses, several of which had already elected leaders like Bishops 
Gitari and Okullu who were willing to criticize the government and were beyond the 
national church leadership’s ability to censure.  Bishop Muge’s election in Moi’s home 
area furthered this trend.    
The Catholic Church is organized according to a similar “episcopal” structure as 
the Anglican Church, with Bishops leading dioceses throughout the country.  The 
Catholic hierarchy does not allow as much autonomy for individual bishops as is 
practiced within the Anglican Church; the Catholic Archbishop of Nairobi was more 
clearly the leader of his denomination than his Anglican counterpart.  Nevertheless, 
authority within the Church was divided to some extent by the existence of the Kenya 
Episcopal Conference, which elected a chairman from among the country’s bishops to be 
the Church’s leader and spokesman concerning social and political issues.  This moderate 
degree of decentralization within the Catholic Church coincided with moderate 
independence from the state; the Catholic Church was neither as oppositional as the 
Anglican Church nor as supportive of the government as the leaders of the other main 
denominations. 
In contrast to the Anglican and Catholic structures, the Presbyterian, AIC and 
SDA denominations each concentrated ultimate national leadership authority in a single 
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individual, which had several effects that facilitated friendly church-state relations.  
Centralization streamlined discussion and negotiation between the church and the 
government (Argument 1a of Chapter 1). John Gatu, Presbyterian Moderator from 1979 
to 1985, has been noted as a church leader who “sought to preserve reasonable relations 
with the government” during his time in office.328  Reverend Gatu recounts that under 
Moi, the Church “had a way of meeting [the political] leadership and telling them what 
was going on,” and he reportedly saw the government as responsive to church needs.329 
The churches’ centralized leadership also allowed Moi to target church leaders for 
personal benefits (Argument 2a).  AIC Bishop Ezekiel Birech, as Moi’s religious leader 
and in-law, was able to take advantage of his relationship with the President. One 
missionary recounts that when the AIC needed to quickly raise $5,000 extra towards 
creating a new missionary college, Bishop Birech responded that he had a “friend” who 
wanted to donate; the Bishop would soon show up with a $10,000 check bearing Moi’s 
signature.330  The benefits were not always directly monetary; for example, when Moi 
attended the large SDA service in 1984, the President’s entourage praised SDA head 
Bazarra’s preached message as “the sermon of the year.”331  
Thus, in the First Nyayo Era, the churches’ attitudes toward the government 
ranged from the moderate criticism of the Anglican Church to support from the SDA 
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church and especially from the Africa Inland Church. The orientations of the Catholic 
and Presbyterian Churches rested in the middle, with the former ambivalent concerning 
the government and the latter neutral if not mildly supportive, given the strong reaction of 
the Presbyterian hierarchy to the harsh words of one of its pastors.  Even the harshest 
church criticism during this period focused more on specific issues rather than offering 
general opposition to the state or the KANU government.  For instance, none of the 
churches objected to Kenya officially becoming a one-party state in 1982, and their 
subsequent complaints were initially over abuses of the system rather than the 
fundamental deficiencies of Moi’s authoritarian system itself.  This latter critique would 
not come for several years, after (some of) the churches experienced a more fundamental 
break with the government.  This break would occur when Moi’s authoritarian policies 
directly impacted the churches.  
 
3 The Second Nyayo Era (1986-1991) 
To the extent that the churches varied in their stances, the differences in their 
political orientations began to manifest during the First Nyayo Era, but it was not until 
the Second Nyayo Era that the churches would fully adopt the positions they would keep 
throughout the rest of Moi’s presidency.  This second era was marked by deteriorating 
political, economic and social conditions, fostering unrest and dissent among the 
population and increasing repression by government forces.  Church leaders were among 
the few individuals exempt from the worst government repression, and thus clergy were 
among the harshest critics of the government.  The political orientation of the churches 
diverged during this period, with some denominations responding more strongly to the 
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conditions within Kenya, and others remaining loyal to the government.   
3.1 Queuing System Controversy and the Election: 1986-1988 
The repression that had marked Moi’s rule intensified even more in 1986.  
Though the government had rounded up and punished most of the individuals responsible 
for the 1982 coup, as well as those merely suspected of involvement, a few coup plotters 
remained free and founded an underground movement called Mwakenya (“Union of 
Nationalists to Liberate Kenya”).332 This group proved ineffective in striking against the 
state, but it provided a convenient justification for President Moi to further expand the 
use of widespread detention and torture against perceived dissidents, beginning in 
1986.333 The perceived threat of Mwakenya even provided Moi with political cover in the 
eyes of his church critics; Bishop David Gitari, for instance, spoke against the secret 
group in 1986.334 
Meanwhile, the first significant controversy to draw negative reactions from 
several of the churches arose, involving elections.  Now that Kenya was officially a one-
party state, primary elections within KANU largely determined who would hold political 
office. In 1985, KANU revised the process by which party elections would be held. 
Instead of secret ballots, voters were required to physically stand in a queue behind their 
preferred candidate.  The government claimed that this process made the election process 
less costly, but it was obvious that this was a system for voter intimidation and 
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exclusion.335 In 1986, it was announced that this new “queuing” system would be 
employed in all KANU elections. 
3.1.1 Church Responses to Queuing 
The churches came out very strongly against this process.  The Anglican Church 
and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) moved first. KANU’s 1986 
announcement of the new voting system corresponded with a church convention being 
held by the NCCK, allowing the umbrella church body to quickly respond with a 
statement written by Anglican Bishop David Gitari against the queuing system.336  The 
clergy argued that the system put them in an intolerable bind: if church leaders 
participated in the public system, it could cause severe divisions within their 
congregations, but not being able to participate would be tantamount to denial of ‘their 
human and constitutional rights” to participate in the political process.337 Several other 
Anglican bishops condemned the change, including moderate Bishops Njuguna and 
Mahiani (both representing GEMA-dominated dioceses).338 Archbishop Kuria, usually 
moderate when compared to some of the other bishops, had particularly strong words 
against the new system , labeling it “ ‘un-Christian, undemocratic and embarrassing.’”339   
Though the Anglican Church and its allies spoke first, it was the Catholic Church 
that spoke more comprehensively. In November 1986, the Catholics released their first 
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critical letter of the Moi administration, an Open Memorandum to the President.340 In 
some of the harshest language of that letter, the Catholic Bishops make the accusation 
against KANU that “the party is assuming a totalitarian role”, though they mainly blame 
the problem on misplaced zeal by some within the party. The letter is very clear in 
separating the President, who is praised, from the party and politicians, who are 
criticized. Substantively, the letter objects to the queuing system in KANU primaries, 
even while acknowledging the government’s promised exemption of clergy from the 
system. It also questions the government’s tactic of changing the country’s constitution, 
though the letter calls for thoughtful dialogue prior to any such changes rather than ruling 
out such changes as illegitimate.   
Even as debate raged over the specific issue of queuing, the general situation in 
Kenya continued to deteriorate, with increased political strife, government repression, 
and economic decline. As the Moi government became increasingly repressive of 
opposition, the clergy remained one of the few voices of dissent in the country.  As 
Timothy Njoya himself once noted, Moi’s respect for the Christian faith allowed the 
churchmen to get away with statements that would have landed anyone else in the 
country in jail.341  Many of the sermons were highly attended. Sometimes printed copies 
of them were distributed. President Moi once referred to certain clergy who were using 
Sunday sermons to distribute subversive literature; many people saw this as a reference to 
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Njoya, a view shared by the reverend himself.342 And newspapers were able to 
circumvent government censorship by publishing criticisms spoken in the context of 
Sunday sermons.  Despite the relative liberty enjoyed by clergy, the freedom of speech 
afforded to clerics like Njoya was still limited.  Njoya drew the ire of his superiors in the 
Church who wanted to maintain good relations with the state.  In late 1986, the national 
leaders of the Presbyterian Church attempted to have Njoya sanctioned by his local 
presbytery following a controversial sermon, but these efforts failed when Njoya’s local 
parish ruled him innocent of any wrongdoing.343 The following March, Presbyterian 
Moderator George Wanjau, backed by former Moderator John Gatu, ordered Njoya be 
relocated from his prominent position in St. Andrew’s in Nairobi to a rural parish in 
Njoya’s home area of Nyeri.344 Njoya was defiant, publicly castigating his church’s 
national leadership for punishing him over his political beliefs and temporarily choosing 
to retire rather than accept his apparent demotion.345  Though the Church leadership was 
publicly tightlipped on the reasons behind reassigning Njoya, the reverend himself and 
other observers saw the Church as bowing to government pressure to silence the cleric 
who President Moi had indirectly accused of being “subversive.”346 
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The outspoken bishops of the Anglican Church also maintained their roles as 
gadflies, hitting the administration on a number of issues. Throughout 1988 and 1989, 
Bishop Muge complained about the poor response to famine in the country, and also 
called for the release of political prisoners.347  When Bishop Gitari criticized the quality 
of delegates KANU was sending to the party’s annual conference in October 1988, the 
party’s secretary-general, Moses Mudavadi, threatened to curb the religious freedom of 
unruly clerics. This threat drew a harsh public rebuke from Archbishop Kuria, among 
others, and the government backed down, disassociating itself from Mudavadi’s threat.348  
Despite this public win by the church, the restraint with which the government dealt with 
clerics slowly began to erode. 
Despite the opposition from the churches and other civil society figures, KANU 
persisted with its repressive policies and its plans to use the queuing system in the 1988 
legislative elections.  Despite the President’s attempt to diffuse the conflict with the 
churches by exempting clergy from the queuing process, the Catholics remained opposed 
to the system, and ambivalent on the general situation in the country.349 In their January 
1988 letter announcing the formation of a national Catholic Justice and Peace 
Commission, the bishops mention “violation of human rights in detention without trial” 
but also approvingly cite President Moi’s Nyayo philosophy of “Peace, Love and 
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Unity."350 A follow-up letter by the Catholic bishops just before the 1988 elections is 
respectful and supportive of the President – again citing the “Love, Peace and Unity” 
mantra behind the government’s Nyayo slogan – but the letter is still mildly critical of 
queuing (even with exemption for clergy and other personnel).351  
The Presbyterian Church belatedly entered the queuing debate in May 1988, with 
the General Assembly issuing a moderate statement that it “‘believes that the most 
appropriate method of wananchi [citizens] to express their democratic right of electing 
their leaders is through the secret ballot'’” and calling for a national referendum or similar 
public process to decide upon the type of voting system to be used.352  Despite differing 
from the government on the issue of queuing, the Presbyterian Church also sought to 
maintain good relations with the President. Two days before passing the resolution 
addressing queuing, Moi was the guest speaker at the General Assembly, during which 
the President complimented the Presbyterians on a number of issues and pledged to 
support efforts by the Church to build new higher education facilities in the country.353 
While the umbrella church organization NCCK protested strongly against the 
queuing system, a smaller collection of conservative denominations, the Evangelical 
Fellowship of Kenya (EFK), supported the President in this matter and that opposition to 
the queuing system violated Biblical principles of deference to state authority.  Moi’s 
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church, the African Inland Church, supported the President by quitting the NCCK in 
protest, along with several smaller conservative denominations, and joining the EFK.354  
The Seventh-Day Adventist Church, as was typical on controversial political issues, 
remained silent, despite support within the SDA membership for the churches opposing 
the queuing system.355   
When KANU not only kept the queuing system for the 1988 elections, but also 
engaged in massive voter fraud and intimidation before and during the vote, Anglican 
Bishops Muge and Gitari went beyond words and took actions against the government’s 
abuses. The bishops employed clerics in their dioceses to document the disparities in the 
vote count, which the queuing system made visually obvious to observers who saw 
candidates declared winners despite not having the longest queues.356 
3.1.2 Church Responses to Queuing: Preferences, Structure and Cooptation 
This unusually strong reaction from the protesting churches was not solely out of 
concern for the country’s citizens.  The queuing system was not just an attack on 
democracy, but also a direct challenge to church leaders.  Queuing behind their preferred 
candidate would require the Bishops and other church officials to publicly declare their 
support for specific candidates.  This was not a major problem for denominations like 
Moi's AIC, which enjoyed close ties with KANU and drew much of its membership from 
Moi’s Kalenjin ethnic base.  For churches populated by groups marginalized by KANU, 
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however, a stark dilemma presented itself.  Lining up behind KANU's preferred 
candidate might alienate a church leader's parishioners. In terms of the church 
preferences identified in Chapter 1, this would represent both declines in church leaders’ 
reputations, as well as likely decreases in churches’ membership.  If church leaders 
instead chose to support their parishioners’ preferred choices, these leaders risked 
incurring the wrath of the ruling party.  And church leaders presiding over divided 
congregations or parishes ran the danger of alienating a section of the flock regardless of 
which candidates they supported. As NCCK Secretary-General Waira Kamau put it at the 
time: “a church leader or a pastor who is a reconciliator in his own way will have lost his 
positive neutral position if he lines up behind a candidate. What do you expect will 
happen if someone like Cardinal Otunga or Reverend John Gatu stood behind a 
candidate?”357 The queuing issue thus hit the church leaders close to home, threatening 
their ability to effectively shepherd their followers. Even when KANU offered to exempt 
clergy from the system, the public nature of the process still threatened to divide 
congregations, as members would be forced to display their political preferences to one 
another.  This could easily decrease camaraderie within the churches and possibly lead to 
schisms as some members exited their denominations, while those who remained would 
face animosity from those with different political views. Using the language of Chapter 1, 
queuing was a threat to both the quantity and faithfulness of church members, as well as a 
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danger to church leaders’ reputations and abilities to lead their organizations 
effectively.358 
Looking at the differences in church structure, it is clear that by this point, church 
centralization still played important roles in the differences in church response.  But 
rather than seeking negotiations with religious leaders, Moi targeted church leaders for 
intimidation on one hand and benefits on the other. Concerning the former tactic, the 
President was not afraid to personally inform church leaders of his displeasure and 
pressure them into falling in line. Following a particularly controversial sermon by 
Presbyterian minister Timothy Njoya in October, 1986 (during the early debate over the 
queuing system), Moi summoned a delegation of church leaders to State House, including 
several Presbyterian leaders (Moderator Wanjau, Secretary-General Plawson Kuria, and 
former Moderator John Gatu), as well as top leaders of the Catholic (Cardinal Otunga), 
Anglican (Archbishop Kuria), and AIC (Ezekiel Birech) denominations.  After this 
meeting, the Presbyterian leadership sent a letter to Njoya’s immediate superior stating 
that the Church’s national Moderator (Reverend Wanjau) had been “required by the State 
to give an immediate answer pertaining to the production and distribution of the Rev Dr 
Njoya's sermon,” which had become “a Church-State issue.”359  
Moi also targeted churches and their leaders for various benefits.  The President 
courted both the national and international leadership of the Seventh-Day Adventist 
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Church, while continuing to appeal to the denomination’s moral beliefs.  In 1986, Kenya 
hosted the first Pan-Africa Adventist Youth Congress, personally addressing the 
assembly to praise the church and encourage it to continue to instill morality in young 
people.360 Two years later, shortly before the 1988 election, Kenya hosted the worldwide 
SDA Church’s Annual Council meeting, which coincided with both the 25th anniversary 
of Kenya’s independence and the 10th anniversary of Moi’s Nyayo state. At the SDA 
meeting, Kenya’s Vice-President at the time, Josephat Karanja, met with the world 
President of the Church, Neal Wilson, and publicly greeted the Council.361 Later, 
President Moi received the world SDA President, and a delegation from the Church, 
during which time Moi reiterated protection of freedom of religion.362 SDA President 
Wilson responded to the government’s overtures by publicly congratulating President 
Moi and thanking him for upholding religious freedom generally, and for protecting 
Adventists in Kenya who refused to work on Saturday from being fired from their jobs in 
particular.363 During this trip, the SDA head also pledged funds for development and 
education projects in Kenya, and in a symbolic gesture, personally gave Moi a study 
Bible.364 Meanwhile, Moi maintained a close relationship with Bishop Birech of the 
Africa Inland Church, which had spearheaded the Christian defense of the President to 
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counter the critical churches during the queuing controversy. After leaving the NCCK for 
the rival EFK umbrella group, the AIC became one of the largest funding sources of the 
EFK and thus had a large say in its decision-making processes.365 The EFK consistently 
supporting the regime, basing their relationship with the government on Romans. 13:1-2, 
a Biblical scripture calling for subjection to political authority.366 The Africa Inland 
Church benefited from its allegiance to President Moi, as did its Bishop, Ezekiel Birech.  
Among the benefits that came from supporting Moi, the Bishop’s son, John Cheruiyot, 
was elected as an MP under the queuing system and made a government Minister.367 
During the Second Nyayo Era, church structure continued to play a role in 
church-state interactions, as more centralized and less accountable church leadership was 
facilitated more friendly church-state relations.  However, because the strategy of the 
state had changed from one of consultation to one of control and cooptation, the 
mechanism by which structure lead to church political stances changed, as well.  Rather 
than easing negotiation, centralization and unaccountability became important because 
these features also eased cooptation of church leaders by the state.  Contrary to the 
assertion of Ngunyi, Moi had not initially set out to break the ties that had carried over 
from the Kenyatta era between the government and the largest mainstream 
denominations, as demonstrated by Moi’s early attempts to coopt the Anglican Church 
and the initially cordial relations between the Catholic Church and the Moi government.  
But whereas Kenyatta valued these larger, nationwide denominations for their size and 
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ability to partner with the government for service and development efforts, Moi found 
these denominations too independent and difficult to control.  He instead opted to cut off 
Catholic and Anglican churches, publicly dismissing their criticisms and attempting to 
discredit the strongest critics among them.  He instead sought to ally with denominations 
such as the Africa Inland Church, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, and even the 
Presbyterian Church, as these denominations were smaller, more regionally-based and 
more centralized, making them easier to coopt.  He furthermore pursued relationships 
with smaller, “evangelical” churches, many of which were represented in the EFK. These 
churches were generally smaller and more centralized, and could be controlled through 
patronage and cooptation of church leaders. 
3.2 The Multiparty Debates: 1989-1991 
In the aftermath of the 1988 elections in Kenya, the Anglican Bishops had 
maintained their oppositional stance against KANU, and the government began losing its 
patience with the recalcitrant clergy. In April 1989, Bishop Gitari had one of his sermons 
heckled by youth he believed were hired by KANU, and his home was later attacked by 
armed thugs, with the bishop and his family narrowly escaping.368 Bishop Okullu 
predicted in 1989 that African dictators would suffer the same fate as recently deposed 
Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.369  Presbyterian Reverend Timothy Njoya, having 
been restored to the ministry after his brief retirement, echoed these sentiments in his 
New Years Eve sermon, asserting that the events in Eastern Europe demonstrated the ills 
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of one-party states. He argued that the one-party system was an import from Europe that 
had failed in the African context, and called for a multi-party system instead.370  
These words, particularly Njoya’s sermon, kicked off a spirited and hostile debate 
within Kenyan politics and society over multi-party democracy.  The discourse divided 
the clergy.  Rev Njoya and Bishop Okullu continued to push for the end of the one-party 
system, while Bishop Gitari came short of demanding multi-party democracy as a 
necessary part of reform.  Anglican Bishop Muge, usually a strong critic of the KANU 
state, actually agreed with the government’s position that multi-party politics would lead 
to ethnic strife.371  Archbishop Kuria, speaking on behalf of the Anglican Church as a 
whole, defended the Church against accusations of subversion coming from the 
government, but declined to take a stance on the issue of multiparty democracy, citing the 
differing opinions within the denomination.372   
3.2.1 Transformation of the Catholic Church: Structural Reform and Political 
Activism 
The Catholic Church’s opposition to queuing had not translated into a more 
general critical stance.  On the contrary, the sole Catholic Pastoral Letter from 1989, on 
the Church’s “Centenary of Evangelization in Kenya” is mostly apolitical, apart from 
quoting a previous letter concerning rising inequality and injustice.  As part of the 
Catholic Church’s centenary celebration, the Church tapped expatriate priest John Baur to 
write a history of the Church in Kenya. As late as 1989, Father Baur could write in this 
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book that “President Moi also has expected positive support from the Churches. So far he 
cannot complain about the attitude of Catholic Church leaders and has noted with 
satisfaction their restraint in recent political controversies.” 373  Baur acknowledges 
criticisms of the Catholic bishops for not being as vocal as other church leaders, but 
makes a distinction between speaking out on issues such as birth-control or growing 
injustice, which the Catholic Church had addressed, and being “drawn into ordinary 
politics.”374 
The Catholic Church essentially operated under two overlapping administrative 
structures, essentially giving it two “heads”.  On the one hand, the Archbishop of Nairobi, 
chosen by the Vatican and enjoying security of tenure until reaching the Vatican-
mandated retirement age of seventy-five, was the highest ranking Catholic in the country, 
and he was viewed both inside and outside the Church as the de facto head of the 
Catholic Church in Kenya. Cardinal Maurice Otunga remained Archbishop of Nairobi 
until his retirement in 1997. On the other hand, since 1970 the Church had also made 
decisions on social and political matters through the Kenya Episcopal Conference, the 
collection of all the countries bishops that met periodically, elected a chairman from 
among the bishops for set terms of three years, and made policy decisions based on 
supermajority rule.  Except when the same individual occupied both roles, these dual 
structures gave the Catholic Church two leaders.   
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In May 1990, the leadership of the Church was multiplied further when the 
Vatican increased the number of archdioceses in the country from one to four, elevating 
the dioceses of Kisumu, Mombasa and Nyeri to the same status that the archdiocese of 
Nairobi enjoyed. This decentralization of national-level Catholic Church leadership 
decreased the ability of the government to target any individual for negotiation, 
intimidation or inducements.  Table 3.4 lists the Catholic Archbishops who were in office 
during the Moi presidency.  The new archbishops were from groups who had long been 
marginalized under Moi: John Njenga and Nicodemus Kirima were from the GEMA 
ethnic bloc, while Zacchaeus Okoth was Luo (the ethnic group of Oginda and Raila 
Odinga).  Besides their own ethnic identities, the archdioceses they administered were all 
outside of Moi’s home region of Rift Valley Province.375  The structural transformation 
of the Catholic Church diversified the interests represented by Church leadership.  The 
increase in the number of Catholic leaders thus set the stage for less cooperative Catholic 
Church-state relations, as was reflected almost immediately in the more critical tone 
taken by the bishops in their pastoral letters and other statements. 
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Table 3.4: Catholic Church Leaders During Moi Presidency 
Archdiocese Archbishop Term in Office Ethnic Group 
Nairobi 
 
Maurice Michael 
Otunga 
 
1971-1997 Luhya 
Raphael S. Ndingi 
Mwana'a Nzeki 1997-2007 Kamba 
 John Njue 2007-2012 GEMA 
Kisumu (becomes 
Archdiocese 1990) Zacchaeus Okoth 1978-2012 Luo 
Mombasa (becomes 
Archdiocese 1990) 
John Njenga 
 1988-2005 GEMA 
 Boniface Lele  2005-2012 Kamba 
Nyeri (becomes 
Archdiocese 1990) 
Nicodemus Kirima 
 1988-2007 GEMA 
 Peter J. Kairo  2008-2012  
 
Just after this structural transformation in 1990, the Catholic Church’s position 
shifted radically, as it fully embraced a role as critic of the government.376 That year’s 
only official Catholic Pastoral Letter begins on a supportive note, echoing earlier letters: 
“Thus, we want to restate here what we have already said: ‘The President deserves the 
support of the whole Nation in his many efforts to build up what we want: Love, Peace 
and Unity.’” 377  From here, however, the letter makes a noted departure from previous 
statements. Whereas previous letters mentioned criticisms of government policies in 
passing while making general statements about societal ills, this one focuses in detail on 
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multiple issues specifically related to government misdeeds. The letter declines to 
directly endorse a multi-party system, but joined the critiques of the one-party state:  
The Catholic Church, without proposing any particular economic or political 
system or programme, has recently restated that "no social group, for example a 
political party, has the right to usurp the role of sole leader, since this brings about 
the destruction of the true subjectivity of society and of individual citizens, as 
happens in every form of totalitarianism. In this situation the individual and the 
people become "objects," in spite of all declarations of the contrary and verbal 
assurances. 
 
The Catholic letter directly challenges the ruling KANU party:  
During the last three years a process of increasing identification of the party with 
the official government has been taking place. Whoever raises any criticism 
against some particular measures taken by the party is considered to be attacking 
the government of Kenya. Furthermore, the superiority of the party over the 
authority of the parliament seems to be an accomplished fact. 
 
From there, the letter gives a litany of complaints about the KANU government, 
including the totalitarian nature of the party, violation of freedom of speech, the queuing 
system and electoral “rigging”, inflation, corruption, and forced harambees (fundraisers) 
imposed upon citizens by government officials.  The letter even mentions fear of Latin 
American style “political murders” taking root in Kenya, a possible reference to the 
brutal killing earlier that year of Kenyan Foreign Minister Robert Ouko, whose unsolved 
murder was reminiscent of the political killings of the Kenyatta era.378  The bishops 
endorse calls for a national conference bringing together civil society voices to address 
these issues. Acknowledging the debates going on in the country over the one-party 
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political system, and seemingly aware of the Catholic Church’s own hesitancy to be 
involved in “ordinary politics” the letter concludes in part by stating that 
the issues we have mentioned in this letter constitute fundamental problems for 
our country and their solutions are a must for any country under any political 
system whatsoever. More than being merely political, these issues raise ethical 
questions of justice and human rights. What has emerged clearly from the public 
debate on the political system is a general agreement that the present structures 
have weaknesses that need to be set right. 
 
3.2.2 Continued Debate and the End of the One-Party State 
Initially, the government responded to the calls for multi-party democracy by 
publicly defending the one-party state and challenging the motives of those who opposed 
it. When the KANU government could not quash this debate, it sought to manage it.  It 
announced an upcoming conference where various sectors of politics and civil society 
could debate the issues. This conference was to be called “The Kenya We Want”, 
echoing the title of a chapter in the 1983 NCCK publication A Christian View of Politics 
in Kenya.379 When the government attempted an about-face by announcing the debate 
closed and changing the conference to “The KANU We Want”, a more limited discussion 
of the ruling party, the Catholic and Anglican churches responded with official pastoral 
letters forcefully calling on the government to stick to its original promises, though the 
letters fell short of explicitly endorsing multi-party politics.380   
A low point for Kenya came in July 1990, when the government arrested several 
politicians planning to hold a pro-democracy rally. When thousands showed up for the 
rally anyway on July 7, the brutal police repression against them sparked several days of 
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rioting in multiple towns that left over 30 dead and thousands arrested.381 In the wake of 
the Saba Saba (Swahili for “Seven Seven”) riots, the churches responded with some of 
their harshest words to date.  Bishop Okullu and Rev Njoya demanded the government 
resign, and Catholic Cardinal Otunga called for a transition government to be created.382  
Presbyterian Moderator George Wanjau did not echo these more radical denunciations of 
the government, but he did join Anglican Archbishop Kuria and church leaders from 
other denominations in a milder statement attributing the riots to “‘deeper problems in the 
society which would not be solved through violence’”383 The government condemned 
this mild statement as well as the stronger words coming from the Anglican and Catholic 
Churches.   
The government went ahead with its plans for limited debate on the political 
issues of the day, with the KANU Review Committee holding a forum in July and August 
1990 for members of civil society and ordinary citizens to express their opinions on “the 
KANU we want.” Once open, however, these hearings went far beyond the scope 
intended by the government.  Several of the churchmen testified early in the process, 
laying out their many challenges to the government, and various citizens in the country 
followed their lead.384 This process led to the party adopting some changes, for example 
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ending the queuing system, but it did not yet bring more far-reaching consequences for 
the political structures of the country. 
On August 14, 1990, Bishop Muge died in a car crash during a visit to Busia 
district, one day after a government minister had threatened that the bishop would “see 
fire and may not leave alive” if he went there.385  The public took note of the suspicious 
circumstances of this death. Archbishop Kuria called for an inquiry into the event, but 
accepted the official views that the bishop’s death was an accident and called for calm to 
remain among the people.386  Despite taking a moderate tone in this instance, Archbishop 
Kuria remained at times a harsh critic of the government. When a government minister 
was forced to resign under corruption charges in January 1991, Kuria held a “prayer 
meeting” for the ousted politician at the prominent All-Saints Cathedral in Nairobi, 
allowing the dismissed official to address a crowd of thousands with his accusations of 
political abuse and tribalism.387  When Kuria attempted to hold a similar meeting shortly 
after the anniversary of the Saba Saba riots, with a large presence from the opposition 
group the Forum of the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) planned, the government 
intimidated the church leaders from having the meeting with barely-veiled threats of 
lethal repression.388   
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 Having just elected Archbishop Zacchaeus Okoth as the new Kenya Episcopal 
Conference Chairman (1991-1997), the Catholic Church would go on in April 1991 to 
release a balanced public message, complimenting the government for the reforms it had 
enacted, such as abolishing the queuing voting system, while pressing the government to 
continue with more reforms on issues such as detainees.389  Finally, an additional 
statement was released in September 1991, addressing additional concerns such as rising 
food prices, ethnic conflict, irregularities in the education system, and selective 
enforcement of citizens’ freedom of expression.  While covering a number of issues, the 
tone of this letter is less confrontational than in 1990.390   
The Presbyterian Church maintained an ambivalent position throughout this 
period. The top Presbyterian leadership did not side with church officials (including 
Presbyterian Reverend Njoya) who were calling for the government to step down after 
the Saba Saba riots, but the Moderator did sign off on a weaker statement presented by 
various denominations to the government.391 When Reverend Njoya, who had previously 
been disciplined by the church hierarchy for his political sermons, made his controversial 
New Years remarks against the one-party state, Moderator Wanjau essentially declined to 
directly enter the debate. While stating that Njoya’s remarks did not reflect an official 
position of the Presbyterian Church, he also publicly supported Njoya’s right to speak out 
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against injustices as the reverend perceived them.392  On the other hand, the Presbyterian 
Church also enjoyed cordial relations with the KANU government during this period. 
President Moi was again a guest of honor at the Presbyterian’s triennial General 
Assembly meetings in 1988 and 1991, as well as the church’s centenary celebration in 
September 1991, where he praised the work of the Presbyterians and other missionary 
churches in Kenya.393 During his 1991 General Assembly appearance, Moi took the 
opportunity to urge churches to resolve any disagreements they had with the government 
through consultation, while castigating critics who had instead taken their complaints 
public.394 
While the Presbyterian Church’s friendliness with the Moi government had been 
tempered by criticisms of issues such as the Saba Saba riots, the African Inland Church 
and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church remained uncritically supportive of the President.  
Moi remained an AIC member in good standing.  Continuing to play off of the Seventh-
Day Adventist’s concerns about religious freedom, Moi hosted the SDA’s International 
Religious Liberty Congress in September, 1991, personally addressing the gathering.395  
Despite the support of these and some smaller denominations, political pressure 
against the government continued to mount from church leaders, civil society and 
international actors. Pressure from abroad included a decision in August 1991 by the 
Paris Group to delay considerations of economic aid until Kenya reformed its economy 
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and political system.396 After defying the call for political liberalization for two years, the 
government finally bowed to this pressure, and In December 1991 repealed Section 2A 
and other portions of the constitution, officially making Kenya a multi-party state.397 
 By the end of the Second Nyayo Era, the Anglican, Catholic and Presbyterian 
churches had all made statements critical of President Moi’s government. Nonetheless, 
the three “oppositional churches” varied in the timing and intensity of their criticisms of 
the government.  The Anglican Church emerged earliest as an intense critic of the KANU 
government.  The Catholic Church would join the Anglicans in the severity of their 
comments, but the Catholic bishops took longer to adopt an oppositional tone, and this 
change in the Catholic stance came rather abruptly in 1990.  The Presbyterian hierarchy 
eventually joined in the criticisms, but later and less intensely than the others.  
As the churches’ political orientations took shape during the Second Nyayo Era, it 
is important to understand why the denominations varied as they did along this 
dimension. The ethnic and organizational features of the churches both provide partial 
explanations for the political orientation displayed by each denomination, but internal 
organization better accounts for the positions taken by these churches.  Many 
commentaries on this era attribute the churches’ activities to ethnic considerations: the 
Kalenjin-heavy AIC supported Moi, while the other churches, controlled by politically 
excluded groups such as the Kikuyu, opposed the President.  While church opposition 
can be painted in broad strokes as a story of ethnic antagonism, ethnic considerations 
alone do not explain all of the variation in the churches’ stances. For instance, the 
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Presbyterian Church leadership and membership are both overwhelmingly comprised of 
the GEMA ethnic groups, who lost the most influence from Moi’s ascension and 
subsequent policies, yet theirs was the weakest of the three church critiques.  
 The variation between these three churches can be explained by an inverse 
relationship between the levels of centralization and autocracy within their internal 
organization and their level of opposition to the government.  As noted in Chapter 1, 
more centralized churches are more likely to form cordial relationships with governments 
for at least one of two reasons. By concentrating power in one or a few individuals, these 
churches either facilitate negotiation with government by minimizing the number of 
individuals speaking on behalf of the church, or they more easily allow cooptation by 
minimizing the number of people who have to be intimidated or enticed to cooperate with 
the government. Autocracy, or lack of internal democracy and accountability 
mechanisms, further facilitates church-state cooperation by lowering the chance that 
agreements made between church leaders and governments will be vetoed or violated by 
other important actors within the church.  As Ngunyi has noted, despite the seemingly 
representative structure of Presbyterianism, the Presbyterian Church in Kenya 
concentrated authority in the hands of the Church’s Moderator, who in consultation with 
his deputy, the Secretary-General, could unilaterally decide Presbyterian Church stances 
on political issues.398  
As noted previously, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church supported the 
government because the government in turn gave the SDA both material and ideological 
support.  This process was facilitated by the nature of leadership within the SDA, as its 
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Executive Directors were appointed from above. Because President Moi was able to 
ingratiate himself to the international leaders of the Adventist Church, he thereby gained 
the local support of the SDA in Kenya, even though many of its members came from the 
excluded Luo ethnic group. 
The support given to Moi by his own Africa Inland Church is over-determined, 
though consistent with the arguments that centralization and lack of internal 
accountability facilitate church-state cooperation. As Ngunyi notes, “it is difficult to 
distinguish whether the adoption of an ethnic advocacy politics in the AIC was a result of 
unilateral decisions by its KANU-connected leaders or reflects a more general openness 
to popular pressure. The AIC’s bishop was heavily patronized by the state and happened 
to share common political goals with the ruling elite.”399 The organizational structure of 
the Africa Inland Church need not have played a significant role in determining AIC 
support for President Moi for the simple reason that the leaders and members of this 
denomination had shared interests in supporting Moi as their fellow church member (and 
for many AIC members, their co-ethnic), especially given the patronage Moi provided to 
them and their communities. Therefore, variation in the factors related to internal 
organization, such as centralized executive leadership, concentrated legislative powers, 
and democratic control or oversight, would not have changed the actions of the AIC since 
its members and leaders had the same goals.   
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4 The Multi-Party Democracy Era, 1992-2002 
4.1 Church Involvement in the 1992 Election 
 With the reforms of December 1991, multi-party electoral competition dominated 
the political discourse in Kenya, peeking with the elections of 1992, 1997 and 2002.  A 
number of political parties formed or received official status after having operated 
illegally.  The newly registered parties largely splintered along ethnic lines, and President 
Moi took advantage of the divided opposition to win plurality victories in the 1992 and 
1997 elections.  The reforms implemented in 1991 imposed term limits on the 
presidency, barring Moi for running in 2002.  In this election, the opposition managed to 
form a unified front, handily defeating Moi’s chosen successor and ending four decades 
of KANU rule.  The churches largely maintained their respective stances in favor or 
against the incumbent KANU government. With the opening of the political system, 
however, the churches taking stands against KANU now had the option to stand for 
another party as well. 
 Prominent political leaders outside of the ruling clique, who had been united by 
their opposition to the KANU government, wasted no time to position themselves to 
contest the 1992 elections. Among the multiple parties that emerged, three were 
significant forces in the 1992 election. The Forum of the Restoration of Democracy 
(FORD), outlawed for most of 1991, emerged as a formidable threat to KANU. The two 
most prominent leaders within FORD were Oginga Odinga and Kenneth Matiba.  Oginga 
had been Kenya’s first Vice-President, but soon split with Jomo Kenyatta and became a 
perennial opposition figure during both the Kenyatta and Moi presidencies, and had been 
subject to detention and harassment over the decades based on his political agitations and 
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multiple attempts to form opposition parties.  Kenneth Matiba, a wealthy businessman, 
had been a cabinet minister in the early Moi government, but became a critic of KANU 
and its queuing system after losing a local party chairmanship in 1988 due to rigged 
elections.  Matiba eventually resigned from his cabinet position in protest, and was 
subsequently expelled from the party and parliament.400   
Matiba and Odinga together represented powerful Kikuyu and Luo voting blocs, 
but could not agree on which of the two politicians would top the FORD presidential 
ticket.401 This dispute split the party in two, with Odinga heading a FORD-Kenya party 
and Matiba’s party becoming known as FORD-Asili.  The third major party to emerge 
ahead of the 1992 elections was the Democratic Party, founded by Mwai Kibaki. Kibaki 
had been part of the political establishment, serving as Moi’s first Vice-President, and 
had held a number of cabinet positions spanning the Kenyatta and Moi presidencies. With 
multi-party politics legalized, Kibaki took the opportunity to resign from his post within 
the KANU government and found an opposition party.  Kibaki, and Matiba were both 
Kikuyus, albeit from different regions, Nyeri and Muranga, respectively.   
The ethnic-based split in opposition parties became reflected in the activities of 
the “oppositional” churches.  Though the churches remained formally neutral, they 
became identified with particular opposition parties. The Anglican Church continued to 
be identified with FORD after the latter became a legal opposition party.  When Kenneth 
Matiba returned to Kenya in May 1992 after a year spent recuperating from a stroke in 
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Britain, he was greeted with a large ceremony at the Anglican All Saints Cathedral.402 
The division within FORD also divided the vocal Anglican Church members.  While not 
officially endorsing any party, Archbishop Kuria and Bishop Gitari, both Kikuyu, 
identified with Matiba’s FORD-Asili, while Luo Bishop Henry Okullu was associated 
with Odinga’s FORD-Kenya.403   
Ethnic clashes raged in Kenya in the lead-up to the 1992 election. These conflicts, 
mostly in the Rift Valley between Kalenjin on one side and so-called “settler” 
communities – Luo, Luhya, Kikuyu - on the other, were widely seen as instigated by 
KANU, both to “prove” the government’s argument that multi-party politics would lead 
to ethnic strife, and to secure KANU vote shares in the Rift Valley by displacing groups 
likely to support the opposition parties.404 The latter motive was important because the 
Kenyan constitution required that a winning presidential candidate not only receive a 
plurality of the national popular vote, but also receive at least 25% of the vote in five of 
the country’s eight provinces.405  While such requirements are intended to force 
candidates to make broad appeals across regions, they can also create incentives for 
manipulating the electorate, in this case violently.  KANU’s strategy worked, as President 
Moi was the only candidate to meet the 25% requirement in five provinces, and the 
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violence successfully prevented any of his rivals from reaching this vote share in Rift 
Valley.406  
The Anglican and Catholic Churches again called the government to task on the 
issue of ethnic violence.  A high-ranking KANU official was cited in the Kenyan press as 
accusing Archbishop Kuria of “open bias” against KANU after the cleric allegedly 
blamed the clashes on the government.407 The Presbyterian Church released an unusually 
harsh letter concerning the ethnic violence on April 23, 1992, which was reprinted in full 
two days later in the Daily Nation newspaper.  The statement, signed by Moderator 
Bernard Muindi (in office 1991-1997) and his deputy, accuses KANU politicians of 
inciting the violence, and, in its strongest words to the government, states the 
Presbyterian Church “that a government which is either unable or unwilling to accord 
protection to its subjects may cease to have legitimacy and hence may not be entitled to 
the allegiance of its people.”408 
The Catholic Church addressed these clashes in several of the many Pastoral 
Letters it released in 1992.  While it never directly blames the government for instigating 
the clashes, the Catholic Church heavily implies government complicity, if not direct 
planning, in the violence. The Catholic letters note the apparent organization involved in 
the attacks, suggesting that some individuals or groups are working behind the scenes.  
The letters explicitly hold the authorities responsible for failing to stop the clashes. In 
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perhaps the Catholic bishops’ harshest letter rebuking the government, the bishops state 
that 
Whether our Government leaders accept it or not, the overwhelming majority of 
thinking people of Kenya have now accepted that the Government is not in 
control or has not got the political will to change the existing situation. If these 
ideas are true, then the Government has no legitimate claim to remain in power 
and should consider the good of the people as their first consideration.409 
 
 The Catholic Bishops did not endorse any political party, but continued to make 
their displeasure with the incumbent government known.410 Their pastoral letters spoke in 
favor of allowing political opposition generally and condemns government discrimination 
in favor of KANU and against other political parties, as well as occasionally indicating 
that the country would be served by a change in leadership.411  Notwithstanding these 
criticisms, the Kenyan Catholic Church’s formal neutrality allowed it to serve as one of 
the groups that monitored the election for evidence of wrongdoing; despite the political 
preferences of Archbishop Kuria and other Anglican Bishops, the Anglican Church also 
remained formally neutral, with Kuria leading a separate monitoring group.412   The 
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Presbyterian Church did not endorse any candidate, and Moderator Muindi warned its 
ministers against openly campaigning for a candidate or party.413  While the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church similarly did not endorse a candidate, in keeping with their practice to 
keep secular politics at arms length.  Yet the SDA maintained friendly relations with Moi. 
During another of his visits to Kenya, the international president of the Seventh-Day 
Adventist church visited President Moi and pledged his Church’s support to the 
government.414 The Africa Inland Church supported President Moi and KANU 
throughout Moi’s presidency. 
4.2 Church Involvement in the 1997 Election 
 President Moi took advantage of the divided opposition and the KANU-approved 
election rules to win reelection despite gaining less than 40% of the vote.  Even though 
the opposition collectively polled very well, the outcome of the 1992 election did not 
bring Moi’s opponents together. On the contrary, the political opposition became even 
more fragmented in the years leading up to the 1997 election.  After Oginga Odinga’s 
death in 1994, Ford-Kenya suffered a leadership dispute between Luhya politician 
Michael Wamalwa, who eventually won internal elections to become party head, and 
Odinga’s son, Raila, who led a Luo exodus from Ford-Kenya, joining the National 
Development Party.  A similar leadership struggle within Ford-Asili led to Martin 
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Shikuku, a Luhya, assuming leadership from Kenneth Matiba, who quit the party.   Only 
Kibaki’s Democratic Party remained intact.   
The Catholic Church continued to be vocal, regularly releasing pastoral letters and 
other statements. A particularly harsh letter came in April, 1993, amid continuing ethnic 
violence in the Rift Valley Province.  The bishops castigate several high-ranking KANU 
officials for making statements that fomented ethnic conflict; President Moi and Vice-
President George Saitoti are among those named in the letter, along with details of the 
date, location and content of their offensive remarks.415 While the bulk of the criticism in 
these letters is directed against the government, opposition leaders receive some critical 
words as well; in one letter, the bishops “deplore the selfish power-seeking struggles 
which are becoming evident among opposition leaders.”416 
The Anglican Church was relatively quiet during this period, due to a host of 
internal problems.  Two Church officials were involved in separate sex scandals, and 
ethnic divisions led to leadership squabbles in several dioceses.417There was also a 
leadership vacuum, as Archbishop Kuria spent most of 1994 on sabbatical in the United 
States before retiring at the end of the year, and his de facto replacement, Bishop Gitari, 
was not formally elected Archbishop for two years.418  This election was contentious, as 
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Gitari’s candidacy was opposed by a group of bishops from the western part of the 
country who felt that Kuria should not be replaced by another Kikuyu.419  
While Moi continued to enjoy the unquestioning support of his own Africa Inland 
Church and friendly denominations such as the Seventh-Day Adventists, the President 
also made an unusual overture toward other Christian leaders. In 1994, Moi appointed a 
ten-person commission to explore the problem of devil worship in Kenya. The ten-man 
“Commission of Inquiry into Devil Worship in Kenya” was chaired by Catholic 
Archbishop Nicodemus Kirima of Nyeri Archdiocese, and included the then-current 
Presbyterian Moderator, Bernard Muindi, and Horace Etemesi, a bishop of the Anglican 
Church.420 This attempt to coopt church leaders met with mixed results; while 
Archbishop Kirima and Moderator Muindi were relatively quiet on political matters 
during this time period, the commission was criticized and dismissed by other prominent 
figures within their denominations, including Catholic Archbishop Raphael Ndingi and 
Presbyterian cleric Timothy Njoya.421 
 During the years after the 1992 election, Kenya was rocked by a series of events 
that implicated the government in various forms of wrongdoing.  In early 1993, a 
whistleblower sparked a flurry of local and international press coverage of what became 
known as the Goldenberg scandal, named after a company that received billions of 
shillings from the government, ostensibly to subsidize exports of gold and diamonds, 
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when in reality such exports were almost completely non-existent.422 This scandal 
implicated various high-level government officials, as well as opposition politicians who 
received donations from the fraudulent company.  The lead-up to the 1997 elections saw 
renewed violence in Rift Valley, which spread to other parts of the country as well.423  In 
addition to the “tribal clashes” that were allowed or encouraged by the government, 
security forces also perpetrated violence against political agitators, such as those 
demanding extensive constitutional reforms before the 1997 election.  One notorious 
incident occurred on the anniversary of the Saba Saba riots, as security forces followed a 
group of rally participants into the Anglican All Saints Cathedral and savagely beat those 
inside, including the participants of the prayer meeting that was in progress at the time.  
Among those attacked was the outspoken Presbyterian Reverend Timothy Njoya, who 
needed to be hospitalized for several days after the beating he endured.424 The Catholic, 
Anglican and Presbyterian churches all condemned the attack.425  
In the aftermath of this incident, President Moi revived the practice of high-level 
meetings between himself and the top national leaders of the churches, including those 
denominations that had been critical of his regime.426 By 1997, there had been significant 
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turnover in the top leadership of the churches. Catholic Cardinal Otunga, approaching the 
Church’s mandatory retirement age of 75, retired in 1997. The Vatican chose as his 
successor Bishop Raphael Ndingi, who had built a reputation for outspokenness and 
would continue this trend as Archbishop.427 In the same year, Zacchaeus Okoth was 
succeeded as Kenya Episcopal Conference Chairman by Bishop John Njue.  Anglican 
Archbishop Manasses Kuria reached his denomination’s mandatory retirement age in 
1994, though a permanent replacement would not be chosen until 1997, when the bishops 
and lay representatives of the Anglican Church elected longtime government critic 
Bishop David Gitari to be the Church’s next Archbishop.  Presbyterian Moderator 
Bernard Muindi finished his final term in 1997, and Jesse Kamau (1997-2003) was 
elected to follow him. The churches that were friendly to the regime also experienced 
leadership turnover.  Joseph Kyale was succeeded as head of the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church in Kenya by Johnson Othoo.  Finally, Moi’s relative and friend, Africa Inland 
Church Bishop Ezekiel Birech, retired and was replaced by Titus Kivunzi (1996-2001). 
Despite these changes in leadership, the church structures remained the same and 
thus reinforced each denomination’s previous stance. AIC Bishop Kivunzi continued his 
predecessor’s policy of supporting KANU.428 Presbyterian Moderator Muindi, outside of 
his service as a member of the President’s devil-worship commission, remained relatively 
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quite on political matters, as did the Seventh-Day Adventist Church.  On the other hand, 
Archbishops Ndingi and Gitari were both selected as leaders who would clearly continue 
their churches’ critical stances vis-à-vis the government.429 The leadership selection 
procedures of these churches did not lend themselves to easy cooptation.  The Catholic 
Church had adopted a decentralized leadership structure in 1990, making it difficult to 
coopt the top of the Church.  This can be seen in the example given above, in which Moi 
was able to recruit Archbishop Kirima into a state-sponsored project, only to have 
Archbishop Ndingi publicly criticize the endeavor.  Furthermore, the Catholic bishops 
had within the Kenya Episcopal Conference a formal process to make decisions through 
consensus and supermajority vote, and the number of bishops in the country (including 
the Archbishops) had by 1997 risen to 20, who were spread throughout the country.430 
The number of bishops, as well as the diversity of their own ethnic backgrounds and the 
areas they represented, made government targeting of the Catholic hierarchy less feasible 
than for other churches. Similarly, whereas in 1980 Moi’s government could influence 
the Anglican Archbishop’s election when there were only seven Anglican dioceses in 
Kenya, by 1997, there were 20 Anglican bishops representing dioceses throughout the 
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country.431  The proliferation of Anglican dioceses proceeded along largely ethnic lines, 
increasing the diversity of interests represented by the Anglican electors.  These churches 
therefore did not present themselves as attractive targets for cooptation. 
 Despite the scandals plaguing his administration and the continued opposition of 
prominent churches, President Moi again survived the 1997 election with a plurality of 
the votes cast.432  This time most of the opposition votes fell to Mwai Kibaki, whose 
Democratic Party had survived the election cycle.  Raila Odinga came in a distant third, 
and the remnants of the FORD parties failed to make a significant impact in the election. 
The churches again aligned in the usual way in the 1997 election.  
4.3 Church Involvement in the 2002 Election 
 Constitutionally barred from running in the 2002 elections, President Moi’s 
handpicked successor was Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s founding President.  Uhuru 
was quickly moved up the ranks within the government to position him for his 2002 run.  
This choice greatly upset a number of senior KANU politicians who had been passed 
over in favor of Uhuru.  These officials, including Raila Odinga (who had only recently 
joined the ruling government), eventually formed an alliance with a near-unified 
opposition bloc led by Mwai Kibaki.  
Violence accompanied the lead-up to the election. This now included widespread 
urban clashes involving corrupt police, vigilante groups and criminal gangs. The latter 
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category including a large Kikuyu movement called Mungiki, which mixed Kikuyu 
nationalism, traditional religious practices and criminal enterprises such as a protection 
racket for public transportation in Nairobi.  This group supported Uhuru’s bid for the 
presidency rather than Kibaki’s, and thus Mungiki formed an uneasy understanding with 
the government that allowed the group to operate with general impunity.433 The pervasive 
violence within Kenya touched the churches as well.  Father John Kaiser, a Catholic 
priest from the United States who was active among marginal communities in Kenya, 
was murdered in 2000.   
By this point, the positions of most of the churches had been solidified, with 
neither the government nor the churches seeking to change the relationships that existed 
between church and state, and so it is not necessary to detail the churches’ stance in great 
detail. The Anglican and Catholic leaderships continued to be critical of the government 
and pressed for constitutional reforms ahead of the 2002 elections.  President Moi 
alternatively attempted to stall and control the constitutional review process through the 
appointment of Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) and later a 
Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC). On the same day that the government appointed 
the PSC, various religious groups expressed their frustration with the review process by 
launching a rival constitution review group called the Ufungamano Initiative.434 The 
Catholic, Anglican and Presbyterian churches were among those supported this initiative.  
Additionally, Anglican Archbishop David Gitari openly attended opposition events and 
publicly urged the various opposition parties to coalesce around a single candidate if they 
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wanted to defeat KANU at the polls.435 The Catholic Church, and Nairobi Archbishop 
Ndingi in particular, did not respond to efforts by Mwai Kibaki to win the Church’s 
endorsement.436 Nevertheless, the Catholic Archbishops and the chair of the Kenya 
Episcopal Conference offered various criticisms of the government prior to the 
election.437  Just as the Anglican and Catholic hierarchies maintained their criticisms of 
the government, the Africa Inland Church and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church 
remained supportive.  Africa Inland Church Bishop Kivunzi lost his 2001 re-election bid 
within the church to Silas Yego.438 Yego was not only a member of Moi’s Kalenjin ethnic 
group, but had also personally supported the candidacy of one of the President’s relatives 
during the 1997 parliamentary elections campaign.439  Mere weeks after Yego pledged 
neutrality in the public discussion of who was to succeed President Moi, the Bishop 
hosted President Moi and Uhuru Kenyatta as guests of honor at an AIC fundraiser, during 
which the President and presidential nominee helped to raise nearly 10 million shillings 
for the Church.440 Despite the national-level AIC leadership supporting KANU, at the 
local level AIC pastors split their support, with the Kalenjin clergy supporting KANU 
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and the Kamba clerics backing Kibaki’s NARC coalition.441 The Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church maintained their abstention from direct participation in politics. Locally, SDA 
members split their allegiance, with some members winning election to parliament under 
Raila’s National Development Party.442 Nationally, the SDA remained friendly with the 
Moi government; as late as 1999, an SDA delegation, including the head of the SDA in 
Kenya, held an hour-long meeting in State House with President Moi.443  
During the Multi-Party Democracy Era, the structures of the churches remained 
divergent, with the Catholic and Anglican denominations continuing to have 
decentralized leadership, while the Africa Inland Church and the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church retained their centralized leadership structures.  These static internal 
organizational features coincided with static political stances. The Catholic Church and 
Anglican Church remained independent of government cooptation and continued their 
critical stances, while the leaders of the AIC and SDA remained clients and friends with 
President Moi, even after the identities of the individuals within the top leadership spots 
of these latter denominations changed.   Among the major Kenyan churches, only the 
Presbyterian Church, which had fallen between these two pairs of denominations in terms 
of both internal centralization and political opposition, had significant movement in its 
political stances during the Multiparty Politics Era.  Now under the leadership of 
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Moderator Jesse Kamau (1997-2003), the Presbyterian Church took a harder stance 
against the government than his predecessors, especially after the Saba Saba 1997 
incident. Kamau criticized the government on a number of issues, including calling out 
cabinet ministers for inflaming ethnic violence, and joined other church leaders in 
pressuring the government to revitalize stalled constitutional reforms ahead of the 2002 
election.444 Even so, it was the decentralized churches that maintained consistent 
opposition to the government throughout this era. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In retrospect, it is not surprising that Christian church leaders stood up to oppose 
the government of President Daniel arap Moi.  Given the oppressive nature of his regime 
and the stark declines in income and rule of law that accompanied Moi’s twenty-four year 
reign, there existed a moral imperative to speak out against the injustices pervading the 
country.  And with secular dissent stifled, clergy were not only morally compelled to 
speak up, but they were among the few individuals allotted a modicum of civil liberties 
that allowed them to voice their opinions.  The genuine puzzle is that some churches and 
church leaders spoke against the government while others supported it, and those that 
opposed Moi varied significantly in the timing and intensity of their critiques.  The two 
prominent existing answers to this puzzle attribute differences in the churches’ stances to 
ethnic differences or variations in theological beliefs.  The former view paints the conflict 
as Moi’s Kalenjin and allied ethnic groups clashing with excluded groups led by the 
Kikuyu.  The other view places the churches along a conservative to liberal theological 
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spectrum, with those on the liberal side exercising a “prophetic” role while the 
conservative branch saw it as their duty to “submit to governing authorities.”445 These 
explanations do not hold up to close examination. Rather, as shown in this chapter, 
differences in the organizational structure of the churches determined the ability of the 
churches to negotiate with President Moi and government officials, and affected the ease 
with which Moi could coopt the churches’ leaders or win the church leaders’ support for 
the government.  Moi’s governing strategies implicitly recognize these mechanisms for 
securing church support; after initially attempting to maintain relationships with the 
larger, less centralized and less authoritarian churches, Moi shifts his focus to courting 
the smaller, more centralized and more authoritarian churches.   
This chapter also illustrates how the preferences of churches and government 
influence church-state relations.  Even with the variations in church structure, the various 
denominations began the Moi era offering uniform support for the new president.  At 
various points, however, Moi chose to pursue policies that accomplished important goals 
for the President but also negatively impacted the churches’ main goals.  Dismissing 
Charles Njonjo eliminated a potential political rival to Moi, but also contributed to the 
alienation of the Anglican Archbishop, who had been linked to Njonjo.  Implementing a 
queuing system for elections allowed KANU to more easily manipulate elections in favor 
of the party leaders’ preferred candidates, but also threatened the operation of churches 
with politically and ethnically diverse membership.  Allowing security forces to violently 
disrupt the Saba Saba protests of 1997 helped to clamp down on dissent but also served 
as an affront to the churches that suffered desecrated holy sites and injured clergy. While 
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seeking to portray himself as a devoted Christian and a patron of the churches, Moi chose 
to focus on the churches that were less expensive to coopt and easier to control.   
 The churches’ activities in the Multi-Party Democracy Era (1992-2002) were 
largely consistent with their stances in the years leading up to democratization.  The 
Anglican Church, led by David Gitari (who succeeded Manasses Kuria as Archbishop in 
1998), remained critical of the government and continued to pressure it to reform.  The 
Catholic bishops did likewise with their Pastoral Letters, while Presbyterian Church 
offered additional mild criticisms as well. The main difference in this last era was the 
support given by the Anglican clerics in particular for opposition parties matching their 
ethnic affiliations, demonstrating that ethnicity was a factor in church opposition, even if 
not the most important one.  The ethnic factor would remain relevant to church political 
activities during the presidency of Mwai Kibaki, but the structure of the churches and the 
preferences of both church and state would remain key to understanding church political 
activity during the rule of Kenya’s third president, as analyzed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Church Political Activity During the Kibaki Years: 2002-2012 
1 Introduction 
Mwai Kibaki, former KANU stalwart turned opposition candidate in the early 
1990s, finally won the presidency of Kenya in 2002 as the head of a united coalition of 
opposition parties.  In his camp were several recent defectors from the ruling coalition, 
including Raila Odinga, who had briefly joined his party to the KANU government but 
then defected to Kibaki’s coalition. 446,447 The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), 
made up of parties including Kibaki’s National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) and Raila 
Odinga’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), easily defeated outgoing President Moi’s 
handpicked-successor, Uhuru Kenyatta.448 After coming to power in 2002, Kibaki’s 
presidency was marked by three significant, interrelated events: a failed attempt at 
constitutional reform in 2005, a disputed 2007 presidential election with a tragically 
violent aftermath, and a successful follow-up constitutional referendum in 2010.  The 
major Christian churches in Kenya, having been highly politicized during the Moi 
                                                
446 Various more established politicians within the ruling coalitions were angry when 
President Moi passed over them and instead chose Uhuru, a political novice as his 
handpicked successor for the presidency. 
 
447 Branch, Daniel. Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. Yale University 
Press, 2011: 246-9.  Raila (as he is generally called in the Kenyan press to distinguish 
him from his prominent father, the late Oginga Odinga) and other senior politicians were 
offended at having been passed over when President Moi, who had been in office for over 
two decades but was constitutionally barred from running again, handpicked 
inexperienced politician Uhuru Kenyatta to run for president atop the KANU ticket in 
2002. 
 
448 Kibaki also won every province except Moi’s Rift Valley and the small North Eastern 
Province. Throup, David. “The Kenya General Election: December 27, 2002.” Africa 
Notes. No 14. January 2003. 
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presidency, generally sought to influence the outcome of each of these events, with 
varying degrees of success.449 
Throughout his presidency, the Kibaki government sought to maintain friendly, if 
arms-length, relationships with the churches, and Kibaki attempted to obtain the 
churches’ support ahead of the three votes that defined his presidency.  Differences in the 
internal structures of the churches generally played less of a role in determining church 
political orientation under Kibaki compared to the Kenyatta and Moi presidencies. 
During these earlier presidencies, the government was able to secure mutually supportive 
relationships with churches that had centralized and unaccountable leadership structures, 
as these internal church organizational features facilitated negotiations between church 
leaders and the government or allowed the government to more easily coopt top church 
leaders.  In order to distinguish his administration from the corruption and authoritarian 
tactics of previous presidents, Kibaki implemented various political reforms that were 
popular domestically and internationally. These reforms paid political dividends but also 
reduced the government’s ability to coopt churches by limiting the government’s 
capabilities for offering financial concessions to supportive church leaders or threatening 
recalcitrant clergy.  Kibaki’s reforms and his decentralized, hands-off style of leadership 
also limited his ability to directly negotiate with church leaders.  With the government 
constrained by its own reforms, the mechanisms by which church structure influenced 
church political orientation broke down.  
                                                
449 The Seventh-Day Adventist Church’s doctrine includes warnings against direct 
involvement in contentious political matters, and thus generally eschews direct political 
involvement.  Though the SDA was unusually politicized by President Moi, it limited its 
political engagement during the Kibaki presidency, but did occasionally engage in 
national political issues.  
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Without these mechanisms for negotiation or cooptation in place, church-state 
interactions hinged on the compatibility or the conflict of preferences between the 
churches and the government.  When churches could find common ground with the 
government, such as collaborating over social services, relations were friendly between 
the church and the state.  On the other hand, the churches and the government disagreed 
over constitutional reforms that were favored by Kibaki but posed a threat to the 
churches’ goals of maximizing membership and maintaining right beliefs and actions 
among church members.  When the government most needed the active support of the 
churches, most notably during the 2007 reelection campaign, Kibaki recognized the 
constraints his government had placed on its own ability to negotiate and coopt, and the 
government circumvented its own rules in order to coopt church leaders and win church 
support by reviving tactics used by Kenyatta and Moi. 
The following discussions examine the political orientation of the five Kenyan 
denominations covered in this dissertation during the three major periods of the Kibaki 
presidency, with each period punctuated by one of the three major events mentioned 
above. Section 2 covers the early Kibaki years, 2002-2005, especially detailing the 
churches’ roles in the constitution-making process and their actions concerning the 
national referendum on the 2005 constitution draft. During the lead-up to the 2005 
referendum, church-state relations fluctuated, as the government had less tools at its 
disposal for securing church support.  The churches were dissatisfied with the version of 
the constitution that the government placed before the people in 2005, but their objections 
were mostly mollified by last-minute negotiations with the government or by pressure 
from the churches’ own members.  The final stance of the churches on the proposed 
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constitution was largely ambivalence.  Political disagreements between Kibaki and 
several major figures within his governing coalition culminated in Raila Odinga leading a 
massive counter-campaign against the document, causing constitutional reform to fail in 
the 2005 referendum.  
Section 3 examines the stances taken by the churches during the period between 
the 2005 vote and the 2007 national election, as well as the actions of the churches to 
address the post-election violence of 2007-2008 that resulted from the dispute election 
results. The politicians who had led the successful “No” campaign went on to form an 
official opposition party, headed by Raila, which ran against incumbent President Kibaki 
in the closely-fought 2007 presidential election.  Kibaki had learned from his difficulties 
in securing church support during the 2005 referendum campaign, and the president 
responded by adjusting his political style and violating his own government’s rules in 
order to win church support in 2007.  Although President Kibaki was able to gain the 
support of the top officials of most of the major churches, ethnically motivated splits 
developed within the less centralized denominations. Kibaki was officially declared the 
winner of the highly disputed 2007 election, sparking waves of violence between 
supporters of the two candidates that left over one thousand Kenyans dead and hundreds 
of thousands displaced.  
One of the components of the peace deal was an agreement to revive the 
constitutional reform process in order to address some of the political grievances that 
precipitated the violence. Section 4 explores the roles of the churches after the formation 
of the government of national unity in 2008 through the 2010 constitution draft 
referendum, during which time the Christian churches in Kenya carried out an 
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unprecedented campaign urging a “No” vote on the proposed law. The churches were 
again dissatisfied with the document presented to the Kenyan people in 2010, and this 
time held a mostly-united front in opposition to the new draft.  Despite this opposition, 
Kibaki, Raila and most of the political elites expressing support for the reforms, as did a 
majority of Kenya’s citizens.  The government thus did not need the backing of the 
churches, and placed only limited effort in winning over the major denominations.  The 
majority of Kenyans who voted in 2010 approved the new document, over the objections 
of the churches.  Section 5 concludes the chapter, reflecting on the implications of the 
Kibaki government’s relations with the major Kenyan churches for understanding the 
roles of church structure and preferences on church-state relations more generally. 
 
2 Constitutional Review and Referendum, 2002-2005  
2.1 The Early Kibaki Years, 2002-2004: From Optimism to Scandal 
 President Kibaki came into office with a great deal of popular support, having 
gained over 60% of the popular vote and winning every province except Moi’s Rift 
Valley and the sparsely populated North Eastern Province.450 Kibaki’s victory against the 
ruling party was viewed as a “second liberation,” comparable to the first liberation 
achieved by Jomo Kenyatta at independence in 1963.451 Enjoying the acclaim that came 
with ushering in a new political era, Kibaki engendered additional goodwill by 
implementing popular policies, such as easing media restrictions, improving health 
                                                
450 Hornsby, Charles. Kenya: A History Since Independence. IB Tauris, 2013: 69. 
 
451 Ranger, Terence O., ed. Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa. Oxford 
University Press, 2008: 235. 
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services, and offering free primary education to schoolchildren.452 Kibaki began his term 
by initiating a fight against corruption, appointing John Githongo to the position of 
Governance and Ethics Permanent Secretary, reporting directly to the President.453 To 
fight the politicization of harambees and their abuse of government funds, Parliament 
passed legislation such as the Public Officers Ethics Act in 2003, which severely 
restricted the ability of elected officials to participate in these fundraisers.454 These 
policies were not only responses to domestic demand for a fight against corruption, but 
they also helped Kenya regain international favor from the United States and other 
sources of external support.455 At the same time, Kibaki implemented the Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF), by which a portion of the national budget was allocated to the 
country’s electoral constituencies, to be spent on development work at the discretion of 
each constituency’s Member of Parliament. Together, these reforms decentralized and, in 
theory, routinized government transfers to local communities.  
The turnover in President and ruling party coincided with turnover in leadership 
within the major churches.  The Seventh-Day Adventist Church, Africa Inland Church 
and Anglican Church had all recently undergone leadership transitions, with Paul Muasya 
being appointed Executive Director of the SDA in 2000, Silas Yego elected Bishop of the 
                                                
452 Gifford, Paul. Christianity, Politics and Public Life in Kenya. Hurst & Co., 2009: 16-
17. 
 
453 Gifford 2009: 18; Hornsby 2013: 700. 
 
454 Daily Nation. November 12, 2003. 
 
455 For instance, the 2004 U.S. Department of State “Background Note” for Kenya 
positively mentions the Public Officers Ethics Act, along with the country’s Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, as steps taken to fight corruption. 
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/kenya/40620.htm. Accessed May 20, 2014. 
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AIC in 2001 and Benjamin Nzimbi was chosen as the new Anglican Archbishop in 2002. 
Shortly after Kibaki took power, David Githii was elected Moderator of the Presbyterian 
Church, a position he would use to carry out personal moral crusades over the next six 
years.456 While the four Catholic Archbishops had all been in office for several years 
before Kibaki took power and would remain so for several years after, the chairmanship 
of the Kenya Episcopal Conference passed from Bishop John Njue to Bishop Cornelius 
Korir.  Table 4.1 lists the leaders of these denominations during the Kibaki presidency. 
The leaders of the major churches were generally receptive of the new President 
and his initiatives.  Observers within Kenya considered the Catholic Church, to which 
Kibaki and his initial Vice-President, Michael Wamalwa, belonged, as particularly close 
to the new government.457 The leaders of the Catholic Church in Kenya were mostly 
positive toward the new government and its anti-corruption agenda.458  Other church  
                                                
456 Githii would stand out as the most controversial leader of the Kenyan Presbyterian 
Church’s history. Githii became convinced that various buildings and names within 
Kenyan society, including the Presbyterian Church, had pagan, Freemason or satanic 
origins, and he spent most of his term as Moderator carrying out a rather idiosyncratic 
crusade to rid the government and the Presbyterian Church of what he considered to be 
pagan and satanic symbols. For example, he claimed that the term harambee was derived 
from the name of a Hindu goddess, and that Jitemegea, the Presbyterian Church’s motto 
of “self-reliance”, was similarly unchristian.  Branch 2011:257; Daily Nation. December 
8, 2004. 
 
457 Daily Nation. September 7, 2003. 
 
458Catholic Bishop Cornelius Korir of Eldoret Diocese, the chairman of the Kenya 
Episcopal Conference (2003-2006) was initially supportive of Kibaki’s anti-corruption 
plans (Daily Nation. November 7, 2003). Archbishop John Njenga of Mombasa similarly 
supported the war on corruption, though he did find fault in the government’s use of 
official funds to finance a ruling party member’s by-election campaign (Daily Nation. 
April 14, 2003). Catholic Archbishop Raphael Ndingi, who had maintained contentious 
relationships with both the Kenyatta and Moi governments, publicly prayed for Kibaki’s 
health and for the new government, referencing both a car crash that had seriously injured 
Kibaki just prior to the 2002 election and a January 2003 plane crash that killed a 
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Table 4.1: Church Leaders During Kibaki Presidency 
Church Name 
Highest 
National 
Church 
Office(s) Officeholder Term 
Ethnic Group/ 
Nationality 
Anglican 
 
 
Archbishop of 
Nairobi 
 
Benjamin Nzimbi 
2002-
2009 Kamba 
Eliud Wabukala 
2009- 
 Luhya 
Presbyterian 
 
 
 
Moderator 
 
 
 
Jesse Macharia 
Kamau 
1997-
2003 GEMA 
David Githii 
2003-
2009 GEMA 
David R. Gathanju 2009- GEMA 
Africa Inland 
Church 
Bishop/Presidi
ng Bishop Silas Yego 2001- Kalenjin 
Seventh-Day 
Adventist 
Executive 
Director Musyoka Paul Muasya 2000- Kamba? 
Catholic 
Archbishop of 
Nairobi 
Raphael S. Ndingi 
Mwana'a Nzeki 
1997-
2007 Kamba 
John Njue 2007- GEMA 
Archbishop of 
Kisumu Zacchaeus Okoth 1978- Luo 
Archbishop of 
Mombasa 
John Njenga 
 
1988-
2005 GEMA 
Boniface Lele 
 2005- Kamba 
Archbishop of 
Nyeri 
Nicodemus Kirima 
 
1988-
2007 GEMA 
Peter J. Kairo 
 2008-  
Kenya 
Episcopal 
Conference 
Chairman 
John Njue 
1997-
2003 GEMA 
Cornelius Kipng’eno 
Arap Korir  
 
2003-
2006 
Kalenjin 
John Njue 2006- 
GEMA 
 
leaders welcomed President Kibaki as well. Anglican Archbishop Nzimbi attended an 
inter-denominational prayer service with Catholic Archbishop Ndingi in 2003 to publicly 
                                                                                                                                            
government minister (East African Standard. January 27, 2003; Hornsby 2013). 
Archbishops Zacchaeus Okoth of Kisumu was initially quiet on political issues during 
this early phase, as was Nicodemus Kirima of Nyeri; the latter’s silence can be attributed 
to serious health issues that plagued the Archbishop from 2002 until his death in 2007.  
“Kenyan archbishop dies aged 71” (Catholic Herald. November 30, 2007). 
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pray for the president’s health after a recent car accident. Vice-President Michael 
Wamalwa represented the President by giving opening remarks during the Presbyterian 
Church’s triennial General Assembly meeting in April 2003.  During this meeting, which 
presented Reverend David Githii as the new Moderator of the Church, Wamalwa 
announced specific policies that would increase cooperation between the Church and 
state in education and healthcare, and Githii pledged to retain a critical stance to make 
sure the new government delivered on its promises.463 Initially, this critical stance would 
only manifest itself in mild disagreements between Githii and the government over issues 
such as the dismantling of small vendor kiosks in Nairobi or private meetings between 
Kibaki and former President Moi at State House.464 President Kibaki personally 
welcomed such “constructive criticism” during his address later that year at the opening 
of new headquarters for the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK).  
Addressing a group that included NCCK officials and Catholic Archbishop Ndingi, 
Kibaki pledged a sharp break from the hostile relationship between the previous KANU 
government and various church leaders, promising church-state cooperation in 
development, anti-corruption measures, national reconciliation, and the fight against 
HIV/AIDS.465  Jan Paulsen, global President of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, paid 
a courtesy call to President Kibaki in November 2003, at which time the Kenyan 
President hailed the SDA Church for its work fighting HIV/AIDS in Kenya.466  For the 
                                                
463 Daily Nation. April 23, 2003. 
464 Daily Nation. July 25, 2003; November 4, 2003. 
 
465 Daily Nation. November 20, 2003. 
 
466 “Kibaki lauds Church for fighting HIV/AIDS” November 12, 2003. 
http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/nov03/2003121101.htm 
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most part, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church withdrew from political life in Kenya, 
reverting to that denomination’s usual abstention from politics.467 Bishop Silas Yego of 
the Africa Inland Church, who had been a strong supporter and confidant of President 
Moi, also largely withdrew from public political life once Kibaki came to power. 
Although the AIC and SDA were the quietest churches during this time period, all the 
major denominations largely stepped back from politics once Kibaki came into power, 
especially when compared to the politically polarized church activities of the Moi era. 
The early achievements of the Kibaki government soon gave way to 
disappointments and scandal.  John Githongo’s anti-corruption investigations led him to 
discover various fraudulent dealings involving government officials.  The largest scheme, 
on par with the Goldenberg affair of the previous administration, involved questionable  
contracts worth tens of billions of shillings that had been made by both the Moi and 
Kibaki governments with a British company called Anglo-Leasing. Githongo’s digging 
uncovered that there were questions concerning the company’s very existence, and that 
funds involved were being secretly diverted by government ministers close to the 
President in order to fund the government’s upcoming re-election campaign.468  Anglo-
Leasing became a major scandal when details of the fraud were made public in 2004, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
467 The only major statement from the SDA during this time period was a strongly 
worded statement criticizing a government minister for proposing to extend the 
workweek to include Saturdays, which the Seventh-Day Adventists characterized as an 
attack on their religious freedom, since Seventh-Day Adventists strictly adhere to a 
Saturday Sabbath. 
 
468 Hornsby 2013: 726-727. 
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becoming a symbol of endemic corruption within the Kibaki government and a failure of 
the new president’s anti-corruption agenda.469  
With the churches neither having close dialogue with the government nor 
enjoying relationships of cooptation, the leaders of the major denominations were free to 
chastise the government when their own morality and the anger of their parishioners 
called for such criticism.  Calls for the accused government ministers to be fired or 
prosecuted came from a number of church leaders, including Kenya Episcopal 
Conference Chairman Korir, Catholic Archbishop Njue and Anglican Archbishop 
Nzimbi.470 Presbyterian Moderator David Githii questioned the government’s 
commitment to an anti-corruption agenda in the context of a report that Kibaki had 
privately met with former president Moi, arguing that the former President represented an 
agenda of corruption and poor governance.471 The Seventh-Day Adventist Church and the 
Africa Inland Church remained reticent during this time period.472  
                                                
469 With half of Kibaki’s cabinet under suspicion of corruption connected to Anglo 
Leasing or other schemes, Githongo feared that he would be fired or killed, and he chose 
to resign and go into exile after exposing the deep-seated corruption within the Kenyan 
government. Hornsby 2013: 726-7. 
 
470 East African Standard. July 13, 2004, July 16, 2004; The Guardian (London). July 16, 
2004.  
 
471 Daily Nation. November 4, 2003. 
 
472 Later in Kibaki’s first term, the SDA eventually called for the accused government 
officials to step aside “House May Form Committee to Probe Scandal, Says Ex-Minister” 
Daily Nation. January 25, 2006. 
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2.2 Government Constraints, Incompatible Preferences, and the Limits of Structure 
Unlike previous eras, variations in church political stances toward the Kibaki 
government generally did not correlate with internal church structure, as churches with 
centralized and relatively unaccountable leaders were not more supportive of the 
government than those with decentralized leadership or internal accountability 
mechanisms.  The Seventh-Day Adventist Church and the Africa Inland Church 
maintained the centralized and relatively unaccountable leadership structures that they 
had during the Moi era.  The SDA in Kenya continued to be led by a single Executive 
Director who was appointed from above by the denomination’s international hierarchy, 
rather than being chosen locally.473 The Presiding Bishop of the AIC was chosen from 
within the denomination and faced elections every five years. However, the leadership of 
incumbent Presiding Bishop Silas Yego, in office since 2001, has been market by 
accusations of manipulating the Church’s electoral rules and silencing of the Bishop’s 
critics and rivals within the denomination.474  These two churches withdrew from politics 
during the early Kibaki years.  The Presbyterian Church also concentrated executive 
authority in a single individual, but the Presbyterian Moderator faced regular elections 
every three years and a two-term limit.  The Moderator’s relationship with the new 
government was mixed, as he was generally cordial with the Kibaki government but was 
                                                
473 Paul Muasya, Executive Director of the East African Union of the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church. Interview by author. November 13, 2009.  
 
474 Controversies within the Africa Inland Church concerning Yego’s leadership have 
been reported in the Kenyan press.  “Moi in Bid to Reconcile Church Leaders.” Daily 
Nation. April 7, 2005; “I Won’t Resign, Church Leader Tells His Critics.” Daily Nation. 
February 24, 2006; “Pastors Want Yego Barred From Running Church.” East African 
Standard. December 12, 2006; “Yego to Remain Aic Head As Solution to Row Sought.” 
Daily Nation. March 22, 2008. 
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willing to question the President on some issues, such as rumored private meetings 
between Kibaki and former President Moi.475 Meanwhile, the less centralized Catholic 
Church, with its four Archbishops and Episcopal Conference President, were publicly 
supportive of Kibaki, outside of critical comments relating to the corruption scandals.  
The Anglican Church, which maintained a federated structure in which individual 
bishops maintained a fair degree of autonomy from the Church’s Archbishop, was also 
critical of corruption within the government but otherwise publicly friendly with 
Kibaki.476  
The correlation between church structure and church political stances did not hold 
for most of the Kibaki presidency for two reasons, both of which are consistent with the 
analysis of church political orientation presented in this dissertation.  First, the Kibaki 
government generally did not need the political backing of the more centralized churches, 
and thus did relatively little to secure their support. As discussed in previous chapters, 
government preferences vis-à-vis churches mainly fall into three categories: churches can 
provide governments with citizen mobilization, ideological support, and social service 
provision. Of the three church “products,” Kibaki initially only sought cooperation with 
the churches over services, as the churches were able to provide useful resources in a 
                                                
475 Daily Nation. November 4, 2003. 
 
476 A telling example of the churches’ stances comes in the form of an article published in 
late December 2004 in the Daily Nation newspaper, evaluating President Kibaki’s 
leadership style.  When asked for remarks, both Catholic Archbishop Ndingi and 
Anglican Archbishop Nzimbi decline to comment and implicitly defend the President 
against criticisms, while Presbyterian Moderator Githii gives a balanced statement, 
praising the President’s ability to delegate while criticizing him for moving too slowly on 
some issues.  The leaders of the AIC and SDA churches are not cited in article. “How 
Leaders Rate Kibaki for His Style And Ability” Daily Nation. December 26, 2004. 
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number of areas.  The churches welcomed the offers of government resources and 
coordination to complement their own work and were happy to work with the 
government in service provision.  Kibaki had pledged improvements in education as one 
of his main campaign promises.477  The churches, finding education provision useful for 
gaining new members and training existing members to be more knowledgeable and 
faithful Christians, remained heavily involved in education at all levels, including higher 
education, with all the major churches in this dissertation operating universities in 
Kenya.478  The churches and government similarly cooperated in healthcare and relief 
work.  The Catholic, Anglican and Presbyterian churches consulted with the Ministry of 
Health on a new anti-AIDS initiatives, and the President congratulated the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church for its HIV/AIDS work in Kenya as well.479 The Catholic Church alone 
was running more than 700 AIDS related projects in Kenya by 2006, primarily funded 
from abroad.480  In the face of a serious famine threat in 2004, the Catholic Church 
                                                
477 Mathooko, Mbatha. "Actualizing Free Primary Education in Kenya for Sustainable 
Development." The Journal of Pan African Studies 2.8 (2009): 151-159. 
 
478 These universities include the Catholic University of East Africa, the Presbyterian 
University of East Africa, and Baraton University, the Seventh-Day Adventist institution 
founded under the patronage of then-President Moi (Gifford 2009b: 46).  Moi also 
founded Kabarak University, which catered to Africa Inland Church clergy as well as 
secular education. Kigotho, Wachira. “Arap Moi Sets Up Private College.” The Times 
Higher Education Supplement. November 3, 2000. The Anglican Church has a 50% 
share in governing the ecumenical St. Paul’s University (“Our History” 
http://www.spu.ac.ke/home/spu.html.)  
 
479 “Catholics Firm Over Condoms” Daily Nation. March 25, 2004. “Anglican Faithful 
Plan New Aids Curriculum” Daily Nation. March 26, 2003. “PCEA Rejects Condom 
Use” Daily Nation. March 29, 2003. “Kenya President Commends Adventist Church” 
Adventist Review. 2003. 
 
480 Gifford 2009b: 47. 
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teamed with various government agencies and non-governmental organizations to 
provide relief to the affected areas.481 The largest Christian denominations were 
especially useful collaborators for the government due to these churches’ connections to 
international partners, such as church-sponsored development agencies, missionary 
groups, and parent or sister denominations in western nations. These connections brought 
significant financial resources into Kenya, as well as human resources in the form of 
missionaries.482 
The Kibaki government initially had little demand for the other two church 
“products.”  Kibaki’s recent landslide election meant that the new president did not 
immediately need to mobilize voters again.  The President’s evident popularity and 
reputation as a democratizer provided the legitimacy he needed to engender voluntary 
compliance from the population, obviating the need for ideological support from the 
church.483  Thus, while the government collaborated with the government for non-
partisan service and development work, Kibaki did not put much effort into securing the 
political support of the churches at a time when he could maintain adequate public 
support through secular means. Much like President Jomo Kenyatta, Kibaki’s initial 
                                                
481 “Agencies Ready to Respond to Food Crisis” Catholic Information Service for Africa. 
July 27, 2004. 
 
482 Gifford 2009b: 48-54, 63-70. 
 
483 According to the “two-turnover” test of democratic consolidation, one prerequisite for 
determining democratic consolidation is for an initial ruling party to lose an election and 
voluntarily hand over power to the winning party. Kibaki’s victory in 2002 thus marked 
an important step along the democratization process in Kenya, and was viewed as such 
both domestically and internationally. Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.  University of Oklahoma Press. 1993: 
266-67; Bratton, Michael. "Second Elections in Africa." Journal of Democracy 9.3 
(1998): 51-66. 
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interactions promoted cooperation in areas such as health and education coupled with a 
separation of church and politics. 
In addition to the government expressing little demand for political support from 
the churches, the second reason why church structure did not correlate with church 
political orientation during the Kibaki presidency is that the government was also 
constrained in its ability to secure such support through the usual channels of negotiation 
or cooptation.  The President’s strategy for retaining popularity and compliance from the 
population was to continue in his role as a reformer, as was evidenced by the policies 
mentioned earlier.  These policies made him popular locally as well as satisfying 
international donors, whose support was also greatly welcomed by the government.  The 
same policies had the additional effect, however, of tying the government’s hand in 
dealing with civil society actors such as the churches.  Presidents Kenyatta and Moi had 
used appearances at harambees, in person or through their top advisors, as important 
opportunities for transferring resources to the churches and thus influencing the churches’ 
leaders to support the government.  Harambees had become highly politicized and 
coercive, however, such that the public approval that Kibaki gained by restricting the 
politicization of these fundraisers through the Public Officers Ethics Act initially 
outweighed the costs of losing the ability to use harambees as a tool of social control. 
Additionally, the Kibaki government’s Constituency Development Fund placed control of 
development funds in the hands of individual MPs, shifting the focus of organizations 
seeking funding (such as churches) from the national level to the constituency level.484  
                                                
484 For example, this devolution of development funding caused the Evangelical Alliance 
of Kenya to introduce a degree of devolution to its own organizational structure in order 
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Through these reforms, the government lost much of its ability to channel resources to 
churches and church leaders.  Similarly, the government’s commitment to respecting civil 
liberties also eliminated any explicit or implied threat to church leaders’ safety and 
security should they choose to disagree with the government. The government’s early 
commitment to reforms thus bore political dividends, but at the expense of depriving it of 
the tools necessary for cooptation.  Thus, while more centralized churches remained 
easier to coopt in theory, the government had neither the will nor the ability to channel 
patronage to these churches’ leaders. 
While these reforms limited the government’s ability to use cooptation to gain 
church support, other features of the Kibaki government hampered its ability to gain 
support through negotiations with church leaders.  President Kibaki’s health was poor for 
most of 2003 due to his recent car accident and subsequent stroke, leaving him largely 
unable to handle government affairs personally and leaving his ministers to administer 
the country in an uncoordinated fashion.485 The president was thus unable to personally 
foster relationships with church leaders to the extent that his predecessors had done, 
although he remained close to a few church allies such as Catholic Archbishop Ndingi, 
who was vocal in defending the President against critics.486 Even after his health 
                                                                                                                                            
to better access funds at the constituency level.  Dr. Wellington Mutiso, General 
Secretary, Evangelical Alliance of Kenya. Interview with author. November 25, 2009. 
 
485 Hornsby 2013: 700-701. 
 
486 Kibaki and Ndingi had reportedly become acquainted during their shared opposition to 
the abuses of the Moi government in the 1990s, and Kibaki had even helped purchase a 
car for the Archbishop during this period. Early in his presidency, Kibaki reportedly 
received Archbishop Ndingi at State House regularly.  “Kibaki Leaves it Up to the 
Archbishop ” The Indian Ocean Newsletter. September 13, 2003; “Ndingi's Long Walk 
to the Pulpit” East African Standard. April 1, 2007. When Kibaki was in the hospital 
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recovered, Kibaki’s hands-off leadership style, in which he left much of governing to his 
ministers, was not conducive to the kinds of top-level negotiations that occurred between 
church leaders and previous presidents.487 In sum, the governance style and various 
policies of the Kibaki government, chosen by the government for the purposes of 
garnering votes, maintaining goodwill domestically and gaining support from 
international corners, had the side effect of limiting the government’s abilities to 
negotiate with church leaders or to coopt them through either benefits or threats.  The 
mechanisms by which church structure previously influenced church political stances 
thus broke down. The government, having won the popular vote in a landslide and 
continuing to enjoy the goodwill of the population and international community, did not 
have much demand for churches’ ideological or mobilization goods and thus was willing 
to give up the tools for influencing public church support by implementing these policies.  
Absent the mechanisms by which internal church structure affected church-state 
interactions and ultimately influenced church political positions, other considerations 
drove churches’ political stances. Recall that a church’s organizational preferences are to 
maximize membership of the denominations, maximize the degree to which members 
conform to their denomination’s beliefs and prescribed practices, and maximize the 
amount of resources at the denomination’s disposal. In addition to the organizational 
                                                                                                                                            
following his 2002 car crash, Archbishop Ndingi was one of his visitors.  “Kibaki Flown 
to London” Daily Nation. December 5, 2002.  During Kibaki’s first term in office, 
Archbishop Ndingi remained close to the President and publicly defended him Kibaki in 
the press.  “Archbishop Ndingi: Don't Exert Pressure On Kibaki” East Africa Standard. 
September 14, 2003. 
 
487 Hornsby 2013: 701-702.  Gifford (2009b) refers to Kibaki’s leadership style as 
“benevolent detachment” and cites the President’s age and poor state of health as 
contributing factors to his hands off approach (17).  
 
 
 
 
 
230 
 
preferences of churches, church leaders also have preferences for securing personal 
resources, gaining prestige and acting in ways that are consistent with their own beliefs 
and morality.  The government’s ability to provide the churches with resources was 
largely limited to collaboration in social services and development work, as other 
avenues of patronage had been blocked by Kibaki’s reforms, and the government’s lack 
of demand for active political support from the churches left little motivation to provide 
such patronage.  While the churches and church leaders therefore did not particularly 
benefit financially from having Kibaki in office, neither did the new president implement 
policies that were particularly onerous for churches or their leaders.  President Kibaki 
was a Catholic in apparent good standing with his church, and his policies and public 
behavior did not present any immediate threat to churches’ goals of maximizing 
members.  Nor did the government’s policies contradict the teachings of the churches, 
and thus the government posed no initial threat to the churches’ goals of maintaining 
right beliefs and actions among church members.  Kibaki’s public persona and religious 
bona fides did not present any obvious moral challenges that would cause church leaders 
to oppose the president.  The  public interactions that took place between church leaders 
and government officials, often connected to collaborations over social services or 
development projects, were generally positive, and thus did not threaten the prestige of 
church leaders, even those such as AIC Bishop Silas Yego who had not supported 
Kibaki’s 2002 presidential run.488 Given Kibaki’s initial popularity, associating with the 
President was generally a way for church leaders to boost their prestige. 
                                                
488 During the 2002 presidential campaign, Bishop Yego hosted outgoing President Moi 
and his chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, at a major AIC fundraiser (East African 
Standard. September 30, 2002). 
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The churches therefore had no initial reason to oppose the new president, even 
though the government did not provide many specific incentives to churches to provide 
active political support.  Thus, initial relations between the churches and the state ranged 
from neutral to supportive.  The early variation in church-state relations across the 
different denominations reflected the alliances that had formed under the Moi 
administration.  The Catholic and Anglican Churches had strongly opposed Moi and now 
welcomed Kibaki, their erstwhile opposition ally, once the NARC leader assumed the 
presidency.489 These two churches were also the largest and most widespread in Kenya, 
and thus found the greatest opportunities to collaborate on social service provision, which 
further promoted good relations between the government and the Catholic and Anglican 
denominations.  The Africa Inland Church and Seventh-Day Adventist Church were 
relatively smaller and more geographically concentrated in certain regions of the country, 
and though they also worked with the government, they had less to offer than their 
Catholic and Anglican counterparts.  The AIC and SDA had also long offered vocal 
support for President Moi, limiting the ability of these churches’ leaders to attempt to 
gain prestige by switching their political backing to Kibaki so soon after having opposed 
him.490 These two denominations thus largely faded into the background once Kibaki 
took power. The Presbyterian Church remained in the middle politically. While 
                                                                                                                                            
 
489 The Catholic Church of Kenya split national power between four archdioceses and the 
chairman of the Episcopal Conference. The Anglican Church, while only having one 
national leader, the Anglican Archbishop of Nairobi, maintained significant autonomy for 
its dioceses, which had expanded to 28 by 2003. 
 
490 Gill (2008) discusses the danger of loss of credibility that a church and its leaders face 
from quickly switching political affiliation. Gill, Anthony James. The Political Origins of 
Religious Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: 54. 
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associating with the Kikuyu President Kibaki was popular among the Kikuyu-dominated 
Presbyterian membership, the Presbyterian Moderator David Githii was unusually 
preoccupied with idiosyncratic moral concerns, including a personal crusade to rid both 
government facilities and his own church of “Satanic” symbols, which kept his 
relationship with the government at arms length.491 Once Kibaki’s image as a reformer 
was shattered by the revelations of Anglo Leasing and other scandals, church leaders had 
moral justification to criticize the government’s failings, and public relations incentives 
to protect their own prestige by distancing themselves and their churches from the corrupt 
government.  The government, having failed to develop relationships of negotiation or 
cooptation with the churches, was unable to prevent such church criticisms from being  
publicly expressed. 
2.3 Failed Constitutional Reform, 2004-2005 
Much like Kibaki’s failure to stamp out corruption, his pledge to accomplish 
quick constitutional reform also failed to materialize.  In the run-up to the 2002 vote, 
candidate Mwai Kibaki had promised to have a new constitution within the first 100 days 
of his presidency, but the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) began its work in 
late April 2003, nearly four months after Kibaki took office.492  The NCC, colloquially 
known as “Bomas” after the name of the resort where the meetings took place, included 
over 600 delegates, including all 210 elected members of parliament, as well as 
representatives from districts, political parties, and civil society groups. During stalled 
                                                
491 “Now Cleric Wants Parliament Symbols Destroyed.” East African Standard. February 
7, 2006. 
 
492 Cottrell, Jill, and Yash Ghai. "Constitution making and democratization in Kenya 
(2000–2005)." Democratisation 14.1 (2007): 11-12. 
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constitutional review process of the later Moi years, a collection of religious groups – 
including the major Christian churches as well as Hindu and Muslim organizations – had 
launched a parallel, “people driven” review process known as the Ufungamano 
Initiative.493 Various religious groups from the Ufungamano Initiative participated in 
Bomas.  Representatives from the major churches included Catholic Archbishop 
Zacchaeus Okoth, retired Anglican Archbishop David Gitari and Seventh-Day Adventist 
Executive Secretary Peter Bwana.494  
Bomas became a battleground for a major political conflict brewing within the 
ruling coalition.  During the 2002 presidential campaign, Kibaki had signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with various ruling-coalition defectors such as 
Raila Odinga and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Although the details remained in 
dispute, Kibaki apparently promised these allies a significant share of cabinet seats and 
other inducements.495 Most importantly, Raila was told that an executive Prime Minister 
position would be created for him, and Kibaki allegedly agreed to only serve one term, 
presumably to open the door for Raila or another coalition member to succeed him in 
2007.496 Once in office, Kibaki reneged on these promises, giving his own NAK party 
                                                
493 The Ufungamano Initiative, named after a facility in Nairobi jointly owned by the 
Catholic Church and the NCCK, two of the major organizations involved in the new 
initiative. 
 
494 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC). National Constitutional 
Conference. Verbatim Report of Swearing in of Delegates to the National Constitutional 
Conferences, Held at the Bomas of Kenya on 29th April 2003.” 
 
495 Hornsby 2013: 698-699. 
 
496 Khamisi, Joe. The Politics of Betrayal: Diary of a Kenyan Legislator. Trafford 
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members a greater share of cabinet seats than called for in the agreement.497 The lack of 
unity within the NARC coalition grew throughout 2003 and 2004, with Raila’s LDP 
essentially becoming an opposition party within the ruling coalition.498 The Catholic 
bishops criticized the inter-party squabbling within government and called for the various 
factions to cooperate on constitutional reform.499 Presbyterian Moderator Githii similarly 
criticized the political infighting as a distraction from development work.500 Instead of 
simply criticizing, however, Catholic Archbishop Ndingi and Anglican Archbishop 
Nzimbi, together with NCCK head Mutava Musyimi, personally intervened in an attempt 
to reconcile the opposing factions.501  
The church leaders’ intervention did not solve the problems within NARC, as the 
battles between Kibaki’s NAK party and Raila’s LDP carried over into the constitution-
writing process.  By allying with KANU (now an official opposition party) and various 
civil society groups who were represented at the NCC, Raila’s group was able to 
assemble a majority of the delegates to write a new constitution in line with the LDP’s 
vision for government, which included a four-tier devolution of governing authority, a 
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weakened presidency, and a powerful Prime Minister.502 The NAK faction, in contrast, 
sought to retain a strong, centralized presidential system. 
The churches were active within the NCC while also maintaining their separate 
identity as the Ufungamano Initiative.  Though initially including Hindu and Muslim 
groups as well as Christian churches, the churches dominated the Ufungamano group.  
The Christian groups within Ufungamano strongly objected to a provision within the 
constitution concerning Islamic “kadhis’ ” courts.  These courts, which had authority to 
handle a limited number of family law cases between willing Muslim parties according to 
Islamic law, had existed in Muslim-populated areas of Kenya since colonial times, 
primarily along the coast.  Kadhis’ courts had been explicitly included in the 
independence constitution, but the churches wanted them removed from the new 
constitution. The churches’ stand against kadhis’ courts caused the major Muslim 
participants within the Ufungamano Initiative to withdraw from the group.503  The 
Ufungamano group also supported the strong presidential system advocated by NAK.   
When it became evident in early 2004 that the LDP recommendations were 
gaining ground at the NCC, the Ufungamano Initiative submitted its own draft 
constitution for consideration at Bomas, retaining the strong presidency while excluding 
the office of Prime Minister, devolution, and kadhis’ courts.504 The leaders of the 
                                                
502 Raila calculated that his best chance of gaining power in the next election was through 
a parliamentary system (Cattrell and Ghai 2007: 12-13, 24 endnote 17). 
 
503 Daily Nation. April 23, 2003. 
 
504 The level of agreement between the Ufungamano Draft and the government’s 
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Anglican and Presbyterian denominations, as well as the chairman of the NCCK, strongly 
pushed for the Ufungamano constitution, but to little success.  The LDP, its allies, and 
chairman Ghai all reacted unfavorably to the Ufungamano draft, and even the Catholic 
Church distanced itself from the proposal, despite individual clerics like Catholic 
Archbishops Ndingi and Njue backing the Ufungamano push.  By the time Bomas 
concluded in March 2004, Raila’s group had won out against the preferences of the NAK 
government and the Protestant churches, completing a “Bomas Draft” constitution 
incorporating the devolution and other reforms sought by the LDK group.505  
 Though the CKRC succeeded in creating a people-driven draft, the new Kibaki 
administration was as keen as the previous government on controlling the constitution-
writing process. After a stall in the process due to various court challenges, Kenyan court 
system. the NAK-dominated government passed legislation allowing the draft to be 
altered through a simple majority process in parliament.506 Using this power, Kibaki’s 
allies rewrote the document, and the new Wako Draft, named after Attorney General 
Amos Wako, was approved by parliament and presented to the country for a referendum 
in November 2005.  The new draft limited devolution, retained a strong presidency and 
created a weak prime minister who was dependent on the president.   Many Kenyan 
citizens and civil society members were outraged at this hijacking of the process, 
decrying the substitution of a government-drafted document instead of the people’s draft 
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that was created at Bomas.  Raila and other disenchanted coalition members, joining with 
opposition forces such as Uhuru Kenyatta’s KANU, began openly campaigning against 
the proposed government draft.  The two camps adopted the names of the images that had 
been selected to appear on ballots as symbols of the two choices during the referendum: a 
Banana for President Kibaki and his government pushing for a “Yes” vote on the 
proposed constitution, and an Orange for Raila and the other politicians campaigning for 
a “No” vote.  
Though it would be an oversimplification to view the referendum results solely in 
terms of ethnicity, it is undeniable that the ethnic factor played a large role in Kenyans’ 
votes.  The “Yes” campaign was identified with President Kibaki’s Kikuyu/GEMA ethnic 
voting bloc,507 though Uhuru Kenyatta’s sided with the No team, threatening to split the 
Kikuyu vote.  Joining Kibaki on the “Yes” side was Simeon Nyachae, a cabinet minister 
and “big man” of the Kisii ethnic group in the western part of the country.508  Of the 
largest remaining ethnic groups – Luo, Luhya, Kamba and Kalenjin– most of the big men 
(and women) either identified with the “No” campaign or split between the two sides, as 
shown in Table 4.3.509   
                                                
507 GEMA consists of the K(G)ikuyu ethnic group, who predominately hail from Central 
Province, as well as the related Embu and Meru who live in eponymous districts in 
neighboring Eastern Province. 
 
508 Whitake, Beth Elise and Jason Giersch. “Voting on a Constitution: Implications for 
Democracy in Kenya” Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 27, No. 1, January 
2009: 1-20. 
 
509 Raila Odinga, the leader of the “No” campaign, has long been the undisputed 
godfather of the Luo.  The Kalenjin still largely followed the lead of former President 
Daniel arap Moi, who spoke out against the proposed constitution and was thought to be 
funding the “No” campaign (Whitake and Giersch 2009: 10).  Also on the Orange side 
was William Ruto, KANU secretary-general at the time, who was emerging as Moi’s 
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Initially, a large cross section of churches, including the Catholic Kenya 
Episcopal Conference, NCCK, and EFK, banded together to oppose the Wako Draft. 
Under an umbrella organization simply called the Kenya Church, the churches mainly 
took issues with the retention of kadhis’ courts in the government’s draft.  While 
mainline churches and their leaders, such as Moderator Githii of the Presbyterian Church, 
were prominent in the Kenya Church opposition movement, the leaders of smaller but 
well-known and media-savvy evangelical churches also featured prominently in the 
opposition.  These included Bishop Mark Kariuki of the Deliverance Church and Bishop 
Margaret Wanjiru of Jesus is Alive Ministries, which have been two of the fastest- 
growing denominations in 21st century Kenya.510  
 Facing both secular and religious opposition, Kibaki sought to come to terms 
with the churches.  After an inconclusive meeting between government officials and 
leaders from both the mainstream churches – including Archbishop Nzimbi and 
Moderator Githii – and evangelicals Kariuki and Wanjiru, the government chose to lobby 
 
                                                                                                                                            
heir-apparent for Kalenjin leadership. The Luhya leadership split loyalties, with Vice 
President Moody Awori siding with Kibaki and Musalia Mudavadi, a former Vice 
President, joining the “No” group.  A similar split emerged in the Kamba leadership 
between government minister Charity Ngilu, who remained loyal to Kibaki, and fellow 
minister Kalonzo Musyoka, who broke with his boss to support Raila’s side (Whitake and 
Giersch 2009: 10-11). 
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Table 4.2: Prominent Political Leaders Positions on 2005 Referendum1 
Ethnicity Yes (“Banana”) Activist 
Office or 
Position 
No (“Orange”) 
Activist 
Office or 
Position 
GEMA Mwai Kibaki President of Kenya 
Uhuru 
Kenyatta 
KANU 
Chairman 
Luo Raphael Tuju 
Information 
Minister of 
Kenya 
Raila Odinga Roads Minister of Kenya 
Luhya Moody Awori Vice President of Kenya 
Musalia 
Mudavadi 
Former Vice 
President of 
Kenya 
Kamba Charity Ngilu Health Minister of Kenya 
Kalonzo 
Musyoka 
Environment 
Minister of 
Kenya 
Kalenjin   
Daniel arap 
Moi 
 
William Ruto 
Former 
President of 
Kenya  
KANU 
Secretary-
General 
Gusii Simeon Nyachae 
Energy 
Minister of 
Kenya 
  
1 Information drawn from Whitake, Beth Elise and Jason Giersch. “Voting on a Constitution: Implications 
for Democracy in Kenya”, as well as Daily Nation and East African Standard newspapers. 
 
the largest churches, sending Attorney General Wako to make the government’s case 
before the archbishops and bishops of the Catholic Church, the Anglican Archbishop and 
bishops, and the leadership of the NCCK on consecutive days between August 30 and 
September 1, 2005.511   
After each of these meetings, the targeted church organization softened its “No” 
stance.  The Catholic Church had been wary of the document due to the kadhis’ courts, as 
well as language that the Church worried might allow abortion. After all the Catholic 
                                                
511 “Churches to State Stand Tomorrow” East African Standard; August 24, 2005. 
“Catholic Bishops Won't Tell Kenyans How to Vote” East African Standard. August 31, 
2005; “Referendum: It is All Up to You, Anglican Bishops Tell Their Flock” Daily 
Nation. September 1, 2005; “NCCK Position Echoes Fellow Christian Churches’” East 
African Standard. September 2, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
240 
 
bishops of Kenya collectively met with Wako during a special meeting of the Kenya 
Episcopal Conference, the KEC decided to adopt a neutral stance on the constitution, 
urging parishioners to read the document for themselves and vote according to their 
consciences.  This stand, however, did not eliminate differences that existed between the 
individual Catholic leaders.  Of the five national Catholic leaders – the four archbishops 
and the chairman of the Kenya Episcopal Conference – Bishop Korir of Eldoret, who 
served as KEC chairman, practically endorsed the document, as did Archbishop Kirima 
of Nyeri (which is President Kibaki’s home diocese).512 Two others, Archbishop Ndingi  
of Nairobi and Archbishop Lele of Mombasa, remained neutral.513 Only Archbishop 
Zacchaeus Okoth of Kisumu, a Luo clergyman from Raila’s home province of Nyanza, 
continued to publicly oppose the Wako draft.514  
                                                
512 Bishop Korir had initially opposed amending the Bomas Draft, but after reading the 
final document and being briefed by AG Wako, Korir became a proponent of the Wako 
Draft, declaring that “by and large it is a big improvement on the Bomas Draft and the 
current Constitution” and argued that voters should not “throw out the whole document 
because of a few unclarified issues.” East African Standard. August 21 and August 31, 
2005; Daily Nation. September 4, 2005. Kirima praised the document, while accusing 
some of the politicians opposing the Draft of purposely misleading Kenyans on its 
contents. Daily Nation. October 3, 2005. 
 
513 Ndingi declined to take a public stand for or against the document, but he had been an 
early proponent of holding a referendum on the Wako Draft.  East African Standard. 
August 8, 2005. Archbishop Lele, who had only been installed to his position a few 
months before the referendum, was quiet during the lead-up to the vote. 
 
514 Even after the bishops had decided that the Church’s stance would be neutral, Okoth 
continued to oppose the new constitution. He was reported as saying that “Attorney-
General Amos Wako short-changed Kenyans by replacing the Bomas Draft with the 
Kilifi Draft [an alternate name for the Wako Draft, referencing the resort town where this 
draft was conceived],” and Okoth argued that the Wako Draft “contains some anti-
biblical sections, and I must ask Kenyans to vote against it.” Daily Nation. September 25, 
2005. 
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The Anglican Church reacted similarly to their Catholic counterparts, adopting a 
neutral stance after the Attorney General met with the Anglican bishops and addressed 
their concerns. As with the Catholic Church, however, the Anglican bishops’ official 
stance was followed by dissent. Three Anglican bishops from Nyanza and Western 
Provinces, where Raila and LDP were popular, called for a postponement of the 
referendum to work out the contentious issues, deriding the “Kilifi clique” and referring 
to objectionable elements of the Wako Draft as “poison” that the Kenyan people should 
not drink.515 Finally, Mutava Musyimi, who both lead the NCCK and chaired the 
Ufungamano Initiative, met with Attorney General Wako and quickly adopted a neutral 
yet seemingly positive stance concerning the Wako Draft, echoing the Catholic statement 
that the proposed draft was an improvement on both the Bomas Draft and the existing 
constitution.516  
The Presbyterian and Africa Inland Churches were among the individual 
denominations that held out longer in their opposition to the Wako Draft under the Kenya 
Church banner.  The leaders of these denominations, Presbyterian Moderator David 
Githii and AIC Bishop Silas Yego, had been critical even of the Bomas Draft, specifically 
on the issue of religious courts. Githii and Yego were among six clerics who filed a 
lawsuit in 2004 to have the courts declared illegal and thus stricken from the Bomas 
Draft.  The Wako Draft also retained the kadhis’ courts provision but, in an attempt to 
appease the Christian critics of the bill, explicitly allowed for Christian and Hindu courts 
                                                
515 “Bishops Want Contentious Issues Resolved Before the Referendum” East African 
Standard. September 13, 2005. 
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to be formed as well.  This new provision did not satisfy the churches, and the 
Presbyterian Church, AIC and a number of smaller, mostly evangelical and Pentecostal 
churches, continued their opposition after their Catholic and Anglican counterparts had 
pulled back. Eventually, however, Kenyan state radio announced that AIC Bishop Yego 
and the Church’s top leadership had decided to let its members read the document for 
themselves and “vote freely.”517 Presbyterian Moderator had held out in opposing the 
Wako Draft even after he and other Presbyterian leaders were summoned to State House 
to meet with President Kibaki.518  While initially withstanding pressure from the 
government, Githii relented when faced with his own church members, apparently telling 
a Presbyterian congregation to “let the people read the document first before deciding 
which way to vote”, a walk-back from the strong “No” stance he had taken in public.519 
Unsurprisingly, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church declined to take a stance for or 
against the document, although it did call for a postponement of the referendum in order 
to conduct civic education and work out the contentious issues that had divided the 
nation.520    
                                                
517 KBC Radio. September 7, 2005. This statement seems to be confirmed by a later 
report in the Daily Nation newspaper concerning a group of AIC pastors rejecting the 
neutral stance “Cracks Emerge in Churches Over Voting” Daily Nation. September 25, 
2005.  
 
518 “Bishops Speak Out Against Religious Courts Clause” Daily Nation. August 25, 2005. 
 
519 Daily Nation. October 29 2005. 
 
520 Others calling for the postponement included Those calling for the suspension include 
the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, the Central Organisation of Trade Unions 
(Cotu) and former Cabinet minister Nicholas Biwott. Daily Nation September 16, 2005; 
Daily Nation September 19, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
The Kibaki government was able to soften the churches’ stance against the Wako 
document, but these efforts were insufficient to win the referendum.  The Orange team 
won a decisive “No” vote throughout the country, largely due to the ethnic politics at 
play.  The Banana “Yes” side only won in Central Province, which voted 
overwhelmingly for Kibaki’s side.521  The Orange team won in Kenya’s other seven 
provinces- overwhelmingly in Nyanza (Raila’s home), Rift Valley (home of the Kalenjin 
ethnic group), Western (home of the Luhya), Coast and Northeast Provinces; narrower 
victories in multi-ethnic Nairobi and in Eastern Province, the latter including the Kamba, 
Meru and Embu ethnic groups. Table 4.3 details the voting results by province and 
ethnicity.  
2.4 Government and Church Preferences and Constitutional Reform 
 As was the case in the earliest years of the Kibaki presidency, the stances of the 
churches during the 2004-2005 constitutional review did not firmly fit the centralization 
argument presented in this dissertation. Churches and government mainly interacted with 
one another in ways that were dictated by their respective preferences, without church 
structure playing a decisive role in mediating While the Kibaki government and the 
churches maintained their underlying partnerships in development work during this 
process, the government found itself in need of more active political support for the 
churches.  Specifically, the government needed votes in its favor for the 2005 
referendum, and knew that the churches had the potential to mobilize their members 
either for or against the new draft.  The churches were initially inclined to oppose the  
                                                
521 Even Uhuru Kenyatta’s home district narrowly sided with Kibaki.  Lynch, Gabrielle. 
“The Fruits of Perception: ‘Ethnic Politics’ and the Case of Kenya’s Constitutional 
Referendum.” African Studies, 65, 2, December 2006: 234. 
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Table 4.3: Kenya 2005 Constitutional Referendum 
Results by Province and by Ethnic group1 
Province Percent Voting “Yes” 
Nairobi 43.35% 
Coast 20.65% 
Northeast 2 5.43% 
Eastern 47.33% 
Central 93.28% 
Rift Valley 22.92% 
Western 37.81% 
Nyanza 15.04% 
Ethnic Group Percent Voting “Yes” 
Kikuyu 93.28% 
Embu 83.38% 
Meru 90.79% 
Luhya 37.81% 
Luo 1.43% 
Kalenjin 16.13% 
Kamba 19.87% 
Kisii 42.05% 
National 38.0% 
1 Source: Kimenyi, Mwangi S. and Shughart, William F., "The Political Economy of 
Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum" (2008). 
Economics Working Papers. Paper 200808. 
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200808 
 
government’s draft.  Many of the denominations’ leaders viewed the continued 
provisions for Islamic kadhis’ courts in the proposed constitution as an affront to their 
churches and to Christianity. Though government and church preferences were largely 
decisive in determining the outcome of church-state discussions over the 2005 
referendum, the effects of church structure were nonetheless evident in the interactions 
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between church and government and in the decisions of the church leaders.   
Rather than focusing on the centralized churches that could theoretically be 
coopted or negotiated with more easily, the government targeted the largest 
denominations, the Catholic and Anglican churches, for special lobbying, as Kibaki 
needed votes and these churches held sway over large numbers of citizens.522 The 
decentralized leadership structure of the Catholic and Anglican Churches, which became 
more fragmented as each church’s bureaucracy expanded, made negotiating with them 
difficult; by 2005, the Catholic Church had twenty-five bishops leading dioceses 
throughout the country, including four archbishops, while the Anglican Church had 
twenty-nine bishops.523 It was not until each of these denominations brought together all 
of their respective bishops in special meetings that the government was able to effectively 
negotiate with the Catholic and Anglican hierarchies, which agreed to end their churches’ 
official opposition.  Even then, however, the decentralized nature of power within the 
Catholic and Anglican hierarchies allowed individual archbishops and bishops to freely 
defect from the official church stance as their own consciences or the demands of their 
parishioners dictated.   
President Kibaki also attempted to sway the more centralized Presbyterian Church 
by summoning the Church’s Moderator to State House, just as previous presidents had 
                                                
522 The government made a similar effort toward the largest Protestant umbrella group, 
the NCCK, which indirectly represented the Anglican Church and most of the largest 
Protestant denominations in Kenya. 
 
523 “On the Burden of International Debt: A Pastoral Letter of The Catholic Bishops of 
Kenya” May 17, 2005 ; “Referendum: It is All Up to You, Anglican Bishops Tell Their 
Flock” Daily Nation. September 1, 2005 
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done when churches were taking stands that the head of state found unacceptable.524  
However, Kibaki lacked the tools of cooptation that had been held by his predecessors, 
and thus was unable to sway the particularly recalcitrant Presbyterian leader, who found 
the government’s proposed constitution an affront to his personal morality and a threat to 
his church’s long-term interests.525  The government put less effort into lobbying the 
leaders of the centralized Africa Inland Church and Seventh Day Adventist Church, 
which were smaller and mostly drew their members from rather polarized 
communities.526 Overall, then, the successful lobbying of the Catholic and Anglican 
churches ahead of the 2005 poll represented an exceptional instance of government 
influence on churches during the first portion of President Kibaki’s first term in office.  In 
general, the various Christian denominations acted in accordance with the interests of 
their leaders and members, and the government had few means available to influence the 
churches’ political statements. 
                                                
524 “Bishops Speak Out Against Religious Courts Clause” Daily Nation. August 25, 2005. 
 
525 The Presbyterian Church draws the vast majority of its members from the Kikuyu (or 
Gikuyu) and related Meru and Embu groups (collectively, GEMA), and these groups 
were overwhelmingly supportive of Kibaki’s proposed constitution, as seen in Table 4.3 
above.  Despite the popularity of the proposed constitution among these groups, 
Moderator Githii strongly objected to the inclusion of kadhis’ courts in the constitution, 
consistent with his larger crusade against non-Christian religious influence within 
government.  Githii also expressed strong moral objections to language in the draft that 
he and other “No” church officials believed opened the door for legalized abortion in the 
country.  “A Clash of Views in the Campaign” Daily Nation. August 28, 2005.  
 
526 The Africa Inland Church draws heavily from the Kalenjin and Kamba ethnic groups, 
both of who were very strongly opposed to the proposed constitution.  Although the 
Seventh-Day Adventist church draws nearly half of its members from the Kisii ethnic 
group, who split o the proposed constitution, it draws an equal number of member from 
the Luo, who were nearly unanimous in following Raila’s “No” stance. See Table 4.3 
above. 
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3 National Elections and Post-Election Violence, 2005-2008 
3.1 Negotiation, Cooptation and Appeals to Church Preferences 
President Kibaki responded to the 2005 referendum defeat by sacking his entire 
cabinet, reconstituting it with Kibaki loyalists, many from the Kikuyu community, to the 
exclusion of those who had campaigned against the Wako constitution.527  Most of the 
major players in the Orange group banded together to form a new opposition party, the 
Orange Democratic Movement, led by Raila Odinga. Raila, still the undisputed boss of 
the Luo constituency, was joined by four other leaders of various important ethnic and 
regional groups to form the ODM “Pentagon.”528 Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) and Kalonzo 
Musyoka (Kamba) initially affiliated themselves with ODM but would break away prior 
to the 2007 election.529  
Against this broad national coalition, Kibaki and his supporters remained within 
the ruling party, renamed NARC-Kenya, which appealed largely to the GEMA 
communities.  Kibaki thus sought additional allies, among them churches.530 In seeking 
                                                
527 Branch 2011: 260; Hornsby 2013: 711, 742. 
 
528 The other members of the ODM Pentagon, who represented major ethnic and regional 
constituencies in Kenya, were: Moses Mudavadi (Luhya), William Ruto (Kalenjin), Najib 
Balala (a Muslim Arab from the Coast region) and Joseph Nyagah (of the Mbeere people, 
a smaller ethnic group related to the Embu). Charity Ngilu (a Kamba, like Musyoka) 
would joined the Pentagon (Hornsby 2013: 749). 
 
529 Uhuru Kenyatta withdrew KANU from ODM and throwing his support behind 
Kibaki, and Kalonzo Musyoka branching off to form a small rival ODM branch, ODM-
Kenya. Even with these splits, ODM remained a broad-based coalition (Hornsby 2013: 
749). 
 
530 All of the major churches were important political allies; the largest and most 
widespread denominations, the Catholic and Anglican churches, held sway over the 
largest number of voters, while the more regionally concentrated churches such as the 
Presbyterian Church (Central Province), AIC (Rift Valley and Eastern Province) and 
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the churches’ support, President Kibaki was sure to appeal to the church leaders’ personal 
interests – access to resource, prestige, and moral considerations – and to the churches’ 
organizational interests – increasing membership, promoting members’ faithful 
adherence to church doctrines, and church control of resources.  The President made a 
significant effort to employ the tactics of negotiation and cooptation that had benefited 
previous presidents in their efforts to gain church support.  As a first step toward securing 
the churches’ support, Kibaki increased his personal contact and discussions with church 
leaders.  Soon after the referendum defeat, the President held a closed-door meeting at 
State House with religious leaders including Anglican Archbishop Nzimbi, Presbyterian 
Moderator Githii and the leadership of the NCCK.531 Later that week, Catholic 
Archbishop Ndingi visited State House ahead of a meeting of the Catholic bishop with 
the President. 532 Around this time, AIC Bishop Silas Yego was publicly associating with 
Kalonzo Musyoka, as the latter was seeking the Church’s support for his upcoming 
presidential bid.533  Privately, however, Bishop Yego was also helping to arrange a series 
of private meetings between Kibaki and former President Moi, who had been on opposite 
sides of the referendum debate the previous year.534 
                                                                                                                                            
SDA (Nyanza) could help the president meet the threshold of winning at least 25% of the 
vote in five of Kenya’s eight provinces, as required by the constitution at the time. The 
Constitution of Kenya. Clause 5(5) e. 
 
531 Daily Nation. December 2, 2005. 
 
532 Ibid. 
 
533 Daily Nation. February 26, 2006. 
 
534 Daily Nation. February 19, 2006. 
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While trying to repair relations with the major church leaders, Kibaki also looked 
to expand his secular political alliances.  Facing a serious threat from the ODM 
challengers, Kibaki put aside whatever reformist agenda remained in order to strengthen 
his own candidacy and undermine ODM’s chances. In February 2006, the East African 
Standard newspaper reported on a secret meeting between Kibaki and Kalonzo Musyoka, 
who at the time was still affiliated with ODM but would later break away to lead his own 
faction of the group.  Soon after the secret meeting was revealed, security forces launched 
a massive raid against the newspaper, as well as the KTN television station.535  The raid 
and subsequent lack of transparency on the part of the government drew severe 
condemnation, including rebukes from Catholic KEC Chairman Korir, Anglican 
Archbishop Nzimbi, and Presbyterian Moderator Githii.536 This new scandal added to 
continued calls from the churches for the government to take more steps in dealing with 
the Anglo Leasing case and other forms of institutionalized corruption. Such calls were 
made by the leadership of the Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and SDA Churches, as 
well as several parishes of the AIC.537 
                                                
535 Ostensibly done in retaliation against the media for reporting on the government’s 
secret political moves, speculation was rife that the raids were actually conducted to 
destroy evidence possessed by the news outlets that implicated important officials in drug 
trafficking and other illegal activities. The speculation was only heightened when it was 
revealed that the operation had been lead by two mysterious Eastern European men with 
suspected drug ties and connections to the Kibaki family.  The two, known in the press as 
the “Artur brothers,” were deported a few months later under a cloud of secrecy.  The 
details of the media raids are described in Branch 2011: 260-263 and Hornsby 2013: 744. 
 
536 “It Was Cowardly of State, Say Lobby Groups” East African Standard. March 3, 
2006; “Kibaki Urged to Speak Out On Armenians.” Daily Nation. June 12, 2006; “Kibaki 
Under Fire On 'Standard' Raid” Daily Nation. March 5, 2006. 
 
537 “Probe All Players in Anglo Leasing Scam, Says Bishop” East African Standard. 
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These condemnations by church leaders over specific government scandals did 
not prevent Kibaki from continuing his efforts to shore up political support from the 
major denominations. Kibaki attended a number of church services and religious events 
for his own Catholic Church as well as other denominations.  These appearances help 
appeal to the churches on religious grounds by presenting the President as a devout 
Christian, someone who valued the churches and who would continue to implement 
policies that would respect Christian doctrines.538  In addition, these events provided 
opportunities for the President to have friendly contact with church leaders and make 
public appearances with high-ranking clergy, which mutually benefited the prestige of the 
President and the clergy involved. After declaring a “National Prayer Day” for April 
2006, the President appeared at a large prayer service with various religious leaders, 
including Presbyterian Moderator Githii, who indicated his support for the government 
by reading from Romans 13, a scripture often cited as requiring church obedience to 
secular authorities.539 
The Kibaki government and the major churches continued to be linked by 
cooperation in services and development work, such as the Catholic Church coordinating 
                                                                                                                                            
Daily Nation. January 25, 2006; “Lobby Group: State Plans to Set Up Commission” East 
African Standard. January 31, 2006; “Resignations Are a Political Gimmick, Say 
Bishops” East African Standard. February 15, 2006; “President Told to Act Fast On 
Reports” Daily Nation. February 23, 2006; “US Envoy in New Graft Call” Daily Nation. 
April 23, 2006. 
 
538 Although many members of Kibaki’s cabinet had been implicated in various scandals, 
the President himself was able to avoid being directly implicated as having personally 
profited from these schemes, allowing him to maintain an image as a faithful Catholic. 
 
539 Gifford 2009b: 224-225. 
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famine relief efforts with the government.540 These links gave more opportunities for the 
President and his officials to receive positive publicity and make joint public appearances 
with religious leaders. For example, at an AIC church service attended by Kibaki in 2007, 
Bishop Silas Yego – who served as a useful contact to former President Moi and the 
Kalenjin community – thanked President Kibaki for the government’s donation of two 
ambulances to AIC health facilities.541  
In addition to taking advantage of the ties that existed between church and state in 
relation to development work and using religious services to facilitate personal contact 
with church leaders increasing personal contact with church leaders, Kibaki revived the 
practice sending his closest ministers and political confidants to attend harambees. The 
2003 restrictions placed on politicians’ participation in harambees had significantly 
limited public officials involvement in the fundraisers, but with the election looming, 
fundraising reemerged in 2006 as a political tool.542  Sometimes, politicians used 
surrogates to circumvent the law.  First Lady Lucy Kibaki helped raise millions of 
shillings, appearing at fundraisers for her own Catholic Church, in addition to appearing 
with Moderator Githii at a Presbyterian harambee and touting her husband’s reelection at 
                                                
540 “Church Struggles to Feed Starving Children and Mothers” Catholic Information 
Service For Africa. January 13, 2006. 
 
541 “President hails constitutional requirement” August 12, 2007. 
http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/august07/2007120801.htm. Accessed May 22, 
2014. Bishop Yego, who remained a close confidant of President Moi, had helped 
facilitate a series of private meetings between Moi and his successor, as did Catholic 
Archbishop Ndingi. Daily Nation. February 19, 2006, “New Deal in the Making: 
Between President Kibaki and Former President Moi” Daily Nation. September 3, 2006. 
542 “MPs Flout the Law And Preside Over Local Harambees” Daily Nation. July 11, 
2006. 
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an Anglican fundraiser.543  Mary Wambui (the President’s unofficial second wife) was 
also a major force on the harambee circuit, including helping to raise millions of shillings 
for the Catholic Church.544  Eventually, top government officials dropped the pretense 
and openly appeared at harambees. President Kibaki made one harambee appearance 
before the 2007 election, donating one million shillings to fund Catholic seminaries in 
Kenya.545 Vice-President Moody Awori raised 240,000 shillings at an Anglican event and 
Justice Minister Martha Karua appeared at an AIC fundraiser.546 The government even 
connected with the Seventh-Day Adventist Church during this time period, with Vice 
President Awori attending the Church’s 100th anniversary celebrations.547 By using their 
appearances bringing in significant amounts of cash for these church fundraisers, 
President Kibaki and his political proxies gave the churches clear financial incentives for 
supporting the incumbent government, and the churches generally welcomed the influx of 
attention and resources. 
                                                
543 “Religion; First Lady Urges Church to Expose Leaders Who Tell Lies.” Daily Nation. 
April 10 2006;  “First Lady calls for concerted efforts to end gender violence.” April 9, 
2006. http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/oafla/news/april06/2006090401.htm Accessed 
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Standard. November 20, 2006; “First Lady Asks Catholics to Support Women's 
Empowerment” Catholic Information Service for Africa. Aug 7, 2007; “Return Kibaki, 
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544 Gifford 2009b: 222; “The Wambui Factor” East African Standard. June 18, 2006. 
 
545 “More Millions Still Needed to Rescue Seminaries” Catholic Information Service For 
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With the ban on politicized harambee appearances effectively nullified, 
opposition candidates also used harambees, worship services and other public events to 
promote themselves to various audiences.548 Ida Odinga, Raila’s wife, helped raise 
millions of shillings for an Anglican church while promoting her husband’s presidential 
run.549 Raila himself made appearances at worship services of his denomination, the 
Anglican Church, and Anglican Bishop Abiero of Maseno South Diocese (located in 
Nyanza Province) joined leaders of various smaller churches and Muslim clerics in 
Nyanza in declaring  “divine anointing” over Raila’s campaign. 550 Raila also made 
appearances at an SDA church service in Nairobi, as well as a celebration of the 100th 
anniversary of an AIC church in Kisumu, the major city of Raila’s Nyanza Province.551 
AIC Bishop Yego was also at this latter event.552  Kalonzo Musyoka, running atop the 
ticket of the small ODM-Kenya splinter party, had been courting the support of Bishop 
Yego and his Africa Inland Church for several years and continued to attend AIC events 
during the campaign.553  KANU leader Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto of ODM 
                                                
548 “Raila: Let Kibaki Meet Orange Team” East African Standard. April 24, 2006. 
 
549 “Raila Bid to Be President is for Real, Says Wife” Daily Nation. May 1, 2006. 
 
550 “Raila: Let Kibaki Meet Orange Team” East African Standard. April 24, 2006; “Raila 
Odinga Begins Bid for Presidency” East African Standard. April 30, 2007’ “Clerics 
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551 “ODM Delegates Set to Pick Flagbearer” Daily Nation. September 1, 2007; “ODM to 
Agitate for Reforms, Says Raila” East African Standard. August 16, 2006. 
 
552 Daily Nation. August 14, 2006. 
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attended separate fundraisers for the Africa Inland Church, as well.554 Uhuru also donated 
120,000 shillings while appearing at the same Catholic fundraiser as President Kibaki, 
mentioned above. The relative amounts given by Kibaki and Uhuru demonstrated that the 
President and others who had access to government coffers were at a distinct financial 
advantage in using fundraisers for political purposes. 
3.2 Top Level Church Leaders’ Support for Incumbent Government 
While the churches were being heavily courted by the various political parties, the 
major denominations officially maintained their neutrality. The Secretary-General of the 
Presbyterian Church, the Reverend Samuel Muriguh, explicitly endorsed President 
Kibaki for re-election during a church service attended by the President in September 
2007, announcing that the church’s General Assembly, its highest decision-making body, 
had decided on this stance.555 Muriguh’s superior, Presbyterian Moderator David Githii, 
walked this statement back the next day by declaring that the Presbyterian Church would 
remain neutral in the election, though Githii did acknowledge that supporting Kibaki 
would be a popular stance given that church members were predominantly from Kibaki’s 
home region of Central Province.556  
The Catholic Church was generally seen as supporting President Kibaki, a fellow 
Catholic, during the 2007 campaign, though some divisions emerged. Of the four 
Catholic archbishops, Nicodemus Kirima of Nyeri did not participate much in the 2007 
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election process, although he did appear with First Lady Lucy Kibaki at a church service 
and fundraiser in 2007.557 Archbishop Lele was also quiet during the campaign. The 
remaining Archbishops were Kikuyu Cardinal Njue in Nairobi and Luo Archbishop 
Zacchaeus Okoth of Kisumu.558 Njue was generally viewed as pro-Kibaki, while Okoth 
publicly leaned toward Raila. Njue shared religious and ethnic affiliation with President 
Kibaki, who was a fellow Kikuyu and Catholic.  The two also shared some history; 
during his time as the main opposition leader in 2002, Kibaki had appeared at a 
fundraiser to help purchase a car for then-Bishop Njue.559  Just before the 2007 elections, 
Njue had quickly emerged as the public face of the Kenyan Catholic Church.  Not only 
was he the new Archbishop of Nairobi, the most prominent of the country’s four 
archdioceses, but he had also been elected by the bishops in 2006 to succeed Cornelius 
Korir as the chairman of the Kenya Episcopal Conference, his second time holding that 
position.  In addition, in October 2007, it was announced that Njue had been chosen by 
the Vatican to become Cardinal, only the second Kenyan to receive this honor.560 By 
holding these three positions, Cardinal Njue’s stature, if not his formal rank within the 
                                                
557 “Religious organizations should spearhead gender equality, says First Lady” August 5, 
2007. Having been in poor health for a number of years, Archbishop Kirima succumbed 
to complications from kidney failure shortly before the election, and his successor would 
not be named until well after the vote was over. 
 
558 In 2007, Njue replaced Kibaki’s confidant, Raphael Ndingi, as Archbishop of Nairobi 
when Ndingi stepped down upon reaching the mandatory retirement age for bishops in 
the Catholic Church. 
 
559 East African Standard. June 24, 2002. 
 
560 The late Maurice Otunga had previously been appointed a Cardinal within the 
Catholic Church.  As a Cardinal, Njue was placed within the inner circle of leadership 
within the worldwide Catholic Church and given a vote in choosing the next Pope should 
the highest position within the Church become vacant. 
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Catholic hierarchy, was elevated above the other Catholic archbishops and bishops in 
Kenya.  Njue’s words were generally viewed as representative of the Catholic Church in 
Kenya as a whole.   
Although the churches did not formally endorse any candidate, they did take 
stances on relevant issues during the campaign.  In general, the top leader of each 
denomination either favored the President’s position on controversial issues or remained 
neutral.  One of the main policy differences that arose between Kibaki and Raila was the 
concept of majimbo, a devolution of power to regional or local levels.561 Kibaki and PNU 
opposed majimbo during the 2007 campaign, while Raila favored the proposed system, as 
did ODM-K candidate Kalonzo Musyoka.562 While neither Njue nor the Catholic Church 
as a body endorsed any candidate directly, the Cardinal condemned majimbo during a 
press conference held after a meeting of the Catholic bishops in Kenya.563 The media and 
political parties took the Cardinal’s statement on majimbo as an official Catholic 
denunciation of one of Raila’s main proposals and thus an implicit endorsement of 
President Kibaki. In the coming days, however, Archbishop Okoth of Kisumu clarified 
that the majimbo comment was Archbishop Njue’s personal view, as the issue had not 
been discussed by the bishops beforehand.564  This was a major public rebuke of the 
                                                
561 Majimbo has been a controversial topic in Kenyan politics over the years since 
independence.  Proponents saw it as a way to benefit smaller and less politically 
connected communities and as a limit on state power.  Opponents argued that this policy 
would lead to divisions and chaos between ethnic groups.   
 
562 Daily Nation. October 27, 2007. 
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Cardinal by a fellow archbishop.  Okoth, a Luo like Raila and presiding over the 
archdiocese covering Odinga’s home area, had previously broken the Catholic Church’s 
neutral stance during the 2005 referendum to side with Raila against the proposed 
constitution, and the Archbishop again agreed with Raila by endorsing the proposed 
majimbo system in 2007.  Based on the public spat between Cardinal Njue and 
Archbishop Okoth, many outside observes concluded that the Catholic Church in Kenya 
have fallen victim to ethnic divisions in its political orientation concerning the election.   
Other church leaders displayed partisan leanings as well during the majimbo 
debate. Anglican Archbishop Nzimbi supported Cardinal Njue’s position against 
majimbo, but Anglican Bishop Abiero, who had previously participated in the anointing 
service for Raila, objected to Njue’s stance.565  Presbyterian Moderator Githii also backed 
Catholic Cardinal Njue’s stance, condemning majimbo as dangerous.566 Africa Inland 
Church Bishop Silas Yego simply urged all sides to cease discussion of the issue until 
after the election, when it could be addressed through the legislative process.567 The 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church, as usual, was quiet during the election.   
A second campaign issue arose concerning the Muslim community, and again the 
top national church leaders sided with Kibaki.  After having painted President Kibaki’s as 
a devout Christian and using harambees and development work to materially benefit the 
churches, the Kibaki campaign also attempted to paint Raila Odinga as pro-Islam (and 
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thus anti-Christian). It was revealed in the press that Raila Odinga had signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with certain Muslim leaders in the country, 
granting them certain assurances in exchange for their support.  This purported evidence 
of Raila siding with Muslims in Kenya struck a chord, as there were a few sources of 
tension between the Muslim and Christian communities in Kenya in recent years, such as 
the 1998 US embassy bombing by al Qaeda, the US led war on terror following the 
September 11th attacks of 2001.  These events had heightened the sense of a threat 
coming from the Kenyan Muslim community and its international connections.  
Furthermore, Kenyan Muslims presented both an opportunity and a threat to the 
churches’ goal of membership maximization.  As the churches had expanded their 
collective population share since independence, Muslims represented the largest non-
Christian groups in Kenya and thus became the targets of church expansion.568  At the 
same time, Christian media, domestic and international, presented Muslims in Kenya as 
expanding through polygamy, high birth rates, and intermarriage, particularly Muslim 
men marrying Christian women.   
Given these perceptions, the idea that a Raila administration would enact pro-
Muslim policies represented a heightened threat against the churches and an impediment 
to their plans to grow by converting Muslims.569 The MOU between Raila and Muslim 
                                                
568 Gifford 2009b: 168. 
 
569 Much like the MOU between Raila and Kibaki before the 2002 election, the exact 
contents of Raila’s MOU with Muslim leaders 2007 were not publicly disclosed, leading 
to wild speculation about what it actually contained.  Regardless of its content, the 
existence of the MOU played into previous notions that Kenya’s Muslim community had 
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behind the provisions concerning kadhis courts during the 2003-2005 constitutional 
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leaders drew condemnation from various Christian leaders. The Catholic Church released 
a letter signed by Cardinal Njue on behalf of the Kenyan Catholic bishops condemning 
“the granting of special religious favours during campaign time” and denouncing 
attempts “to turn [Kenya] into a religious state.”570 Presbyterian Moderator David Githii 
criticized the agreement, warning that “Christians and Muslims have lived in harmony for 
a long time, but such pacts could create bad blood between them.”571 Anglican 
Archbishop Benjamin Nzimbi called for the contents of the MOU to be disclosed 
publicly and debated. As before, however, Anglican bishops from Nyanza Province 
supported their local candidate, Raila, against criticism on this issue.572 The Africa Inland 
Church was one of over a dozen denominations signing off on statements by the 
Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK, formerly known as the Evangelical Fellowship of 
Kenya) concerning the MOU. The EAK challenged Raila to disavow the MOU, 
rhetorically asking the candidate whether he would uphold the MOU or the Constitution 
of Kenya if he became president.573 The EAK remained critical of the MOU throughout 
the campaign. The SDA maintained its silence, as it does not share other churches’ 
concerns over the “threat” posed to its members by Islam.574  
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The 2007 presidential race was tight, with opinion polls in the months before the 
election and early ballot counts immediately after the vote suggesting a Raila victory 
might be likely.  When government forces ejected all media from the vote counting 
proceedings and then suddenly announced Kibaki the winner, the President’s hastily 
arranged swearing-in ceremony was immediately followed by clashes across the country, 
especially in the ethnically-polarized Rift Valley. Over the next few months, waves of 
attacks and counter-attacks between ODM and PNU supporters left approximately 1,300 
Kenyans killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.  One of the worst incidents came in 
early January where a church was set on fire while perceived PNU supporters huddled for 
safety inside, burning dozens of individuals alive.   
In the wake of the violence, the Kenyan churches generally appealed for peace 
and reconciliation, though some of the partisan leanings of church leaders persisted. For 
instance, Catholic Cardinal John Njue stood by his earlier remarks on majimbo,575 while 
Archbishop Okoth condemned the government for having stolen the election, and 
demanded that Kibaki step down and allow a re-vote.576  Anglican Archbishop Nzimbi 
offered to mediate between the Government and ODM and took a centrist tone; he 
supported a recount of the election results, but joined Catholic Cardinal Njue in objecting 
                                                                                                                                            
Muslim community in Kenya, as both groups are (in the eyes of the SDA) minority 
religions that share various moral proscriptions (such as bans on drinking, smoking and 
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to ODM’s call for mass action in protest of the results.577 Njue, Nzimbi and AIC Bishop 
Yego were among a number of religious leaders who were invited to talks between the 
government and ODM, while the SDA and Presbyterian denominations were not major 
players in attempting to resolve the conflict.578 In the end, the churches’ various efforts at 
mediation were inconsequential for the resolution of the political stalemate. Retired UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan led a “Panel of Eminent African Personalities” who 
ultimately convinced the two sides to agree to form a Grand Coalition government.579  
3.3 Top Level Support and Defections: The Role of Church Structure in Influencing 
Church Political Stands  
By reviving the use of top-level negotiations and cooptation, the government’s 
strategies for winning support ahead of the 2007 presidential election restored the link 
between church structure and church political orientation.  Overall, consistent with the 
structural view of churches presented in this dissertation, the government was able to 
successfully win over the top national leader within each denomination (excluding the 
generally apolitical SDA), but the less centralized churches could not stop defections of 
prominent leaders within the churches’ ranks. The “leader” of the Catholic Church in 
Kenya, Cardinal Njue, seemed to clearly favor President Kibaki over Raila Odinga, but 
Archbishop Okoth, technically of equal rank as far as the Kenyan Catholic hierarchy was 
                                                
577 “Kibaki, Raila Spell Out Conditions.” East African Standard. January 5, 2008. “World 
Watches Country” East African Standard. January 13, 2008 
 
578 “All Eyes on the Clergy as They Join Talks at State House” Daily Nation. January 11, 
2007. 
 
579 Other international actors involved in the intervention included South African 
Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Ghanaian President John Kufuor. 
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concerned, displayed positions much more sympathetic to Raila.  Anglican Archbishop 
Nzimbi also sided with President Kibaki on the substantive issues of the campaign, with 
at least one Anglican bishop from Raila’s home region endorsing Odinga instead.  The 
Presbyterian leadership came as close as any of the major churches to giving an official, 
top-level endorsement to the incumbent President. Bishop Yego of the Africa Inland 
Church maintained a low profile during the campaign, but his actions ultimately 
benefited Kibaki by encouraging a split in the opposition vote between the two ODM 
branches.580 Furthermore, Bishop Yego’s activities as an intermediary between Kibaki 
and former President Moi paid dividends for the incumbent when Moi declared his 
support for Kibaki’s presidency and later officially endorsed Kibaki for a second term.581 
Only the Seventh-Day Adventist Church remained disengaged from the campaign. This 
neutrality drew the ire of government minister Simeon Nyachae, himself a member of the 
SDA, who publicly called on his denomination to publicly declare a stance in the 
upcoming election.582 
                                                
580 Yego was seen as close to Kalonzo Musyoka, the presidential candidate running on 
the ODM-Kenya splinter ticket.  While Musyoka was technically an opposition 
candidate, his candidacy largely had the effect of drawing away votes from Raila and the 
original ODM, especially among Musyoka’s own Kamba ethnic group in Eastern 
Province, thus helping Kibaki’s chances of reelection. 
 
581 With rising Kalenjin star William Ruto campaigning for the ODM coalition, Moi’s 
endorsement was important to Kibaki in Rift Valley. Yego also accompanied Catholic 
and Anglican bishops from Rift Valley in a delegation to State House to present their 
members’ grievances to Kibaki, leading to a presidential campaign trip to the province 
“Moi - I Will Continue Supporting Kibaki” East African Standard. March 4, 2007; “Moi 
Endorses Kibaki for Second Term” Daily Nation. August 28, 2007; “President Now 
Changes His Campaign Style” Daily Nation. October 14, 2007. 
 
582 “SDA Church Told to Declare Stand.” East African Standard. December 15, 2007. 
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The shift in strategies by the Kibaki government between 2005 and 2007, which 
led to differences in the relationship between church structure and church support, 
reflected the differences in government priorities created by the political circumstances 
surrounding each vote.   Although President Kibaki favored constitutional reform in 
2005, his loss in the 2005 referendum did not directly threaten his position as President, 
and thus Kibaki’s lobbying efforts toward the churches remained within the limits of the 
rules and practices the government had put in place at the beginning of Kibaki’s term. In 
the 2007 vote, by contrast, Kibaki’s political survival was on the line, a concern that 
trumped Kibaki’s reform agenda and preferred hands-off leadership style. With the 
heightened stakes of 2007, the President’s desire to secure reelection necessitated 
securing support from a number of sources, including the major churches.  Kibaki was 
able to appeal to the organizational interests of the churches by painting himself as a 
devout Christian who valued the churches, implying that the policies of a second-term 
Kibaki administration would be consistent with the values of the various denominations.  
He also used Raila’s Memorandum of Understanding with Muslim leaders to paint the 
opposition candidate as a champion of Islam, who would implement policies that favored 
the growth of Islam over Christianity in the country. 
Beyond these appeals to the churches, President Kibaki’s need for political 
support led him to use the tools of negotiation and cooptation to appeal to the 
organizational interests of the churches and the personal interests of church leaders, even 
at the cost of undermining Kibaki’s own anticorruption agenda. Although Kibaki’s 
governance style was neither as personalistic as Jomo Kenyatta nor as authoritarian as 
Daniel arap Moi, Kibaki cultivated connections with various individual, top-level leaders 
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(Ndingi, Njue, Yego) and used financial incentives and personal appearances by himself 
and his surrogates to maintain support from top clergy such as Moderator Githii.  By 
targeting these top national leaders, Kibaki was able to successfully coopt the official 
positions of the centralized churches like the AIC and the Presbyterian Church.  For the 
less centralized churches, however, Kibaki’s managed to win the support of the most 
prominent national leader within each denomination –  Cardinal Njue of the Catholic 
Church and Archbishop Nzimbi of the Anglican Church – but neither Njue, Nzimbi nor 
President Kibaki could prevent other prominent officials within these churches from 
publicly dissenting.  While the incumbent government used its advantages to maintain 
top-level support, opposition candidates were able to use their local stature and ethnic 
solidarity to get notable clergy to defect from their denominations’ stances.  Raila in 
particular commanded enormous ethno-political clout in Nyanza, and on several issues – 
constitutional reform, majimbo, even the 2007 election itself – he was able to gain the 
backing of high-ranking clergy from his home region, even when these clergy had to 
directly contradict their colleagues or superiors.   
3.4 The Limited Role of Ethnicity in Determining Church Political Stands  
Clearly, ethnic affinity played a significant role in church political affiliations.  As 
Moderator Githii made explicit, endorsing Kikuyu President Mwai Kibaki was popular 
among the GEMA-dominated Presbyterian Church, and Cardinal Njue’s apparent support 
for the President was also generally viewed in ethnic terms.  Furthermore, Raila Odinga’s 
ability to win support from certain clergy within the major churches was closely tied to 
ethnic and regional affinities; the prominent Catholic and Anglican clergy who sided with 
Raila were fellow Luo from Nyanza Province.  The ethnic story, however, does not 
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negate the role of organizational structure in determining these church positions. With 
regard to the Catholic Church, the largest church in the country, Kibaki was advantaged 
by the externally-determined appointments of John Njue within the Catholic hierarchy – 
KEC chairman, Archbishop of Nairobi and Cardinal within the worldwide Catholic 
Church – which centralized authority within the Kenyan Catholic Church in the hands of 
an individual supportive of the President.  By having a good relationship with Cardinal 
Njue, the Catholic Church’s top leader and spokesman in Kenya and a fellow Kikuyu, 
Kibaki gained the perceived backing of the entire Catholic hierarchy.   
Similarly, through the support of Anglican Archbishop Nzimbi, who had 
displayed a favorable disposition toward Kibaki since early in the latter’s presidency, 
Kibaki got backing from the Anglican Church as an organization (which was, 
incidentally, the denomination of Raila Odinga).  Nzimbi’s backing was not easily 
explained by ethnic considerations; as a Kamba, Nzimbi did not have a direct ethnic link 
to either of the two main candidates, and actually shared ethnic identity with Kalonzo 
Musyoka, yet he sided against both Musyoka and Raila to support Kibaki’s position.  
Similarly, Bishop Yego of the AIC belonged to the Kalenjin group, which had no 
presidential candidate in the race and was divided between loyalties to President Moi and 
ODM member William Ruto.  Yego, a longtime friend of Moi, facilitated Moi’s support 
for Kibaki instead of fellow Kalenjin Ruto.  Overall, then, ethnic considerations played 
some role in determining church leaders’ political stances but cannot explain church 
political orientations as well as church structural features and appeals to church 
preferences on the part of the government. 
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4 Renewed Constitutional Review and 2010 Referendum 
4.1 Churches’ Objections and Campaign Concerning 2010 Constitution Draft 
The peace agreement which ended the post-election violence of 2008 created a 
grand coalition government, with Kibaki remaining as President and Raila took a newly-
created position as Prime Minister, creating an ill-defined arrangement of executive 
power-sharing between the two former rivals.  The deal also enlarged the cabinet to 
accommodate the political allies of the two “Principals,” as Kibaki and Raila were known 
under the new arrangement. Even though the churches were not instrumental in 
negotiating the peace settlement between the Kibaki and Raila factions, the resultant 
coalition government had maintained ties with the major churches.  Cardinal Njue lead a 
delegation of Catholic bishops to separately consult with each Principal shortly after the 
new arrangement was put into place. 583 Kibaki continued to attend a number of Catholic 
fundraisers and events with Cardinal Njue, and Raila even appeared at a Catholic bishop 
installation service over which the Cardinal presided.584 Cardinal Njue and the other 
Catholic Archbishops (Okoth, Lele, and the recently installed Peter Kairo of Nyeri) lead a 
Catholic “courtesy call” to the President in February, 2009, at a time when secular critics 
and religious leaders were lashing out against the coalition government over its lack of 
                                                
583 “Bishops Dismiss Calls for Elections” Daily Nation. April 12, 2008. 
 
584 “Tight security as Kenyan president tours country's southwest” BBC Monitoring-
Africa. East African Standard. December 15, 2008; “Nation Marks 30 Years of First 
President's Death” Catholic Information Service for Africa. August 22, 2008; “Faiths Join 
Protests Against Curbs on Media Freedom” Catholic Information Service for Africa. 
December 16, 2008; “Let's Forgive One Another, Says Raila in Visit to Nyeri” Daily 
Nation June 15, 2008. 
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progress in improving economic and social conditions in Kenya. 585 Kibaki appeared at 
the installation of new Presbyterian Moderator David Gathanju during April 2009 
Presbyterian General Assembly, and the President used this opportunity to defend the 
coalition government and pledge further cooperation with the Presbyterian Church in the 
education and health sectors.586 Three months later, the President and Vice-President 
Kalonzo Musyoka (who had been appointed to this position by Kibaki during the early 
days of the post-election violence) were among the government delegates in attendance 
when Eliud Wabukala was installed as new Archbishop of the Anglican Church in 
Kenya, with Kibaki delivering remarks at the ceremony.587 The Africa Inland Church 
remained mostly withdrawn from politics. The world president of the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church visited Kenya and met with President Kibaki in 2008, during which the 
two leaders spoke of the need for church-state cooperation, but the SDA otherwise 
distanced itself from public life.588 
                                                
585 “Bishops Meet Kibaki After Harsh Censure” Catholic Information Service For Africa. 
February 27, 2009.  
 
586 Speech by His Excellency Hon. Mwai Kibaki, C.G.H., M.P., President and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kenya during the P.C.E.A. 
19th General Assembly, St. Andrews, Nairobi. April 14, 2009.  
http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/speeches/kibaki/april09/2009140401.htm. Accessed 
June 7, 2014; “Kenyan president "confident" coalition will hold” BBC Monitoring Africa-
Political. April 14, 2009. 
 
587 Daily Nation. July 5, 2009. 
 
588 “Adventist World Leader Challenges Churches On Ethnicity” Catholic Information 
Service for Africa. September 9, 2008. The SDA later made a rare public statement to 
object to another proposal by a government minister to implement a six-day work week.  
“Religious Group Criticises 6-Day Working Week” Daily Nation. April 5, 2008. 
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One of the stipulations of the peace deal was the revival of the constitutional 
review process in order to address deficiencies in the Kenyan political system. Through 
extended negotiations, the legislature appointed a new twenty-seven member 
Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), made up of both Kibaki allies and Raila 
supporters.589 The PSC in turn selected a Committee of Experts (CoE), drawn largely 
from the legal and advocacy communities in Kenya and abroad.590  The CoE and PSC 
drew up a new draft that represented a compromise between the different factions in the 
government and presented a series of changes that would be implemented after the next 
general elections.591  The new constitution would eliminate the office of Prime Minister 
in the next government and maintained a strong President, but also implement new 
checks and balances on presidential power.592 The government published the new draft 
and set August 4 as the date for a nationwide referendum on the proposed document.593  
                                                
589 “Kenyan House appoints team to spearhead constitutional reforms” BBC Monitoring 
Africa – Political.  December 17, 2008. 
 
590 The CoE was made up of six Kenyans, three expatriates who were drawn from a list 
submitted by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, and a Director. Kenya National 
Assembly Official Report. February 10, 2009. 
 
591 The changes proposed by the new constitution would therefore maintain the coalition 
government, including the office of Prime Minister, until after the next election. 
592 Among other changes, Parliament would be restructured to include a second chamber 
representative of the various counties (which were essentially the old electoral districts 
renamed), a simplified version of devolution would be implemented that placed some 
authority and resources in local hands, and various land reform measures would be put 
into place.   
 
593 Hornsby 2013: 777-778. 
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Unlike the previous effort at constitutional reform, both Kibaki and Raila 
supported the 2010 draft.594 Most of the major political figures in the government, 
representing most of the major ethnic groups and regions of the country, joined the 
Principals in backing the Yes vote. The main political opposition came from the Rift 
Valley Province, lead by William Ruto, who was eying a 2012 presidential run and had 
developed an increasingly adversarial relationship with his erstwhile ally Raila after the 
2007 election.595 Ruto managed to lead a group of MPs, mainly from Rift Valley (but 
with some representation from other regions), to campaign against the 2010 draft.  
Former President Moi also joined Ruto in opposing the new draft, giving the opposition a 
largely Kalenjin face. Ruto's group named a number of objections to the new document, 
including land reform and devolution of some aspects of governing authority.  Many in 
the “Yes” camp accused the “No” leaders of wanting to protect landholdings that they 
had allegedly acquired under dubious circumstances during President Moi's presidency. 
The "No" group was assigned the color Red as its symbol, while the "Yes" campaign 
bore Green, and these colors soon became ubiquitous as the two sides took their 
campaigns across Kenya.  
The other primary source of opposition to the 2010 draft came from the churches.  
As in 2005, various evangelical and Pentecostal churches objected to the new draft over 
social issues of centered on abortion and kadhis’ courts. Both mainline and evangelical 
                                                
594 The former likely saw passing a new constitution as a way to cement his legacy in 
positive terms, while Raila would gain a political victory by finally achieving reforms 
such as devolution and land reform, and these political points were thought to be 
beneficial for his upcoming presidential campaign. Hornsby 2013: 779. 
 
595 Raila was the clear favorite to succeed Kibaki as President, and William Ruto sought 
to supplant the Prime Minister from front-runner status. 
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churches had since 2009 publicly taken issue with the language surrounding these two 
issues during the constitutional review process, threatening to oppose the draft if the 
offending clauses were not altered.596 The CoE responded to the churches’ concerns 
about abortion by including a “Right to life” clause that, among other things, stated: 
“Abortion is not permitted unless, in the opinion of a trained health professional, there is 
need for emergency treatment, or the life or health of the mother is in danger, or if 
permitted by any other written law.”597 The churches objected to a number of words and 
phrases in this clause, claiming that the language was purposely tailored to echo western 
legal principles on abortion and therefore left much leeway to expand abortion rights.  
The churches similarly objected to expansion in the jurisdiction of kadhis’ courts, 
as the proposed draft altered language that previously limited kadhis’ jurisdiction to the 
coastal area of Kenya.598  Beyond this specific objection to the language of the new 
document, most of the churches objected to retaining any mention of these courts in the 
new constitution as a violation of the separation of religion and politics and an unfair 
elevation of one religion at the expense of others.599 The churches generally favored 
                                                
596 Caren Kiptoo, Program Officer: Peace Building & Conflict Prevention, National 
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK). Interview with author. November 4, 2009; Rev. 
Dr. Wellington Mutiso, General Secretary , Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (formerly 
Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya). Interview with author. November 25, 2009. 
 
597 The Proposed Constitution of Kenya. Clause 26(4). Published May 6, 2010. 
 
598 Article 66 (4) of the old constitution limited kadhis’ courts jurisdiction to “the former 
Protectorate [of Kenya],” which was a ten-mile wide strip along the coast of what is now 
Kenya.  The Constitution of Kenya. Revised Edition. National Council for Law Reporting. 
2008. Article 170 of the 2010 proposed draft removed mention of the Protectorate and 
stated that kadhis’ courts shall have jurisdiction “within Kenya.”  
 
599 The 2010 draft did not include provisions for Christian or Hindu courts, as had been 
included in the 2005 Wako Draft as a means of appeasing these religious groups. 
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removing the kadhis’ court provisions from the constitution entirely, and regulating these 
Muslim courts through acts of parliament, while various Muslim groups suspected the 
churches’ proposal was setting the stage to restrict or proscribe kadhis’ courts in the 
future.   
In addition to the two main issues of kadhis’ courts and abortion, various church 
figures raised a number of secondary objections to the constitution. The Catholic Church 
claimed that provisions in the constitution concerning family (Article 45) and children 
(Article 53) could allow for same-sex marriages, encourage priests to marry, and 
undermine parent-child relationships, while other clauses opened the door for euthanasia 
and various social vices.600  Anglican Archbishop Wabukala said that the draft allowed 
religious-based “limitation of fundamental rights based on religion.”601  The Presbyterian 
Church believed that the clause banning religious-based discrimination, Article 32(3), 
would harm church-run institutions, such as schools and hospitals.602 Negotiations 
between the government and various churches ended once the government informed the 
churches that the disputed clauses could not be amended before the referendum.603 At this 
point, the major mainline churches, including the Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
600 These arguments were presented during 8:30 mass at Holy Family Basilica in Nairobi 
(and presumably in other Catholic congregations across the country) as part of the 
Kenyan Catholic Church’s “Pro-Life Day”, July 18, 2010, which the author attended. 
 
601 “Anglicans Appeal for Quiet Vote” Daily Nation. July 29, 2010. This statement is 
likely a reference to clause 24(4) of the 2010 constitution, which allowed limitations on 
personal freedoms in order to allow Islamic law as adjudicated by kadhis’ courts.  
 
602 George Kahuho, Secretary Training and Administration, Presbyterian Church of East 
Africa. Interview with author. July 20, 2010. 
 
603 “Churches Gear for No Vote” Daily Nation. April 28, 2010. 
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Africa Inland Church, as well as the NCCK and EAK umbrella organizations, joined their 
evangelical colleagues in opposing the draft due to these “contentious issues.”   
The Christian leaders opposing the 2010 draft presented a more unified and 
sustained front than they did in 2005.  The Catholic Church, for example, launched its 
“No” campaign in April and sustained it consistently through the August referendum.604 
To the extent that church positions changed over time, they tended to move toward 
greater opposition for the new constitution, at least as far as the national church 
leadership was concerned. Eliud Wabukala, the Anglican Archbishop since 2009, initially 
supported the new draft, but switched to opposing the document once the Anglican House 
of Bishops met in late April and decided to oppose the draft.605 The Africa Inland Church 
worked in collaboration with the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK) umbrella 
organization to push for a “No” vote.606 The Presbyterian Church instructed its clergy and 
local congregations concerning the reasons behind its “No” stance, but was not as 
publicly vocal as some of the other denominations.607  
The public face of the churches’ no campaign was largely evangelical.  
Televangelists such as Bishop Mark Kariuki and Bishop Margaret Wanjiru spoke against 
                                                
604 Daily Nation April 18, 2010. 
 
605 Daily Nation April 5, 2010. Archbishop Wabukala sometimes echoed language from 
2005 that voters should read the document and vote according to their conscience, but 
generally stated the Anglican Church’s position as “No” based on the abortion and 
kadhis’ courts clauses. Daily Nation April 29 and May 30, 2010. 
 
606 David Mulwa, Administrative Secretary, Africa Inland Church. Interview with author. 
July 7 2010. 
 
607 George Kahuho, Secretary Training and Administration, Presbyterian Church of East 
Africa. Interview with author. June 20, 2010.  
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the 2010 draft during their televised services and at “No” rally appearances alongside 
Red politicians such as William Ruto.  These two pastors had remained in the “No” camp 
during the 2005 referendum even after the major churches softened their stances, and 
they revived their objections during the 2010 debate.  Although Cardinal Njue and 
Archbishop Wabukala appeared at some joint press conferences with their evangelical 
counterparts, the mainstream church mostly stayed away from the public No rallies, 
distancing the churches’ campaign from the political “No” movement.608 The major 
denominations took advantage of their widespread membership and infrastructure to 
spread their No message through church services, Bible studies, funerals, weddings, and 
church-run media.609 
The Seventh-Day Adventist Church was the most prominent denomination that 
did not join the No camp, as the SDA adopted its usual neutral stance concerning political 
matters and told its members to vote according to their consciences.610  When asked 
about the specific issues raised by the other churches, however, SDA officials noted that 
their church’s doctrines did not preclude either abortion or the existence of kadhis’ courts 
                                                
608 “Referendum - Church Calls for 'No' Prayers.” Nation. July 22, 2010. “Church Rejects 
Rallies Against Constitution” Daily Nation. May 2, 2010.  
 
609 Jane Marine, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission. Interview with author. July 2, 
2010; David Mulwa, Administrative Secretary, Africa Inland Church. Interview with 
author.  July 7 2010;  11:30am Church Service, All-Saints Cathedral. July 18, 2010; 
George Kahuho, Secretary Training and Administration, Presbyterian Church of East 
Africa. Interview with author. July 20, 2010. 
 
610 “Adventist Church Remains Neutral On Law.” Catholic Information Service for 
Africa. May 14, 2010. 
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under the conditions stipulated in the draft constitution.611  While not an official 
endorsement, this was a significant defection by a major denomination from the unified 
stand of the other churches. Within the “No” churches, there were various defections 
from the national stance. Several bishops in the Anglican Church broke with their 
Church’s official stance and openly supported the draft.612 These bishops hailed from the 
Western and Nyanza Provinces, home to Raila Odinga and the most supportive region for 
the Prime Minister, suggesting that they were acting based on ethno-regional concerns.613   
In addition to these ethnically based defections, ideologically based differences also arose 
within the Kenyan Christian community. Former Anglican Archbishop David Gitari, and 
radical Presbyterian preacher Dr. Timothy Njoya publicly broke with their 
denominations’ stance to support the new document, possibly at the urging of the 
government.614   
4.2 Explaining Church Opposition to 2010 Constitution Draft: Institutional 
Constraints and Incompatibilities Church and Government Preferences 
Gitari and Njoya reflected the will of the majority of Kenyans, as the 2010 draft 
passed overwhelmingly, with nearly 70% of voters casting their ballots for “Yes”. The 
                                                
611 Paul Muasya, Executive Director SDA East Africa Union. Interview with author. July 
28, 2010. 
 
612 “Listen to 'No' Voices, State Told.” Daily Nation. May 9, 2010. 
 
613 The 2010 draft implemented many of the reforms that Raila had previously advocated 
in the run-up to the 2005 referendum, and with Kibaki retiring after his current term, the 
passage of the 2010 draft would be a significant political win for Odinga. 
 
614 “Kibaki wants to counter Church ‘No’” Indian Ocean Newsletter. July 10, 2010. 
Alphonce Shiundu And Andrew Doughman “Njoya Dares Clerics for 'Honest' Debate On 
New Law” Daily Nation. July 25, 2010. 
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churches suffered a very public defeat, leading observers to question why they had 
maintained a losing effort even as polling data indicated the document would pass. The 
churches’ 2010 stand become even more puzzling given their actions in 2005, when they 
eventually relented from their opposition and adopted neural stances instead.  Why did 
the churches take such a strong stand for an unpopular and losing position in 2010, 
especially when they were not as adamant in 2005, when a stronger “No” stance would 
have been more popular? As discussed in Chapter 1, a church’s main organizational goals 
are to increase both the quantity and the quality of their members, as well as increasing 
the various resources (financial resources, physical assets and human capital) owned or 
controlled by the church. In addition, church leaders value their own personal resources, 
public reputation, and internal morality.  In the short run, the No stance taken by most of 
the major churches hurt church leaders’ reputations and threatened to decrease 
membership – a poll conducted just after the referendum showed that only 19% of 
Kenyans trusted church leaders completely, while 38% of the population did not trust 
church leaders at all, making them a more distrusted group than politicians.615 Several 
church officials acknowledged that the churches’ stance might alienate some members, 
making their stance puzzling to outside observers. 
To some extent, church leaders’ stances concerning the 2010 constitution likely 
reflected their own moral beliefs.  Catholic doctrine, for instance, categorically prohibits 
abortion, so any change seen as liberalizing abortion law in Kenya would be opposed by 
the Catholic Church. The Seventh-Day Adventist Church doctrine, on the other hand, 
allows for medical exceptions to its general anti-abortion stance, and thus the SDA 
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leadership had no moral qualms about the proposed abortion clause in 2010.  Beyond 
personal conscience (which is necessarily unobservable), the reputation costs of not 
taking a stand were higher in 2010 than they were in 2005, for two reasons.  First, the 
evangelical churches that opposed the 2005 draft had grown in size and popularity in the 
time between the two referenda.  By the time of the 2010 referendum, Bishop Mark 
Kariuki, the head of the Deliverance Church denomination had recently relocated from 
Nakuru to personally pastor a large congregation in Nairobi.616 Not only had Margaret 
Wanjiru’s Jesus is Alive Ministries grown, but the Bishop herself had been elected as an 
MP in 2007 running on the ODM ticket, raising her personal stature.  With these 
evangelists reaching larger audiences with the message that the proposed draft was 
unchristian, the major denominations risked losing a portion of the most devout 
Christians among their memberships if these mainstream churches were seen as 
supporting a morally unacceptable document.  
The second reason why the churches believed they could not sit on the fence is 
because of their partisanship surrounding the 2007 election and their ineffectualness 
during the post-election violence.  Several church leaders expressed the thought that the 
churches lost credibility and needed to regain it by taking a stand in 2010.   Taking an 
unpopular stand, however, ran the risk of pushing away members who supported the 
proposed new constitution, but some church officials expressed willingness to shed less 
devoted and less devout members in order to maintain and energize a core base of 
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dedicated members – in essence, to sacrifice quantity for quality, at least in the short 
run.617 
Beyond these immediate concerns of morality and prestige, the churches viewed 
the proposed constitution as presenting two ideological challenges that threatened future 
church membership and church members’ adherence to their denominations’ teachings.  
On the one hand, the churches were reacting to what they perceived to be the growing 
and evolving presence of Islam in the country.  Muslims have been in Kenya for 
hundreds of years.  Trade and migration from the Arabian Peninsula resulted in Muslim 
ethnic groups along the coast, and the North East Province of Kenya is largely populated 
by ethnic Somalis who are overwhelmingly Muslim. The kadhis’ courts also predate the 
existence of Kenya as an independent nation, and their inclusion in the constitution at 
independence was a compromise to keep the coast of Kenya (which had been under the 
domain of the Sultan of Zanzibar during colonial times) from seceding. Estimates of the 
Muslim population vary wildly, ranging from less than 10% to 30% or 40% of the 
country’s population618.  The government’s official count is on the low side of this range, 
approximately 11%.  There is a popular perception, however, that the number of Muslims 
is growing, due to a combination of immigration (mainly from Somalia, including both 
refugees and illegal immigrants), higher birth rates and conversion.  In addition to 
population share, the economic clout of Muslims is expanding. Sharia-compliant banking 
has become a presence in the Kenyans economy in the last few years. The first two 
                                                
617 Jane Marine, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission. Interview with author. July 2, 
2010; Wellington Mutiso, Evangelical Alliance of Kenya. Interview with author.  July 13, 
2010; Pastor Nelson Makanda, Nairobi Baptist. Interview with author. July 19, 2010. 
 
618 Muslim leaders tend to cite higher figures; Christian sources give low estimates. 
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Islamic banks opened in 2008 and within about one year gained a 1% market share in the 
country, with several conventional banks now offering Islamic options as well.619 
Muslims are increasingly investing in businesses and real estate in Nairobi and elsewhere 
in the country.   
The churches, as well as the government to a large extent, fear that the Muslim 
population is becoming more aggressive and potentially dangerous.  This fear has been 
fueled by the related problems of international terrorism and spillover from the long-
running conflict in neighboring Somalia.  The 1998 US embassy bombing, which killed 
300 people, still colors the way the government and society view Muslims in the 
country.620 With the influx of Somali refugees and illegal immigrants, there were fears 
that terror and other illicit activities would follow.621  The 2010 bombing of a World Cup 
viewing event in neighboring Uganda, for instance, involved several Kenyans, and 
evidence suggested that Nairobi was an intended target as well.622 The real estate boom in 
the predominantly-Somali Eastleigh neighborhood in Nairobi was suspected to operate as 
                                                
619 “Islamic Banks ‘Doing Well.’” Daily Nation. April 29, 2009. 
 
620 Gifford 2009b: 167. 
 
621 These fears have unfortunately been validated in recent years.  In late 2011, Kenya 
responded to the spillover of violence across its border by sending troops into 
neighboring Somalia to battle the militant Islamic group Al-Shabab.  Since  then, there 
have been a number of retaliatory terror attacks within Kenya, most notably the 
September 2013 attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, which left at least 67 people dead. 
Tom Odula. “Somali militants moving into Kenya, official says” Associated Press. 
January 14, 2014; Tom Odula. “Kenya police: Car bombers linked to mall plotters” 
Associated Press. March 31, 2014. 
 
622 “Kampala Bombers ‘Plotted to Hit Nairobi’” Daily Nation. Sept 19, 2010. 
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a way to launder money coming from Somali piracy, and the government had initiated 
crackdowns against these presumed illicit funds.623 
Because of these concerns, the church saw the constitutional referendum as a way 
of pushing back against the growth of Islam in the country.  In addition to the kadhis’ 
courts, some churches also objected to a new provision that conferred citizenship to 
young abandoned minors whose nationality could not be determined, arguing that this 
would benefit illegal Somali immigrants.624 Some church officials also expressed concern 
that anti-discrimination laws would largely be used to allow non-Christians, specifically 
Muslims, to infiltrate and take over church-run institutions such as schools and 
universities.625  Eliminating the kadhis’ courts would have limited impact on the growth 
of Islam in Kenya, as the courts do not propagate the faith, but as the courts potentially 
make it easier for Muslims to practice their faith in Kenya, eliminating or limiting them 
                                                
623 “Pirate Booty Causes Kenya Property Prices to Skyrocket” Voice of America English 
Service. March 18, 2009. 
 
624 Ken Kimiywe, Senior Pastor, Nairobi Pentecostal Church, Valley Road. Interview 
with author.  July 7, 2010; Peter Nuthu, Executive Treasure, Kenya Assemblies of God. 
Interview with author. July 12, 2010.  Article 14(4) of the 2010 Draft read: “A child 
found in Kenya who is, or appears to be, less than eight years of age, and whose 
nationality and parents are not known, is presumed to be a citizen by birth.” 
 
625 Ken Kimiywe, Senior Pastor, Nairobi Pentecostal Church, Valley Road. Interview 
with author. July 7, 2010; Peter Nuthu, Executive Treasure, Kenya Assemblies of God. 
Interview with author. July 12, 2010;  Joy Mdivo, House of Bread, Deliverance Church. 
Interview with author. July 12, 2010; George Kahuho, Secretary Training and 
Administration, Presbyterian Church of East Africa. Interview with author. July 20, 2010. 
Article 27(4) of the draft stated that “The State shall not discriminate directly or 
indirectly against any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture, dress, language or birth.” Article 27(5) extended these protections to 
include actions by private citizens: “A person shall not discriminate directly or indirectly 
against another person on any of the grounds specified or contemplated in clause (4).” 
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may have had some effect. Largely, however, the issue seemed symbolic, intended to 
send a message against the ascendancy of Islam in the country. 
The second major force that the church was pushing back against was a perceived 
encroachment of liberal, progressive and anti-Christian ideas into Kenyan law and 
society.  Abortion rights constitute the main issue in this fight.  The churches in their 
campaign often offered very detailed analysis of the language used in the “abortion 
clause” of the draft, pointing out how they believed it was shaped by western ideology. 
To give one example, the clause allows abortion if the “life or health” of the pregnant 
woman is in danger.  The churches see the inclusion of “health” as a reference to the 
World Health Organization definition of “health”, which defines the concept as “a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease 
or infirmity.”626 This definition, they argue, is overly broad to the point of allowing 
abortion for almost any circumstance.627 
Though less adamant than they were about abortion rights, the churches saw other 
affronts to their conception of the family, including loopholes that might allow same-sex 
marriage or lead to restrictions on the rights of parents over their children.628  
                                                
626 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the 
International Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 
by the representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, 
no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948.  In my interview with CoE member 
Bobby Mkangi, he denied that the inclusion of “health” was a reference to this document, 
and argued that the government of Kenya was free to define the term in officials and the 
citizenry saw fit (August 10, 2010). 
 
627 Interviews with author: Caren Kiptoo, NCCK. June 30, 2010; Wellington Mutiso, 
EAK. July 13, 2010; George Kahuho, Presbyterian Church. July 20, 2010. 
 
628 These objections were raised, for example, during the 8:30am Catholic Mass at Holy 
Family Basilica in Nairobi as part of the Kenyan Catholic Church’s National Pro-life Day 
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Furthermore, the churches perceived an open-ended liberal bias written into the 
constitution through clauses that incorporated international law into the national law of 
Kenya and guided judges to interpret laws in ways that err on the side of extending 
rights.629  These provisions, the churches argued, were ways to introduce liberal ideals 
into Kenyan law without having the people or their elected representatives vote on them.  
Much of this concern for western liberal influence was heightened, if not created, by the 
2008 election of Barack Obama. President Obama’s administration was perceived among 
some church leaders as actively pushing a liberal agenda on other countries.  One 
evangelical leader commented to me that George Bush sent Africa money to fight AIDS 
while Barack Obama sent money to provide abortions, and some church leaders stated 
matter-of-factly that the Yes campaign was receiving US funding or encouragement.630 
So even though the abortion legislation was similar to that in the 2005 draft, there was 
more concern that additional force would be placed behind the new law pushing the 
country in a liberal direction. 
The mainline churches thus found themselves facing competition on three sides – 
from upstart evangelical denominations that threatened to draw away the most fervent 
Christians; from increasingly aggressive, proselytizing and transnational forms of Islam 
                                                                                                                                            
of Prayer, which the author attended.  A lengthy discussion focused on Articles 45 and 53 
of the proposed draft, which covered “Family” and “Children,” respectively. 
 
629 Article 2(5) of the proposed draft stated that “the general rules of international law 
shall form part of the law of Kenya.” Article 20(3) read: “In applying a provision of the 
Bill of Rights, a court shall (a) develop the law to the extent that it does not give effect to 
a right or fundamental freedom; and (b) adopt the interpretation that most favours the 
enforcement of a right or fundamental freedom.” 
 
630 Interviews with author: Wellington Mutiso, EAK. November 25, 2009 and July 13, 
2010; George Shiramba, Senior Pastor Nairobi Baptist Church. July 6, 2010. 
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that threatened to draw away marginal church members; and from western, liberal values 
and worldviews that could potentially erode the doctrines and moral principles upon 
which the churches based their existence and moral authority. 
As had been the case during the early years of the Kibaki presidency, internal 
church structure did not have a noticeable influence on the churches’ political stances.  
As in the initial period of the Kibaki presidency, the relationship between church 
structure and church support broke down due to the government refraining from using the 
tactics of negotiation or cooptation to win the backing of church leaders.  Given the 
strength with which the churches opposed the 2010 constitution, why did the government 
not anticipate the churches’ objections and either amend the document or gain the 
churches’ compliance through incentives and negotiation?  As in the initial years of the 
Kibaki presidency, this neglect of the churches on the part of the government arose from 
a combination of institutional constraints and lack of motivation on the part of the 
government.  The nature of the 2009-2010 constitutional review process curtailed the 
ability of government the ability to bargain with the churches.  The factions that made up 
the coalition government, along with the Kofi Annan-led Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities, purposely designed the Committee of Experts to be removed from politics.  
The members of the CoE were technocrats, mainly drawn from the legal and human 
rights communities.631 Three of the nine members of the committee were expatriates, 
recommended by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities.   The CoE sought to 
promote individual and group rights while balancing the demands of a number of 
                                                
631 The only non-lawyer on the committee was an academic and historian.  “Kenya: 
Constitutional review team sworn in” BBC Monitoring Africa-Political. March 2, 2009. 
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communities and interest groups, and viewed the churches as one type of interest group 
among many.  As one of the committee members recounted shortly after the referendum, 
no one received everything they wanted from the new set of laws.632  In the case of 
abortion, for example, the relevant clause was only added after churches requested that 
the constitution address the issue, and the wording was meant to outlaw abortion as a 
general principle while making allowances that satisfied other civil society actors and the 
medical community.633 The kadhis’ courts clauses were included due to historical 
precedent and for the purpose of providing continued protect to Muslims as a minority 
population within the predominantly Christian Kenya.  
After the Committee of Experts handed of the draft to the Parliamentary Select 
Committee, the PSC managed to produce a document that included acceptable 
compromises on the major issues that the Kibaki and Raila factions found most 
important, including retaining a strong executive President and limiting devolution to two 
levels.634 When brought before the full Parliament, various MPs proposed 150 
amendments to the draft, but lingering divisions between the various political factions 
prevented any of these amendments, including those supported by Christian churches, 
from obtaining the supermajority required for altering the draft.635 These procedural 
                                                
632 Bobby Mkangi, Member of Committee of Experts. Interview with author. August 10, 
2010. 
 
633 Ibid. 
 
634 Daily Nation. April 22, 2010. 
 
635 “Draft - Cotu Wants Locals Given Free Reign.” Daily Nation. April 8, 2010.  
Constitutional amendments required approval of at least 145 of the 222 MPs who 
comprised Parliament. “Leaders in Secret Waki List Face Jail As Tribunal Planned” 
Daily Nation. October 17, 2008. 
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constraints distanced the Kibaki government from the constitution-making process, 
limiting the ability of the government to bargain with the churches. Once the draft was 
finalized and a referendum date set for August 2010, the government attempted to bring 
the churches on board, employing the usual tactic of high-level negotiations with church 
leaders.  The government targeted both the leaders of the largest churches, such as 
Catholic Cardinal Njue and Anglican Archbishop Wabukala, as well as prominent 
evangelicals such as Bishops Mark Kariuki and Margaret Wanjiru.636 By this point, 
however, the government was constrained in its ability to make any changes to the 
document prior to the referendum, and its promises to amend the draft after the vote were 
deemed insufficient by church leaders. 
Once the draft was finalized and the referendum date set, the government also had 
only limited incentive to placate church leaders. As established in Chapter 1, 
governments can seek church support to help mobilize citizens around elections or other 
important events or policies.  The government did not need the church’s support to pass 
the 2010 draft.  With Kibaki, Raila and their main allies supporting the document, the 
major political blocs and ethnic groups were united around the 2010 draft, with the 
exception of William Ruto and the Kalenjin ethnic group in Rift Valley.  Furthermore, 
both the politicians and the population were eager to enact reforms as a way to prevent 
the next general elections from turning into a repeat of the bloodshed that had followed 
the 2007 vote.  Having taken five years to create a new draft and organize a new 
constitutional referendum after the 2005 vote, Kenyan citizens and political leaders were 
                                                                                                                                            
 
636 Isaac Ongiri. “Kibaki, Raila Plot to Get 'No' Bosses to Defect” Nairobi Star. July 21, 
2010. 
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operating under a sense of urgency to pass a new constitution ahead of the general 
elections expected in 2012.637 A series of opinion polls conducted in the country in June 
and July showed the percentage of intended voters who intended to vote “Yes” between 
57-66%, a number that trended upward over time.638  These numbers included majorities 
of both Catholic and Protestant Christians surveyed.639  Most of these polls even showed 
slim majorities for the “Yes” vote in Rift Valley, the heart of the political opposition to 
the draft.  Kibaki and Raila thus had reason to be confident that the draft would pass 
comfortably even without the support of either William Ruto and his allies or the 
churches.  Even though the government preferred to have the backing of the churches, it 
did not need the churches’ support in this instance.   
One of the church officials I interviewed in 2010 made a point of stating that his 
denomination’s opposition to the draft constitution should not be seen as a vote of no 
confidence in the government, which the church still recognized as legitimate.640 This 
statement can be generalized to reflect church-state relations in Kenya; despite the 
                                                
637 A January 2012 ruling by the Kenya High Court delayed the general elections from 
August, as dictated by the constitution, until March 2013. "Kenya high court delays 
elections to March 2013". Reuters. January 13, 2012. 
 
638 “Referendum Baseline Public Opinion Poll.” Synovate Ltd. June 4, 2010; “Opinion 
Poll on Referendum.” Strategic Research. July 2010; “An Infotrak Harris Poll On 
Kenyans’ Voting Intentions for the August 4th Referendum on the Proposed New 
Constitution” Infotrak Research & Consulting.  July, 2010; “Opinion Poll on 
Referendum.” Strategic Research. July 2010. 
 
639 “An Infotrak Harris Poll On Kenyans’ Voting Intentions for the August 4th 
Referendum on the Proposed New Constitution” Infotrak Research & Consulting.  July, 
2010; “Opinion Poll on Referendum.” Strategic Research. July 2010. 
 
640 George Kahuho, Secretary Training and Administration, PCEA. Interview with 
author. July 20, 2010. 
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disagreement between the churches and the government over the 2010 constitution, the 
various denominations still shared interests with the government that facilitated 
cooperation after August 4, 2010. The Catholic and Anglican churches brought in 
international relief aid to deal with a famine in marginal regions of Kenya in 2011.641 The 
Catholic Church also worked on a major clean water project in Eastern Province, 
bringing in both local and international funds.642 Prime Minister Raila Odinga and Uhuru 
Kenyatta, Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government, spoke at a groundbreaking 
ceremony for a new Anglican University in Kenya.643  The Presbyterian Church and its 
international partners built “the largest suspension bridge in Africa” in Malindi, an area 
along the Kenyan coast.644 Uhuru Kenyatta appeared on behalf of Kibaki at the opening 
of an expansion wing of the AIC Kijabe Mission Hospital.645 Kibaki attended an SDA 
harambee in Kisii, located in Raila’s Nyanza Province.646  The President reappointed 
Archbishop Wabukala as chairman of the National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering 
                                                
641 Catholic Information Service for Africa. June 17, 2011; Alphonce Gari “4,000 
Families Get Sh100 Million Church Aid” Nairobi Star. September 9, 2011  
 
642 “Igembe 40-Acre Dam to Cost the Catholic Church Sh10 Billion” Nairobi Star. 
January 17, 2012. 
 
643 “Shun Tribalism, Raila and Uhuru Tell Leaders” Daily  Nation. June 21, 2011. 
 
644 “New Bridge Saves Villagers from the Jaws of Crocodiles” Daily Nation. March 23, 
2010. 
 
645 Njenga, Stanley. “Kibaki Asks for Help in Health Sector.” Nairobi Star. November 
16, 2012. 
 
646 “Kibaki And Raila Set for Kisii Visit” Nairobi Star. June 23, 2011. 
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Committee.647 As demonstrated by these continued collaborations between church and 
government, Kibaki had rightly believed that he could pass the 2010 constitution over the 
churches’ objections without permanently severing useful church-state links. 
 
5 Conclusion 
After the highly polarized nature of church-state relations that characterized the 
Moi presidency, the interactions between the major Christian denominations and the 
Kibaki government were initially friendly.  Kibaki entered office enjoying the goodwill 
of the majority of citizens and the major churches in Kenya, but the new President was 
not immune to church criticism.  Although Kibaki initially received some leeway from 
the churches, including the denominations that had been most critical of President Moi, 
issues of systematic corruption harmed the government’s image and drew criticisms from 
the churches.  The government was constrained in its ability to obtain agreement or 
compliance from the churches.  Kibaki initially won office by repudiating the 
authoritarian practices of the Moi government, meaning that the new President could not 
use the strong-arm tactics of his predecessor.  Furthermore, to the extent that the 
government did attempt to tackle corruption, such as placing significant restrictions on 
the ability of government officials to participate in harambees, these measures 
constrained the ability of Kibaki and his allies to provide financial incentives to the 
churches or their leaders.  The government and the churches still found avenues for 
                                                
647 Francis Mureithi “Kibaki Re-Appoints Wabukala for Anti-Graft Committee” Nairobi 
Star. August 20, 2011. 
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mutually beneficial relations in terms of service provision, relief aid and development 
work, even if the churches were critical of government dealings in other areas. 
Nevertheless, when the government most needed the support of the major 
churches, Kibaki fell back to the tactic of financial incentives and high-level relations 
with top church leaders.  The Kibaki government was characterized by three major 
political events: the 2005 constitutional referendum, the 2007 general elections (and their 
violent aftermath), and the 2010 constitutional referendum.  In 2005, the President faced 
heavy opposition in his efforts to pass a new constitution, including pushback from the 
churches.  The government responded by engaging the various archbishops and bishops 
in direct, high-level negotiations, culminating in Attorney General Wako’s whirlwind 
three-day engagement with the major church leaders over the legislation that bear his 
name.  Ultimately, the government received the backing of the most significant national-
level church leaders.  When Kibaki again needed votes for a close presidential race in 
2007, he again sought the support of the churches and specifically of their top leaders.  
The President was able to obtain implicit backing from most of the national church 
leaders, though neither the government nor the churches could prevent defections within 
the church ranks, which was facilitated by decentralized structures within the Catholic 
and Anglican denominations in particular.  After the 2007 elections, post-election 
violence and subsequent peace deals, the resulting coalition government and the churches 
found themselves on opposite sides of a 2010 constitutional referendum, due to 
conflicting preferences and political processes that made negotiations difficult.  The 
major churches, faced with threats from evangelical churches, Islam and western-style 
liberalism, saw the 2010 document as detrimental to their long-term goals of expanding 
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membership and maintaining members’ faithfulness to church doctrines.  The 
government had only limited incentives to gain church support by negotiating with the 
churches on these issues, as political alliances and popular will within Kenya and abroad 
assured the Kibaki government that the new draft would pass even without church 
support.   
In many ways, the Kibaki era represents a hard case for testing the influence of 
church structure on church political activity.  Political reforms implemented during this 
period limited the tools available to the government for influencing churches, while the 
structures of the Catholic and Anglican churches in particular were not generally 
conducive to centralized negotiations between these churches and the state.  
Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, the Kibaki government maintained ties with 
the top national leadership of the major churches, and the government used the tools it 
possessed to influence church support in the instances when the government most needed 
the churches to influence popular opinion. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
This dissertation is an examination of the ways in which civil society 
organizations behave as political actors, using several of the largest Christian churches in 
Kenya over time as case studies.  Within the field of political science, religious 
organizations have been significantly understudied as political actors.648  Even the 
upsurge of interest in political Islam following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
has largely produce political science research that “does not tie inquiries to broad 
questions that engage the discipline.”649 Some scholars have recognized the usefulness of 
examining religious organizations as rational actors, but political science has yet to catch 
up with other disciplines such as sociology when it comes to taking religion seriously.  
Furthermore, much of the political science work that has been done on religion looks at 
the effects of religious beliefs, practices, and affiliations on individual members’ political 
capabilities and activities650.  Understanding the impact of religion on individuals is 
useful, but examining the behavior of religious organizations is also an important but 
relatively neglected topic, even among social scientific works on religion.   
                                                
648 As Wald and Wilcox (2006) note in their review of the paucity of research on religion 
in the pages of the American Political Science Review, “apart from economics and 
geography, it is hard to find a social science that has given less attention to religion than 
political science.” Wald, Kenneth D., and Clyde Wilcox. "Getting Religion: Has Political 
Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor?." American Political Science Review 100.04 
(2006): 523-529. 
 
649 Ibid: 528. 
 
650 See, as examples: Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. Voice 
and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Vol. 4. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995; Djupe, Paul A, and Christopher P. Gilbert. The Political 
Influence of Churches. Cambridge University Press. 2008. 
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The size, resources, influence and organization of Christian denominations, in 
particular, make them formidable political actors. The Catholic Church, to look at the 
most prominent example, is “probably the wealthiest institution in the entire world,” and 
its national branches are generally impressive in terms of both size and resources when 
compared to other private organizations.651 Churches also often have the size and 
organization to carry out mass mobilization, and their role as producers and disseminators 
of moral prescriptions give them significant influence in determining how their members 
vote and otherwise engage in political and civil life.  Ignoring the roles of religious 
groups as political actors is therefore unwise given their potential and actual political 
clout.  Overlooking religious actors in developing contexts such as Africa is especially 
problematic, as the historical dearth and underdevelopment of secular civil society has 
often left churches as among the few groups with the organization, resources and freedom 
to challenge the state. 
Despite the focus on Christian churches, the importance of the insights derived in 
this study is not limited to scholars of Christianity or even religion, nor is the usefulness 
of these analyses limited to Kenya specialists or Africanists more generally.  
Understanding how organizations channel preference into political actions and how 
governments engage with organizations in terms of negotiation or cooptation is important 
                                                
 
651 The American Catholic Church, for example, has an annual operating budget that 
surpasses the yearly revenue of companies such as General Motors or Apple.  Matthew 
Yglesias. “How Rich is the Catholic Church?” Slate. March 14, 2013. 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2013/03/catholic_church_and_pope_fr
ancis_religious_institutions_are_exempted_from.html. Accessed July 23, 2014; “The 
Catholic Church In America: The Working.” The Economist Newsblog. August 16, 2012. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2012/08/catholic-church-america. Accessed 
October 6 2014. 
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for examining political parties, advocacy organizations, trade unions and various other 
forms of political or politicized social organizations.  Examining churches has been 
useful in approximating conditions of exogenous organizational structuring and 
restructuring in order to more clearly examine how organizational factors influence 
political orientation. With internal structures that developed in circumstances long 
removed from contemporary national politics, Kenyan churches presented pre-established 
organizational models to the Kenyan government.  
 This concluding chapter reviews and summarizes the arguments and evidence 
presented in this dissertation, presents additional evidence that expands the arguments 
beyond Kenya by examining church political orientation in Africa more generally, and 
highlights the importance of the arguments presented in the dissertation.  In Section 2, I 
review the main arguments of the dissertation and the evidence marshaled from the 
church case studies in Kenya across the country’s first three presidents.  Section 3 
presents evidence to test the external validity of these arguments, especially the primary 
argument of the importance of church structure on influencing church support, by using 
statistical analyses of church political stances across independent Africa.  Section 4 
expands upon the quantitative analysis with a qualitative discussion of selected cases 
from the data. Section 5 concludes by discussing the significance of the results and 
analyses of this dissertation for scholars and political actors alike. 
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2 Church Political Orientation in Kenya: Structure and Preferences 
2.1 Church Structure and Church-State Relations: Negotiation and Cooptation 
I have focused my analysis on the ways in which the churches under study differ 
in their internal leadership and decision-making structures and explored how these 
differences influence the ways in which the churches have interacted with various 
governments over time and ultimately why the churches have taken different stands 
toward these governments.  Past analyses of church political and economic activity, 
which collectively form a body of literature known as the political economy of religion, 
have explained church activities either by focusing solely on the preferences of churches 
or by looking at the interaction between churches and other actors, such as rival 
denominations or the state, based on the assumed preferences of these actors.  I add to the 
existing analyses by arguing that these interactions, particularly the interactions churches 
have with governments and states, are influenced and mediated by structures internal to 
the churches, most importantly leadership (de)centralization, leadership accountability 
and internal democracy or autocracy in decision-making procedures. These structural 
characteristics of churches influence how preferences within a church are aggregated into 
organizational goals, how churches’ organizational goals are presented to external actors 
such as governments, and how churches interact with governments.  
On the one hand, leadership centralization gives centralized churches negotiation 
advantages over decentralized churches.  A single leader can more coherently and more 
credibly present his church’s interests to the government.  Furthermore, such a leader can 
make credible commitments during negotiations with the government, particularly when 
this leader has authority within his church to make policy commitments without fear of 
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veto or sanction.652  Additionally, the existence of a single leader increases the role that 
personal relationships, such as those that a church leader may have with a country’s 
president or other important political leaders, can play in facilitating church-state 
negotiations to the mutual benefit of both actors.  On the other hand, a church leader who 
possesses sole and ultimate decision-making authority has leeway to make commitments 
on behalf of the church that benefit the leader individually, regardless of whether they 
benefit the church as an organization.  Therefore, the leaders of centralized and 
authoritarian churches may not represent the interests of their organizations, as distinct 
from the interests of the church leaders as individuals, to the government.   In both 
scenarios, negotiation and cooptation, centralized churches are more likely to come to an 
agreement with governments, and since governments seek political support from 
churches, centralization makes church support for government more likely and church 
opposition less likely. 
These two mechanisms, negotiation and cooptation, have both been evident 
throughout the history of church-state relations in Kenya.  During the era of President 
Jomo Kenyatta, the hierarchies of the major churches in Kenya were relatively small, 
with few high-ranking officials (such as bishops), and each denomination generally had a 
single individual sitting atop its national leadership structure.  Given the small size of the 
church elite, President Kenyatta was able to maintain personal relationships with several 
church leaders, such a Catholic Archbishop J.J. McCarthy and Presbyterian Moderator 
                                                
652 Kalyvas (2000) cites the internal structure of religious institutions as being decisive in 
the ability of religions to make credible public commitments of political moderation in 
the context of democratic transitions.  Kalyvas, Stathis N. "Commitment Problems in 
Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties." Comparative Politics (2000): 
379-398. 
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Charles Kareri.   Even when personal relationships did not exist between the President 
and national church leaders, the hierarchical and centralized church structure still 
facilitated negotiations by clearly delineating the lines of authority within the churches 
and allowing church leaders to appoint effective delegates to engage with government 
officials.653 
Even when compared to the heavy-handed rule of President Kenyatta, the 
authoritarian rule of his successor, Daniel arap Moi left little room for negotiation.  
President Moi instead used inducements, threats and manipulation to coopt and control 
church leaders.654  Moi received strong support from his own denomination, the Africa 
Inland Church, and specifically from this church’s leaders.   In turn, the son of the AIC’s 
top leader became a Member of Parliament under the ruling party, and was promoted to a 
cabinet position within the government.  Through his Anglican Attorney General, Charles 
Njonjo, President Moi manipulated the election of a new Anglican Archbishop, but this 
move to control the Anglican Church backfired once Njonjo fell out of the president’s 
good graces and thus eliminated Moi’s connection to the Church.  The President provided 
prestige and publicity to the head of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Kenya, and 
maintained friendly relations with the international hierarchy of the SDA as well. 
                                                
653 For example, Anglican Archbishop Obadiah Kariuki was Kenyatta’s brother-in-law 
and thus a favored confidant of the President, but he was also of lower rank than 
Anglican Archbishop Leonard Beecher, meaning the Archbishop could employ Kariuki’s 
relationship with Kenyatta to present church concerns to the President.  When the 
government’s tacit endorsement of forced Kikuyu oaths threatened the Church, 
Archbishop Beecher was able to compel Bishop Kariuki to both take a public stand 
against the practice and privately discuss the issue with Kenyatta. 
 
654 Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi also took advantage of personal relationships with 
church leaders. This was especially true when Moi’s longtime associate, Ezekiel Birech, 
served as head of Moi’s own Africa Inland Church. 
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President Moi made a habit of being a presence, in person or through a high-ranking 
government representative, at the triennial Presbyterian General Assemblies, during 
which the Presbyterian Moderators were elected to lead the denomination.  When a sole 
Presbyterian minister became too much of a critic of the government, Moi summoned the 
sitting Moderator and other Presbyterian officials to his office, after which the 
Presbyterian leadership took measures to discipline the outspoken clergyman. 
Despite Moi’s use of material benefits and strong-arm tactics, the President 
eventually faced strong church opposition, particularly from the Anglican and later the 
Catholic churches.  The fallout between the Anglican Archbishop and the government 
over the dismissal of Charles Njonjo was exacerbated by the outspokenness of individual 
bishops within the Anglican hierarchy.  As the federal-style hierarchy of the Anglican 
Church grew in size, individual bishops from various parts of the country rose within the 
ranks of the church, promoted by local Anglicans within their particular dioceses and 
representing the local grievances of these Anglican populations. Thus, bishops like David 
Gitari, Henry Okullu and Alexander Muge increasingly drove church-state relations with 
their sustained criticisms of the Moi government. The most notable and sudden structural 
change, however, occurred within the Catholic Church when the Vatican decentralized 
the national church hierarch by creating three new archdioceses within Kenya in 1990. 
This change elevated several bishops, representing various parts of the country, to 
national leadership and corresponded with a drastic change in the Catholic Church’s 
political involvement – the relatively apolitical denomination quickly became critical of 
the political and economic failures of President Moi and the KANU ruling party.  The 
Catholic Church emerged as the strongest and most consistent source of church criticism 
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of the Moi government from 1990. As these structural changes made it more difficult for 
the President to control the voices of the largest denominations like the Catholic and 
Anglican churches, he instead increasingly associated himself with more centralized 
churches like the AIC and SDA that he could more easily coopt. 
Once Mwai Kibaki ended KANU’s rule within Kenya and ushered in a new era of 
democracy, the new President’s hands-off style, a reflection of both Kibaki’s own 
temperament and poor health, resulted in less of the personalized church-state relations 
that characterized the Kenyatta and even the Moi governments.  Furthermore, political 
reforms decentralized government funding for local development, curtailed politicization 
of harambees (fundraisers), and largely did away with authoritarian practices such as 
partisan use of police violence and political detentions. Such reforms initially gained 
Kibaki popular support in Kenya and international support as well, but they also meant 
that the government had given up many of the tools it had previously used to coopt civil 
society actors and threaten or punish government critics.  Consequently, church structure 
had less of an impact on church political activities during this period, as the mechanisms 
through which structure influence church-state relations had been significantly disrupted. 
2.2 Church and State Preferences and Church-State Relations 
2.2.1 Toward a More Complete Understanding of Church and State Preferences  
While this discussion of church structure highlights the reasons why examining 
the preferences of churches and states is insufficient for understanding church-state 
interactions and church political orientations, it is nonetheless necessary to properly 
identify the preferences of these actors in order to understand the outcomes of their 
interactions.  Therefore, the second goal of this dissertation has been to refine and expand 
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upon existing understandings of the goals that churches and states bring into their 
interactions with one another.  From the point of view of churches, I argue that the 
standard view of churches as member and resource maximizing organizations is too 
simplistic.  First, churches as organizations do not simply seek to maximize the raw 
number of people who can be counted as members of the church, as is evident by the 
various moral and behavioral strictures that churches place on members.  While churches 
do generally seek to increase their memberships, each church also places value on the 
degree to which members’ beliefs and behaviors conform to the moral and theological 
tenets of the church.  Churches therefore face a tradeoff between gaining more members 
and gaining more devout and orthodox members – a tradeoff between member quantity 
and member faithfulness.  Churches also seek to maximize resources, though this is 
generally a secondary goal for many denominations.  Focusing on resource accumulation 
is nevertheless a necessary priority for churches due to the practical expenses of 
operating and maintaining churches as functioning organizations.  Churches also face the 
necessity of expending human and financial resources to win new converts and maintain 
existing members, both directly through evangelization activities and religious education, 
and indirectly through service provision.  
 The second major point of this dissertation concerning church preferences is that 
the preferences of church leaders are not synonymous with the organizational goals of 
churches as identified above.  This is not to say that a church leader’s preferences are 
completely discordant with those of their organizations; on the contrary, due to both 
genuine devotion on the church leader’s part and the benefits of leading a successful 
organization (that is, one that is maximizing its size, resources and the devotion of its 
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members), a church leader has strong incentives to promote the membership quantity, 
membership faithfulness and resource accumulation of his church.  At the same time, 
however, a church leader generally values individual benefits such as income, prestige 
and their own sense of faithfulness to the doctrines in which they believe.  Identifying the 
preferences of organizations with strong leaders therefore involves identifying the 
preferences of these organizations’ leaders, and leader preferences are a mix of 
organizational and personal goals. 
Even though this dissertation focuses on church-state relations by looking at the 
political orientations of churches, it is important to understand the preferences of 
governments, since these preferences determine government demand for churches’ 
“products” and shape government policies toward churches, which in turn influence the 
stances churches adopt.  Gill identifies government demand for church support in terms 
of ideological goods.  Governments want churches to espouse obedience and pro-state 
ideology that will inspire citizens to voluntarily comply with the government’s laws and 
policies and therefore decrease the cost to governments of ruling.655 While this is one of 
the “goods” that churches can provide for governments, it is not the only one, and this 
dissertation identifies two others. In addition to ideology, governments seek church 
support in order to gain votes and other forms of active political mobilization.  Churches 
can instruct their members on how to vote, and can mobilize members to campaign, and 
use their infrastructure and human resources to get church members to the polls.  This 
motivation obviously varies according to the political structure of the country at hand, but 
                                                
655 Gill, Anthony. Rendering unto Caesar: the Catholic Church and the State in Latin 
America. University of Chicago Press, 1998: 50-54. 
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even autocracies often hold elections and other polls – however rigged they may be – and 
find it useful to be able to mobilize citizens.  Finally, in both the developed world and 
particularly in the developing world, governments rely on organizations like churches to 
provide social services, taking some of the burden of providing such services off of the 
government.   
2.2.2 The Role of Preferences in Influencing Church-State Interactions 
The preferences identified above were shown to have shaped the political 
interactions of churches and the Kenyan government throughout the history of the 
country as an independent state.  Founding President Jomo Kenyatta, initially enjoying 
widespread support and prestige as the living symbol of the independence struggle and 
the founding father of the nation, had relatively little demand for the ideological support 
of the churches due to his secular prestige.656 He instead preferred for the churches to 
have a quiet voice in politics. The churches, which were often vulnerable to accusations 
of foreign control or colonial collaboration, were willing to play a quiet, supportive role 
lest they be painted in a negative light and thus lose members and social standing.  
Kenyatta’s personal popularity, as well as the effective banning of political opposition 
parties and assassinations of potential rivals, meant that the President faced no significant 
political threats at the polls and did not need the churches to campaign or garner votes in 
his favor.  Instead, Kenyatta primarily drew upon the churches as partners in 
development; the young nation needed the churches help in providing health and 
                                                
656 He did draw support from the churches at individual moments of political importance 
an controversy, such as Catholic Archbishop McCarthy’s endorsement of “African 
Socialism” and Anglican Archbishop Beecher’s praise of the government during the 
political fight with the KPU opposition party.  
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education services (even after the nationalization of the school system), and the 
government found the churches useful for drawing in foreign resources that could further 
the country’s economic development.  The churches welcomed government cooperation 
in various service projects, leading to collaborations between church and state that 
fostered good relations between these actors.  As time passed, the churches indigenized 
their leadership and the government shifted from a maximalist coalition to a more ethnic 
and patronage-based rule.  Some of the churches ventured into moments of mild 
criticism, but the mutual benefits of good church-state relations were too great to allow 
any significant break between the major denominations and the government.  By 
maintaining conditions that allowed the churches to both grow in size and educate their 
members in proper beliefs and practices, and by materially benefiting the churches 
through cooperation in service work, Kenyatta’s policies aligned with church preferences, 
helping to maintain widespread cordiality in church-state relations.   
President Moi, in contrast to his predecessor, tied his public persona to his 
Christian identity, and desired the churches’ help in fostering his image as a servant of 
God. He thus sought active, vocal ideological support from church leaders.  To an even 
greater extent than President Kenyatta, Moi used authoritarian tactics to suppress political 
opposition, and thus did not demand that churches mobilize support for the ruling party 
through votes.  Even with democratization in the 1990s, Moi was able to secure his rule 
through divide-and-rule tactics and politicized ethnic violence, and thus was able to forgo 
the political support of the largest churches in the country.  Unlike Kenyatta, Moi was 
less concerned with development work, and thus church-initiated development projects 
became a substitute for government service provision rather than a complement to 
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government activities.   
Moi gained church support from the Africa Inland Church, of which he was a 
member.  For the church, its increased prominence under Moi helped raise the prestige of 
both the denomination and its leaders.  These leaders often had personal relationships 
with Moi, which brought both access to the President and personal gain for the church 
leaders.  In addition, because the AIC largely drew from Moi’s base of supporters in the 
Rift Valley Province, the church could actively support the president without worrying 
that its political activities would alienate current or potential members.  Though the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church did not share regional or ethnic affinities with President 
Moi, the Church’s strict ethical and behavioral code agreed closely with the President’s 
own beliefs and lifestyle, and thus Moi was able to present himself as a defender of the 
SDA’s beliefs, promoting the faithfulness of its members by publicly promoting the 
Church’s beliefs in his rhetoric and through hosting various international SDA events.  
Moi was also a patron of the SDA in a more traditional fashion, including facilitating the 
development of an SDA university in Kenya. The President’s patronage was 
institutionalized through the use of harambee fundraisers; an appearance by Moi or one 
of his top deputies was able to secure millions of shillings at a time, incentivizing the 
churches to maintain friendly church-state relations.  Although Moi and his officials 
initially used harambees to patronize the larger denominations, the leaderships of the 
Catholic and Anglican churches became too decentralized and too “expensive” to 
effectively control, and so the President channeled resources and privileges away from 
these denominations and toward his preferred church clients.  Meanwhile, leaders in the 
Anglican and Catholic churches were able to gain prestige from their communities by 
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championing their members’ interests in the face of government oppression, and many of 
these leaders cited moral imperatives to oppose the authoritarian tactics of the 
government.  
 President Mwai Kibaki in many ways returned to the strategies of Kenyatta.  He 
came into office with secular sources of legitimacy and thus did not seek much public 
approval from the churches.   Instead, the churches were useful development partners, 
due to their domestic resources and their ability to draw upon financial and human capital 
from abroad.  This was especially true for Kibaki’s own Catholic Church, which 
remained the largest and most widespread denomination in Kenya and had access to 
unparalleled development resources from abroad, including missionaries and expatriate 
members of religious orders.  As time drew on, however, Kibaki found himself in need of 
public support, and specifically votes, during three occasions: the 2005 constitutional 
referendum, the 2007 presidential election, and the 2010 constitutional referendum.  
Especially in 2005 and 2007, Kibaki faced strong political opposition and reached out to 
the churches, especially the larger ones such as the Catholic Church, for support.  In 
contrast, Kibaki was able to secure more than enough political support to approve his 
proposed constitution in 2010, and thus the government chose to tolerated church 
opposition rather than make concessions that would mollify religious leaders.   
2.2.3 Incompatibilities Between Church and State Preferences and Church-State 
Conflict 
The existence of member quantity and member faithfulness as distinct goals for 
churches not only means that tradeoffs sometimes exist between these two goals, but it 
also means that churches care about the effects of government policies on both of these 
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goals.  During each of the three governments in Kenya, churches faced government 
policies that the churches saw as threatening both the quantity and faithfulness of their 
membership, leading to particularly strong reactions from some or most of the major 
denominations, reactions that cannot be fully understood if churches were only seeking to 
maximize the number of members.  During Jomo Kenyatta’s presidency, the churches 
were faced with the nationalization of their schools, and the Catholic Church reacted in 
an uncharacteristically strong and publicly critical way to the government takeover of its 
schools.  The Catholic Church, which had the largest network of schools of any 
denomination at the time of the 1968 government takeover, not only valued control over 
education as a way of gaining new members from among the student bodies of Catholic 
schools (as both Catholics and non-Catholics attended these schools), but also saw 
religious education through the school system as a very important tool for assuring that 
both new and existing members of the Church knew and understood church doctrine.  
Because Catholic doctrine is unique and particular, the Catholic Church was especially 
concerned that guarantees of continued access to schools and religious education be 
sufficiently tailored to allow continued Catholic education.  The government, meanwhile, 
sought control of the school system as a symbol of independence and effective 
government, and as a way to inculcate pro-state ideology and support national 
development goals.  The government was willing to risk the temporary ire of the Catholic 
Church in order to accomplish these goals, and was eventually able to negotiate 
concessions that pleased the Church. 
One year later, when faced with the government’s tacit endorsement of forced 
Kikuyu oaths aimed at compelling loyalty to the Kenyatta government, most of the major 
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churches participated in public campaigns against the oathing practice.  Church members, 
who objected to the “pagan” oaths on religious grounds, were the victims of violence 
when they refused to participate.  Perhaps a bigger threat to the churches, however, was 
not violence against those who abstained from the oaths, but rather the compromised faith 
of those who chose to participate in them. The oaths thus endangered not only the safety 
of church members, but also their faith in church doctrine, and thus threatened to both 
decrease church membership and lessen the “quality” of remaining church members who 
had their allegiances torn between their church and their political and ethnic affiliations.  
The government either did not foresee the reaction of the churches, or those individuals 
who wielded political authority  (accurately) predicted that the churches’ opposition to 
the specific phenomenon of oathing would not lead to a permanent break in church-state 
cooperation due to the sustained mutual benefits of cooperation. 
The churches faced a similar threat during the Moi era when the government 
instituted queue voting as a replacement for secret ballot voting in KANU primary 
elections, which were particularly important given that only the ruling party was legally 
allowed to operate in the country.  This policy lead to the first significant clash between 
the government and some of the major churches, as objections to the new policy came 
from the Anglican, Catholic and (to a lesser extent) Presbyterian denominations, which 
were worried that forcing their members and leaders to publicly declare their political 
allegiances would lead to major splits within their churches.  For other denominations 
such as the Africa Inland Church and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the leaders of 
these denominations had already publicly allied with the government and were not 
threatened by engaging in yet another public display of support for President Moi and 
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KANU.  The government valued the ability to control the outcome of elections enough to 
tolerate drawing objections from the Anglican Church (with which the government 
already had somewhat strained relations due to the ousting of Charles Njonjo from the 
government and the outspokenness of the more activist Anglican bishops) and the 
Catholic Church (which still maintained cordiality with the government generally). 
Under President Kibaki, the churches were threatened by the prospect of 
constitutional reform, which centered on referenda in 2005 and 2010.  Though the 
President and his aides were able to alleviate the fears of the largest churches and church 
organizations in 2005, Kibaki failed to win enough secular political support to pass 
constitutional reform.  In 2010, the government had enough political will to pass a new 
constitution, but faced opposition from most of the major churches.  These large mainline 
denominations were faced with competition for members from newer evangelical and 
Pentecostal churches, which had been taking issue with certain clauses from the 2005 
document that had been reproduced in the 2010 draft. The churches also faced 
competition from the growing presence of Islam (including more radical Muslim 
influences largely coming from neighboring Somalia), and feared that the proposed 
constitution unfairly advantaged Islam through its provisions for Islamic civil courts.  
Beyond the threat of losing members to other Christian denominations or to Islam as a 
rival religion, the churches also feared that western, liberal principles embodied in many 
of the new constitution’s provisions, such as (implied) abortion rights, were at odds with 
Christian doctrines and practices and would lead to a general watering down of Christian 
beliefs and behaviors among the Kenyan population.  Thus, again the churches faced 
threats to both the quantity and faithfulness of their membership, leading to conflictual 
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church-state relations over these issues.  However, much like relations under Kenyatta, 
the Kibaki government and the churches found value in maintaining cooperation, 
particularly in development work, and so neither side allowed the clash over the 2010 
constitution to expand into more general church-state conflicts. 
One commonality of these specific church-state conflicts have been the absence 
of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church from engaging in the controversies.  Due to its 
theological prohibitions against significant political involvement and ethnic and 
geographical distance from the center of Kenyan politics, the SDA’s preferences diverged 
from other churches.  The SDA had already discovered the practical difficulties of 
operating schools without government support, and so did not have an incentive to 
oppose government school takeover in 1968, as long as it was allowed to continue 
religious education in former SDA schools.  Furthermore, the church did not draw much 
of its membership from the GEMA groups that were involved in the oathing controversy, 
and did not therefore face significant threats to its members.  The SDA had already 
embraced President Moi’s patronage by the time of the queue voting controversy of the 
1980s, and thus chose not to object to the government’s alteration of voting procedures.  
And the SDA, unlike other denominations, did not see its membership or its specific 
beliefs threatened by the reforms of the 2010 constitution, and thus had no reason to 
oppose the document. 
These case studies demonstrate that, in addition to the importance of examining 
church structures, it remains important to properly identify the preferences of churches 
and governments to fully understand the interactions between these actors and the 
resultant stances taken by churches.  While more centralized churches generally had 
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better relations with the government, there were individual instances where the 
preferences of various churches and the government were incompatible, leading to 
temporary conflicts with even the most centralized denominations.   Outside of these 
specific circumstances, however, the impact of church and government preferences was 
mediated through the structures of the churches in question. 
 
3 Church Political Orientation in Africa: Quantitative Analysis 
The arguments presented in this dissertation have largely been derived from 
examinations of the case study churches themselves.  Although the preceding analyses 
have offered further evidence of the arguments’ validity and elaborated upon the 
mechanisms by which church structure influences church political activity, focusing 
solely on these five churches leaves open the question of external validity. To examine 
the larger validity and applicability of these arguments, the next section presents an “out 
of sample” statistical analysis of church political support for governments across Africa 
since independence. I have gathered data for various Christian denominations in thirty-
four African countries from independence until 2011.657 This represents the universe of 
cases in which at least one church (national-level Christian denomination) has had 
adherents equal to at least five percent of the country’s population at some point between 
independence and 2011.658 For each country, I examine the relationship between each 
                                                
657 For most of the countries in the dataset, independence is defined as the end of colonial 
or white rule.  The following cases of less obvious independence dates are as follows: 
Ethiopia, 1974; Liberia, 1980; Namibia, 1990; South Africa, 1994; Zimbabwe, 1980.   
 
658 Despite meeting the criteria for inclusion in the dataset, one country – Chad, – 
completely drop out of the sample due to missing data. Data on the number of church 
adherents across time gathered from the dataset compiled by Mandryk, Jason. Operation 
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successive government that has operated within the country and the largest church that 
existed within the country during that government’s time in power.659 The data equates 
governments with heads of state, in keeping with the strong presidential systems that 
characterize African governments.660 Thus, the unit of analysis is the Church-President 
dyad.661 Except in rare instances in which a country has had only one leader since 
independence, this procedure produces multiple observations for each country.662 
3.1 Dependent Variable: Church Political Orientation 
The dependent variable for my analysis is a trichotomous measure of church 
political orientation equaling ‘1’ if a church was supportive of the government during the 
period in question, ‘0’ if the church was neutral or participated in politics in a non-
partisan way, and ‘-1’ if the church was critical or oppositional. Measuring the political 
orientation of churches is a complicated and necessarily subjective process, and I have 
used a wide range of sources to code this variable. When possible, I have relied on 
official statements released by a church’s national leaders.  For example, one of the 
                                                                                                                                            
World: The Definitive Prayer Guide to Every Nation. Biblica Europe; 7th edition October 
2010. 
 
659 I exclude short-lived governments, defined as those in which a head of state was in 
office for less than two years. 
 
660 See Van de Walle, Nicolas. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging 
Party Systems." The Journal of Modern African Studies 41.02 (2003): 309-311. 
 
661 For example, the orientation of the Kenyan Catholic Church to President Jomo 
Kenyatta is treated as one observation, the Catholic Church-President Moi dyad as a 
second observation, and the Catholic Church-President Kibaki dyad as a third 
observation.  
 
662 The dataset considers Zimbabwe to have achieved independence in 1980, and thus 
identifies Robert Mugabe as the country’s only post-independence leader. 
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innovations that arose from the Catholic Church’s Second Vatican Council was the 
creation of Episcopal Conferences, formal organizations of all the Catholic bishops and 
archbishops of a particular country that they decide upon national church policy and craft 
statements on relevant national issues.663  These statements often take the form of 
Pastoral Letters, written in the name of all the bishops or signed by the president of the 
conference, who is elected from among the bishops for a fixed term. . 
I also look at the statements made by national Church leaders as reported in 
various news sources and publications. For churches with only one top national leader, 
such as the patriarch of an Orthodox church, the statements of that leader are taken as 
official statements of the church’s position, as are any statements clearly authorized by 
the national leader. Given that Archbishop is the highest office within the Catholic 
Church in a particular country, Archbishop statements are taken as representing the 
Catholic Church’s official stance or that country.  When multiple Archbishops exist 
within a single country, all of their statements are taken as official.  The president of a 
national Catholic Episcopal Conference is also considered a top national leader, and his 
statements likewise represent official church policy.  Except when speaking on behalf of 
an Episcopal conference or with clear authorization from an archbishop, I generally do 
not include statements made by other bishops (who are known as suffragan bishops) as 
official Church statements, as such bishops are generally viewed as subordinate to the 
Archbishops in their countries in terms of Church authority, despite the freedom given to 
bishops to express their own views. I also do not rely on statements released by the 
Vatican or by the Vatican’s diplomatic representatives within a country as indicative of 
                                                
663 Smaller countries are occasionally grouped together or paired with larger countries, 
such as the Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé. 
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the stance of the Catholic Church in that country, as the opinions coming from Rome may 
differ from those of the national-level hierarchy. In addition to official Church 
statements, I also rely on a number of secondary sources for each country that describe 
the attitude or actions of the Churches toward a particular government.   
Using these various sources, I label a Church’s orientation toward a particular 
government as either supportive (1), neutral/mixed (0) or oppositional (-1).  These three 
categories are interpreted as follows.  Churches are categorized as Supportive (1) if they 
offer significant amounts of praise for the President or government, going beyond minor 
congratulations or acknowledgement of government accomplishments. Archbishops or 
church spokesmen may make statements directly extolling the President or government, 
as well as criticizing opposition parties and opponents of the incumbent. In electoral 
contexts, support includes statements indicating a preference for the incumbent president 
or party to be re-elected over challengers. Support for government may also be indirectly 
given by expressing opinions on controversial political issues that are in line with the 
stances taken by the incumbent government.664 
Churches are considered Neutral (0) if they are neither supportive of government 
nor critical/oppositional.  Neutrality combines three scenarios: 
                                                
664 For example, during the 2007 presidential race in Kenya, Archbishop John Njue of the 
Nairobi archdiocese strongly condemned a proposal to institute a system of federalism 
known as majimbo. This was widely seen as an endorsement of the incumbent President 
Mwai Kibaki, as the president opposed the proposed system while his main challenger 
favored the reform.  Another Kenyan Archbishop, Zacchaeus Okoth, took the unusual 
step of clarifying that Njue’s statements were personal opinion and not the official view 
of the Kenya Episcopal Conference. This political disagreement had an ethnic dimension. 
Kibaki and Njue belonged to the Kikuyu ethnic group; Okoth was a Luo, as was the main 
contender for the presidency and proponent of majimbo, Raila Odinga. 
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A) The Church is neutral between government and opposition, expressing no support or 
opposition to any side. Neutrality need not be explicit declared, as a Church may simply 
decline to issue statements or take actions on partisan issues. Furthermore, explicit 
declarations of neutrality are not sufficient to be placed in this categorization if other 
Church statements or actions contradict the neutrality claim by expressing supportive or 
oppositional views. 
B) The Church expresses mixed opinions. This can be either simultaneous, with multiple 
leaders having different views on the same issue, or over time, if the Church fluctuates 
between support and opposition (instances where the Church trends from one position to 
another without reversal are discussed below).   
C) The Church is involved in politics in a non-partisan way. This generally takes the form 
of activities such as mediation between rival factions, non-partisan civic education or 
voter registration.  These activities must not be performed in a way that indicates a clear 
preference for one party prevailing over another. 
A Church is deemed Oppositional (-1) if it is critical on many issues and/or on a 
fundamental issue, such as democratization or human rights abuses. An oppositional 
Church may advocate for a change in government. This includes, but is not limited to, 
supporting particular opposition parties or movements.  This category does not include 
instances where Churches have generally cordial relationships with government but have 
very occasional disagreements on particular, doctrine-specific issue (such as birth 
control). 
It is often the case that the Church initially seeks to be neutral or supportive but 
becomes increasingly critical as circumstances within the country change. There are also 
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instances in which an initially hostile Church becomes more supportive over time. In 
instances where the political orientation trends over time from one position to another, 
without subsequent reversal, I use the position at the end of the time period to determine 
the Church’s orientation. When political orientation changes multiple times, for instance 
going from supportive to critical to supportive again, this is coded as mixed and thus 
neutral. 
One of the most conceptually difficult parts of the project concerns how coding 
the dependent variable in instances where there does not appear to be data. Lack of 
statements from the Church during a particular regime, coupled with absence of 
secondary commentary on the Church’s stance, could simply be missing data, or it may 
indicate that the Church took a neutral stance and refrained from politics during this time.   
The analysis deals with these cases by adopting the following rule.  For countries in 
which the Church’s stance is clear for a majority of the governments in the dataset, the 
Church is coded as Neutral concerning those governments for which no information on 
Church orientation is available. This is done based on the assumption that if the political 
stances of a church have been recorded for most of the governments that have operated 
within a country, the absence of political statements for the remaining governments of 
that country indicate that the church refrained from making such statements concerning 
these latter governments.  When church statements are absent for the majority of the 
governments that have existed in a country, those dyads for which no information exist 
are simply dropped from the dataset.  Instances where there are statements from the 
Church that are too ambiguous to classify, or where secondary sources disagree on the 
Church’s stance, are also treated as missing data and dropped from the analysis.   
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3.2 Independent Variables 
The main variable of interest, church structure, is multifaceted. For the purpose of 
this analysis, I focus on leadership centralization, which is a dummy variable 
CENTRALIZATION for whether only one individual occupied the top leadership 
position within a national-level denomination during the years covered within a given 
observation (i.e. the term of the country’s president).665  For churches like the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church, for example, one individual, the Church’s Patriarch, occupies the top 
leadership position.  For many Catholic churches, in contrast, there may be several 
archbishops operating within a country, and all are of equal formal rank within the 
Catholic hierarchy.  In addition, as described in previous chapters, national Catholic 
denominations elect one of their bishops to head their national Episcopal Conferences.  
When the selected bishop is not one of the archbishops, his selection effectively adds 
another national leader to the church, and thus Episcopal Conference Presidents are also 
included in the count of national leaders for the Catholic churches in the dataset.666  
A simple bivariate regression shows a strong relationship between the basic 
measure of centralization and support for the government.667  The dataset contains 116 
                                                
665 The data does not currently allow independent tests of the claims made in Arguments 
2 and 3 raised in the first chapter of this dissertation, as the accountability systems in 
place for most of the churches in the dataset are too similar to differentiate.  
 
666 An individual is only counted once, however, if he is both an archbishop within the 
Catholic Church and the president of his Episcopal Conference. 
 
667 The bivariate regression of the centralization dummy on the trichotomous measure of 
church support gives a point estimate of 0.44 with a standard error of 0.12 and a p-value 
of 0.003. Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. 2014. "ls: Least Squares Regression 
for Continuous Dependent Variables” in Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau, 
"Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software," http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig 
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church-government dyads, and just over one-third of the dyads (43) feature churches hat 
were centralized for the duration of the governments with which they are paired.  Of 
these 116 dyads, 16 of them feature church support for the incumbent government, and an 
overwhelming number of these supportive churches (12/16 observations) were 
centralized.  In contrast, centralized churches account for only 39% of the neutral 
churches (24/62 observations) and only 18% of the oppositional churches (7/38 
observations).  As the data shows, centralization is not a sufficient condition for churches 
to support government, as most of the centralized churches were neutral.  However, 
centralized churches in the data were almost twice as likely to be supportive than 
oppositional.  
As discussed previously, a church seeks to maximize the quantity and faithfulness 
of its members and the resources that the church owns or controls.  The government can 
influence church membership and resources in a number of ways.  A government can 
benefit a given church by elevating the denomination to official state church or a similar 
privileged status, banning rival denominations, favoring the church and its clergy in 
public functions, providing subsidies and tax exemptions to the church, and promoting 
beliefs and behaviors consistent with the church’s theology through laws and public 
statements.  Conversely, a government can be detrimental to the goals of a church by 
restricting or banning the denomination, excluding the church and its clergy from public 
functions, placing onerous taxes or regulations on the church, denouncing the tenets of 
the church and promoting beliefs and behaviors that are incompatible with the theology 
of the church in question.  Existing data does not allow me to directly test government 
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policies in these areas.668 However, I include measures of several variables that may be 
indicative of government policies toward religion and specific religious organizations. 
For each church-government dyad, I include a dummy variable DENOMINATION 
MATCH for whether or not the country’s President is a member of the church in the 
dyad, since it stands to reason that a President may favor his own denomination over 
other churches or religious groups, and that a church would therefore be more likely to 
support its own member as President.  I also include a dummy variable MUSLIM for 
whether the President was Muslim, as Muslim-Christian divides have characterized 
religious competition in many African nations and such divides have been transformed 
into political competition as well.  Because Islam presents an alternative worldview and 
set of beliefs to Christianity, churches may fear that Muslim Presidents will promote 
Islam, which can lead to decreased church membership and less orthodoxy of practice 
and beliefs among remaining church members.  Muslim Presidents may also decrease 
church resources by channeling state preferences away from Christian organizations.  I 
also include a variable for whether the President identified as Marxist. Though no longer 
a major issue in African politics, historically Marxism employed an alternative ideology 
to Christianity, one which was sometimes explicitly hostile toward religion, and churches 
                                                
668 The most comprehensive data sources on international religious freedom tend to only 
reach as far back as the 1990s or 2000s.  For example, the Pew Research Centers’ Global 
Restrictions on Religion project examines religious freedom in 198 countries during the 
years 2006-2008. http://www.pewforum.org/2009/12/17/methodology/.  The United 
States Department of State’s Report on International Religious Freedom, released 
annually, only goes back to 1999. The Religion and State Project, published by Jonathan 
Fox as part of the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), covers the years 1990 
through 2008. Fox, Jonathan. "The religion and state project." TheARDA. Available 
(2004).-Minorities Dataset, published by John Fox and Yasemin Akbaba as Akbaba, Y. 
and Fox, J. (2011) ‘The Religion and State-Minorities Dataset’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 48 (6), 807–16. 
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also clashed with Marxist governments over expropriation of church property, although 
non-Marxist governments have also carried out such policies. 
The most controversial targets of government expropriation in Africa, as well as 
other regions such as Latin America, have been church schools.  Governments have taken 
over control of previously church-dominated school systems in order to control national 
development and inculcate nationalistic values in citizens. For churches, however, losing 
control of church schools is a particularly threatening development. Not only are the 
school buildings and land valuable physical resources, but education is also a very 
important tool by which churches gain new members and teach existing members right 
beliefs and practices.  Controlling the education system is thus important for all three of 
the church’s goals (maximizing member quantity, member faithfulness, and church 
resources), and governments that threaten the church’s ability to control education should 
face church opposition. I thus include a dummy variable SCHOOLS NATIONALIZED 
for whether or not the government nationalized some or all of the country’s previously 
church-run education system. 
While relatively few studies have focused on the determinants of church political 
orientation generally, much more work has been done on the relationships between 
religion in general, or Christianity in particular, and democracy. While this study does not 
make church attitudes concerning democracy the dependent variable, as in other works, 
the degree of democracy in a country may influence church political orientation towards 
incumbent governments.669 Various authors have posited links between Protestantism and 
                                                
669 See, for example, Philpott, Daniel. "Explaining the Political Ambivalence of 
Religion." American Political Science Review 101.03 (2007): 505-525. 
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democracy, offering reasons why the ideas of equality inherent in Protestant theology and 
practice make this strand of Christianity particularly compatible with democratic 
politics.670 Huntington famously noted that “the third wave [of democratization] of the 
1970s and 1980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave.”671 As noted previously, 
Huntington attributes this largely to pro-democracy reforms within the Catholic Church 
brought about by the Second Vatican Council in the mid 1960s.  Thus, both mainline 
Protestantism and post-Vatican II Catholicism are viewed as generally supportive of 
democratic forms of government, though works such as Gill (1998) demonstrate that 
churches’ support for democracy over authoritarianism is far from uniform.  Variation 
notwithstanding, the literature suggests a preference for democracy among both mainline 
Protestant and Catholic churches. Other Christian denominations, such as newer 
Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations, have displayed more ambiguous attitudes 
towards democracy.672  “In general”, argues Gifford (1995), “it could be said that it is the 
mainline churches that have challenged Africa’s dictators; the newer evangelical and 
Pentecostal churches that have provided the support,” though Ranger (same volume), 
argued that the attitudes of Evangelical and Pentecostal churches toward democracy were 
more varied.673 Though churches are far from uniform in support for democracy, the bulk 
                                                
670 For overviews see Freston, Paul. “Christianity: Protestantism” in Haynes, Jeffrey, ed. 
Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics. Routledge. 2009: 32-33, 36-37. 
 
671 Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.  
University of Oklahoma Press. 1993: 76 
 
672 See Freston, Paul. “Evangelical Protestantism and Democratization in Contemporary 
Latin America and Asia.” Democratization. Vol 11, No. 4. 2004: 21-41. 
 
673 Gifford, Paul, ed. The Christian Churches and the Democratisation of Africa. E.J. 
Brill. 1995: 5. 
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of the literature suggests a preference for democratic forms of government. “While 
regime illegitimacy is not a sufficient condition for an oppositional church,” write 
Johnston and Figa,  “it does increase the doctrinal and popular pressure for the church to 
exercise its unique privileges in favor of social and political change. Thus, the church’s 
oppositional potential seems to be inversely linked with the regime’s legitimacy.”674 I 
therefore include a variable, DEMOCRACY, which gives the average democracy score 
for each country during the time period covered in a given dyad, using the 21-point 
measure of democracy included in the Polity IV dataset.675 
It is difficult to study modern African politics without dealing with questions 
concerning ethnicity.  This dissertation recognizes the salience of ethnicity in politics 
even in the context of religious organizations and leaders.  All else being equal, I assume 
that religious leaders will be more likely to support governments headed by members of 
the same ethnic groups as the majority (or a significant minority) of their church’s 
members, and these church leaders will more likely oppose governments when political 
opposition in the country is associated with church members’ co-ethnics. This influence 
                                                                                                                                            
 
674 Johnston, Hank and Figa, Jozef. “The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative 
Perspectives on Mobilization against Authoritarian Regimes.” Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion. Vol 27, No 1.Mar 1988: 32-47. 
 
675 Because Polity scores are based on the political situation in a country are based on the 
political situation existing at the end of a given year, I do not include the final year of a 
presidency when calculating the average polity score, except for governments that were 
still in office on December 31, 2010, the last day covered in the Polity dataset.  For 
countries in which the Polity score is missing for some years, I average the years for 
which data exists.  Polity IV does not provide any information for _ countries in my 
sample, and these observations are dropped from all regressions that include the 
DEMOCRACY score due to the missing data. Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 
"Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002." 2002. 
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of ethnicity works through the composition of a given church (or, for regional leaders 
such as bishops, the composition of the area over which the leader has jurisdiction).  
Church leaders may, and often do, simply care about the people under their care and 
leadership, even those they don't personally know.  But even if it were the case that 
church leaders do not have genuine concern for members, church leaders may suffer 
reproof from these communities if the latter feel their interests are not being properly 
served676. Parishioners who feel that the church or its leaders are not sufficiently 
promoting the interests of the local community may switch to another denomination or 
faith they perceive as more in tuned with the needs of the community, though there may 
be constraints to doing so. Or, if religious, ethnic, cultural or geographical reasons 
prevent denomination switching, these dissatisfied members may simply decrease their 
devotion (in terms of monetary and other contributions).  To capture these dynamics, I 
include a dummy variable REGION MATCH, measuring  '1' if the Province/State where 
the President was born is one of the three Provinces/States in the country with the largest 
number of affiliates of the Church in question, and equaling ‘0’ otherwise.  Ideally, I 
would also include a measure of ethnic affiliation, but the data does not currently allow 
me to include this alternative measure. 
Turning to the point of view of the government, rulers look to churches to provide 
pro-state ideology, which lowers the cost of ruling by inspiring voluntary compliance 
among citizens.  Rulers also seek church support in order to secure votes, and to provide 
                                                
676 For ethnic groups sanctioning elites, see Bates, Robert H. "Modernization, Ethnic 
Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa." in Rothchild, 
Donald S., and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds. State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy 
Dilemmas. Westview Press, 1983: 161-163. 
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social services.  The degree to which these motives guide government preferences vis-à-
vis churches varies based on the political system and climate of a given country.  The 
government’s demand for churches to provide legitimacy and promote obedience will be 
less if the government has alternative sources of legitimacy and inspiration.  The 
usefulness of churches in mobilizing votes will be less in a political system in which 
votes are unnecessary or less important.  And the demand for church-provided social 
services will lessen as the government’s resources and capacities to provide such services 
increase. 
Argument 4 holds that governments seek to cooperate with churches for social 
service provision in order lessen the burden on governments to provide these services 
directly, and churches likewise seek government subsidies and cooperation for service 
and development projects. All else being equal, churches with greater capacities for 
social service provision make more attractive partners to governments, and these 
churches are therefore more likely to be able to come to mutually beneficial arrangements 
with their governments, lessening the probability of church-state conflict.  To proxy 
church capacity, I include CHURCH SIZE, a measure of church membership as a 
percentage of the population at the beginning of the president’s term.677  While church 
                                                
677 Membership data, drawn from the Operation World dataset, is recorded at five-year 
intervals, and so I use the first the population data that is chronologically closest to the 
start date of the dyad, which is the same as the beginning of the term for the head of state.  
For example, for a dyad beginning in 1967, I use Operation World membership data for 
1965, whereas a dyad beginning in 1968 would use 1970 data. Focusing on membership 
at the beginning of a president’s term helps to avoid endogeneity, as church growth 
during a term may be related to a church’s political stands. While I used Operation 
World’s more inclusive measure of church adherents to determine which church was the 
largest during the term of each head of state, I use the more restrictive measure of 
membership as a proxy for church adherents.  While adherents, that is all those who 
identify as following the doctrine of a particular church, are important for the overall 
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size is used as a measure of the supply of church-provided social services, government’s 
must also have a demand for these church-provided services.  As a rough approximation 
of government capacity, I include the natural log of the per capita GDP (LN PER 
CAPITA GDP) of the country for the period covered in each observation, based on the 
assumption that the governments of poorer countries will have less resources with which 
to provide social services and have greater incentive to turn to churches to help serve the 
population.   
As a control, I include a measure of the natural logs of the countries population at 
the beginning of the period covered in each dyad (LN POPULATION).  Also included 
are variables indicating whether the President was the first head of state for the nation 
post-independence (FOUNDING FATHER), which may decrease a church’s willingness 
to oppose the government, lest the church lose popularity among the local population.678 
3.3 Results and Robustness Checks  
I test the relationship between the trichotomous political orientation variable and 
the independent variables described above using a basic ordinary least squares model.679  
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 5.1 below.  Model (1) includes all the 
variables described above.  The estimate for the CENTRALIZATION variable is in the 
                                                                                                                                            
societal influence of a church, church-administered social service provisions and 
development works are more likely to be handled by those who hold formal membership 
within a particular church, making membership a better indicator of church capacity. 
 
678 The prestige associated with being a founding father may, however, lessen the 
incentive of a government to seek church support, which would result in a negative 
relationship between founder status and church support.  The expected sign of this 
variable is thus ambiguous. 
 
679 All regression run using the Zelig package in R. version 3.0.2. 
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expected direction and highly significant, indicating that churches with only one leader 
are more likely to be supportive of governments than churches with multiple leaders.   
The only other variables that attain statistical significance in the regression are CHURCH 
SIZE and LN POPULATION.  Larger churches are more likely to support the 
government, consistent with the reasoning stated above that governments more actively 
seek the support of larger churches.  The result for the population variable also indicates 
that church support is more likely in larger countries.  The other variables are 
insignificant.  Model (1) does not take into account the fact that for nearly 90% of the 
observations in the dataset, the church is Catholic.  Furthermore, church structure is 
correlated with denomination, as all of the non-Catholic churches in the dataset are 
centralized. Model (2) replicates the previous model with the addition of a dummy 
variable CATHOLIC.  Including the CATHOLIC variable decreases but does not 
eliminate the significance of the CENTRALIZATION, CHURCH SIZE and LN 
POPULATION variables, while the other independent variables remain insignificant. 
Because of concerns for degrees of freedom, which are exacerbated by the fact that some 
of the independent variables suffer from missing data, Model (3) excludes the 
independent variables that are neither significant in the previous models nor significant in 
bivariate regressions (SCHOOLS NATIONALIZED, DEMOCRACY, REGION 
MATCH and FOUNDING FATHER).    The streamlined model retains the significance 
of the main variable of interest, CENTRALIZATION, as well as CHURCH SIZE and LN 
POPULATION. In addition, the MUSLIM PRESIDENT variable remains negative, as 
expected, and gains marginal significance in this specification.  Model (4) adds decade 
fixed effects to the previous model.  CENTRALIZATION remains significant, though at 
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a lower level, while the estimates of CHURCH SIZE and LN POPULATION also retain 
their significance but MUSLIM PRESIDENT becomes insignificant again. 
Table 5.1. 
Political Orientationa 
Coefficients (Std. Errors) 
Variable  (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS  
CENTRALIZATION 0.59  0.44  0.46  0.37 
   (0.17)*** (0.20)*  (0.18)*  (0.22)† 
DENOMINATION  0.26  0.25  0.20  0.22 
     MATCH  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
MUSLIM  -0.29  -0.34  -0.39  -0.33 
     PRESIDENT (0.23)  (0.24)  (0.21)†  (0.22) 
MARXIST  -0.01  -0.01  -0.12  -0.04 
     PRESIDENT (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (0.22) 
SCHOOLS  0.06  0.06     
     NATIONALIZED (0.23)  (0.23)     
DEMOCRACY 0.02  0.02     
   (0.02)  (0.02)     
REGION MATCH -0.21  -0.25     
   (0.15)  (0.16)     
CHURCH SIZE 1.72  1.54  1.18  1.28 
   (0.77)*  (0.78)†  (0.67)†  (0.74)† 
LN POPULATION 0.20  0.16  0.18  0.16 
   (0.07)** (0.07)*  (0.07)** (0.08)* 
LN PER CAPITA 0.13  0.11  0.10  0.10 
     GDP  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
FOUNDING  0.16  0.12     
     FATHER  (0.18)  (0.18)     
CATHOLIC     -0.37  -0.32  -0.34 
     CHURCH    (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.30) 
 
Decade Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes 
N   86  86  94  94   
Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '** 0.01 '*' 0.05 '†' 0.1 ' ' 1 
aDV=Trichotomous variable =1 if church supports government in church-government 
dyad, 0 if church is neutral or non-partisan, and -1 if church opposes government or 
supports opposition.  
 
The above analyses are based on a trichotomous dependent variable, which can 
take values of either 1 (support), 0 (neutrality or mixed) or -1 (opposition).  Some works, 
however, identify church neutrality with tacit support for a given government and its 
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policies.680  This view implies that the distinction between support and neutrality is not 
substantively important, and that neutral churches should be considered as supportive of 
their governments.  The regressions summarized in Table 5.2 conform to this point of 
view by combining the support and neutrality categories into a single category, assigning 
a 1 to all such cases.  Church opposition is labeled 0.  Thus, these regressions are more 
specifically models of the determinants of active church opposition, examining the cases 
in which churches have explicitly opposed governments against the cases in which 
churches offer support, whether active or tacit, to the incumbent head of state.  The 
independent variables are the same as in those used in the models shown in Table 5.1.  
Because the dependent variable is now dichotomous, I use the logit function in Zelig for 
all the models in Table 5.2.  As seen below, the CENTRALIZATION variable is initially 
significant, as seen in Model (5), but loses significance when the CATHOLIC variable is 
added to the equation in Model (6).  The coefficient for MUSLIM PRESIDENT 
maintains its expected negative sign but now gains significance.  REGION MATCH also 
gains significance but with a negative coefficient, running counter to prediction.    
These results suggest that church structure does not play a strong role in the 
specific decision to actively oppose or criticize a sitting government, particularly among 
Catholic churches, which make up the vast majority of the denominations in the dataset.  
Furthermore, consistent with predictions, Christian churches are more likely to actively 
oppose Muslim presidents.  The results for REGION MATCH are more puzzling,  
                                                
680 Gill (1998), for example, uses this dichotomous framework in his analysis of the 
political stances of the Catholic Church in Latin America. Gill, Anthony. Rendering unto 
Caesar: the Catholic Church and the State in Latin America. University of Chicago 
Press, 1998. 
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Table 5.2 
Political Orientationa 
Coefficients (Std. Errors) 
Variable  (5) Logit (6) Logit (7) Logit (8) Logit  
CENTRALIZATION 1.40  0.68  0.54  -0.71 
   (0.68)*  (0.83)  (0.67)  (0.92) 
DENOMINATION  0.87  0.86  0.81  1.23 
     MATCH  (0.62)  (0.63)  (0.62)  (0.70)†  
MUSLIM  -1.86  -2.09  -1.96  -2.76 
     PRESIDENT (0.99)†  (1.02)*  (0.95)*  (1.17)* 
MARXIST  0.13  0.07     
     PRESIDENT (0.81)  (0.82)     
SCHOOLS  -0.68  -0.65  -0.44  -0.40 
     NATIONALIZED (0.85)  (0.85)  (0.79)  (0.89) 
DEMOCRACY 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.05 
   (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
REGION MATCH -1.13  -1.25  -1.20  -1.66 
   (0.59)†  (0.60)*  (0.57)*  (0.67)* 
CHURCH SIZE 3.28  1.63     
   (3.07)  (3.38)     
LN POPULATION 0.44  0.21     
   (0.30)  (0.35)     
LN PER CAPITA 0.85  0.70  0.54  0.86 
     GDP  (0.44)†  (0.44)  (0.35)  (0.42)* 
FOUNDING  0.99  0.74     
     FATHER  (0.80)  (0.81)     
CATHOLIC     -2.13  -2.66  -4.16 
     CHURCH    (1.61)  (1.44)†  (1.96)* 
 
Decade Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes 
N   88  88  88  88   
Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '** 0.01 '*' 0.05 '†' 0.1 ' ' 1 
aDV=Dichotomous variable =1 if church supports government in church-government, 
church is neutral or church is non-partisan, and 0 if church opposes government or 
supports opposition.  
 
suggesting that churches based in a President’s home region are actually more likely to 
oppose him than those based outside of his home. Though region is an admittedly 
imprecise proxy for ethnic affinity, the consistently significant results in the regressions 
indicate that the region variable is picking up a genuine factor influencing church 
opposition.  It is not immediately obvious why presidents from a church’s base region 
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would be more likely to earn the ire of the church.  It is possible that these churches’ 
positions give them privilege access to public forums and political space and therefore 
give them greater opportunities to be critical than are afforded to churches in 
marginalized regions.  It may also be that presidents feel they can rely on the citizens of 
their home regions for support and have less need to court the support of churches in 
these regions. 
Table 5.3 presents a similar set of regressions using a dichotomous dependent 
variable.  This time, however, the modified outcome variable is created by combining the 
neutral and opposition categories of the original trichotomous variable, assigning 0 to 
observations that fall into either of these categories, while continuing to score active 
church support for government as 1.  This is a more specific model of active church 
support as distinct from other forms of church political activity.    The regressions in 
Table 5.3 thus test the specific instances in which churches are vocal in their support for 
governments against all other church political orientations.  Since actively endorsing a 
sitting government could potentially endanger a church’s reputation (as well as its ability 
to draw and maintain members and donations) should that government lose credibility or 
popularity, it is important to understand the circumstances under which a church would 
undertake such an action.  CENTRALIZATION is again significant in these regressions, 
at a higher level than in the initial OLS regressions.  This implies that centralized 
churches, those with a single individual in the top national leadership position, are more 
likely to actively support incumbent governments, consistent with the main argument of 
this dissertation.  As noted earlier, 12 of the 16 observations of active church support in 
the dataset involve centralized churches.  CHURCH SIZE is also positive and statistically  
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Table 5.3 
Political Orientationa 
Coefficients (Std. Errors) 
Variable  (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) Logit (4) Logit  
CENTRALIZATION 5.47  5.51  0.54  -0.71 
   (2.01)** (2.08)** (0.67)  (0.92) 
DENOMINATION  1.47  1.46  0.81  1.23 
     MATCH  (1.27)  (1.27)  (0.62)  (0.70)†  
MUSLIM  -0.73  -0.71  -1.96  -2.76 
     PRESIDENT (2.03)  (2.06)  (0.95)*  (1.17)* 
MARXIST  -2.75  -2.74     
     PRESIDENT (2.19)  (2.19)     
SCHOOLS  2.77  2.74  -0.44  -0.40 
     NATIONALIZED (1.67)†  (1.73)  (0.79)  (0.89) 
DEMOCRACY 0.17  0.17  0.08  0.05 
   (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
REGION MATCH -0.002  0.03  -1.20  -1.66 
   (1.28)  (1.37)  (0.57)*  (0.67)* 
CHURCH SIZE 10.03  10.15     
   (5.42)†  (5.74)†      
LN POPULATION 1.66  1.67     
   (0.74)*  (0.78)*     
LN PER CAPITA -0.19  -0.17  0.54  0.86 
     GDP  (0.88)  (0.94)  (0.35)  (0.42)* 
FOUNDING  -0.79  -0.77     
     FATHER  (1.52)  (1.55)     
CATHOLIC     0.12  -2.66  -4.16 
     CHURCH    (1.75)  (1.44)†  (1.96)* 
 
Decade Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes 
N   86  86  88  88   
Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '** 0.01 '*' 0.05 '†' 0.1 ' ' 1 
aDV=Dichotomous variable =1 if church supports government in church-government, 
and 0 if church is neutral, church is non-partisan, church opposes government or church 
supports opposition.  
 
significant in this set of regressions, which is consistent with the argument that 
governments seek the active cooperation and collaboration with larger churches.  LN 
POPULATION is also positive and significant.  
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4 Church Structure and Political Orientation: A Brief Survey of African Churches 
4.1 Internal Structure and Political Orientation of Catholic Churches The Catholic 
Church has consistently been the largest Christian denomination in Africa, and eight out 
of every nine dyads in the dataset used above involve a national Catholic Church.  The 
Catholic Church’s roles in African politics have been varied, as noted by the mixed 
results on the CATHOLIC variable in the regressions described above. Anecdotes abound 
of national Catholic Churches taking leading roles in political opposition, such as the 
Catholic bishops of Malawi breaking the political silence by criticizing Hastings Banda, 
or the Kenyan Catholic hierarchy taking up the cause against President Moi in the 1990s.  
The Catholic Church has also often served a neutral role, such as mediating between 
conflicting political parties or armed groups.681 In still other cases, the Catholic Church 
has developed close ties to incumbent governments and offered support and legitimacy to 
existing regimes; the Church most notoriously served this role before and even during the 
1994 Rwandan genocide.682  Looking at the Catholic subset of the data, centralized  
Catholic Churches comprise a majority of the Catholic Churches that actively supported 
governments (5/9). Of the four decentralized cases of supportive Catholic churches, three 
of them – Presidents Zafy (1993-1996) and Rajoelina (2009-2011) of Madagascar, and 
Obasanjo (1976-1979) of Nigeria – involved a specific scenario: the Catholic Church 
supporting short-lived or transition governments that had come into office after 
                                                
681 The national Catholic Churches of a number of Francophone countries served in this 
role by volunteering bishops to chair national conferences for political reform during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Gifford, Paul. "Some Recent Developments in African 
Christianity." African Affairs. 1994: 513. 
 
682 Longman, Timothy. Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda. Vol. 112. Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.7, 153, 174. 
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partnering with the Church in political opposition against a previous repressive regime.  
In contrast to the supportive churches, only one third of the Catholic Churches that 
remained neutral (19/57) were centralize, and a mere 16% of those that opposed the 
government (6/37) were centralized churches. While this obviously shows that 
centralization is not a sufficient condition for church support, it seems to be almost a 
necessary condition outside of very specific political conditions. 
4.2 Internal Structure and Political Orientation of Orthodox Churches 
Meanwhile, the non-Catholic Churches were uniformly centralized, and tended to 
be supportive and rarely oppositional.  In only 14 observations, covering 7 denominations 
in 7 countries, was a non-Catholic Church the largest denomination.  Seven of these 
fourteen cases feature active church support for the government, and only one of these 
cases (the Egyptian Coptic Church under President Anwar Sadat) feature church 
opposition, as will be discussed below.  Nearly half of the fourteen non-Catholic 
observations involve churches belonging to the branch of Christianity known as Oriental 
Orthodox: the Ethiopian Orthodox Church under Presidents Menghistu and Meles; the 
Eritrean Orthodox Church under President Afewerki; and the (Egyptian) Coptic Orthodox 
Church under presidents Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. The second category of non-
Catholic churches in the data include two denominations with largely African origins and 
leadership: The Zion Christian Church (ZCC), which has been the largest South African 
denomination under Presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma; and the Zimbabwe 
Assemblies of God Africa (ZOAGA), which has been the largest church of the 
presidency of Robert Mugabe.  The ZCC, the largest of the various African-Initiated 
Churches that cover southern Africa, gained political notoriety during the Apartheid era 
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for remaining neutral to the political situation and publicly maintaining friendly 
relationships with the white-dominated governments.683  The Zimbabwe Assemblies of 
God Africa has its roots in the works of South African and Western missionaries to 
Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), but has essentially operated as an African initiated church 
since the ZOAGA group and its charismatic leader, Ezekiel Guti, were kicked out of the 
last of its missionary parent groups in 1967.684  The third group of non-Catholic churches 
are missionary-derived Protestant denominations: the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
Namibia (ELCIN), which grew out of a Finnish mission to the north of the country, and 
the Botswana branch of the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa (UCCSA), 
a denomination which traces its origins to the London Missionary Society and currently 
spans five countries in southern Africa.685 
The Orthodox Churches were heavily supportive of the government.  In 4 of the 6  
Orthodox dyads, the church was actively supportive of the government in power.  In one 
case, the Eritrean Orthodox Church under President Afewerki, the Church has remained 
politically neutral.  In only one instance, the Egyptian Coptic Church under President 
Sadat, did the Church leadership publicly break with the government.  Examining the 
                                                
683 For example, on more than one occasion, the president of South Africa was invited to 
participate in the ZCC’s holiest event, an annual Easter pilgrimage to the Church’s 
headquarters in Moria. Anderson, Allan H. "The Lekganyanes and Prophecy in the Zion 
Christian Church." Journal of Religion in Africa (1999): 292-294. 
 
684 Guti’s group was expelled from the South African-based Apostolic Faith Mission in 
1959, and joined the Canadian Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada mission, only to be 
expelled from the latter in 1967. 
 
685 Ejikeme, Anene. Culture and Customs of Namibia. ABC-CLIO, 2011: 42;  Benedetto, 
Robert, and Donald K. McKim. Historical Dictionary of the Reformed Churches. Vol. 
99. Scarecrow Press, 2009. 
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internal organization of the Orthodox churches and the history of church-state relations in 
these countries, it is clear that the Orthodox Church structures influence the political 
stances of the churches by allowing the government to coopt or coerce the churches’ top 
leader.  Like the Catholic and Anglican churches, the Orthodox churches operate 
according to an “episcopal” structure, in which religious authority is vested in individual 
clergy organized in a hierarchical structure of archbishops, bishops and priests.  At the 
head of each national Orthodox Church is a single Patriarch who is generally selected for 
life to lead the church.  The office of Patriarch thus creates a single official with whom 
governments can negotiate, and who can be targeted by the government for rewards or 
punishments based on his political stances.  Furthermore, because the Orthodox churches 
are not part of a larger transnational body like the Catholic Church, governments have 
greater opportunity to manipulate the selection or tenure of Patriarchs, who have no 
religious superiors to whom they must report.  
In all three countries, governments have intervened in choosing the leadership of 
the Orthodox Church. The Egyptian Coptic Patriarch is selected at random from a group 
of three candidates chosen by an electoral body comprising various bishops and lay 
representatives of the Church.686 This procedure was not an ancient tradition of the 
Church; rather it was initiated in 1957 by the Nasser regime after the government had 
deposed the sitting Patriarch, whose old age and ineffectual leadership had created 
violent divisions within the Coptic Church.687 Although the candidate selection procedure 
                                                
686 O'Mahony, Anthony, and Emma Loosley, eds. Eastern Christianity in the Modern 
Middle East. Routledge, 2009: 74. 
 
687 Pennington, J. D. "The Copts in modern Egypt." Middle Eastern Studies 18.2 (1982): 
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is representative and thus reflects the desires of the Coptic membership and clergy, once 
the Patriarch is elected, he cannot be removed from office by the Church, limiting the 
degree to which he is accountable to the membership or subordinate clergy. 688 In theory, 
the Patriarch has to take into account the advice of a lay council called the majlis al-milli, 
but in practice this body has grown weaker vis-à-vis the Patriarch since Nasser’s time in 
office.689  Although the government generally does not interfere with the Patriarch, it can 
remove its recognition of the Patriarch.690 The one substantial instance of an Orthodox 
Church clashing with a government demonstrates this option. Relations between 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Coptic Patriarch Shenouda III, who came to power 
one year apart (1970 and 1971, respectively), were initially cordial.  This relationship 
soured when Sadat chose to ally himself with more Islamist elements within Egypt, 
marginalizing Christians and doing little to curtail violence against members of the 
Coptic Church.  Shenouda publicly broke with the government, and Sadat responded by 
stripping the Patriarch of his responsibilities and exiling him to a remote monastery, 
where he remained until several years into the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, Sadat’s 
Vice-President who assumed power upon Sadat’s assassination in 1981.691 Despite 
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Mubarak’s apparent hostility toward Shenouda during the former’s time as Vice 
President, Mubarak restored the Patriarch to his previous authority within the Coptic 
Church in 1985.692 Though the details behind Mubarak’s decision have not been 
publicized, Shenouda responded to his release with an immediate statement of support for 
Mubarak and became a strong supporter of the regime; in one prominent example, 
Shenouda called upon Coptic Christians to vote for Mubarak in the 2005 presidential 
election and ordered the Church’s bishops to vote for the sitting President.693   
The various Ethiopian governments have been even more interventionist in the 
Patriarchy of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC). In 1959, the Egyptian Coptic 
Church, granted autocephaly (independence) to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, which 
had previously been subordinate to the Coptic Church.694  When the 1974 Ethiopian 
revolution deposed Emperor Haile Selassie, who had maintained a very close relationship 
with the Orthodox Church as the official state church, the Marxist Derg regime soon 
deposed, and secretly executed, the sitting Ethiopian Patriarch as well, replacing him with 
more cooperative clergy.695  When the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic 
                                                
692 Ibid. 
 
693 Tadros 2009: 275-277, 285 fn 40. 
 
694 Angold, Michael, ed. The Cambridge History of Christianity: Volume 5, Eastern 
Christianity. Vol. 5. Cambridge University Press, 2006: 486. 
 
695 Haustein, Jörg, and Terje Østebø. "EPRDF's Revolutionary Democracy and Religious 
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Front (EPRDF) overthrew the Derg government in 1991, the new regime likewise 
deposed the sitting Orthodox Patriarch and replaced him with a supporter of the new 
government.696  
Shortly after these events, Eritrea peacefully seceded from Ethiopia under the rule 
of Isaias Afewerki, with the Eritrean branch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church soon 
becoming an independent denomination.  The Eritrean government has kept strict control 
over religious organizations within the country; the Eritrean Orthodox Church is one of 
only four religious organizations officially permitted to operate.697  The Patriarchs of the 
Eritrean Orthodox Church have generally refrained from criticizing or opposing the 
repressive regime.  When one Patriarch confronted the government over interference, he 
was stripped of his authority, placed under house arrest, and ultimately replaced by a new 
Patriarch under government supervision.698 
4.2.1 Internal Structure and Political Orientation of Orthodox Churches in 
Comparative Perspective 
To see how church structure is influencing political activity in these three 
countries, it is useful to compare the Orthodox churches to the smaller Catholic churches 
in each nation. The Orthodox and Catholic churches operate along similar episcopal 
church structures, but the Catholic Church is part of a larger, transnational organization 
that appoints the leading clergy (bishops and archbishops) in each country, limiting the 
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ability of national governments to influence the selection of leaders. Because these 
Catholic churches are smaller than their Orthodox counterparts in each country, these 
Catholic churches were not included in the quantitative dataset, and thus represent out of 
sample cases. 
The small Egyptian Catholic Church (approximately 0.4% of the population in 
2000) is extremely fragmented699. While the vast majority of Catholics belong to the 
branch of Catholicism known as Latin Rites, this branch represents one of seven distinct 
forms of Catholicism operating within Egypt and possessing parallel hierarchies.700 The 
Egyptian Catholic Church has not had much involvement in the politics of the country.  
In Ethiopia, the Catholic Church was centralized, with the various dioceses in the country 
supervised by the Archdiocese of Addis Abeba. For most of the duration of the Derg 
government, the Archbishop of Addis Abeba was Paulos Tzadua, who was appointed by 
the Vatican in 1977 and retired in 1998.  Although some Catholic Church facilities were 
expropriated by the Derg government, Archbishop Tzadua assured international relief 
workers that the government did not unduly interfere in Church activities.701 Archbishop 
Tzadua, shortly after his elevation to Cardinal in 1985, described the relationship with the 
Derg government as “respectful distance,” noting that “’the status quo is good. We're 
carrying out our activities freely.’”702 In Eritrea, the Catholic Church remains relatively 
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decentralized compared to the Ethiopian Catholic Church, though not as decentralized as 
the Egyptian Catholic Church.  Eritrea contains four Catholic eparchies (dioceses), each 
headed by a bishop.  These four bishops are of equal rank within the Church, having no 
authority over one another and all falling under the oversight of the Archeparchy 
(Archdiocese) of Addis Abeba, Ethiopia.703  The decentralized structure of the Catholic 
Church within Eritrea and its links to a transnational hierarchy have limited the ability of 
the Eritrean government to coopt this Church.  The Eritrean Catholic Church has 
therefore been more outspoken than its Orthodox counterpart, including issuing 
somewhat critical pastoral letters in 2001 and 2014.704 Though the Eritrean government 
has censured the Catholic Church, banning its 2001 letter, there is no one official for the 
government to target with sanctions or inducements, and the government has not risked 
the ire of the worldwide Catholic Church by directly punishing the Catholic bishops, a 
marked difference from the treatment of the Orthodox hierarchy.705   
In short, when compared to the manipulations of the Orthodox Churches, the 
governments of these three countries have exercised much less interference in the 
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hierarchies of their nations’ Catholic Churches, which are appointed from above and 
answerable to the Vatican.  The Catholic leadership of these countries has thus been 
allowed to exhibit exogenously determined variation in the degree to which they are 
centralized, with the expected correlation between centralization and relations with 
government.  The Ethiopian Catholic Church has been the most centralized of the three, 
and has had cordial if not particularly close relations with even the atheistic Derg 
government.  In contrast, the decentralized Eritrean Catholic Church has been critical of 
the government, which is especially noteworthy given the generalized repression of 
dissent that exists within the country. 
4.3 Internal Structure and Political Orientation of African Initiated and Protestant 
Churches 
The African-founded denominations, the Zion Christian Church of South Africa 
and the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa, are even more centralized and less 
accountable in their leadership than the Orthodox Churches.  The ZCC has been led by its 
founding Bishop, Ezekiel Guti, since the Church’s founding in 1924.  In the decades 
since the Church’s founding, Guti’s statute has increased, as he has established 
international patronage networks that allow him to dominate the administration within the 
Church and developed a cult of personality around himself.706 As Guti’s Church grew 
through aggressive evangelization tactics to become the largest denomination in the 
country, the ZAOGA distanced itself from the independence struggle of the 1970s.  
When white rule ended and Robert Mugabe assumed power, the new ZANU-PF 
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government was initially hostile toward the ZAOGA.  Although ZAOGA initially tried to 
ingratiate itself to the new government by cooperating in various development projects, 
ZANU-PF viewed the Church’s size and organization as a threat to the ruling party’s 
dominance, which was exacerbated by the fact that Guti, and the people he placed in 
positions of authority around him, were members of the Ndau ethnic group, who were the 
base of support for a rival faction of ZANU.707  
In the 1990s, however, as the government struggled with various economic and 
political problems within the country and found itself criticized by mainline 
denominations like the Catholic Church, ZANU-PF and ZAOGA established a mutually 
beneficial relationship of reciprocal support.  The Church gave Mugabe and other high-
ranking ZANU-PF officials platforms to engage in political campaigning and allowed the 
President to shed his former Marxist ideology in favor of a born-again Christian image.  
The Church also publicly supported Mugabe by proving moral backing for the 
President’s homophobic and sexist comments, and Guti himself has told his church that 
“‘every church leader must support the Government and pray for the Government.’”708  
In exchange for the Church’s support, the government provided support for the ZAOGA 
and particularly for its Archbishop.  Mugabe used his authority to convince Kenyan 
President Moi to allow the ZAOGA to expand to Kenya, as well as providing Guti the 
opportunity to personally preach his message in China.709  Mugabe appointed Guti as one 
of the 395 delegates tasked with rewriting Zimbabwe’s Constitution in 1999, placing the 
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ZAOGA leader alongside his counterparts from other denominations such as the Catholic 
Church who also sat on the commission.710  Guti has touted his personal access to 
President Mugabe as a way of further strengthening the church leader’s authority and 
prestige within the ZAOGA.  The Church’s centralized, authoritarian leadership, centered 
on the person of Ezekiel Guti, made it relatively easy for the government to target Guti 
with beneficial policies as a successful tactic for coopting Guti’s denomination into the 
ruling party infrastructure.  
The Zion Christian Church (ZCC) of South Africa has had a similarly 
concentrated and personalistic leadership.  The church was initially dominated by its 
founding prophet, Engenas Lekganyane, who emerged from Pentecostal movements 
within South Africa to start his own religious movement, and leadership has past through 
inheritance to the founder’s son, Edward, and then to Edward’s son, Barnabas; the latter 
was only twelve years old when he inherited the title of “holy prophet” from his father.711  
The elder Lekganyane based his authority on supernatural abilities, mainly the power to 
heal the sick, an ability that he insisted flowed through him alone and could not be 
independently practiced by other leaders within the church.712 Lekganyane also claimed 
to be able to predict the future.713 Though Edward and Barnabas placed less emphasis on 
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charismatic gifts such as healing, they were still viewed by their followers as having 
inherited from the founder special supernatural powers and direct access to God. 
The Church’s growth, from a few hundred followers to millions, has led various 
government officials to seek the denominations support. Like the ZAOGA in white-
dominated Rhodesia, the ZCC refused to join other black-led denominations in opposing 
white rule in apartheid-era South Africa.  Indeed, the ZCC maintained good relations 
with various South African National Party governments, including inviting various 
political figures to the Church’s Easter celebrations.714  Due to their command of the 
millions of ZCC followers, the Lekganyanes have become powerbrokers within South 
Africa, with various politicians attempting to win the Church’s endorsement.  In 1992, for 
example, the leaders of all three major parties in South Africa (Nelson Mandela, F.W. de 
Klerk and Mangasuthu Buthelez) all accepted the Bishop’s invitation to attend the ZCC’s 
Easter celebration.715  President P.W. Botha had previously been a guest at one of the 
Church’s Easter services, and the Mandela and Mbeki governments valued the friendly 
relations they enjoyed with the ZCC. 
The mainline protestant churches in this sample were also centralized, placing 
national-level authority in a single individual.  The leaders of these churches, however, 
faced greater accountability than their counterparts in the denominations discussed above, 
with regular turnover in their leadership.  The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia 
(ELCIN), by far the largest of three separate Lutheran denominations operating in 
Namibia, emerged from the work of Finnish Lutheran missionaries among the Ovambo 
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and Kavango people in Namibia.  The ELCIN partnered with the South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) during the struggle for Namibian independence from 
South Africa. After SWAPO became the ruling party of Namibia at independence in 
1990, the ELCIN reportedly maintained good relations with the government.  This 
impression is largely based on the inaction of the denomination rather than its actions – 
those criticizing the ELCIN point to its failure to criticize the government more than to 
positive statements or actions performed by the church.  The cordial relationship mainly 
remained after founding Namibian President Sam Nujoma was succeeded by Hifikepunye 
Pohamba, although the ELCIN leadership took a few actions to distance itself from 
explicitly supporting SWAPO.716 The Botswana Synod of the United Congregational 
Church of Southern Africa (UCCSA) is the largest church in that country.  In the 1990s, 
the UCCSA and several other major denominations in the country “tended to be implicit 
supporters of the government.”717 
In short, the non-Catholic churches in my dataset all feature centralized 
leadership, which has facilitated at least cordial relationships with their governments.  For 
the highly centralized and hierarchical Orthodox Churches, their structure has allowed for 
significant cooptation and control of their top leaders by a succession of diverse 
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governments.  The African initiated churches display leadership centered on the 
churches’ founder or his descendents.  This dynastic leadership structure does not allow 
governments to choose the churches’ leaders, but it does present clear targets for 
government cooptation.  In contrast, the mainline Protestant churches are less 
authoritarian in their leadership structures, and thus their good relations with their 
respective governments have taken the form of friendly coexistence rather than active 
cooptation. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The main contribution of this dissertation is to establish that internal 
organizational structure matters for understanding organizations’ political activities, even 
when examining highly ideological organizations such as churches. This significance of 
organizational features such as leadership centralization, internal democracy and 
accountability mechanisms is evident in the qualitative case studies of churches in Kenya, 
the quantitative analyses of church political orientation across Africa, and the brief 
qualitative vignettes of churches contained in the quantitative data sets.  Furthermore, the 
impact of organizational structure is not only significant but also substantial, even taking 
into account factors such as ethnicity and religion that have previously been identified as 
paramount to political calculation in Africa and elsewhere. Thus we see the Kikuyu 
dominated Presbyterian Church of Kenya maintaining friendly relationships with the Moi 
government even as the Kikuyu are being largely marginalized from Kenyan politics.  
Similarly as discussed above, we observe the leaders of the Egyptian Coptic church 
actively supporting the authoritarian Muslim president of Egypt, and the dynastic 
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leadership of the Zion Christian Church maintaining equally friendly relations with 
apartheid era rulers and post-apartheid ANC presidents alike.   
Additionally, the evidence suggests that governments realize that structure 
matters. This has been evident in the histories of political and economic actors such as 
labor unions, as has been well-documented in the literature on corporatism, for example. 
By demonstrating that these structural factors have political impact even for religious 
organizations, as well as showing that governments both seem to realize this and 
strategically employ this knowledge in their relations with churches, this dissertation 
shows the widespread importance of structural factors in understanding the relationships 
between governments and non governmental actors more generally.  When governments 
can manipulate the internal structures of organizations, they do so in ways that increase 
the centralization and hierarchal nature of the organizations in order to make them easier 
to control, as seen, for example, throughout the history of the various Orthodox churches 
in Africa. When confronted with existing hierarchal and centralized organizations, 
governments seek to coopt or otherwise develop mutually advantageous relationships 
with these organization’s leaders and may even interfere with the leadership selection 
process in order to place friendly individuals atop the existing organizational hierarchy. 
And when faced with multiple organizations that vary in their internal structure, as has 
been the case for Kenyan governments interacting with Christian churches, governments 
will strategically choose which organizations to engage or target for cooptation.  
Furthermore, while internal structure has a significant impact on political 
activities by shaping interactions between organizations and governments, the specific 
preferences of these actors also matter.  This dissertation has therefore detailed the 
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preferences of both churches and governments in greater detail than existing works in 
order to better understand church-state relations.  By examining African churches in 
particular, this study expands the social and geographical scope of the political economy 
of religion literature, exploring how churches and governments interact outside of 
relatively well-studied regions such as Western Europe and the Americas. 
These insights are important for a number of reasons. For scholars of religion, 
particularly those who examine religious actors from a rationalist perspective, this study 
advances our understanding of how such actor’s preferences are translated into actions. 
For religious practitioners, this study demonstrates ways in which secular factors interact 
with and sometimes even overwhelm, religious motivation. Finally, this study is valuable 
for those who care about civil society, either as a topic of scholarship or as a normatively 
important actor in political life.  For societies that are developed or developing, 
economically and politically, the impact of organization’s internal structure on 
interactions with government is important for the ability of organizations to successfully 
lobby or negotiate the government.  Additionally, for nations struggling with economic 
and political development, identifying the mechanisms by which governments coopt civil 
society organizations is an important scholarly pursuit and can help civil society actors 
structure their organizations in ways that allow them to remain independent. Future 
research can further explore the mechanisms I have identified for Christian churches and 
other religious actors, as well as for various secular civil society organizations.  And for 
practitioners – members of religious organizations, human rights activists, labor 
unionists, and many others – this research will be useful as they develop strategies and 
tactics for pursuing their various political and societal goals. 
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Appendix 1: Kenyan Church Profiles 
Catholic Church. The Catholic Church made initial contact with Kenya as early as 1498, 
and has had a significant missionary presence in the country since 1889.718  The church is 
present throughout the country and currently estimates over 8 million members.719 The 
Catholic Church in Kenya, as in the rest of the world, is organized based on an Episcopal 
structure.720  This is a hierarchical system under which local bodies of believers (called 
parishes in Catholicism) are subordinate to larger units known as dioceses.  Individual 
dioceses are under the supervision of an archdiocese, and the entire worldwide structure 
is government from the Vatican.  Each subordinate unit is governed by a single ordained 
individual who is appointed from above and enjoy near-lifetime appointments721 – parish 
priests, bishops, archbishops.  The top official in the entire church is the Pope, who upon 
                                                
718 Baur, John. The Catholic Church in Kenya: A Centenary History. St. Paul 
Publications. 1990. 25. 
 
719 Historical information and current membership data from the Kenya Episcopal 
Conference website, http://www.kec.or.ke . 
 
720 There are generally three ideal types of church polity: Episcopal, Presbyterian, and 
Congregational.  These structures differ in the concentration or diffusion of authority 
within each level of church administration. Episcopal churches (such as the Catholic, 
Anglican and Orthodox denominations) place leadership and decision-making authority 
within single individuals: the local church unit, a parish, is headed by a priest; various 
parishes collectively form a diocese, lead by a bishop; and the dioceses of a country are 
grouped under one or more archdioceses, each administered by an archbishop.  In the 
Presbyterian model, at each level of administration, authority rests with a representative 
body (this body often holding the name “presbytery”), culminating in a General 
Assembly or similar national legislative body.  In the Congregational model, local 
decision-making authority rests within the entire membership of the local congregation, 
who generally make decisions based on some form of democratic procedure. Though 
individual congregations may elect officials to represent them in regional or national 
bodies, decisions made at these higher levels are generally not binding at the local level. 
 
721 Diocesan bishops, for example, are required by Roman Catholic Church Canon Law 
401 to resign at age 75 or if he is rendered unfit for service by ill health or another reason. 
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the death of the previous Pope is elected by a two-thirds majority vote of the College of 
Cardinals, a subset of the Church’s Bishops.   
The Second Vatican Council (1965-1967) of the worldwide Catholic Church 
made various  reforms that increased the role of the church in politics, including the 
establishment of national Episcopal Conferences made up of the Catholic bishops of 
individual countries. 722  An Episcopal Conference was to meet in a Plenary Assembly, 
choose conference leaders from among the Bishops themselves and collectively decide 
on the church’s stance concerning issues within the country.723  The Catholic Church of 
Kenya adopted this organizational model, thus injecting a “relatively democratic” system 
of decision-making (among the Bishops at least) in an otherwise hierarchical system.724  
The hierarchy in Kenya itself was decentralized in 1990 when the Dioceses of Mombasa, 
Nyeri and Kisumu were elevated to the status of Archdioceses.  No longer under the 
supervision of Nairobi, these new units would operate autonomously of one another and 
each have supervision over several dioceses in the country.   
 
Anglican Church of Kenya. Founded in 1844 by the British Church Missionary Society 
(CMS), the Anglican Church also maintains a significant presence throughout the 
country, though smaller compared to the Catholics.  Total membership today is almost 2 
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million.725 The church is organized along an Episcopal model similar to that of the 
Catholic Church, but with a few important differences that decrease the hierarchical and 
undemocratic implications of this polity.  First, bishops are chosen within a diocese by 
election by the synod (governing council) of the diocese, though elected bishops must be 
approved by the national leadership.  Second, bishops enjoy considerable autonomy.  The 
Anglican Archbishop does not govern the country’s bishops, but serves as a first among 
equals.  Technically, the highest level of governance in the Anglican Church of Kenya 
rests with the Provincial Synod, made up of elected representatives of the various 
dioceses, and the House of Bishops, but in practice most decisions and actions are 
decided at the diocesan level.726  
 
Africa Inland Church (AIC).  Founded by American missionaries in 1895, the AIC now 
operates as an independent church not subordinated to or affiliated with any 
denomination outside of Kenya, though it does still retain financial and personnel ties 
with the Africa Inland Mission.  The church does not identify with a particular 
denomination outside of the country, but its governing structure operates according to the 
Presbyterian model.  The leading official of the church is a Presiding Bishop, who is 
elected by the Church’s ordained pastors for a term of 5 years. 
 
                                                
725 Though the official ACK website gives a membership figure of 5 million, the sum of 
estimated members of each diocese, gathered from the website and personal interviews, 
gives a figure of 1.7 million 
 
726 Sabar2002: 12-14, 295. 
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Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA).  The Church of Scotland Mission (CSM) 
landed in Kenya in 1891 and began the PCEA (which also contains a few congregations 
in Uganda and Tanzania).  It remains most concentrated in central Kenya. As its name 
suggests, the PCEA operates according to a Presbyterian polity.  This is similar to an 
Episcopal structure, except that at each administrative level (parish, presbytery, national), 
authority rests with a governing board instead of a single individual. Membership in each 
board comes from representatives of the level of administration immediately lower. The 
highest decision-making power in the church is the General Assembly, made up of 
representatives from the country’s various presbyteries.  The top official for the church, 
the Moderator, is elected by two-thirds vote of the General Assembly for a 3-year term, 
once renewable.  Since the position of Moderator was established in its current form in 
1961, every person holding the office has served two terms.  The church remains heavily 
concentrated among the GEMA727 ethnic groups. 
 
Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA).  Founded in the region surrounding Lake Nyanza, the 
SDA church still draws around half of its membership from this region, which is home to 
groups such as the Luo and Luhya.  The Adventist Church is an international 
organization with a worldwide leadership structure, leading up to its world headquarters 
in Silver Spring, Maryland.  The church is known for being very bureaucratic in its 
leadership and organizational structure.728  Leadership selection is mixed between 
                                                
727 The umbrella term for three related ethnic groups, the G(K)ikuyu, Embu and Meru.   
 
728 Nyaundi, Nehemiah. Religion and Social Change: A Sociological Study of Seventh-
Day Adventism in Kenya. Lund University Press. 1993: 250. 
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elections at the various administrative levels and appointments from above.  The top 
official in Kenya, the Executive Director, is appointed from above. The Adventist Church 
is notable because of its extensive extra-biblical beliefs and regulations, largely based on 
the teachings of founding Adventist Ellen G. White and detailed in a Church Manual 
updated periodically by the Church.  One relevant belief of Adventists is separation from 
secular government.  “Due to the official adventist view of church and state, its 
relationship to the state in Kenya is a distant one, being neither openly friendly nor 
openly hostile”, but as of the 1980s “the gap between adventists and the state [was] 
narrowing.”729 
 
                                                
729 Nyaundi 1993: 208. 
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